creative commons
COMMONS DEED

저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:

저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.

비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.

변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 이용허락규약(Legal Code)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

Disclaimer

dCollection

국제학박사학위논문

The Alliance Politics of Role-Playing:

Intra-alliance Conflicts within the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan Alliances during the First and Second Gulf War

역할수행의 동맹정치:

제 1, 2 차 걸프전 당시 한-미, 미-일동맹 내부의 갈등에 대한 연구

2015년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

양 희 용

The Alliance Politics of Role-Playing:

Intra-alliance Conflicts within the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan Alliances during the First and Second Gulf War

by

Hee-Yong Yang

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of Graduate School of International Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in International Studies

Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

February 2015

The Alliance Politics of Role-Playing:
Intra-alliance Conflicts within the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan Alliances during the First and Second Gulf War

역할수행의 동맹정치:
제 1, 2 차 걸프전 당시 한-미, 미-일동맹 내부의 갈등에 대한 연구

지도교수 신 성 호

이 논문을 국제학박사 학위논문으로 제출함

2014년 10월

서울대학교 국제대학원 국제학과

양 희 용

양희용의 국제학박사 학위논문을 인준함

2014년 12월

위 원 장 이 근 (인)

부 위 원 장 김 태 균 (인)

위 원 김 박 영 준 (인)

위 원 김 기 주 (인)

위 원 신 성 호 (인)

THESIS ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, appointed by

The Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

Have examined the thesis entitled

The Alliance Politics of Role-Playing:

Intra-alliance Conflicts within the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan Alliances during the First and Second Gulf War

Presented by **Hee-Yong Yang**,
Candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Studies, and hereby certify that the examined thesis is worthy of acceptance:

Committee Chair — Lee, Geun

Committee Vice Chair — Kim, Taekyoon

Committee Member — Park, Young-June

Committee Member — Kim, Ki-Joo

Thesis Adviser — Sheen, Seong-Ho

Date: December 2014

ABSTRACT

This research is an attempt to analytically explain alliance conflicts in the U.S. bilateral security alliances in East Asia. During the first and second Gulf War, despite substantial diplomatic, military, and economic contributions made by South Korea and Japan, the U.S. was frustrated by allies' commitments, and bilateral relations were strained and damaged. Existing alliance theories based on realist school of thought or economic theory of alliance cannot provide sufficient explanations for this U.S. alliance management behavior. The main analytical task of this research is to examine the conditions that influence the U.S. alliance management behavior vis-à-vis its bilateral security partners in East Asia—South Korea and Japan.

This research applies K.J. Holsti's national role conception argument to bilateral security alliances and presents a role-based framework to explain fluctuating relations between the U.S. and its bilateral allies. The framework was designed to describe intra-alliance dynamics in asymmetric bilateral alliance with a particular focus on the role conceptions by national policymakers as major determinants of inter-alliance behavior. According to the role-based approach, the inter-alliance behavior is determined by the relations between the role prescription—national role that the U.S. policymakers prescribe to its alliance partners—and the role performances—contributions to the U.S.-led coalition—based on role conception by alliance partners. The convergence of the role conceptions by the U.S. and its allies would contribute to cozy relations, and the divergence of role conceptions would result in conflict or, at worst, breakup of an alliance.

Empirical analysis demonstrates that the U.S. alliance behavior—U.S. response to allies' contribution—can be explained by the framework based on the security role conception. In the Persian Gulf War, while there was a convergence of role conceptions between South Korea and the U.S., the U.S.-Japan relations was marked by a divergence of role conceptions. Seeking refugee behind the peace constitution, Japanese

policymakers was indecisive and reactive to the U.S. call for support, leaving an impression that Japan is a free-rider. Meanwhile, during the Iraq War in 2003, the security role conceptions between South Korea and the U.S. diverged, largely thanks to South Korea's demographic and generational change and increasing demand for self-reliance. South Korean policymakers deferred the decision to make force commitment and attempted to use the troop deployment as a tool to gain U.S. consent on the engagement policy toward Pyongyang. In contrast, Japan's response was proactive. Japanese policymakers pledged unconditional support. Under the top-down leadership of the Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan enacted a series of laws that enabled the dispatch of SDFs to the Indian Ocean and provided substantial diplomatic, economic, and military support for the U.S. efforts in Iraq.

The role-based approach to bilateral alliance has important implications. This research finds that change in national role conception is contingent upon both external and internal circumstances and that, more importantly, the change occurs as a result of close interplay between external pressure and internal factors. In that way, the role-based approach can provide a framework to understand alliance transformation in more analytical fashion. While the Sino-U.S. power struggle is underway, the research also points out the geostrategic implications of the changing U.S. role prescriptions vis-à-vis its alliance partners in East Asia.

……

Keywords: Role Theory, ROK-U.S. alliance, U.S.-Japan alliance, Gulf War, Iraq War, Security Burden Sharing.

Student Number: 2011-30832

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT i
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vii
LIST OF TABLES viii
LIST OF FIGURES ix
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1
1. Intra-Alliance Conflict in Bilateral Security Groupings 1
2. Proposal of Discussion 6
(1) Background and Context 6
(2) Puzzling Observations 11
(3) Objectives 13
3. Limitations of Previous Studies 15
(1) Limitations of Alliance Security Dilemma and Asymmetric Alliance Argument 17
(2) Limitations of Collective Action Argument 23
(3) Filling Gaps in the Alliance Literature to Explain Intra-Alliance Conflict 27
4. Research Questions and Case Selection 30
(1) Research Questions 30
(2) Case Selection 31
5. Research Structure 33
CHAPTER II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 36
1. Level of Analysis 36
(1) IR Theories and Levels of Analysis 37
(2) Dyadic-level Analysis 41
(3) Building an Analytical Framework based on Dyadic-level Analysis 46
2. Role Theory 48

(1) Finding an Alternative Approach and Holsti's Role Theory 48
(2) Key Concepts and Role Types 51
(3) Critical Review of Holsti's Arguments 55
3. Analytical Framework 57
(1) A Role-based Approach to Intra-alliance Conflicts 57
(2) Assumptions and Propositions 61
(3) Research Methodology 67
CHAPTER III. POST-COLD WAR ROLE ENACTMENT AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 70
1. Post-Cold War U.S. Security Strategy and Realignment of Defense Posture 70
(1) Coming to Terms with the Sudden End of the Cold War Rivalry 70
(2) U.S. Role Enactment: Searching for the Post-Cold War Grand Strategy 74
(3) Post-Cold War U.S. Defense Posture Realignment 77
2. Post-Cold War U.S. Security Strategy for North East Asia 87
(1) Review of U.S. National Security Strategy towards South Korea and Japan 88
(2) The Post-Cold War U.S. Defense Posture Realignment in East Asia 93
(3) Post-Cold War Military Balance in East Asia 102
3. Post-Cold War ROK-U.S. Alliance Management 108
(1) Dyadic Relations and South Korea's Role Conceptions 109
(2) *Nordpolitik* 115
4. Post-Cold War U.S.-Japan Alliance Management 123
(1) Dyadic Relations and Japan' Role Conceptions 124
(2) U.S.-Japan Trade Disputes 132
CHAPTER IV. 1991 GULF WAR AND ALLIANCE ROLE PERFORMANCES 140
1. Gulf War and Coalition Support 140
(1) Overview 140
(2) U.S. Call for Support 142
2. South Korea's Role Performance and U.S. Response 148

(1) Gulf War and ROK-US Alliance Burden Sharing 148
(2) Summary and Analysis 153
3. Japan's Role Performance and U.S. Response 156
(1) Gulf War and U.S.-Japan Alliance Burden Sharing 156
(2) Summary and Analysis 169
CHAPTER V. POST-GULF WAR ROLE ENACTMENT AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 174
1. U.S. Security Strategy toward Northeast Asia 174
(1) Post-Gulf War U.S. National Security Strategy 174
(2) U.S. Security Strategy toward North East Asia 178
2. ROK-U.S. Alliance Management 186
(1) Democratization and South Korea's Role Conceptions 186
(2) North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Growing Divergence in Remedy 199
(3) Summary 214
3. The U.S.-Japan Alliance Management 218
(1) Japan's Search for New Security Role after the Persian Gulf War 218
(2) Japan's Security Role Conceptions 223
(3) Summary 231
CHAPTER VI. 2003 IRAQ WAR AND ALLIANCE ROLE PERFORMANCES 233
1. Iraq War and Coalition Burden Sharing 233
(1) Overview 233
(2) The Formation of the International Coalition 234
2. South Korea's Role Performance and the U.S. Response 236
(1) 1st Deployment (November 2002 - March 2003) 236
(2) 2nd Deployment (September 2003 - March 2004) 242
(3) Analysis and Summary 254
3. Japan's Role Performance and U.S. Response 259
(1) Japan's Initial Response 259
(2) Koizumi's Leadership and Japan's Proactive Support 264

(3) Japan's Assistance to Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations in Iraq 273
(4) Analysis and Summary 277
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION 294
1. Conclusion 294
(1) Overview 294
(2) 1991 Persian Gulf War 299
(3) 2003 Iraq War 301
2. Implications for Research and Policy 307
(1) Research Implications 307
(2) Policy Implications 311
3. Limitations of the Research and Future Research 321
(1) Research Limitations 321
(2) Future Research 323
REFERENCES 325
ABSTRACT IN KOREAN 360
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 363

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFC	Combined Forces Command
DCA	Defense Cooperation Account
DOD	Department of Defense
EASI	East Asia Strategic Initiative
EASR	East Asia Strategic Report
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCFCG	Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group.
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC	National Role Conceptions
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting
SMA	Special Measures Agreement
UNCMAC	United Nations Military Armistice Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USFK	United States Forces in Korea
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

NOTES ON TRANSLATION

Romanization of Korean was made in accordance with the Korean Romanization System of the National Institute of the Korean Language.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Key Concepts in Role Theory 52

Table 2. Holsti's Role Types and Description 54

Table 3. U.S. Role Conceptions of South Korea and Japan 92

Table 4. Phased U.S. Troop Reductions in East Asia 99

Table 5. U.S. Troop Deployments in East Asia (Five-Year Average) 104

Table 6. The East Asian Balance of Power in 1990 105

Table 7. The Composition of U.S. Forces in Japan and South Korea by Service in 1990 107

Table 8. South Korea's Post-Cold War Alliance Role Conceptions 122

Table 9. Japan's Defense Expenditure, 1955-86 130

Table 10. The Japan-U.S. Trade Balance between 1975 and 1986 132

Table 11. Japan's Post-Cold War Alliance Role Conceptions 136

Table 12. Allied Participation in the Multinational Force 144

Table 13. Full Desert Shield/Desert Storm Costs 146

Table 14. Foreign Financial Contributions for the Persian Gulf War ($ in million) 147

Table 15. Review of Plans for Military Contribution 150

Table 16. Plan for Additional Monetary Contribution 151

Table 17. U.S. Role Conceptions of South Korea and Japan 183

Table 18. South Korea's Cost Sharing, 1991-2004 214

Table 19. South Korea's Alliance Role Conceptions 215

Table 20. Japan's Alliance Role Conceptions 232

Table 21. Top 10 Countries with Financial Pledges to the U.S.-led Coalition 235

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Financial Contributions to the Persian Gulf War in 1991 9

Figure 2. The Comparison of Coalition Supports by South Korea and Japan 10

Figure 3. Shares of Military Contributions during the 2003 Iraq War 10

Figure 4. Vertical Drift: Different Levels of Analysis and Major Variables 46

Figure 5. Holsti's National Role Conceptions Model 53

Figure 6. Role Prescription by Alliance Leader 60

Figure 7. Alliance Role Conception Model 62

Figure 8. Dynamics of Intra-alliance Relations in Bilateral Alliances 64

Figure 9. Ally's Contributions and Intra-alliance Relations in a Bilateral Alliance 66

Figure 10. Causal Process of Role-based Approach 69

Figure 11. U.S. Military Spending (1980-2000) 79

Figure 12. U.S. Military Spending (1951-2011) 80

Figure 13. U.S. National Defense Spending as Share of GDP 80

Figure 14. Number of U.S. Troops in Foreign Countries 82

Figure 15. Percent of U.S. Troops Deployed in Foreign Countries 83

Figure 16. U.S. Global Troop Deployments by Region 84

Figure 17. The Post-Cold War US Troop Reductions in East Asia 103

Figure 18. Redefinition of the U.S. Security Role Conceptions towards South Korea and Japan 106

Figure 19. U.S. Federal Budget Surpluses and Deficits (1969-1997) 110

Figure 20. U.S. Trade Deficit (1970-1995) 110

Figure 21. U.S. Economic and Military Aid to South Korea (1946-1995) 111

Figure 22. South Korea's Trade Balance with the U.S. (1965-1995) 113

Figure 23. The Deterioration of the U.S.-Japan Alliance..... 138

Figure 24. South Korea's Contribution to U.S.-led Coalition in 1991..... 152

Figure 25. Role-based Approach to the ROK-U.S. Relations during the Gulf War..... 156

Figure 26. Japan's Contribution to US-led Coalition in 1991..... 167

Figure 27. Role-based Approach to the U.S.-Japan Relations during the Gulf War 173

Figure 28. The Deterioration of the ROK-U.S. Alliance 216

Figure 29. Different Threat Perception and Divergence of Role Conceptions 217

Figure 30. Role-based Approach to the ROK-U.S. Relations during the Gulf War..... 258

Figure 31. Role-based Approach to the U.S.-Japan Relations during the Gulf War 288

Figure 32. Transformation of the U.S. Alliance System..... 306

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

1. Intra-Alliance Conflict in Bilateral Security Groupings

Why do alliance partners come into conflicts? What factors influence the U.S. alliance behavior regarding security commitments made by its bilateral alliance partners? In particular, how do we make sense of the U.S. frustration over South Korea and Japan despite their substantial assistances during the first and second Gulf War? Seeking answers to these questions, this study attempts to examine the conditions that influence the U.S. alliance management behavior vis-à-vis its key bilateral security partners in East Asia—South Korea and Japan.

Alliance is a living organism.[1] Yet, the canons of international relations (IR) literature had exclusively focused on the formation of alliance.[2] Major scholarly interests have been laid on the conditions that determine who allies with whom under what conditions.[3] Relatively little attention has been paid to the intra-alliance dynamics, which include the evolution or transformation of an alliance and rearrangements of

---

[1] For definitions of alliance by scholars, Hans Morgenthau defines alliances as a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multi-state system. George Modelski refers to alliance as one of the dozen or so key terms in international politics. Modelski, George. "The study of alliances." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7-4 (1963): 769-776. Stephen Walt defines alliance in relatively broad sense of term and notes an alliance or alignment is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member's power, security and influence. Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliance*. Cornell University Press, 1987.

[2] Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010; Walt (1987); Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Peace and Power*. New York: Knoph, 1973; Liska, George. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*. Vol. 42. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

[3] Morgenthau, for example, argued that alliance is indispensable to maximize one's chances of survival Morganthau (1960); Walt (1987). In similar vein, George Liska in *Nations in Alliance*, which is often regarded as one of the earliest attempts to provide systematic inquiry into the function of alliance, argued that "a weaker state seeks protection from a stronger state in response to a potential threat while a stronger state tends to act in self-interest of protecting the resources of the weaker states from an adversary." Liska (1968), p. 13.

respective security roles after an alliance is formed. Besides, even when subject area was intra-alliance management after formation, much of the scholarship has concentrated on NATO, a multilateral collective defense system.[4] Despite ample research findings, focus on the multilateral security institution generated a tendency to approach alliance system in an aggregate manner, blurring the distinction between a multilateral security grouping and a bilateral one. This study attempts to enrich alliance literature by addressing these shortcomings.

Finding answers to these questions and filling theoretical gaps are important for both theoretical and practical concerns. First of all, understanding the U.S. alliance behavior and managing discord in alliance bear critical importance for East Asian allies. For South Korea, the 60-year old alliance partnership with the U.S. remains the most salient external security variable that shapes, if not dictate, South Korea's security policy. During the Cold-War rivalry, South Korea's foreign policy behavior and inter-Korean relations were inextricably tied to the U.S. regional security policy. For example, the rise of military regime at the Korean War and rapid industrial success followed by rapid social and industrial advancements cannot be accounted for without reference to the ROK-U.S. security alliance. Further, the ROK-U.S. alliance has undergone both vertical and horizontal expansion. The relations between the two countries have grown beyond security concerns over the Korean peninsula and now covers a wide range of socio-cultural, economic, and political issues. In that regard, the ROK-U.S. security relation has become structurally inherent. Managing the bilateral relation with the U.S. is of paramount importance for South Korea's domestic and foreign policy.

Existing literature on the ROK-U.S. security alliance have limitations in providing a systemic framework to analyze the conditions that affect inter-alliance

[4] A classic study is "collective goods argument" by Olson and Zeckhauser. See Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. "An economic theory of alliances." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* (1966): 266-279. Stephen Walt divided the literature on intra-alliance relations into four main areas: 1) the distribution of burdens within an alliance, 2) alliance cohesion and leadership, 3) twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment, and 4) the impact of norms and institutions on alliance dynamics. See Walt, Stephen M. "Alliances in a unipolar world." *World Politics*, 61-01 (2009): 89-91.

conflicts. Significant scholarly attention has been paid to the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, the vast majority of the studies have approached the issue with historical perspective and revisited major historical events, such as, the post-World War II readjustment of the U.S. military footprints, the Nixon doctrine, the Carter administration's troop reduction plan, and the establishment of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). When the discord in the ROK-U.S. security alliance was addressed seriously, still main focus was to find a breakthrough to avoid security alliance conflicts. Much studies have been done, with few analytical framework to understand alliance conflicts in a systemic way.[5] An analytical tool to explain the alliance discord both in analytical and historical perspective is yet to come.

Then, why is alliance conflict a serious issue? First, alliance function, in principle, is future oriented. Alliances are promises or pledges for future cooperation, particularly in times of security crisis.[6] Despite the dissolution of the Soviet threats, the ROK-U.S. security alliance remained relevant for South Korea's security because South Korea still faces serious security challenges. Mounting regional security threats coming from North Korea and China makes conflict with the U.S. a serious security concern for Seoul. Alliance conflict could result in reserved and circumscribed, though not indifferent, stance of the U.S. in times of North Korean security crisis. At worst, conflict

---

[5] For several meaningful attempts, see Chun, Chae-Sung. "Theoretical Approaches to Alliance: Implications on the ROK-US Alliance." *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Vol.7-2 (2000): 71-88; Lee, C. M. "Reassessing the ROK-US alliance: transformation challenges and the consequences of South Korea's choices." *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 57-2 (2003): 281-307; Kim, Gye-dong. "Reappraisal of the ROK-US Alliance: With the Analytical Framework of the Alliance Theory." *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, 41-2 (2001). For studies that addressed the alliance conflict between South Korea and the U.S., see Shin, Wookhee, "Conflicts in Asymmetric Alliances: Political-Psychological Aspects." *Journal of National Defense Studies*, (2007): 3-31.; Cho, Dong-jun. "Oegyojeongchaekgyeoljeongja simlibunseokui yuyongseong geomto [Examining the utility of psychological factors of foreign policy decision makers]." *Korean Journal of Political and Diplomatic History*, 26-1 (2004): 197-222; Moon, Chang-Geuk. *Hanmigaldeungui Haebu [Analysis of ROK-U.S. Conflict]*. Seoul: Nanam, 1994.

[6] There is wide spread agreement of the assumption that the alliance function is to prepare its members for a future contingency that may or may not occur. Alliance is designed to deter aggressors, to defend in the event of war, or to initiate military action. Glenn Snyder argues that alliances are formal agreements to use military force in specified circumstances. See Snyder, Glenn H. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 4.

could lead to the end of the alliance.[7] Second, without any viable alternative, the weakening, though not complete dismantling, of alliance ties with the U.S. would inevitably entail substantial political and economic costs. Given increasing domestic demand for peace dividend and social welfare, balancing guns and butter would be a difficult challenge for South Korea provided the U.S. security commitment would taper off.

Second, while multilateral alliances are gradually giving way to bilateral alliances, alliance politics in bilateral ties are understudied. So far, studies on alliance politics whether the subject matter is alliance formation and management or burden-sharing have focused on multilateral alliances, most notably the NATO. Therefore, researches on alliance should pay more attention to alliance dynamics in bilateral groupings. Indeed, bilateral security partnership has emerged an important mechanism for security cooperation. Under the purview of "rebalancing" or "pivot to Asia," the U.S. is committed to building new bilateral security partnership or strengthening existing bilateral alliances.

Third, studies on changing U.S. alliance strategy vis-à-vis its South Korea and Japan are becoming increasingly important as China continues to rise toward regional hegemon. While there is no consensus among scholars on future prospects for U.S.-China power rivalry,[8] special attention should be given to the change in U.S. bilateral

---

[7] Walt, Stephen M. "Why alliances endure or collapse." *Survival*, 39-1 (1997): 156-179. The durability of the ROK-U.S. security alliance is exceptional. Only few alliances—the U.S.-Japan alliance and NATO—lasted for more than fifty years. Out of the 112 alliances that formed between 1815 and 1939, the vast majority of them were disintegrated within 10 years. See Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. "Formal alliances, 1815—1939: A Quantitative Description." *Journal of Peace Research*, 3-1 (1966): 1-31.

[8] Studies from "ripe for rivalry" school: Friedberg, A. L. "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia." *International Security*, 18-3 (1993): 5-33; Friedberg, A. L. "The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?." *International Security*, 30-2 (2005): 7-45.; Friedberg, A. L. "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations." *Survival*, 44-1 (2002): 33-50.; Mearsheimer, J. J. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3-4 (2010): 381-396; Mearsheimer, J. J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. WW Norton & Company, 2010; Mearsheimer, J. J. "China's Unpeaceful Rise." *Current History-New York Then Philadelphia, 105*(690) (2006), p. 160; Roy, D. "Hegemon on the Horizon?: China's Threat to East Asian Security." *International Security*, 19-1 (1994): 149-168; Betts, R. K. "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War." *International Security*, 18-3 (1993): 34-77. Studies from

alliance management and its implications for looming power transition. If future course of U.S.-China power competition were to follow the path of U.S.-Soviet Union during the Cold War, whether there would be a war or not would rely on alliance management by the two great powers. With hind sight, direct confrontations between the two parties were rare. Rather, confrontation between U.S. and Soviet Union almost always revolved and escalated around allies or partners of the two parties. For example, strategic rivalry over the sphere of influence in Northeast Asia resulted in a devastating war on the Korean peninsula. In 1962, the most dangerous moment during the Cold War era started with Soviet Union's secret installation of its nuclear missiles in the territory of its strategic ally, Cuba. Even the historic war between Athens and Sparta, according to Thucydides, was ignited by Spartan fear of Athena's growing power and prosperity with the help of its allies.[9] Therefore, if history is any guide, future courses of U.S.-China rivalry would revolve around their alliance managements over Taiwan, the South China Sea, Senkaku/Daioyu islands, or Ieodo, a submerged reef in waters south of Jeju Island, where the U.S. allies and partners and China are at loggerheads over territorial claims.[10] In this respect, when making prospect of U.S. and China power transition, it is important to carefully examine the changing alliance dynamics of the two great powers regarding alliance policies and alliance dependence.

Lastly, the U.S. intra-alliance management behavior surrounding allies' support for the U.S.-led coalition is a central issue because ad-hoc coalition of the willing has emerged as new mechanism of power to address international security challenges. There

---

"ripe for cooperation" school: Ross, R. S. "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century." *International Security*, 23-4 (1999): 81-118; Christensen, T. J. "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia." *International Security*, 23-4 (1999): 49-80.

[9] Thucydides, N. D. *The Peloponnesian War*. Baltimore: Penguin Book, 1954.

[10] In November 2013, China announced the air defense identification zone, prompting criticism from Japan and the US. Some experts said it was aimed not only at confronting Tokyo's control of disputed islands known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, but also at challenging U.S. dominance in the region. In response, the US flew two B-52 bombers over the islands without informing Beijing. "China sends warplanes into disputed airspace over East China Sea." *The Guardian*. November 28, 2013; Perlez, Jane and Martin Fackler. "China Patrols Air Zone over Disputed Islands." *New York Times*, November 28, 2013.

are several reasons behind this trend. First, after the end of the Cold War, UN has actively engaged in collective security and peace keeping operations, and such UN's mission has carried out in the form of ad hoc coalition by the willing states. Second, states without formal military alliance tend to favor coalition because they do not want to bear the cost of maintaining ties security ties and to be bound by formal treaty. Lastly, the U.S. as the sole super power in the world favors coalition. In order to maintain dominance in the new world order, the U.S. has actively engaged in international disputes, and the U.S. preferred coalition in which the U.S. could have more freedom of action and garner necessary support and resources from participants.[11] In 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush underlined the importance of coalitions as complementary, not replacement, to existing alliances.[12] International efforts related to military intervention in civil wars, humanitarian support, and nuclear proliferation—PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative)—have been conducted under the framework of coalition.

2. Proposal of Discussion

(1) Background and Context

Forged in the early 1950s, the U.S. bilateral alliance system has served as major pillar of the East Asian security architecture. Also known as hub-and-spoke system, the bilateral securities ties in which the U.S. played a central role has secured peace and stability and thus provided grounds for post-war economic development of the region. During the Cold War, East Asian allies gave priority to maintaining strong ties with the U.S. as a strategic means to maintain power balance of the region. In particular, for the

[11] For the unipole's increasing reliance on coalition, see Walt, Stephen. "Alliances in a unipolar world." *World Politics*, 61-01 (2009): 89-91.

[12] Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Executive Office of the President. Washington DC, 2002, p. 6.

two Asian countries, Japan and South Korea, faced with the imminent threat of Soviet expansion over their territorial and maritime borders, U.S. military presence and the strong security commitment from the U.S. deemed indispensable.

While the San Francisco alliance system had been evolved over time in accordance to changes in regional and global security environment and U.S. national security strategy, the end of the Cold War cast shadowed over the relevance of the San Francisco system. The fall of Soviet Union signaled the demise of the bipolar rivalry between U.S. and Russia and change in the global power politics. Changes in security environment called for change in the U.S. security strategy, and traditional military alliances, U.S. military strategists assumed, should change accordingly. The spread of WMDs and 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil contributed to strengthening the belief that the traditional U.S. military alliance formed in Asia was the legacy of the Cold War and thus no longer suitable to address post-Cold War security challenges. In the two wars—1991 Persian Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War—conducted under the leadership of the U.S, the U.S. formed on ad-hoc coalition in order to meet challenges in the Middle East. For example, 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. garnered supported from more than 50 countries. Countries in the coalition supported the U.S. war efforts with various means. During the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003, 46 countries provided diplomatic, economic, and military support for the U.S.

Observing ad hoc coalition set up and led by the U.S. conducting wars in the Middle East, some were quick to opine that the U.S. interest in the coalition of the willing signaled a reshuffling of world alliances.[13] Bruno Tertrais, for example, noted that complex nature of the strategic environment tested the notion of traditional alliance, forcing permanent alliances to give way to ad hoc coalitions.[14] Former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld observed that "the mission determines the coalition. The era

[13] Menon, Rajan. "The End of Alliances." *World Policy Journal*, 20-2 (2003): 1-20; Dibb, P. "The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?." *Washington Quarterly*, 25-2 (2002): 129-144.

[14] Tertrais, Bruno. "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances." *Washington Quarterly*, 27-2 (2004): 133-150.

of rigid alliances, if it ever truly existed, is clearly over, and the US must plan accordingly."[15]

The increased U.S. reliance on ad-hoc coalition, however, does not necessarily mean a fundamental shift in U.S. alliance strategy, nor the demise of traditional alliance. In fact, the two wars conducted by the U.S.-led coalition confirmed that U.S. alliance system is well and alive. Most of all, it should be noted that tremendous finical and military support for the U.S. came mainly from its long-time allies. Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated, "The U.S. alliance system is neither dead nor in decline."[16] Rather, he argued, the nature and purpose of alliance are changing in response to the challenges of a new era. In this regard, it was foreseeable that U.S. would prioritize strengthening its alliance system as it tries to shift its strategic focus to Asia under the name of "Rebalancing."[17]

Besides instantaneous and copious support by the U.S. allies, what is particularly interesting about the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War is the level of support by two U.S. bilateral allies in East Asia—South Korea and Japan—and different response of the U.S. to each of their support. After the U.S. decided to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait, the Japanese government responded to the U.S. call for support by writing a $13 billion check. As <Figure 1> shows, Japan's financial support accounted nearly one fifth of the total cost of Gulf War, $61 billion. Notwithstanding Japan's determination to support U.S. at its best, Washington denigrated Japan's support, calling it as "checkbook diplomacy." What is intriguing is that South Korea's much less war support than Japan did not bring about as much criticism from Washington. South Korea after hesitation deployed only a team of medical support with some 200 soldiers.[18]

---

[15] Krepinevich, Andrew. *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.

[16] Campbell, Kurt M. "The end of alliances? Not so fast." *Washington Quarterly*, 27-2 (2004): 151-163.

[17] Clinton, Hillary. "America's Pacific century." *Foreign Policy*, 189-1 (2011): 56-63.

[18] "Gulf War Coalition Forces." International Statistics at NationMaster.com, "Gulf War Veterans: Measuring Health." by Lyla M. Hernandez, Jane S. Durch, Dan G. Blazer II, and Isabel V. Hoverman, Editors; Committee on Measuring the Health of Gulf War Veterans, Institute of Medicine. Published by The National Academies Press 1999. <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/Gulf-War-Coalition-Forces>.

South Korea also pledged $500 million support, but the volume was incomparably small when compared with Japan's aid.

Figure 1. Financial Contributions to the Persian Gulf War in 1991



Source: Darman, Richard. "US Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions," Office of Management and Budget Report to the U.S. Senate, October 15, 1991.

In 2003 the U.S. target of criticism shifted to Seoul. During U.S. invasion to Iraq, the South Korean President Roh at the request of the U.S. promised to send some 3,000 troops. Even though the role of the force was limited to non-combatant mission, the size of troops to be deployed was large enough to make other states' support negligible. After all, as <Figure 2> and <Figure 3> show, South Korea dispatched 19,000 troops for Iraq War, the second largest troop deployment after the U.K. South Korea also made $200 million donor pledge in the form of grant for Iraqi reconstruction. Given the relative economic power, Korea's financial support was not meager. However, despite Korean government's outstanding effort, Seoul's support plan met criticism from Washington.

Figure 2. The Comparison of Coalition Supports by South Korea and Japan



Source: The Brookings Institution. *Iraq Index*.2003. <http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/saban/iraq-index>; U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq." GAO-07-827T (Washington DC, 2007).

Figure 3. Shares of Military Contributions during the 2003 Iraq War



Source: The Brookings Institution. Iraq Index 2007.

(2) Puzzling Observations

The U.S. response to its East Asian allies gets more intriguing when theoretical perspectives from alliance literature are factored in. Many aspects of the East Asian allies' support cannot be sufficiently explained by existing literature. In particular their exceptionally large and extensive support is puzzling from theoretical view point. The U.S. frustration of such exceptional support is doubly puzzling.

First of all, relatively large scale of support by Japan in 1991 and South Korea 2003 is at odds with realist perspectives on alliance behavior if extensive contribution to the great power can be read a sign of bandwagoning, alignment with the U.S. Realist theory of balance of power and balance of threat predicts that states would be hesitant to join U.S. efforts to punish Iraqi aggression. The balance of power theory predicts that states would balance against power.[19] Realist theory expects rising powers to sit on the side lines rather than join the U.S. effort. During the first and second Gulf War, however, major powers—Britain, Germany, and Japan—did not balance against U.S. power. Instead, they chose to bandwagon by supporting the U.S. even though the U.S. has predominant military capability to stop Iraq by itself. The balance of threat theory predicts that states would balance against perceived threat.[20] In other words, states with relative low threat perception have less incentive to balance. South Korea and Japan did not possess a direct reason to balance against Iraq. For both South Korea and Japan, Saddam Hussein and his WMD posed little threat to their security. Geographic distance combined with Iraq's limited military capability and lack of hostile intention against South Korea and Japan gave them little reason to balance against Iraq. In sum, purely structural perspective based on realism alone cannot explain fluctuations in the level and intensity of military and financial support made by South Korea and Japan and the U.S. frustrations to their extensive contributions.[21]

---

[19] Waltz (2010); Morgenthau (1948).

[20] Walt (1987).

[21] Nye argued that even though a theory has parsimony and explanatory power, that does not necessary mean that the theory can explain every aspect of reality. A theory with general application has to specify

Liberal and institutional theories of alliance predict that institutions and common interests would provide states with strong incentives to collaborate.[22] From liberalism's perspective, one could assume that states that have common economic interests or collective security interests are likely to ally against threats. However, liberal institutionalism provides little explanations for NATO members' relative low support in 2003 and different levels of support across states, much less about different and explicable U.S. response towards South Korea' and Japan's assistance.

Focusing on state-level interactions, one could argue that East Asia allies' support and the U.S. response can be explained by inter-government relations. Based on this view, Japan's reluctance to support the U.S. and the U.S. criticism of Japan's reactive foreign policy are reflection of strained U.S.-Japan relations due to economic disputes started in the 1980s. Japan's proactive support for the U.S. war against terrorism in 2003 can be interpreted as the result of cozy relations between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. Meanwhile, uneasy relations between the Roh administration and the Bush administration resulted in the U.S. frustration over South Korea's assistance. Analyzing the U.S. alliance management by ups and downs of bilateral relations might be useful in explaining and predicting the U.S. intra-alliance behavior.

Yet, personal rapport between the political leaders alone cannot explain puzzling observations within the intra-alliance behavior between the U.S. and its East Asia allies. Why the amicable relations between Prime Minister Kaifu and President George H.W. Bush could not prevent the bilateral relations from going sour over

---

certain conditions under which causal relations operates as the theory predicts. See Nye, J. S. "Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18-4 (1988): 581-590. However, Waltz also acknowledged that parsimonious theory, though it is more desirable in IR theory building, tends to miss complicate relations between variables from different level of analysis and thus fail to capture the complexities of the state motivations. Waltz, K. "Reductionist and Systemic Theories." In Keohane, R. O. (Ed.). *Neorealism and its Critics.* Columbia University Press (1986): 47-69; Waltz, Kenneth. "International Politics is not Foreign Policy." *Security Studies*, 6-1 (1996): 54-57; Elman, C. "Horses for Courses: Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies*, 6-1 (1996): 7-53.

[22] Liberalism theory of alliance. Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. "The promise of institutionalist theory." *International Security*, 20-1 (1995): 39-51; Nye, Joseph S. "The changing nature of world power." *Political Science Quarterly* (1990): 177-192.

coalition support? Why did the Roh administration, despite strained relations with the Bush administration, provided a significant level of military support? As historical incidents illustrate, the status of political relations cannot always be a suitable marker for bilateral security cooperation.[23] Besides, it should be noted that the bilateral relationship cannot always be an independent variable of the U.S. foreign policy behavior. Bilateral relation is not constant. Rather, it is subject to change as a result of intra-alliance behavior, in particular allies' contingency support and increased security commitment to the U.S.

As will be discussed later in this chapter, economic theory of alliance and public goods theory posit that small states have tendency to free-ride while great powers bear the major cost of security.[24] Since security is public goods without the character of rivalry and exclusiveness, states with limited capability tend to free-ride on great powers. In other words, the level of defense burden sharing of states is correlated to power and security interests at stake of the state. The facts that South Korea deployed the second largest troops for 2003 Iraq War and that Japan provided financial support of nearly $5 billion while the U.K, staunch ally of the U.S., offered $400 million contradict public goods theory's prediction. Alliance dependence argument may explain traditional allies' support for the U.S. leadership. However, it does not explain the cross-case variance within allies' support, nor the U.S. response to the two East Asian allies.

(3) Objectives

These theoretical considerations make U.S. response to wartime support by South Korea and Japan more difficult to comprehend. The U.S. expressed chagrin to its Asian allies who leaned against the tendency to free-ride and decided to provide financial

---

[23] During the 2003 Iraq War, the amicable bilateral relation between the U.S. and Turkey could not prevent the Turkish government from rejecting the U.S. request for military access to Turkey. On the other hand, even though the Sino-U.S. relations had been strained over Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989, China did not veto the UN sanction on Iraq.

[24] Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).

and military support. The U.S. did not hide its frustration over its East Asian allies——Japan in 1991 and South Korea in 2003—who were willing to take cost and risk of making support or sending troops. Instead, the U.S. attempted to extract more support from its Asian allies, who did not define Iraq and its WMD existential threat to their national security.

The hard-to-understand responses by the U.S. lead to the following questions. What kind of leverage did the U.S. have against Japan and South Korea in 1991 and 2003 so that it could draw relatively more support than its NATO allies and even neighboring countries who felt threatened by Iraq's WMD? Under what internal and external circumstances, did the U.S. demand more support from Korea or Japan who was willing to take risk and provide support? What affected South Korea's and Japan's assistance to the U.S.? How different threat perceptions affect intra-alliance management? How alliance management in bilateral alliance is different from one in multilateral alliances? The study attempts to find answers to these questions.

Against this backdrop, this research seeks to establish and examine an analytical framework to understand the U.S. behavior against two East Asian allies by comprehensively reviewing the decision-making process of the parties involves during the first and second Gulf War. This research does not discredit any theory of alliance in explaining alliance behavior during the wars.[25] However, the U.S. alliance behavior observed during the Gulf War crises challenged the alliance literature in that existing alliance studies do not adequately explain the U.S. alliance behavior. As noted earlier, U.S. could bring out relatively bigger support from its bilateral allies in East Asia than allies in multilateral groupings such as NATO. More importantly, even when Japan and South Korea were willing to provide necessary support despite cost and domestic

[25] The advantages of each alliance theories in explaining coalition support cannot be stressed enough. Collective action theory explains the exclusive roles that the U.S. and U.K. assumed in addressing Iraqi aggressions. Balance of threat argument supports the lack of free riding tendencies from the neighboring Gulf States. The participation of states that experienced no direct threat from Iraq can be explained by alliance dependence argument.

backlash, the U.S. was dissatisfied at the suggested level of support and demanded more support.

Understanding intra-alliance behavior within asymmetrical bilateral security groupings in East Asia requires a new comprehensive analytical framework. Other than traditional variables for international politics, such as relative power distribution, balance of power, threat, and interests, additional explanatory and/or intermediate variables such as domestic politics, dependency, perceptions, and reciprocity should be given careful examination.

As an attempt to fill the gap in alliance literature, this research formulates a role-based framework and apply the analytical framework to explain the U.S. alliance management behavior vis-à-vis its East Asian allies—South Korea and Japan—during the first and second Gulf War. The analytical framework is based on the assumption that intra-alliance relation in an asymmetrical bilateral alliance is a function between role prescription and role conception/performance, shaped by specific security requirements as well as external and domestic conditions.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the East Asian bilateral security alliance underwent changes in security arrangements and mutual obligations. The post-Cold War alliance rearrangements will be analyzed in the framework of the role-based approach. As case studies, the East Asian allies' political, military, and economic assistance and the U.S. response during the first and second Gulf War will be reviewed in a chronological order.

3. Limitations of Previous Studies

Alliance studies have yet to produce a comprehensive analytical framework to explain intra-alliance conflict within bilateral security groupings under unipolarity. A vast literature has touched upon key issues of alliance politics, such as alliance formation, alliance management, alliance security dilemma, alliance cohesion and leadership, and

burden sharing. Each theoretical perspective has provided important insights into conditions that affect the formation or management of alliance system, which is unquestionably central part of IR. Yet alliance theory has provided limited explanation of intra-alliance management and conflict in the East Asian bilateral alliance system. In particular, the sources and conditions of alliance conflict have been understudied despite their significance to alliance management and transformation.

Even when the subject area was intra-alliance management after formation, the vast majority of studies have exclusively focused on alliance dynamics in multilateral groupings, most notably NATO. The world politics has observed that multilateral security groupings gradually give ways to bilateral security groupings, in which the U.S. plays a leadership role. As the center gravity of world politics is shifting to Asia Pacific and the U.S. reorients its strategic focus accordingly, understanding dynamics within the U.S. bilateral alliance system is becoming increasingly important. In addition, even though the U.S., after the collapse of Soviet Union, has emerged as the sole super power or global hegemon in world politics and strengthened its bilateral security ties, few studies have tried to analytically review the impact of systemic change on bilateral alliance management.

In particular, existing alliance theories cannot provide sufficient analytical explanation for the puzzling U.S. response to its East Asian bilateral allies during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. It can be assumed that understating intra-alliance relations within bilateral security cooperation requires an alternative analytical framework that might draw on many different fields of IR.

Mindful of this theoretical challenge, this section discusses major alliance studies in IR with critical review of their limitations in explaining post-Cold War U.S. alliance behaviors during the two Gulf Wars. After reviewing alliance security dilemma and asymmetric alliance arguments, the two major scholarly debates on alliance management, this section investigates into their limitations in addressing intra-alliance conflict. Economic approach to alliance that shed light on dynamics of alliance burden sharing will be reviewed with its limitations in describing East Asian allies' contribution

and the U.S. responses. In the end, this section summarizes theoretical gaps that need to be filled in order to explain the dynamics of intra-alliance conflict within the U.S.-led bilateral security arrangements in East Asia.

(1) Limitations of Alliance Security Dilemma and Asymmetric Alliance Argument

Alliance Security Dilemma and Bargaining Power

Despite its importance, alliance management is one of the subjects in IR that are understudied. After an alliance is formed, there comes the task of managing it. Members in an alliance want to shape it in a way that maximizes their net benefits. When allies coordinate their security policies and engage in joint military operations, alliance management can be collaborative. At times, management may be unilateral when a member seeks to maximize its benefits while minimizing the cost, and an alliance leader could threaten its members to withhold support from an ally in a crisis. Thus, understanding the complexities involving alliance management requires a carefully designed theoretical framework.

Glenn Snyder's study is one of most significant attempts to analyze political dynamics between alliance partners. Once an alliance is formed, the primary dilemma, Snyder argues, is to how much alliance commitment to make for a partner in specific conflict situations. In other words, the fundamental issue becomes the choice between "cooperation" and "defect."[26] According to Snyder's alliance theory, states within alliance system choose between cooperation and defection based on abandonment and entrapment dynamics.

Interestingly, in a bilateral alliance relation, the risks of abandonment and entrapment are inversely related. Efforts to reduce one lead to the increase of the other. In other words, a cooperation strategy of strong commitment to an ally reduces the risk

[26] Snyder, Glenn H. "The security dilemma in alliance politics." *World Politics*, 36-04 (1984): 461-495.

of abandonment. Therefore, "the choice strategy," Snyder asserts, "requires chiefly a comparison and trade-off between the costs and risks of abandonment and entrapment.[27]

The alliance theory based on the fear of abandonment/entrapment is said to be relevant in explaining alliance politics in contemporary East Asia. For alliance theory, the East Asian case shows, Victor Cha argues, the fear of abandonment tends to dominate the states' strategic choice because of 1) power imbalances of the two states vis-à-vis the U.S., 2) constant external threats represented by North Korea, and 3) no alternative alliance partners.[28] One might argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union combined with the increased security capability of South Korea and Japan would have substantially lowered abandonment fear regarding the U.S. If that is the case, the abandonment/entrapment dynamics would be less compelling in explaining alliance behavior in East Asia. However, anxieties over U.S. abandonment are still felt by both South Korea and Japan. "The end of the Cold War," Victor Cha writes, "has effectively made fears of U.S. abandonment structurally inherent."[29] The prospect and fear of U.S. withdrawal remains salient in East Asia.

Glenn Snyder also understood alliance management as a process of bargaining.[30] In general, alliance management involves pursuing both common interests and competitive interests. While alliance partners have the most fundamental common interests of preserving the alliance, they, at the same time, have competitive interest of controlling the ally in ways in which one can minimize costs and risks involving the alliance. The job of alliance management is to overcome divergent and conflicting interests through various means and to maximize joint benefits while minimizing costs. Prominent issues in intra-alliance bargaining are diverse ranging from the coordination of military plans to sharing of military burdens, to the renegotiation of alliance

---

[27] Ibid, p. 467.

[28] Cha, Victor D. "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea." *International Studies Quarterly*, 44-2 (2002): 261-291.

[29] Ibid, p. 284.

[30] Snyder, G. H. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 165.

agreement. The members can also jump into a bargaining process in order to settle down issues in conflict.

According to Snyder, the outcome of alliance bargaining reflects the parties' relative bargaining power. The bargaining power is a functions of three general factors: 1) the allies' dependence on the alliance, 2) their commitment to the alliance, 3) their comparative interest in the object of bargaining. The values of dependence and commitment are negatively correlated with relative bargaining power while comparative interest is positively correlated. In other words, a state's bargaining power will be greater, if the dependence and commitment are lower and interest at stake is higher.

Usually, the interests at stake in bargaining are conflicting interests. The allies have a joint interest in resisting the adversary, but they disagree about how to share the benefits and costs of doing that. There disagreements can occur, Snyder notes, in one of the three main security areas: preparedness, diplomacy, or military action. In other words, alliance members can have conflicts over their relative military and economic contributions, diplomatic stance toward the adversary in a crisis, or their joint strategy in war.

Autonomy-Security Trade-offs in Asymmetric Alliance

Alliance is not necessarily a grouping of states with similar capabilities. In fact, a considerable number of alliance treaties are formed between states with different levels of power and military capability, especially under bipolarity and unipolarity. James Morrow's research on alliance is meaningful in that it attempted to explain alliance dynamics in the framework of asymmetric model.[31] According to Morrow, the capability aggregation model is a special case in which allies possess mutual interest and similar capability in deterring a common threat.

[31] Morrow, James D. "Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability aggregation model of alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* (1991): 904-933.

Morrow contended that the typical view of alliances as tools of capability aggregation and threat deterrence is incomplete, and provided an alternative explanatory tool to capability aggregation model. While traditional approach to alliance assumed that both allies equally receive security benefit from an alliance, Morrow approached alliance in light of its effects on the allies' autonomy and security. According to his alternative logic, the autonomy-security trade-off model, when alliance type is asymmetric, one alliance partner receives autonomy while the other gets security benefits from the alliance. Morrow confirmed the propriety of the trade-off model by proving the following properties of asymmetric alliance: 1) asymmetric alliances are easier to form and last longer than symmetric ones, 2) the greater the change in alliance members' capabilities, the more likely the alliance will be broken, 3) second-rank major powers will be more likely to form asymmetric alliances as their capabilities increase.[32]

Morrow's study on the alliance's effect on autonomy and security provides important implications to the U.S. bilateral alliance system in East Asia. The ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan security alliances are typical of asymmetric alliance in which U.S. provides security guarantee. Capability aggregation and threat deterrence constitute an essential pillar of the bilateral alliance, but they are incomplete to describe the complexity of allies' interests involved in the alliance. In the form of asymmetric bilateral alliance, states involved "advance diverse but compatible, interests."[33] The U.S. uses alliance as a tool to advance its strategic and economic interests. The weaker parties in alliance—South Korea and Japan—gain security benefits by offering military bases, defraying expenses of force stationing, or even coordinating foreign and domestic policies, that can ensure the U.S. freedom of action. In order to capture alliance dynamics in East Asia, one has to understand how diverse interests are served through alliance. States involved continue to measure the benefits of an ally's ability to advance its interests against the costs.

---

[32] Morrow (1991), p. 904.
[33] Ibid, p. 905.

Limitations of Security Dilemma and Asymmetric Alliance Argument

Abandonment/entrapment complex and asymmetric alliance argument provide useful analytical insights into the East Asian bilateral security alliance. In particular, Snyder's argument can be used as an analytical framework to understand alliance contributions as a result of intra-alliance negotiations based on relative U.S. bargaining power vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan. However, the arguments need to be further developed in order to explain intra-alliance conflicts in the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan relations.

First, different levels of support by South Korea and Japan cannot be explained by abandonment/entrapment complex alone. Drawing on Snyder's argument, Victor Cha argued that fear of U.S. abandonment became structurally inherent. However, if South Korea and Japan were exposed to constant fear of being abandoned by the U.S., it may explain general tendency for South Korea and Japan to be dependent on and thus supportive to the U.S. Yet, it cannot fully explain the composition, size and timing, and fluctuation of their contributions. In addition, South Korea's and Japan's extensive contributions to the U.S. might be interpreted as actions driven by the fear of abandonment in the face of mounting regional security threats. However, the puzzling U.S. responses remain unanswered.

Second, relative bargain power argument and asymmetrical alliance argument cannot readily explain intra-alliance conflict. First of all, it should be noted that relatively high bargaining power does not always lead to success in bargaining. In that sense, the U.S. efforts to draw necessary support from its East Asian allies were half success and half failure. U.S. succeeded in drawing support but failed in making its allies contribute as much as the U.S. wanted. Frustrations over coalition contribution led to intra-alliance conflict. Therefore, it can be assumed that factors other than dependence, commitment, and interest might come into bargaining process, affecting both U.S. demand and allies' supply. In other words, in order to explain intra-alliance conflict, external or internal

conditions in which allies with relatively low bargain power could underplay or resist U.S. pressure for support have to be specified.

Similarly, Morrow's asymmetric alliance argument is inadequate to address the issue of intra-alliance conflict. It may be useful to understand that in the U.S. bilateral security relations autonomy-security trade-off is at work and that for South Korea and Japan, the U.S. security guarantee has come at the expense of autonomy. The argument also suggests that while still dependent on the U.S. for security, an ally's effort to increase autonomy can be the source of intra-alliance conflict. Yet, in order to explain discord in alliance, the argument should also incorporate systemic and sub-systemic variables that might affect the equation between security and autonomy. Moreover, assumptions and premises of the argument have not yet been fairly tested to see whether it can provide explanations for the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia.[34]

Third, a common and serious shortcoming of the two approaches is that they did not treat multilateral and bilateral alliance separately. Even though it can be assumed that different alliance dynamics at work between a multilateral and bilateral security groupings, studies on alliance approached to alliance system in an aggregate manner. Consequently, differences in underlying principles that govern bilateral security grouping, different from those of multilateral groupings, are yet to be fully addressed. Much work has been done with few analytical insights into bilateral alliances. Victor Chia made a compelling argument on why the U.S. developed bilateral security alliances in East Asia.[35] Yet, his powerplay argument focused on the U.S. consideration behind the formation of bilateral alliance—the ease of controlling its alliance partners. An analytical framework that would enable to capture different dynamics in intra-alliance

[34] For example, Morrow's asymmetric alliance theory may not be of general application. Arguably, security-autonomy tradeoff argument does not fully explain the ROK-U.S. security alliance, a classic example of asymmetric alliance and thus often referred as "patron-client relation." It is argued that in an asymmetric alliance which emphasizes deterrence against imminent threat, increased military and economic capability of a client state—South Korea—does not naturally lead to the increase in autonomy. Chang, Noh-soon. "Trade-Off in the "Autonomy-Security Trade-Off Model": The Case of Asymmetric U.S.-South Korea Alliance." *Korean Journal of International Studies*, 36-1 (1996).

[35] Cha, Victor D. "Powerplay: Origins of the US alliance system in Asia." *International Security*, 34-3 (2010): 158-196.

management that distinguishes bilateral security alliances in East Asia from other multilateral groupings has to be developed.

(2) Limitations of Collective Action Argument

Economic Approach to Alliance

The theoretical inquiry into the issue of alliance burden sharing emerged after the World War II. Cost or burden distribution within alliance system had become practical issue, and the creation of the NATO opened up debates on the distribution of security burden. Once the collective defense system is formed based on mutual security interests of thwarting Russia's expansionary ambitions in Europe, then discussions on uneven distribution of security burden across member states followed as a corollary.

The collective goods theory put forward by Mancur Olson provided theoretical foundation for defense burden sharing within alliance. Olson in his seminal work, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), attempted to explain how states bind together and share burdens to pursue a common goal.[36] After noting that there is no consensus on how to share the cost of collective burden, he argued if a small group of powerful states does not assume the bulk of burden, multilateral system is hard to be maintained.

Olson ascribed the uneven distribution of burden to the nature of public goods. The observation that the larger the actor, the bigger share the actor assumes is the result of the distinctive features of public goods, distinct from commercial goods. The consumption of public goods are governed by two unique factors: non-excludability and non-rivalry. First, one cannot exclude others' consumption of public goods even if they provide little or no cost at all. Since everyone can have access to public goods such as information, it is impossible to prevent others from enjoying the benefits of public goods although they have little interest in cost bearing. Second, non-rivalry suggests that

[36] Olson, M. *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard Economic Studies, V. 124. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965.

consumption of public goods does not necessarily reduce the amount of public goods available for others to consume. In other words, no actor can monopoly the use of public goods even the actor bears a considerable amount of burden necessary to produce the public goods.

The findings of behavioral patterns of actors concerning public goods are directly applicable to security realm. Olson and Zeckhauser applied the public goods theory of economics to the analysis of NATO defense burden and suggested a burden sharing model of collective security.[37] Here public goods is nuclear deterrence, and the means to provide the public goods—collective defense—is multilateral alliance system, NATO. They posited that nuclear deterrence provided by NATO has two characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry. Just as information, it is nearly impossible for a state to prevent other states from taking benefits of security provided by NATO, even if they do not voluntarily provide appropriate level of contribution. Besides, if a state takes advantage of nuclear deterrence, that itself does not diminish the power and efficacy of nuclear deterrence by NATO.

Drawing on these conclusions, Olson and Zeckhauser argued that because of the nature of nuclear deterrence the collective action problems can also be found among NATO members. Member states, they suggested, will have incentives to underpay for deterrence or free-ride if others bear the cost of collective defense. Since states with limited resources have to consider the opportunity cost of increasing defense spending, states without incentives would want other states to contribute more to the collective security. By reviewing NATO defense contributions of each of its member states, Olson and Zeckhauser found out that states actually have shown tendency to rely on others to pay for collective defense. They proved that states with high resources assumed greater defense burden than states with low resources. Because if collective defense system fails, it is wealthier states who usually have to pay the cost of security failure since they have more incentives to maintain the system.[38]

---

[37] Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).

[38] Thies, W. J. "Alliances and Collective Goods A Reappraisal." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31-2 (1987):

Limitations of Collective Action Argument

While the economic model of alliance shed light on defense burden sharing, the model does not capture all the motivations behind alliance contribution. The collective action theory drawing on economic theory mainly focused on non-political and economic aspect. Besides, studies based on the public goods theory exclusively focused on defense burden sharing among NATO states. Heavy emphasis on peace-time defense budget blinded other aspect of burden sharing and contribution for specific events or operations. At the same time, the collective action theory underestimated that bargaining between alliance leaders and allies is possible and that small states can resist the temptation to free ride and do their share under the following conditions. First, participating states can contribute for future interests not just for immediate gains. Patricia Weitsman, for example, has demonstrated that instead of acting out of threat, allies can provide support for an alliance leader as a hedging strategy for future security interests.[39] According to Weitsman's argument, hedging states demonstrate their commitments to the leader with the expectation that their support will curry favor. Second, by supporting alliance leaders, supporting states can increase its interests other than security area. Third, states facing external security threats can avoid temptation of free-riding and contribute more.

For these reasons, economic models cannot explain anomalies in intra-alliance behavior within U.S. bilateral security alliances in East Asia. First of all, South Korea and Japan leaned against the tendency to free ride on the U.S. Their material, economic, and military assistance to the U.S. contradict public goods theory's prediction. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War Japan extended $13 billion economic support for the U.S.

298-332. The so-called "Joint model" claims that free-riding tendency of small and medium powers has reduced as the result of reduced deterrence after the US implemented the flexible response strategy. See Murdoch, J. C. and Sandler, T. "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26-2 (1982): 237-263; Sandler, Todd, and Keith Hartley. "Economics of alliances: The lessons for collective action." *Journal of Economic Literature* (2001): 869-896.

[39] Weitsman, Patricia A. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

war efforts. In 2003 South Korea deployed the second largest troops after U.K. for stabilization operations in Iraq, and Japan provided financial support of nearly $5 billion while the U.K, staunch ally of the U.S., ended up offering $400 million. If security were to be established in East Asia thanks to strong alliance relations with the U.S., it would possess the characteristics of collective goods—non-exclusiveness and non-rivalry. However, economic theory alliance cannot explain the absence of collective actions problems in East Asia. South Korea and Japan, who public goods theory assumes had little incentives to bear the bulk of security burdens, provided significant level of support to the U.S. war efforts.

Second, economic model of alliance cannot fully explain U.S. responses to East Allies' support during the Gulf Wars. First, in stark contrast to NATO's case, the U.S. as an alliance leader could exact security burden sharing and draw not only economic but also military contributions from South Korea and Japan. Then, what is more interesting is the U.S. response to their efforts to support the U.S. It can be assume that the more is the better regarding alliance support. However, the U.S. did not hide its frustration over its allies who leaned against the tendency to free ride and even risked the danger of sending troops to war. The U.S. tried to extract more support from its Asian allies who did not define Iraq and its WMD existential threat to their national security.

In sum, contributions made by South Korea and Japan were way off from predictions of economic model of alliance. More importantly, the experiences of the two Gulf War demonstrate that public goods theory may be a useful tool to understand burden sharing tendency in multilateral security groupings but may not be that useful in explaining burden sharing practices in bilateral security alliances. It can be assumed that understanding dynamics of security burden sharing in bilateral groupings calls for a different analytical framework. In other words, asymmetric bilateral alliance in East Asia might be governed by different rules and conditions which allows an alliance leader to transfer its security burden to its partner without sacrificing alliance cohesion.

(3) Filling Gaps in the Alliance Literature to Explain Intra-Alliance Conflict

Alliance theories have been developed over time. Drawing on many different field of academics from economics to psychology, alliance theories have provided useful insights into the formation, management, and intra-alliance dynamics of security alliances. However, as far as the source of conflict in bilateral security alliances is concerned, extensive researches on alliance have been made with few analytical outcomes.

This research suggests that understanding the changing alliance dynamics and alliance management in U.S.-led bilateral security alliance framework requires further theoretical advancement in alliance politics. To be more specific, theoretical refinement in five areas of alliance theory that are interconnected should be made in order to explain the post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis its bilateral alliance partners.

First of all, we need an analytical framework that can specify conditions upon which alliance partners come into conflict over wartime support. Alliance is formed to achieve common security interest, and alliance when formalized is based on mutual security roles and responsibilities, whether explicit and/or implicit, for both peace and wartime. Changes in external and internal conditions of member states lead to changes in security arrangements and commitments, and the changes in turn might serve to create a rupture in alliance relations, laying the seeds of intra-alliance conflict. In that regard, conditions in which the changes are translated into alliance conflict need to be explained in an analytical fashion.

Second, the influence of systemic change—the end of the Cold War and ensuing transition from bipolar to unipolar—on alliance politics has to be counted.[40]

[40] Stephen Walt advanced the discussions on structural effects on alliances by presenting a theoretical analysis of alliance politics in unipolarity. Since a preponderance of power in the hands of a single state had never before occurred, he asserted, the unipolarity had substantial effects on the nature of contemporary alliances. According to his argument, weaker power have essentially three choices in a unipolar world. They can 1) align with other states in order to mitigate the unipole's influence, 2) align with the unipole in order to support its actions or exploit its power for their own interest, or 3) remain neutral. In a nutshell, alliances in a unipolar world will be a reaction to the dominant states, which is to

Since current unipolar moment is unique in world history,[41] the job of identifying the influence will have be based on both theoretical perspectives and empirical observations. Systemic change incurs realignment and rearrangement of exists alliance structure. For an alliance leader, the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity means the extinction of strategic rival, whom the alliance leader had to compete for sphere of influence and interest. The end of exhausting rivalry alters the goal of an alliance as well as alliance leaders' polices vis-à-vis its alliance partners in terms of security commitments, burden sharing, and the content and scope of security cooperation. In the context of this research, it can be assumed that change in international security environments required both the U.S. and its alliance partners—South Korea and Japan—to readjust their alliance policies. In addition, while it is important to distinguish purely structural impact from general outcomes of American unipolarity, the unique nature of the unipole, whether cultural, political, economic, or geographical, has to be considered when assessing and predicting the U.S. foreign policy behavior toward its traditional allies.

Third, more attention should be given to intra-alliance dynamics in bilateral alliance. A notable aspect of change in post-Cold War alliance structure is that multilateral alliances are increasingly giving way to bilateral ones.[42] The difference in alliance politics and intra-alliance dynamics between multilateral and bilateral groupings should be specified. An aggregate approach to alliance system fails to capture inherent differences between the two types of alliance groupings. For example, if the intensity of security alliance dilemma—fear of abandonment and entrapment complex—in a bilateral alliance is different from multilateral alliances, conditions in which security dilemma gets magnified or abridged should be specified.

Fourth, if needed to explain intra-alliance conflict, the interaction between structural variables and domestic variables has to be considered. The dilemma of explanation versus description is relevant here. A linear alliance model with a single

---

either constrain it or exploit it. Walt (2009).

41 Wohlforth, William C. "The stability of a unipolar world." *International Security*, 24-1 (1999): 5-41.

42 Tertrais (2004).

independent variable provides parsimonious analysis of alliance politics. The balance of threat argument by Stephen Walt, for example, possesses strong explanatory power in terms of motivations of alliance formation. Based on the argument, researchers and policy makers can foresee who will alliance with whom. However, as we have seen, a parsimonious alliance theory lacks descriptive power. It may provide general patterns for alliance behavior, but it cannot fully describe the complexity of diverse alliance behavior. Karl Popper once argued that "Theories are nets cast to catch what we call 'the world': to rationalize, to explain, and to master it, we endeavor to make the mesh ever finer and finer."[43] In order to increase descriptive power of an alliance model, the interplay between the 3rd and 2nd image variables should be carefully considered.[44] In establishing analytical approach to explain alliance conflicts, the role of domestic factors and its effect on alliance decisions should be carefully examined.

Lastly, an analytic tool to understand the transformation of alliance should be developed. Alliance is a living organism. Tradition approaches to alliance assumed that the nature and goal of alliance is constant. However, the nature and scope of alliance tend to evolve over times. The extinction of common major threat does not necessarily lead to the dissolution of alliance. Rather, alliance changes its terms of agreements in accordance to changes in external security environment. So does the bilateral alliance system. The sustainment of the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliance cannot be explained

---

[43] Popper, K. R. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Hutchinson, 1959, p. 59.

[44] Neoclassical realism, emerged in the early 1990s, provides a useful reference for building new analytical models. Neoclassical realism's basic assumption is that the impact of systemic pressure (independent variable) on states' foreign policy decisions (dependent variable) are indirect and complex. Sub-systemic intermediate variables play an important role in shaping states' foreign policy decisions. For theoretical discussions, see Rose, G. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics*, 51 (1998): 144-172; Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. M., & Taliaferro, J. W. (Eds.). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, 2009; Elman, C. "Horses for Courses: Why nor Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies*, 6-1 (1996): 7-53; Zakaria, F. "Realism and Domestic Politics: a Review Essay." *International Security*, 17-1 (1992): 177-198. For academic researches based on neoclassical realism, see Snyder, J. L. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991; Schweller, R. L. "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism." In *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (2003): 311-47.

by simple threat-or-capability-based approach. Asymmetric alliance argument assumed that the significant change in alliance members' capabilities would lead to break down of the alliance. However, the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia persisted despite substantial increase of U.S. allies' capability. Rather, the alliance had been reconfigured and rearranged over time to serve common interests.

In sum, the understanding the U.S. responses to allies' contributions during 1991 and 2003 war coalitions requires one to frame U.S. behavior within existing alliance scholarship, but at the same times, it demands one to look beyond existing analytical framework and consider possible modifications in order to better explain seemingly unique alliance dynamics East Asia.

4. Research Questions and Case Selection

(1) Research Questions

Based on theoretical discussions, this research seeks to answer following questions concerning the post-Cold War U.S. alliance behavior vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan. Why do alliance partners come into conflicts over wartime coalition support? During the 1991 Gulf War, despite remarkable financial support, the U.S. policymakers denounced Japan for "Check book diplomacy" and asked for more active security support. And once satisfied with modest support from South Korea in 1991, the U.S. expressed frustration over South Korea's significant military contribution in 2003. How do we make sense of the U.S. frustration over South Korea and Japan despite their substantial assistances during the first and second Gulf Wars? Under what circumstances, did the U.S. demand more support from Japan in 1991 and South Korea in 2003 when they were willing to take risks and provide support?

Finding answers to these questions lead to the following questions of what made the difference. What was the source of change in U.S. response? What factors

influence the U.S. alliance behavior regarding security commitments made by its bilateral alliance partners? Was it the change in external security environment or domestic politics? How did affected the U.S. foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan, and, more importantly, how was it translated into intra-alliance conflict?

Assuming that both internal and external environments can affect alliance behaviors, the following questions to reframe the U.S.-led alliance within a broader context should also be addressed. After defeating the Soviet Union, the U.S. had become the sole super without a clear enemy. How did the change in the global distribution of power and external security environment affect the U.S. alliance policy toward East Asia? What was the role of the U.S. domestic politics in realigning the post-Cold War U.S. East Asian bilateral alliances? As a source of determining the content and level of material, economic, and military assistance to the U.S., how did the domestic politics in South Korea and Japan affect foreign policy decisions, and how was it translated into conflict with the U.S.?

(2) Case Selection

In order to explain the dynamics of intra-alliance conflict, this research examines coalition supports and the U.S. responses in four cases—ROK-U.S. relations and U.S.-Japan relations during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and 2003 War in Iraq. The cases have been chosen for the following reasons. First, the wars marked the two greatest security challenges the U.S. faced after the end of the Cold War. The U.S. as a single super power in international politics played a leading role and formed an international coalition to address the security challenges. Coalition support by allies and friends helped the U.S. gain legitimacy of its actions and share the expenses of war.

Second, both South Korea and Japan made significant support with different content, level, timing, and composition to the U.S., including military support. Among various types of support, military support is the name of the game since deploying troops abroad involves the highest political risks for a provider. Allies' support for contingency

deserves careful scholarly attention since alliances are promises or pledges for future cooperation, particularly in times of security crisis. In that sense, the U.S. request for war-support from South Korea and Japan was a litmus test for their security commitment and obligation described in formal agreement. More importantly, the U.S. responded in a puzzling way to the allies' contribution, which is the subject of this research.

The cases are similar in that the U.S. requested war-time support from both South Korea and Japan, and the adversary of the U.S. was Saddam Hussein's Iraq for both cases. This similar case background creates a semi-controlled environment that limits the effects of third variables. In other words, the cases provide better control of the impact of other variables and appropriate for comparison. The cases also allow their pairing for controlled comparison because they have similar condition and yet different values on the study variable—different U.S. alliance behavior vis-à-vis its East Asian alliance partners.

Despite their similarities, it should be noted that the two wars were marked by difference in goal, scope, and spectrum. First, goals were different. In 1991, in response to Iraq's invasion into Kuwait, the U.S. formed an international coalition to repel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and requested allies' support. Meanwhile, the U.S. goal of the 2003 Iraq War was nation-building, which requires more resources and more boots on the ground. Second, the U.S. military actions met different reactions from the international community. While the U.S. military intervention into Kuwait to expel the Iraq forces in 1991 gained almost unanimous support from the international community, the U.S. unilateral decision to invade into Iraq could not attain enough support the U.S. needed. Third, the wars developed in a remarkably different manner largely because of the differences in goals. In 1991, the U.S. military offensive against Iraq ended with splendid victory. However, the U.S. intervention into Iraq in 2003 dragged on. In the face of strong Iraqi insurgency, American casualty soared, and the cost of reconstruction continued to rise, the combination of which served to trigger domestic opposition. The situation in Iraq required more boots and dollars on the ground, and thus support from allies and friends became more desperate from the U.S. policymakers.

Understanding these differences is important in analyzing the U.S. responses to East Asian allies' contribution. As we have noted, the two wars were conducted in different context, and different strategic needs lead to different expectations regarding allies' contribution. Therefore, in analyzing the intra-alliance conflict created by the unmet expectation, it becomes important to note that the U.S. faced different strategic requirements for each war.

5. Research Structure

In order to achieve the goal of analyzing the U.S. intra-alliance behavior within its asymmetrical bilateral security alliance in East Asia, this research is structured as follows.

Chapter two presents the theoretical framework for analyzing the U.S intra-alliance behavior during the two wars against Iraqi aggression. Drawing on social theory of role conception and K. J. Holsti's role-based approach to international politics, this research establishes a role conception model as the main framework of analysis. This chapter elucidates how the role-based approach incorporates antecedent conditions—both systemic and domestic—that might affect the role conceptions by the U.S. and its alliance partners. For the level of analysis, dyadic level approach is suggested as the most proper approach to capture unique features of intra-alliance relationships within bilateral security groupings. Finally, the chapter explores the analytical foundation and propositions of the approach.

Chapter three analyzes the U.S. role conceptions and intra-alliance relations after the demise of the Soviet Union. As a preliminary step to measure convergence or divergence of role conceptions between the U.S. and its allies, the U.S. role enactment in the post-Cold War security setting will be reviewed. Then, the post-Cold War U.S. security strategy towards Northeast Asia was reviewed in order to grasp U.S. role prescriptions vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan. The major changes in bilateral security

arrangements will be traced. The bilateral relations are reviewed in a dyadic level perspective, and the association between security issues and non-security issues will be highlighted, particularly in the U.S.-Japan relations. This chapter will help us understand the intra-alliance relations surrounding coalition support for the Persian Gulf War in the historical and analytical context.

The following chapters present empirical analysis of the two Persian Gulf Wars based on the role model. As case studies, the chapters apply the role-based approach to the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 War in Iraq and details intra-alliance negotiations for coalition support and respective security roles and responsibilities between South Korea and the U.S. and between the U.S. and Japan for each cases.

Chapter four details coalition supports by South Korea and Japan during the first Gulf War in 1991. Allies' support and the U.S. responses will be analyzed in the framework of role model. This chapter will contrast U.S. acquiescence in South Korea's moderate assistance with the puzzling response of the U.S. policymakers to Japan's exceptional financial support. The disparate responses by the U.S. will be analyzed in the framework of role conception model.

Chapter five addresses major changes in U.S. security policy and role conceptions of South Korea and Japan after the Gulf War crisis. For the ROK-U.S. alliance, this chapter discusses how the changes in domestic politics marked by the rise of progressive political forces contributed to strained relations between Washington and Seoul. For Japan's case, how Japan after the Persian Gulf War gradually shifted away from the post-war pacifism and moved towards proactive foreign policy will be discussed.

Chapter six provides empirical analysis of coalition support for the 2003 War in Iraq. The intra-alliance conflict over South Korea's coalition contribution will be analyzed. Japan's proactive response to the Bush administration's call for coalition support will be contrasted and discussed in the perspective of role-based approach to alliance. This chapter concludes with the implications of Japan's shift in foreign policy.

Finally, chapter seven discusses research and policy implications. The chapter summarizes major findings of this research and enumerates the usefulness and implications of the role-based approach to intra-alliance conflict within bilateral security groupings. Chapter seven also discusses policy implications of this research. This discussion includes the on-going alliance transformation, the U.S. rebalancing strategy, and the looming power competition between the U.S. and China. Chapter seven concludes with the limitations of this research and directions for future research.

CHAPTER II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Level of Analysis

In building a theoretical framework, the issue of a level of analysis emerges the first and immediate concern. A level of analysis is a conceptual and methodological unit in which sources of observed phenomena and events to be explained are located. As researchers try to select appropriate unit for analysis, they face the level of analysis problem or dilemma. The level of analysis choice presents methodological challenges no matter what the subject matter is.

A researcher's thinking on the unit of analysis has immediate effect on conclusion. The difference in specifying the level of analysis appropriate for a research has been a key issue in divergent theoretical approaches, causal explanations, and results. The World War, the most widely studied subjects in IR, is a good example. Approaches based on different units of analysis resulted in different outcomes of what the primary cause of a war was. Scholars in realist tradition, for example, have attributed the war to the balance of power at the system level.[45] While seen from the alliance level, the World War II originated from the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles.[46] Meanwhile, many attributed the war to German militarism led by Hitler at the nation-state level,[47] and some, at the bureaucratic level, highlighted the conflicting German and British military

[45] Liska (1962); Walt (1985); Mearsheimer (2001).

[46] Boemeke, M. F., Feldman, G. D., Chickering, R. and Glaser, E. (Eds.). *The Treaty of Versailles: a Reassessment after 75 Years*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

[47] Ritter, Gerhard. *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*. Coral Cables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1969; Vagts, Alfred. *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military.* Ed. Hollis and Carter, 1959. As another example of a state level analysis, Van Evera argued that decision makers' perception of the global technological offense-defense balance will affect the likelihood of war. See Van Evera, Stephen. "Offense, defense, and the causes of war." *International Security*, 22-4 (1998): 5-43; Van Evera, Stephen. "The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War." *International Security* (1984): 58-107. Evera writes, "war is far more likely when conquest is easy... shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war." (1998, p. 5).

culture in the making of the war.[48] It seems that which unit of analysis a researcher places emphasis on determines the outcome of a research.

(1) IR Theories and Levels of Analysis

Indeed, scholars in IR can be categorized into different schools of thought—classical realism, neo-realism, liberalism, and constructivism—based on their thinking on how different unit of analysis affect outcomes in searching for the sources of war and peace. For classical realists, wars occur because human beings have innate tendency for aggression.[49] To quote a popular Roman proverb, first attested in Plautus' *Asinaria* in 195 B.C. and later often cited by Thomas Hobbes: *Homo Homini Lupus* [Man is a wolf to his fellow man]. For neo-realists, it is the anarchic nature of international system that makes war inevitable. Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them. Liberalists tend to argue that the internal structure of states determines external behavior of states. Most notably, democratic peace theory posits that democratic societies are reluctant to engage in a war since statesmen would be held accountable for a war.[50] Meanwhile, arguing that core aspects of IR, most notably the anarchy, are socially constructed, constructivists tend to focus on conceptual units as the sources of war and peace.[51] Alexander Wendt, leading scholar in constructivism, argued that the social structures are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces. Consequently, he calls

---

[48] Legro, J. W. "Military culture and inadvertent escalation in World War II." *International Security* (1994): 108-142.

[49] Scholars in this line of though include Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*. Yale University Press, 1928; Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Yale University Press, 1997; Niebuhr, R. *Christianity and Power Politics*. Archon Books, 1969; Morgenthau, H. J. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Vol. 189). University of Chicago Press, 1967; Morgenthau, H. J. *Politics among Nations*. New York: Knoph, 1978.

[50] Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970; Russett, Bruce. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton University Press, 1994; Doyle, Michael W. "Liberalism and world politics." *American Political Science Review*, 80-4 (1986): 1151-1169.

[51] Ruggie, John Gerard. "What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge." *International Organization*, 52-04 (1998): 855-885; Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press, 1996.

for attention to non-material units such as ideas, identities, culture, interests of actors involved, and etc. as factors governing the international politics.

One of the earliest attempts to deal with the analytical implications of the level of analysis was Kenneth Waltz.[52] Puzzled by the contrasting views of scholars who had dealt with the subject of war, Waltz divided previous attempts to understand the causes of war into three levels of analysis. 'First image' relates international conflict to human behavior; 'Second image' focuses on internal structure of states; and 'Third image' identifies international anarchy as the fundamental cause of war. Theoretical and methodological implications are as follows. If a study focused on the third image, it would tend to draw explanatory variables from the international system, balance of power, or power distribution between states. For the second image studies, major variables are more likely to be drawn from state-level factors such as regime type, economic index, and military power.

After reviewing theoretical implications of each images, Waltz asserted that first and second image approaches, however useful, impinge on not only the question of the causes of war and but also the quest for the possibilities of peace. Instead, he viewed 'the third image' as a theory of the framework of state action and a theory of the conditioning effects of the state system. Even if the efficient cause of the war is the desire of a state, Waltz asserted, the permissive cause is the fact that there is nothing to prevent the state from undertaking the risks of war.

While the level of analysis problem had been the major of source concern for any social scientists, J. David Singer was one of the scholars who brought academic attention to discussions of the problem.[53] Singer argued that the most important aspect of research in the beginning is to choose the level of analysis that fits best for an analytical framework.[54] Singer evaluated the pros and cons of the two widely employed

---

[52] Waltz, Kenneth (1959); Waltz, "International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis." *World Politics* (1960).

[53] Singer, J. David. "International Conflict Three Levels of Analysis." *World Politics*, 12-03 (1960): 453-461; Singer, J. David. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations." *World Politics*, 14-01 (1961): 77-92.

[54] Singer called researchers' struggle over numerous level of analysis as "vertical drift," saying "We have,

levels of analysis—systemic orientation and sub-systemic, or nation-as-actor, orientation. In particular, he looked into the ways in which a researcher's choice of analytical focus impinges on a research model and affects its descriptive, explanatory, and predictive capability.

The system-oriented model, for example, poses some difficulties in terms of explanatory adequacy since it exaggerates the impact of the system upon national actors, while discounting the impact of actors on the international system. Moreover, by eschewing reality that there are domestic and internal variations within the separate nations, the system-oriented approach, Singer writes, "tends to produce a sort of "black box" or "billiard ball" concept of the national actors."[55]

On the other hand, approaches that set the national state as level of analysis factor in significant differentiation among actors in the international system. By doing so, the nation-as-actor analysis could avoid the homogenization or over-generalization which can be found in system approach, but it may lead researchers into an exaggeration of the differences among sub-systemic actors.[56] In other words, the sub-systemic approach gains descriptive power at the expense of explanatory and predictive power, and the descriptive advantage can only be achieved at the price of considerable methodological complexity. When one chooses the nation as the major focus of analysis, one can be better suited to deal with the question of national goals, motivations, and decision-making process in national policy. In a nutshell, the systemic approach produces a more comprehensive picture of international politics, and the national and sub-systemic level approach provides more detailed and extensive outcomes.

---

in our texts and elsewhere, roamed up and down the ladder of organizational complexity with remarkable abandon, focusing upon the total system, international organizations, regions, coalitions, extra-national associations, nations, domestic pressure groups, social classes, elites, and individuals as the needs of the moment required." (1961: p.78).

[55] Singer (1961), p.81.

[56] This tendency is what Kenneth Waltz called as "second-image fallacy," in which belligerent or peaceful behavior of a state is exclusively be explained by its domestic economic, political, and social conditions. See Waltz (1968), Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Meanwhile, it should also be noted, as Singer contends, that while doing a vertical drift, one can develop an analytical framework which employs two or more of these levels of analysis without significantly sacrificing clarity and consistency.[57] Indeed, the utmost difficulty lies in the multi-causality, which is not so uncommon in most social and political reality. Often times a particular phenomenon is caused by a combination of distinct factors from multiple layers of levels. In this regard, neoclassical realism emerged in the early 1990s is relevant here. Neoclassical realism's basic assumption is that the impact of systemic pressure (independent variable) on states' foreign policy decisions (dependent variable) is indirect and complex.[58] Even though it recognizes overwhelming importance of the systemic pressure, neoclassical realism also admits that sub-systemic intermediate variables play an important role in shaping states' foreign policy decisions. In that way, neoclassical realism gains descriptive power while sacrificing parsimony.

Summary

An important thing is to understand that one cannot make an overriding case for one particular theoretical approach over other different approaches. Waltz writes, "So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two. Still, emphasis on one image may distort one's interpretation of the others."[59] If one is inclined to see the international politics with emphasis on certain level of analysis unit, one is likely to encounter counter-arguments based on other levels of analysis.

Given that each analytical approach has its own merits and demerits, key issue in the vertical drift of finding proper level of analysis is what one seeks to investigate. A

[57] Singer refers to Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* (1957) as one of few attempts at that time. Singer (1961), p.81.
[58] Rose (1998).
[59] Waltz (1959), p. 160.

researcher must be prepared to evaluate the relative utility and implications of focusing on a certain level of analysis and choose an approach that would best serve research needs. Singer writes, "So the problem is really not one of deciding which level is most valuable to the discipline as a whole and then demanding that it be adhered to from now into eternity. Rather, it is one of realizing that there *is* this preliminary conceptual issue and that it must be temporarily resolved prior to any given research undertaking."[60] Here, Singer's and Waltz's attitudes toward the level of analysis problem seem to converge. Waltz also concluded his argument with a call for a balanced approach, saying "the third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results."[61]

After all, one of the biggest challenges for a researcher is to navigate through both upsides and downsides of focusing on a certain level of analysis and to find the most appropriate approach for his or her research goals. Therefore, if one is to examine states' policy outcomes, an important question to begin with is where one attempts to find an analytical tool to explain and describe states' behaviors or to build an explanatory tool to make general predictions about the ways in which states will respond to specific circumstances.

(2) Dyadic-level Analysis

The level of analysis problem remains relevant or, in a sense, becomes more important when it comes to the study of alliances. Since alliance politics is one of the core aspects of international politics along with war, peace, and conflicts, the level of analysis choice presents methodological challenges in a study of alliance. Then, what would be the most appropriate level of analysis for a study of alliance politics? How

[60] Singer (1961), p. 90.
[61] Waltz (1959), p. 238.

does the nature of an alliance, whether be it multilateral and bilateral, make the difference in selecting proper analytical model? If one aims to provide plausible causal explanations and predictions about how a specific nation *x* (U.S.) in a bilateral military tie would respond to its alliance partner *y* (South Korea or Japan), on which level does a research should focus?

The level of analysis, ranging from the nation-state, dyadic, international institution, and systemic, affects the formation and management of alliance. Indeed, the different and sometimes contradicting outcomes of studies of alliance behavior were the result of divergent approaches in specifying the level of analysis. Traditional approaches to alliance relied on the status of balance of power defined by the international system; alliance was considered a major means for balancing by aggregating one's national power. Stephen Walt's balance of threat argument made a major modification to the traditional alliance theory by focusing not just on power but states' perception of power and aggressive intention of other states. Meanwhile, others attempted to approach alliance, focusing on state level analysis. For example, Randall Schweller's research on alliance came to a conclusion that states may prefer to bandwagon with powerful states or state alliances rather than balance against them as traditional realists would predict.[62] Similarly, Glenn Snyder, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, incorporated both structural and intra-alliance level perspectives and developed the concept of the alliance security dilemma as a vehicle to understand intra-alliance relations.

Bilateral vs. Multilateral Alliance

Aforementioned seminal works on alliance theory, however, do not address the difference between multilateral and bilateral alliance dynamics. Instead, alliances have been analyzed in an aggregate manner. While it is a widely held view that any alliance behaviors are the results of tradeoffs between groups, institutions, and states, alliance

[62] Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist state back in." *International Security* (1994): 72-107.

literature has not paid enough attention to the view. Thus, multilateral and bilateral alliances were not studied in a separate manner despite their differences in formation and intra-alliance negotiations. That is partly because studies of military alliance were inclined to focus on the system level. While the polarity of the system and its impact on states' behaviors were the major interests of scholars, the difference between multilateral and bilateral security alliance was not fully addressed. Just as the number of hegemonic super powers has immediate effect on international politics, the number of allied partners and their relative power distribution determines ways in which states would respond to and interact with its partners.

A growing body of literature, however, has emerged to point out that analyzing security alliances as singular entities is problematic.[63] Recent researches on alliance have attempted to analyze alliance in a disaggregate manner, and they have profound impact on theories of alliance behavior. Leeds, for example, opposed the reductionist view on alliance and instead separated alliances based on the level of commitments and specific provisions found in the content of alliance treaties.[64] Other scholars have attempted to analyze the role of different alliance relationships and treaty obligations in shaping alliance behaviors.[65] For example, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, through content analysis of alliance treaties, found that alliances are in fact reliable 75% of the time and highlighted the importance of analyzing alliance commitment in the context of specific

---

[63] Leeds, B. A. "Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties." *International Organization*, 57-4 (2003): 801-828; Ashley Leeds, B., & Anac, S. "Alliance institutionalization and alliance performance." *International Interactions*, 31(3) (2005): 183-202; Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. "Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments." *American Journal of Political Science*, 53-2 (2009): 461-476; Leeds, B. A., & Savun, B. "Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements?." *Journal of Politics*, 69(4) (2007) 1118-1132; Leeds, B. A. *Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook*. Houston: Rice University, Department of Political Science, 2005; Kimball, A. L. "Alliance formation and conflict initiation: The missing link." *Journal of Peace Research*, 43-4 (2006): 371-389.

[64] Leeds argued that "relationships between alliances and military conflict have been masked in aggregate analysis." See Leeds (2003), p.427.

[65] Gibler, Douglas, and Toby Rider. "Prior commitments: Compatible interests versus capabilities in alliance behavior." *International Interactions*, 30-4 (2004): 309-329; Leeds, Brett, et al. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944." *International Interactions*, 28-3 (2002): 237-260., Morrow, James D. "Alliances: Why write them down?." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3-1 (2000): 63-83.

provisions and obligations.[66] A close examination of the alliance data, they found, demonstrated that contrasting processes take place after a state enters into an alliance, suggesting that pooling the bilateral and multilateral military alliance together is empirically problematic. Such findings imply that when poorly managed, the difference between bilateral and multilateral alliance would be a potential source of the level of analysis dilemma.

Ryan Dudley's work on alliance provides useful insights relevant to this research.[67] His research is based on the assumption that the processes that states undertake to manage multilateral alliance and the nature of multilateral institution are theoretically distinct from the bilateral alliance. It would be rational to assume that alliance behaviors in a multilateral alliance in which three or more partners make deals and necessary compromises would be much more dynamic than in a bilateral one. In other words, the management process in multilateral grouping is fundamentally different from alliance management in a bilateral setting. Based on this assumption, Dudley asserted, "Bilateral alliances are dyads and multilateral alliances are systems or networks operating at a different level of analysis."[68] To put it differently, the operation of a pair of states (bilateral alliances) is different from that of a group of states (multilateral alliances), and thus each requires different modeling and approach.

In his study on alliance, Dudley attempted to provide evidence to show that multilateral and bilateral alliances are designed to serve unique purpose for each member states. As the first evidence, he pointed to the fact that member states of NATO formed numerous bilateral alliances outside of the NATO obligations. In 1963, France and Germany formed a bilateral alliances outside of NATO. Between 1990 and 1993 several Eastern European states—Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—formed bilateral alliances with members of NATO, and when they became members of NATO, their bilateral ties

---

[66] Leeds, Brett, et al. (2000).

[67] Dudley, R. W. *It Takes Two to Tango: An Endogenous Theory of Bilateral Military Alliances*. University of California, Davis, 2010.

[68] Dudley (2010), p.6.

with NATO remained effective.[69] Second, he demonstrated that two alliances show stark difference in terms of formality and endurance. According to Dudley, for example, of the 35 multilateral alliances formed from during the Cold War, 15 (42.8%) are still in effect. In contrast, out of the 183 bilateral alliances formed during the same period, only 43 (23.4%) remain, which proves that bilateral alliances are relatively easy to be dissolved. Besides, multilateral groupings generate relative more formal institutions with designated organization committees and regular meetings.[70] These facts lead us to believe that states view the two alliance types differently. These observations lead us to assume that different alliance grouping should be analyzed with different analytical framework.

More importantly, Dudley directly addressed the issue of adopting proper level of analysis when analyzing alliance dynamics. He contended that while the decision to ally with another states is made at the nation-state level, once formed, bilateral alliances function at the dyadic level of analysis and multilateral alliances operate at the international institution level of analysis.[71] Dudlely writes:

> Once a state chooses to form a bilateral alliance, the process is dyadic. Two states enter into negotiations and form an alliance that satisfies the needs of each state. During the management phase, any negotiations to change the parameters of the alliance (extension, reconfiguration, termination) or conditions under which the alliance is enacted are also dyadic. The consequences of a bilateral alliance, or the conflict behavior of the two member states, are generated by actions taken by, or against, a member of the dyad. Thus, any theory addressing the hypothesized response should emerge from the dyad.[72]

Based on Dudley's argument, differently levels of analysis and major explanatory variables for each level commonly used in international relations studies can be summarized as in <Figure 4>.

---

[69] Ibid, pp.10-11.
[70] Ibid, p.12.
[71] Ibid, p. 5
[72] Ibid, p.9.

Figure 4. Vertical Drift: Different Levels of Analysis and Major Variables



(3) Building an Analytical Framework based on Dyadic-level Analysis

Drawing on the Dudley's argument on the different traits of the two alliances, this research will examine intra-alliance dynamics with focus on the dyadic level of analysis. Dyadic level seems to be the most appropriate approach given the subject matter and purpose of this research. First, dyadic level analysis fits the purpose of this research, which is to find the source of alliance conflict in bilateral security groupings. To be more specific, the goal of this research is to build an analytical model to understand the U.S. alliance behavior vis-à-vis its bilateral alliance partners in East Asia. Establishing a theory that has general application to all different types of states and alliances, which is comparable to Waltz's work on the sources of war, is not what this research aims to achieve. Rather, this research aims to analyze intra-alliance dynamics of the U.S. bilateral alliances and, if possible, build an analytical framework that can explain U.S. alliance policies vis-à-vis its bilateral alliance partners.

Second, unique features of ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan bilateral alliances can be best explained by a level of analysis that focuses on intra-alliance dynamics. As many scholars have pointed out, bilateral alliances are analytically distinct, which compels researchers to approach alliances in disaggregated manner. Furthermore, San Francisco alliance system in Northeast Asia possesses unique character in its origins, asymmetry of power capability, unique role, the intensity of cooperation, and etc., which researchers cannot easily dismiss.[73] In sum, dyadic level of analysis would do best in analyzing U.S. bilateral alliance management if it can be modeled to capture the uniqueness of the U.S. bilateral military alliances.

Employing dyadic level of analysis, however, does not necessarily mean this research would investigate into inter-state or intra-alliance relations only. Just as any researchers would do, explaining alliance behavior requires one to examine the situations of states as well as their individual characteristics and even system level considerations. The purpose of this research is to understand and, hopefully, predict U.S. alliance behavior vis-a-vis specific states in bilateral military alliances. In doing so, this research attempts to look into not only dyadic relations on sub-systemic level but also systemic level variables which has direct influence on U.S. bilateral alliances, such as changes in power balance and level of regional threats. For most cases, studies on alliance have tendency to treat systemic level and sub-systemic variables separately, championing one level of analysis over the other; therefore, their interactions were often neglected. However, this research would carefully look into interactions between variables from different level of analysis.

For the study of U.S. alliance behavior with East Asian alliance partners, dyadic level of analysis has significant implications that go beyond merely focusing on relations of the two states. First, dyadic level analysis would address intra-alliance phenomena and negotiations which in traditional alliance studies have been understudied. Traditional

[73] It is often argued that based on the asymmetry of power, the U.S. formed the unique hub-and-spoke system in East Asia as a means to constrain its allies from committing reckless behavior, most notably starting a war with its communist neighbors. See Cha (2010).

approaches to alliance, with its reductionist view, have given much more weight to external phenomena. As studies have shown, however, bilateral alliances, once they are formed, function with different interactions among member states which is distinct from multilateral alliance. Dyadic level analysis would therefore delve into the dynamics of intra-alliance relationships between alliance members.

Second, adding a dyadic lens into alliance studies and focusing on intra-alliance relations can shed light on relations between security areas and other foreign policy arenas within a bilateral alliance. Studying alliances in a reductionist view, intra-alliance relations, despite its importance, have been under-addressed. Even though it is logical to assume that there is relationship between security and non-security cooperation, particularly when it is a bilateral one, the extensive nature of intra-alliance relationships between member states has not received enough attention in alliance literature. Endogenous relationship might help us better understand alliances behaviors that are often times at odds with traditional approaches that focus on external factors, and instead it might explain relation between security and other foreign policy areas.

2. Role Theory

(1) Finding an Alternative Approach and Holsti's Role Theory

Existing literature on alliance does not seem suitable for the task of analyzing intra-alliance conflict in bilateral alliance. Alliance had been extensively studied as one of the core aspects of international politics in international relations theory. However, major theories on alliance may not be suitable to understand the ever changing dynamics of alliance relationships. That is because, first of all, the majority of alliance theories treated alliance in an aggregate manner, failing to understand subtle difference in alliance dynamics between multilateral and bilateral ones. Second, since they tend to concentrate on external conditions as major explanatory variables to explicate alliance behavior. Yet,

external and material factors alone cannot explain why allies conflict with each other despite a common strategic goal.

Then, one might attempt to investigate into non-systemic and non-material factors as alternatives in order to make sense of the fluctuating relationships between conflict and cooperation among states bound by bilateral alliance treaties. Besides interest and preferences, for example, one can think of adopting constructivist approaches. As complementary explanatory variables, constructivists emphasized the role of ideational or cognitive variables in understating states' foreign policy outcomes.[74] They argue that foreign policy outcomes are in most part determined by cognitive or political psychological factors such as decision makers' perception of external environment, identity, experience, norms, and etc.[75] Their argument is predicated upon the idea that in agent-structure relation, an agent is not simply dependent upon the structure, but agents are somehow capable of managing structural pressure. For them, agents are no longer passive actors, subordinate to system. Thus, rather than analyzing structural constraints on states' behavior, they analyze interactions between structure and states.

Among numerous theoretical frameworks to explain states' foreign policy behavior, role theory, that focuses on the role of policymakers and traces their effect on states' decision, can be modified to explain intra-alliance conflicts. Role theory first appeared in foreign policy analysis in the 1970s when scholars attempted to identify behavioral patterns of states in the bipolar structure. Borrowing the concept of role from social psychology, which stressed the relational and social roots of roles, scholars asserted the existence of a number of social roles of states—such as leader, non-aligned,

---

[74] Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1999; Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane. "Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework." *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (1993): 3-30; Rosati, Jerel A. "The power of human cognition in the study of world politics." *International Studies Review*, 2-3 (2000): 45-75.

[75] Interestingly, scholars have pointed to misperception as a cause of wars. Studies of misconception include Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Vol. 49. Princeton University Press, 1976; _____. "War and misperception." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988): 675-700.

allies, satellites, follower, and aggressor—in the social structure of international relations, which was not unproblematic yet meaningful.

K. J. Holsti applied the role model to states and developed national role conceptions argument to explain state's foreign policy behavior.[76] Walker and Wish also attempted to incorporate the role theory into the IR scholarship.[77] Alexander Wendt stressed the systemic dynamics of the role identity of states.[78] While leading role theories differ with regard to the focuses and sources of role conception, there are two major strands in role conception perspective. The first strand emphasizes the actor's material or cognitive factors as determining factors of role conceptions. The second strand follows constructivist understanding that explores language, identity, and social interactions.

Holsti's work is one of the first analytical approach to states' role conception.[79] Role theory, Holsti posits, offers a framework not only for describing national role performance and roles conceptions but also for exploring sources of role conceptions. Tradition approaches to the world politics, he found, are only rough categorization of reality. Balance of power argument, for example, has made references to national roles such as aggressor, defending group, and a balancer as possible causal variables in explaining the foreign policies of individual states. However, "treatments based on the polar model of the world," he contends, "generally ignore the great variety of roles that

---

[76] Holsti, Kalevi J. "National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy." *International Studies Quarterly* (1970): 233-309.

[77] Walker, Stephen G. (Ed). *Role theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987; Wish, Naomi Bailin. "Foreign policy makers and their national role conceptions." *International Studies Quarterly* (1980): 532-554.

[78] Wendt writes, "[R]ole theorists have tended to assume that the social structure of international politics is too "ill-defined, flexible, or weak" to generate significant role expectations, and so states' foreign policy roles are entirely a functions of policy makers' beliefs and domestic politics, rather than their relations to Others. In effect, the agentic, *role-taking* side of the equation has been emphasized at the expense of the structural, *role-constituting* side, which strips the concept of role of much of its interest. Neorealists seem to agree." Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1999: pp.227-28.

[79] K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 1970).

smaller states play in the system and in various regions."[80] Representing the world in terms of power balance and the Cold War roles does not reveal all the behavioral variation in the different sets of relationships into which states enter. Instead, he assumed that how policymakers view the roles their nation should play in international arena determines behavioral pattern of states. The followings are the questions that Holsti had in mind: what are the major national role types in the contemporary system? And what are the sources of role conceptions held by policymakers?[81]

(2) Key Concepts and Role Types

Borrowing from behavioral science, Holsti developed role theory that is applicable to the study of international politics and foreign policy. In role theory of behavioral science, the term *role* (or role performance) refers to behavior (decisions and actions) and is distinguishable from *role descriptions*, which are the norms and expectations that cultures, institutions, or groups attach to particular *positions*.[82] Just as human behavior is a function of position and expectations the other projects on the position, *the role performance* (decisions and actions) of governments, role theorists assumed, can also be explained by policymakers' own conceptions of their nation's role in a region or in the international system.

Key concepts of role theory that can be modified and employed in the analysis of foreign policy are defined as follows. *Role expectations* consist of ego and alter expectations. The former refers to individual or domestic expectations of proper role. The latter is implicit or explicit demand by others. The role sets, therefore, entail a

---

[80] Hosti (1970), p. 234.

[81] In fact, IR theories are replete with implicit national role models. This research contends that he following arguments can be read in the framework of role models: balancer/offshore balancer argument (balance of power theory), satisfied/non-satisfied or status-quo power/revisionists power (power transition theory), and Japan's middle power argument.

[82] In social science theory, roles are social positions that are constituted by ego and alter expectations in achieving common purpose in an organized group. Linton, Ralph. *The Study of Man: an Introduction* (1936); Turner, Ralph H. "Role-taking, role standpoint, and reference-group behavior." *American Journal of Sociology* (1956): 316-328.

potential for conflict within a role and between roles. *Role conceptions* refer to an actor's perception of its position vis-à-vis others and of role expectations of others. In that way role conceptions can be expanded to encompass actions and perceptions of others as well as identity. *National role conceptions* refer to a set of role conceptions constituted by states. National role conceptions include, Holsti says, "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their states should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional system."[83] In other words, national role conceptions delineate the scope of foreign policy behaviors that decision makers perceive as appropriate for their state to undertake. In that way, national role conceptions are separated from *role performance*, the actual foreign policy behavior. <Table 1> presents key concepts that can be employed in the analysis of foreign policy.

Table 1. Key Concepts in Role Theory

Concept	Definition
Role Conception	Actor's perception of his or her position in relation to others and the perception of the role expectations of others
National Role Conception	Self-defined role by a government
Role Performance	Behavior of an actor
Role Prescriptions	Role, under varying circumstances, derived by the alter or external environment
Position / Status	Place where action takes place; state's status in a system of role prescriptions

Source: Holsti (1970); Wish (1987); Krotz, Ulrich. *National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared*. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 2002.

However, there are differences between the social and international context. Therefore, Holsti observed, some modifications had to be made when adopting social role theory into the analysis of states behavior. For instance, the concept of *position* was replaced by *status* which refers to the estimate of a state's ranking in the international system. Assuming that role performance of a state results from policymakers'

[83] Holsti (1970), pp.245-46.

conceptions of their nation's orientations in the regional and international system, Holsti defined *national role performance* as the general foreign policy behavior of governments which includes patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions, and commitments toward other states. <Figure 5> illustrates overall conceptualization of role conceptions with domestic sources.

Figure 5. Holsti's National Role Conceptions Model



Source: Holsti (1970), p.245

After reviewing evidence gained from reading diverse sources over 71 states, Holsti identified 17 different national roles that policymakers seem to have. <Table 2> shows the list of national conception roles, arranged along the degree of activity and passivity in foreign policy that each role conceptions imply. While traditional balance of power approaches do not adequately address great variation of diplomatic behavior, the distribution of national role conception model emphasizes a rich and varied diplomatic life.

Table 2. Holsti's Role Types and Description

Role Type	Description
1. Bastion of revolution-liberation	Governments that have a duty to organize or lead various types of revolutionary movements
2. Regional leader	Governments that perceive they have duties or special responsibilities in its relation to states in a particular region
3. Regional protector	Governments that bear special leadership responsibilities on a regional or issue-area basis
4. Active independent	Governments supporting the concept of non-alignment
5. Liberal supporter	Governments supporting liberation movements
6. Anti-imperial agent	Governments seeing themselves as agents of struggle against imperialism
7. Defender of the faith	Governments that view their foreign policy objectives and commitments in terms of defending value systems
8. Mediator-integrator	Governments that perceive they are responsible for fulfilling special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states
9. Regional-subsystem collaborator	Governments that have far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities
10. Developer	Governments that have a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries
11. Bridge	Governments that believe to have a communication functions, acting as a "translator" of information between peoples of different cultures
12. Faithful ally	Governments that have alliance commitments made through mutual assistance and other types of treaties
13. Independent	Governments that value the element of policy self-determination
14. Example	Governments that emphasize the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies
15. Internal Development	Governments that direct most of their efforts directed toward problems of internal development
16. Isolate	Governments that have a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety
17. Protectee	Governments that allude to the responsibility of other states to defend them, but do not indicate any particular functions toward the external environment

Source: Holsti (1970), pp. 260-71.

(3) Critical Review of Holsti's Arguments

As we have noted, Holsti's role theory can be used as a useful tool for describing diverse foreign policy decisions of states. For the purpose of this research, which is to find causes of conflicts between the U.S. and its allies, Holsti's theory has two significant implications for the research of intra-alliance dynamics.

First, role theory is related to structural theories of IR, but emphasis was given to policymaker's role conception. Role-based approach incorporates the influence of system structure and power capabilities in foreign policy analysis. For example, some studies have focused on material traits of a role conception, in particular the size and capability of states.[84] Yet, even though such studies can be regarded as an extension of structural realism, role-based approach distinguishes itself from other structural theories designed to explain foreign policy behaviors in that it focused on leaders' perception.[85] Holsti defined national role conceptions with reference to individual decision makers. He assumed that decision makers representing a state share broad agreement on their state's role in world politics.[86] For empirical investigation of role conceptions, therefore, he utilized official statements and government documents on foreign policy.

---

[84] For them, size was readily recognized as a structural variable since size determined a state's place in the global hierarchy of powers. Wish, Naomi B. "National attributes as sources of national role conceptions: A capability-motivation model." In Walker, S. G. (Ed.) *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press (1987), p. 256; Neack, Laura. "Linking state type with foreign policy behavior." In Neack, L,, Hey, J.A.K., and Haney, P. J. (Eds.) *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation* , Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall (1995).

[85] Traditional approaches have resorted to external sources to explain foreign policy outcomes. In doing so, balance of power theorists have more or less ignored domestic, social, political, and personality variables. Even Morton Kaplan, who posited the importance of national role in international politics, argued that the sources of national roles are predominantly external, meaning that the essential rules and attributes of international system determine the orientation and of states. Kaplan, Morton A. *System and Process in International Politics*. ECPR Press, 2005.

[86] Other scholars also attempted to address the issue of bridging the individual and the state level analysis by focusing on the role of decision makers. Hopf studied the relationship between decision makers and the foreign policy behavior of the states, under the assumption that decision makers act on behalf of the state. Hopf, Ted. *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Cornell University Press, 2002. Similarly, Moravcsik argued that foreign policy behaviors determined by decision makers represent the role conceptions of domestic constituencies. Moravcsik,

Second, Holsti's focus on leaders' perception as the major source of national role conceptions is closely connected to agent-structure problems in IR.[87] Wendt, a seminal thinker in this area, argued that both agent and structure are important and that they co-constitute each other.[88] As we have seen, Hoslti also recognized the interaction between agent and structure. However, he favored domestic sources of national role conceptions while downplaying the significance of external influences.

In fact, Holsti addressed the difficulty in identifying sources of national role conceptions. A systemic analysis on national role must address the origin and change of national role conceptions. In other words, identifying external and internal conditions that promoted policymakers to abandon traditional roles and constitute new roles should be an imperative. While studies of certain countries for a period of time might reveal fluctuations in domestic and external variables which cause changes in nation role conceptions and we can trace sources through policymakers' statements, Holsti argued, studies in role theory have yet to suggest solid analysis to explain sources. The relationships between national roles and certain domestic and external variables remain an area for further research. In that regard, Holsti's national role conceptions framework left us a challenge to deepen our understanding of the relationship between agent and structure.

Third, Holsti's role theories focused on the ego part of roles, self-conceptualizations of a state's purpose by its leaders. Consequently, Holsti neglected role prescribed by the alter—external agents—and exclusively focused on states' own role conceptions even though he acknowledged states behaviors are the function of the two—one that ego enacts and the other alter imposes on the ego. Holsti stressed that emphasis is on the definition of national role conceptions and the domestic sources of those

---

Andrew. "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics." *International Organization*, 51-04 (1997): 513-553.

87 Breuning says, "Roles leave their mark in decision makers' speeches and statements." Breuning, Marijke. "Role research: genesis and blind spot." In Harnisch, Sebastian, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (eds.) *Role Theory in International Relations*. Taylor & Francis (2011), pp. 18-19.

88 Wendt, A. E. "The agent-structure problem in international relations theory." *International Organization*, 41-03 (1987): 335-370.

conceptions.[89] In doing so, Holsti presumed that the position of alter, external environment, is a constant. Focusing on ways states define its national role in international system does not necessarily mean the total exclusion of external variables in determining role performances. However, in reality it is almost impossible policymakers to neglect external influence and actions expected by international communities when they make important decisions. It can be assumed that the same is true with intra-alliance dynamics. Particularly, when a small state—South Korea—is in an asymmetric bilateral security alliance with super power, a certain role or decision prescribed by its alliance leader could not be taken as constant or easily dismissed. Given the U.S. position in the international system and the nature of the U.S. bilateral alliance system, the U.S. role expectations would play an important role in readjusting role conception/performance by its alliance partners.

In sum, role theories incorporate cognitive variables and offer analytical framework to explain diverse foreign policy decisions by states in rich detail. Since role theories have attempted to set role conceptions by states that can explain general tendency of states policy preferences, they are relatively free from criticism of losing explanatory capability at the expense of descriptive capability. Yet, the literature has exclusively focused on role conceptions by states themselves while paying little attention to the roles prescribed by other external forces. More importantly, few have attempted to apply role conception approach to intersubjective role conceptions in bilateral security groupings.

3. Analytical Framework

(1) A Role-based Approach to Intra-alliance Conflicts

[89] Holsti (1970), p. 244.

This research adopts Holsti's role-based approach to build an analytical framework to explain fluctuating relationships between the U.S. and its bilateral allies in Northeast Asia. In Holsti's theory, national role conception has important roles both as a dependent and an independent variable. As we have discussed in detail, Holsti's role conception argument asserts that states' decision to act or respond through policy is mainly determined by policymakers' national role conception in the international system. In a nutshell, the purpose of this research is to explain states' behavior, which is dependent variable, with national role conceptions as an independent variable. At the same time, on the basis of the role-based approach, the sources of role conceptions, both external and internal, are to be explored over a period of time. More importantly, among many different sources that contribute to role conception, the issue of which source has the most influence has to be a researcher's major concern, when national role conception is a dependent variable. Based on the analytical framework of role theory, it can be assumed that within bilateral alliances discrepancy between role conception by policymakers' and prescriptions by alter can explain cooperative and conflictive behavior between alliance partners.

In order to build an analytical framework based on national role conceptions and apply the framework to bilateral alliance behaviors, following issues have to be carefully addressed with some necessary adjustments to exiting role theory. First, identifying national role conceptions and sources of the conceptions should constitute the key part of this research. On the one hand, regarding the enactment of national role conceptions, this research recognizes the shortcomings of the purely material and structural explanations. For example, size as a material factor matters in constituting role conceptions; however, size alone does not determine the content of role conceptions. On the other hand, this research emphasizes foreign policy decision makers and systematically evaluate their conceptions of their state's role in a given alliance system and probes into sources of national role conceptions. This research regards decision makers' role important because they articulate a vison of a state's role in international community, and decision makers' official statements and stated foreign policy objectives

represent the outcome of debate and discussion within a government. Accordingly, in order to determine the content of the national role conceptions of decision makers, empirical researches should take a careful look at official policy statements; leaders' speeches, acts, and reactions to policy outcomes; and government documents and reports.

Second, when applying role theory to alliance system, the role prescription by alliance leader—external role expectations—should be of major concern. The role prescribed by an alliance partner sets expected behavior from its partner and thus functions as a reference to the alliance commitment or faithfulness of its alliance partner. Drawing from behavioral science,[90] Holsti recognized that the foundation of national foreign policy performance consists of role conception defined by policymakers and the role prescribed by external environment. However, as we discussed, since Holsti and other scholars have concentrated on the role of cognitive and psychological variable in explaining foreign policy outcome, they regarded external environment as constant and instead examined patterns of national role types and their sources. Holsti argued that "[E]go part of a national role is more influential than the alter part since international relations provide only weak role prescription."[91]

However, we can assume that when two nations are tied in security commitments, there are role expectations formulated both by alliance leader itself and by respective alliance partners in relationship with other partners. In that context, role prescription by alliance leader can affect role performance of its alliance partner as much as role conception does. That is particularly true when the alliance in question is asymmetric in power capability just as U.S. hub and spoke system in Northeast Asia. In an asymmetric alliance, unlike capability aggregation type of alliance with similar level of capability, major power in alliance would have a role conception of its minor power

[90] In behavioral science, external role expectations by "significant others" are considered to play an important role in shaping ego's behavior. Significant others are often associated with primary socializing agents such as parents and siblings. In parent and child relationship, parents assert considerable leverage because children would face significant material or psychological barriers if they choose to withdraw from the relationship. Harnisch, Sebastian, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, eds. *Role Theory in International Relations*. Taylor & Francis, 2011: p.11.

[91] Holsti (1970), p. 243.

partner though not clearly articulated, and in contingencies the major power would evaluate partner's role performance based on the prescribed role.

Figure 6. Role Prescription by Alliance Leader



More importantly, the role conceptions between states might share some aspects or might be different yet compatible; however, some elements of conceptions might be conflictual. Competing or clashing role expectations about ego and others could lead to conflict between states. In a bilateral security alliance, when a state's national role conceptions are broadly incompatible and conflicting with the role prescription by an alliance leader, the alliance partners would have conflicting relationship.

Third, it should be noted that the national role conceptions are subject to change over time and that a change in conceptions is contingent upon specific circumstances. Therefore, researches on security role conceptions in alliance system address specific conditions under which role conceptions change over time. The sources for role changes may be internal, external, or both, and within states they may occur bottom-up, top-down, or both. In other words, foreign policy as role performance or enactment, changes could originate from fundamental structural changes in the international system or external pressure from alliance leaders, or changes could be driven by changes in domestic politics, say change in political leadership, or security crisis. The role change could also occur as a result of inter-role conflicts when a state was encouraged or forced to change its role conceptions. Pace and scope of changes will also be contingent upon specific conditions, and the core of national role conceptions might remain unchanged.

Lastly, conflicts in bilateral alliance should be analyzed in the dyadic level. In dyadic level of analysis, intra-alliance relations should be stressed. That is to say that as the source of divergent role conceptions and performance among allies, the contents of intra-alliance relationship should carefully examined. Intra-alliance agreements, compromises, exchanges, and negotiations between member states can also shape inter-subjective role conceptions as much as external power balance or domestic socio-economic and political needs do. In doing so, we should also pay attention to possible inter-relations between security and security-related or even non-security issues. In asymmetric bilateral alliance, policymakers tend to view intra-alliance relations in terms of relative gain or interest vis-à-vis its alliance partner. It can be assumed that negotiations or agreements in foreign policy issues could affect negotiations in other issues, or vice-versa.

(2) Assumptions and Propositions

As we have noted, bilateral alliance behavior—fluctuation between cooperative and conflictive mood—might be better explained through role-based framework, in which role conceptions serve as the foundation of states' foreign policy decisions. According to the role theory, policymakers constitute national role conceptions based on both external and internal sources. It is often the case that a state's national role conception alone might not be a useful indicator of explaining or predicting states' foreign policy outcomes in the international system. In particular, in an asymmetric bilateral alliance grouping, a major power's role prescription of its minor alliance partner, who is relatively more dependent upon the major state for its security, immediately take effect throughout the process of constituting nation's proper role and making important policy decisions when both parties have national interests at stake on the decision. <Figure 7> shows conceptualization of how role conceptions and role prescriptions are formed and displayed by role performances through foreign policy decisions and actions.

Figure 7. Alliance Role Conception Model



Assumptions

Based on discussions on role-based approach, the research assumes the following assumptions.

- States' foreign policy decisions are guided by national role conceptions assumed by policymakers.
  - Policymakers act on behalf of their state, and their official and general statements represent the outcome of debate and discussion within a government.

- Policymakers possess unique power and opportunities to enact and revise national role conceptions. However, in democratic states, such revisions must resonate with domestic audience.

- National role conception is subject to change.
  - Role conception is the result of policymakers' careful consideration of external and domestic circumstances.
  - Changes in sources of role conception would inevitably lead to changes in national role conception.
  - Changes in national role conception as well as role prescription by an alliance leader is contingent upon specific circumstances, whether internal or external, or both.

Based on the alliance role conception approaches, it is assumed that convergence/divergence dynamics between US role prescriptions and allies' role performance have resulted in different U.S. attitudes towards two states' responses in the wars and that different role conceptions that U.S. had vis-à-vis its of allies led to different response to each supports. <Figure 8> shows conceptualization of how alliance behavior can be understood through dyadic role model. Convergence of roles would lead to harmonious relations; divergence of role performance and role prescription would result in uneasy relations or intra-alliance conflict. If the gap between the two widens, that means common grounds or common interests between the two parties are diminishing. If the gap widens further and becomes unbridgeable, the alliance could eventually break apart.

Figure 8. Dynamics of Intra-alliance Relations in Bilateral Alliances



The purpose of this research is to understand intra-alliance conflicts over alliance partners' wartime contributions. To be specific, this research attempts to analytically understand the dynamics of intra-alliance conflict within the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia through examination of U.S. alliance behavior, its response to allies' coalition contributions.

Analytical Framework and Propositions

When it comes to allies' support for the U.S. war efforts, contributions to the U.S.-led coalition can come with many different forms: diplomatic, financial, and military. First, states can provide diplomatic support by officially announcing their support for the cause of a U.S.-led coalition and expressing their willingness to offer whatever help is necessary. In the case of the Persian Gulf War, official denouncement

against Iraq's invasion into Kuwait, pledges to support military operations to dispel Iraqi forces, participation in implementing security resolutions to coerce Saddam Hussein, and observing economic sanctions imposed on Iraq all fall into this category. Second, states can also support a coalition by writing checks. Financial support could be used for different purposes. It could be directly used to foot a bill for military operations, but it could also be used for other purposes. Financial support by states can be redirected to various non-military purposes, including materiel and logistical assistance and reimbursement for losses incurred by a war. Often times, financial contribution goes to international organizations involved in developmental, reconstruction, humanitarian, and refugee efforts. Third, states can show their flags by sending troops. That is, states can contribute to an international coalition by providing military assets needed to win a war. The role or mission of military assets can range from combat operation to combat support and logistic and medical support, to even military operations other than war.

The type and volume of coalition support a state makes is determined by various factors. A state's interest and the level of dependence on the U.S. are major considerations in determining level of support. It can be assumed that the greater a vital national interest, whether economic or political, a state has regarding the coalition, the greater level of support a state would provide. Domestic factors also impact the coalition support.[92] In particular, available resources and a state machinery's political capability in mobilizing necessary resources will have a decisive effect on the type and volume of contribution. In representative democracy, the level of domestic support will affect coalition support. After all, contributions can take diverse forms, and type and extent of contributions to coalition leader are determined by various factors. And alliance leader's

[92] Studying cases of the 1991 coalition support, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger found that while external pressures explain a state's incentives to contribute, internal constrains explains better for its ability to contribute. See Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War." *International Organization*, 48-01 (1994): 39-75. Baltrusaitis applied burden sharing model developed by Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger to the 2003 Iraq War coalition and found that domestic structure—the relationship between the state executive and legislature—significantly influence a state's burden sharing behavior. Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. *Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing and the War in Iraq.* Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2008.

expectations for size, composition, and timing of contributions are contingent upon strategic needs for a specific war but consistent to the security role conceptions established overtime.

Therefore, intra-alliance conflict can be understood in the context of U.S. expectations of allies' contributions for three categories of support and allies' actual security role performance, which is contribution to the U.S. for each categories. <Figure 9> illustrates conceptualization of theoretical framework to understand intra-alliance conflict over wartime support.

Figure 9. Ally's Contributions and Intra-alliance Relations in a Bilateral Alliance



Based on the analytical framework, following propositions can be examined.

P 1. In bilateral alliance grouping, divergence between the role prescription by a major power (U.S) and the role performance based on role conception by policymakers of a minor power (South Korea and Japan) causes intra-alliance conflict, that can be

identified by mutual repugnance or serious disagreement or argument about important bilateral security arrangements or responsibilities.

- For wartime contributions, alliance leader's role conceptions of its partner determine the scope of expectations for ally's contributions, whether military, economic, and diplomatic, and if a minor power's wartime contributions do not fall within the scope of a major power's (alliance leader) expectations, the major power would be frustrated over the minor power's contributions.

P 2. Intra-alliance conflict could lead to coerced or voluntary role compliance by a minor power.

- In asymmetric bilateral alliance, if a minor power's security dependence on a major power persists, the intra-alliance conflict would compel the minor power to realign its security role conceptions out of fear of abandonment.

(3) Research Methodology

This research is a qualitative and comparative case study focusing on alliance conflict within the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia. For research method, this research relies on building analytical framework, examining the validity of propositions, and in-depth case study through empirical analysis of intra-alliance relations utilizing discourse analysis and process tracing method.

First, in order to examine the validity of role-based framework and propositions, this research would carry out a discourse analysis of the following sources. First of all, in order to identify contents of national role conceptions, primary and secondary sources will be investigated. For primary sources, this research will analyze official and general statements of policy makers (presidents, prime ministers, or foreign ministers), government report, and official foreign policy statements of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan within the context of the bilateral security alliance in East Asia. Secondary sources

will also be reviewed to understand the constitution and change of role conceptions of states in a more analytical fashion. The U.S. role prescriptions vis-à-vis its East Asian alliance partners—South Korea and Japan—will be analyzed through the following materials: general statements or reviews on foreign policy regarding South Korea and Japan, Congressional debates and hearing, summit talks, statements or agreements made during regular defense meetings and dialogues, high-level inter-alliance talks, direct quotations of official statements, editorials or interpretations of formal and/or informal statements by observers or commentators, and etc.

Second, process-tracing method will be used for examining the four cases. Process-tracing is a method useful for small-n analysis to trace causal process. Primarily, the process-tracing method is used to "identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable."[93] Yet, various techniques of process-tracing can be employed for different purposes.[94] Among varieties of process-tracing method, this research utilizes detailed narrative approach presented in the form of a chronicle to explain how intra-alliance conflicts came about during the first and second Gulf War.

Tracing causal process of role conception/performance is indispensable for examining the propositions because it allows us to demonstrate how distinct external and internal observations are linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of each cases. As illustrated in <Figure 10>, this research will attempt to trace causal sequence in order to explain 1) how internal and external conditions worked to constitute alliance role conception, 2) how the role conception was expressed by foreign policy decisions and actions, and 3) how diverging role conceptions contributed to intra-alliance conflict (dependent variable).

---

[93] George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press, 2005, p.206.

[94] Process-tracing is compatible with other research methods and thus can be used as complements. See George and Bennett (2005), chapter 10.

Figure 10. Causal Process of Role-based Approach



In assessing the four cases, this research will trace processes of decision making in each governments and different bureaucratic bodies, and demonstrate how key internal/external conditions are translated into alliance role and policy outcomes. In doing so, the intra-alliance interactions will be thoroughly examined in chronological sequence. The government-level interactions, discussions, and negotiations over coalition support by South Korea and Japan during the first and second Gulf War will be the major subjects of examination. Role performance of states will be analyzed through investigation of foreign policy outcomes and war time supports by allies. The coalition support by South Korea and Japan in response to the U.S. request will be analyzed in three dimensions: military, political, and economic support.

In addition, this research based on process-tracing method will also trace the post-Cold War changes in the U.S. grand strategy as well as security policy towards East Asia and its alliance partners in order to examine changes in roles and responsibilities of the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia. Dyadic relations leading up to after each Gulf War will also be analyzed in order to trace the linkage between security-related issues and non-security issues. However, dyadic level analysis between ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan will be selective, focusing on what are considered to be particularly important in affecting role conception/prescription.

CHAPTER III. POST-COLD WAR ROLE ENACTMENT AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

1. Post-Cold War U.S. Security Strategy and Realignment of Defense Posture

(1) Coming to Terms with the Sudden End of the Cold War Rivalry

The sudden, unexpected end of the Cold War rivalry left the U.S. unprepared of how to manage in the new world order as the single super power international system. The Iron Curtain gradually lifted after Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. While the Soviet Union fought a frustrating war in Afghanistan for throughout the 1980s,[95] the Soviet economy faced the extremely high cost of the arms race, which made the already stagnant economy more fragile.[96] In high hopes of reviving the sluggish economy, Gorbachev introduced the two polices of *Glasnost* (openness) and *Perestroika* (restructuring). With the former, Gorbachev encouraged Soviet officials to allow western ideas and goods into USSR, and with the latter, he tried to implant liberal market incentives to Soviet citizens. This set of policies ushered in the ear of freedom and render the Soviet Union unwilling to react to challenges unfolding in Eastern Europe. On November 10, 1989, the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the Cold War, came down. In 1990, starting in Poland, free elections ousted Communist leaders everywhere in Eastern Europe. Eventually in December 1991, Ukraine and other Soviet republics declared their independence. Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic,

[95] Reuveny, Rafael, and Aseem Prakash. "The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union." *Review of International Studies*, 25-4 (1999): 693-708.

[96] Lundestad, Geir. "'Imperial Overstretch', Mikhail Gorbachev, and the End of the Cold War." *Cold War History*, 1-1 (2000): 1-20.

formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.), and the Soviet Union became history. With stunning speed, the Cold War came to an end.[97]

Indeed, staring in the mid-1980 U.S. was making progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. In order to tackle economic malaise and decline, the U.S. cut a deal with the Soviet Union to cut strategic arms and reduce military tensions, and a serious of arms reduction treaty began to bear fruits. As a result, U.S.-Soviet relations improved considerably since the mid-1980s. At a dramatic summit meeting held in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, Gorbachev proposed a 50 % reduction in the nuclear arsenals of each side, and for a time it seemed as if a historic agreement would be reached. The summit, however, ended in failure, owing to differences over SDI. Meanwhile, on 8 December 1987, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in Washington, eliminating an entire class of nuclear and conventional missiles with intermediate ranges. The INF Treaty was the first arms-control treaty that mandated an actual reduction in nuclear arsenals. After the Malta summit in 1989, which officially announced the end to the Cold War, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in July 1991 signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in order to reduce and limit strategic offensive arms.

Yet, the end of the Cold War suddenly left the U.S. unprepared of how to manage the new world order as the single super power in the international system. No serious academic and political discourse in the U.S. addressed the likelihood of a Soviet Union's collapse,[98] not to mention a new national security strategy. Indeed, intellectuals and pundits failed to foresee sudden demise of the Soviet empire. In academic discussions, because of the status-quo bias of international system, structural realists, for example, had believed that the bipolarity of the Cold War would be the most stable in terms of international distribution of power.[99]

---

[97] Mandelbaum, Michael. "Coup de grace: The end of the Soviet Union." *Foreign Affairs* (1991): 164-183.

[98] Gaddis, John Lewis. "International relations theory and the end of the Cold War." *International Security* (1992): 5-58.

[99] According to Kenneth Waltz, bipolarity fosters stability—limitation of violence—for the following reasons: 1) with only two world power, there are no peripheries. Any action of one states automatically elicit a response from the other. 2) the increased intensity of competition makes the issue of 'who is a danger to whom' clear, and 3) the constant presence of pressure and recurring crises, making reaping gains

There seemed to be no consensus on the cause of the sudden collapse. At the breakdown of the Soviet Union, some believed that the competitive military spending and arms race between Washington and Moscow led the Soviet Union without solid economic foundation to the collapse. Others argued that the containment strategy eventually bore fruit in 45 years after the Harry Truman regime implemented the grand strategy.[100] Some others claimed the no one really won the Cold War, pointing to the loss of American lives during proxy wars in Vietnam and the Korean peninsula. All in all, most Americans found it difficult to accept the new world in which the long fought enemy is suddenly gone. Furthermore, the world still remained unsafe with new security challenges coming from various sources such as rogue states and weapons of mass destruction.

Scholarly debates in the U.S. sparked by the collapse of the Soviet Union reflected similar uncertainty of the post-Cold War world order and the status of America in the world. Some were quick to opine that the collapse of the Soviet empire heralded the era of American preponderance. Charles Krauthammer, an American political commentator, asserted that the most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is unipolarity.[101] Rejecting then widely accepted assumption that the post-Cold War world is multipolar with powers dispersed to Germany, Japan, and diminished Russia, he argued that the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world is "a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial West."[102]

---

difficult. See Waltz, Kenneth N. "The stability of a bipolar world." *Daedalus* (1964): 881-909. For arguments in similar vein, Waltz (1979), pp.170-176; Mearsheimer, John J. "Why we will soon miss the Cold War." *The Atlantic Monthly*, 266.2 (1990): 35-50.

[100] Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar* American National Security Policy. Vol. 690. Oxford University Press, 1982.

[101] A unipolar system can be defined as one in which a single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of a balancing coalition against it.

[102] Krauthammer, C. "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?." *Washington Post*, 13 (1992), A25; Krauthammer, C. "The unipolar moment." *Foreign Affairs*, 23-33 (1990); He writes ""It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies." (p.24) In the article, he also rejected other conventional assumptions: 1) the domestic American consensus for an international foreign policy will be restored, 2) in the new post-Soviet strategic environment, the threat of war will be dramatically diminished.

He figured that multipolarity will come, but it will come not in decades but in generations. In order to sustain unipolar preeminence, he contended, the U.S. should maintain economic growth and effectively respond to emerging new threats, most notably, the spread of weapons mass destruction and the emergence of the so-called "Weapon State"—a failing state with strategic weapons.[103]

Other commentators argued that unipolarity is momentary and dangerous.[104] The U.S. preponderance, according to their argument, will be easily negated by other emerging great powers, and thus unipolarity is a moment that will not last long or is already giving way to multipolarity. For example, "Unipolar systems," Christopher Layne asserts, "contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers."[105] States, according to Layne, would balance against a global or regional hegemon.[106] Therefore, the strategy of preponderance designed to preserve the Cold War status quo was doomed to fail. This line of arguments was drawing on neorealist school of thought. According to neorealism, unipolarity is the least stable structure among all international structures because concentration of power threatens other states and cause them to restore a balance.[107] Some others even claimed that the post-Cold War system is never unipolar.

---

[103] Krauthammer wrote, "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives." (1990), pp. 30-31.

[104] Layne, C. "The unipolar illusion: Why new great powers will rise." *International Security*, 5-51 (1993); Layne, C. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy." *International Security*, 22-1 (1997): 86-124; Monteiro, N. P. "Unrest assured: Why unipolarity is not peaceful." *International Security* (2011)*;* Kupchan, C. A. "After Pax Americana: benign power, regional integration, and the sources of a stable multipolarity". *International Security*, 23-2 (1998): 40-79; Mastanduno, M. "Preserving the unipolar moment: realist theories and US grand strategy after the cold war." *International Security*, 21-4 (1997): 49-88.

[105] Layne (1993), p.7.

[106] Mearsheimer argued that achieving a status of global hegemon is nearly impossible because of the limitation of power projection capability and the stopping power of water. Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. WW Norton & Company, 2001.

[107] Waltz, Kenneth N. "America as a model for the world? A foreign policy perspective." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 24-04 (1991): 667-670; Waltz, Kenneth N. "Evaluating theories." *American Political Science Review* (1997): 913-917; Waltz, Kenneth N. "The emerging structure of international politics." *International Security* (1993): 44-79; Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural realism after the Cold War."

On the other hand, some scholars challenged neorealist argument of balancing and suggested that the coming era of unipolarity will be stable.[108] Wohlforth, for example, argues that neorealist wisdom that the post-Cold War distribution of power, that is unipolar, is unstable and more prone to conflict is wrong. First, Wohlforth asserted, the unipolarity is novel in modern history. The argument goes, the U.S. is the first leading states with a much larger margin of superiority in all the underlying components of power—economic, military, and technological.[109] Second, the unipolarity is prone to peace because almost absolute power advantage of the U.S. could minimize security competition among the other great powers. To add, the argument goes, the unipolarity is sustainable since potential competitors' effort to increase their power would face local counterbalancing behavior thanks to geopolitical reasons. Therefore, unipolarity can be not only peaceful but also durable.

(2) U.S. Role Enactment: Searching for the Post-Cold War Grand Strategy

At the onset of the post-Cold War order, the U.S. did not seem to have a clear and coherent strategy to cope with the new world order. Since 1945 the U.S. had fought to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its sphere of influence and thereby altering

---

International Security, 25-1 (2000): 5-41. If this argument holds true, the following question would be why there is no balancing against the U.S.? The realist theory of balance of power cannot explain the absence of balancing behavior of states or balancing coalition against the U.S. Common responses to the questions are as follows: 1) the nature of the U.S. dominance—the U.S. as a benign hegemon does not pose much threat to others, 2) geography—the U.S. is isolated by the oceans, and others are not immediately threatened by the U.S., and 3) preponderance of the U.S. military and economic power makes the cost of balancing unbearable for others. See also Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. "Balancing on land and at sea: do states ally against the leading global power?." *International Security*, 35-1 (2010): 7-43. Meanwhile, others claim that in the early stages of balancing behavior against the U.S., major powers would adopt "soft-balancing." Pape, Robert A. "Soft balancing against the United States." *International Security*, 30-1 (2005): 7-45; Paul, Thazha V. "Soft balancing in the age of US primacy." *International Security*, 30-1 (2005): 46-71; Walt (2005).

[108] Wohlforth (1999).

[109] Professor Joseph Nye stressed the role and importance of non-material aspect of the U.S. power. Nye, Joseph S. "Soft power." *Foreign policy* (1990): 153-171; Nye, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs, 2004.

the global balance of power to its advantage. The national strategy to achieve the goal was containment. As we have discussed, however, there seemed to be no consensus on the post-Cold War world order. For the U.S. decision makers, the grave challenge was to find a new American role in the new security environment. Foreign policy pundits suggested diverse strategic options the U.S. can take in the post-Cold War ranging from grand strategy of isolationism to selective engagement, to unbridled internationalism.[110] In the following, the U.S. national efforts in the early days of the post-Cold War to forge a new grand strategy in response to a perceived new world order will be examined.

U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 1988 written during the last years of the second term Reagan administration still reflected the Cold War mentality.[111] In the mid-1980s, the Soviet leader Gorbachev was introducing dramatic reforms and put an end to Russian involvement in Afghanistan. However, NSS 1988, while paying attention to the reforms and political liberation among the Warsaw pact states, still cautioned that there was yet no clear sign that the Russian ambition for expanding its influence became obsolete. NSS 1988 emphasized that the Soviet Union remained the most significant threat to U.S. national interests despite some progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. The report concluded, "Our overall strategy toward the Soviet Union remains to contain Soviet expansionism, and to encourage political democracy and basic human rights within the Soviet Union and the countries under its hegemony."[112]

The first National Security Strategy report by the G. H. W. Bush administration acknowledged that the global security environment is rapidly changing and that the opportunities and challenges comes with it. Celebrating the U.S. success in containing Soviet expansionism, the document stressed new world order requires a new strategic

---

[110] For example, Robert Art opposed isolationism. Instead of the complete withdrawal of overseas forces, he called from retrenchment, arguing that residual U.S. global military presence would be needed. Art, R. J. "A defensible defense: America's grand strategy after the Cold War." *International Security*, 5-53 (1991). Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, argued that the U.S. should focus more on domestic imperatives and sustain the policy of selective and proportionate global commitment. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Selective global commitment." *Foreign Affairs* (1991): 1-20.

[111] Reagan, R. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers Incorporated, 1988.

[112] Reagan (1988), p. 26.

vision with clear goals, interests, and means that will go beyond containment.[113] The report stressed that the end of the Cold War does not mean the elimination of all possible threats, and the key responsibility of the U.S. is to maintain stability of the international balance. More importantly, the report argued that the U.S. needs not only skilled diplomacy and formidable military forces but also a dynamic and strong economic base in order to retain the position of international leadership role in the age of strategic transformation, fiscal austerity, and great uncertainty. "America's national power," the report writes, "continues to rest on the strength and resilience of our economy."[114]

As we have discussed so far, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the successful purging of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the post-Cold War national strategy was gradually taking shape based on external security environment and domestic conditions. Some of the principles of American foreign policy at the onset of the post-Cold War world can be summarized as follows. First, the old bipolar world is gone, and while the U.S. remained as the only super power, the global power was gradually being dispersed with new possible great powers like Japan and Germany. Thus, the primary goal of foreign policy was to maintain U.S. power preeminence and leadership role. Second, between two poles of isolationism and internationalism, the U.S. was leaning towards an internationalist foreign policy, which was radically weakened by the War in Vietnam. Third, the sudden dissolution of the Soviet empire and the rolling back of outstretched Soviet forces contributed to reduction of external threat level for the U.S. As the Soviet threat dramatically diminished and the new source of threats—heightened possibility of low intensity conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—emerged, the U.S. recognized the need to recalibrate its defense strategy and military

---

[113] In an address to the Congress delivered after purging the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, President Bush stressed that the Persian Gulf War ushered in new world order and that the United States would be obligated to lead the world community and pursue national interests within a cooperative framework of the international community. See Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit." September 11, 1990. <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9>.

[114] Bush, George. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1990*. Brassey's, 1990, p. 21.

posture accordingly. Fourth, the U.S. policymakers recognized its national power would continue to rely on the strength of its economy. In the face of low economic growth and fiscal austerity, the U.S. national security strategies emphasized the need for not only skilled diplomacy and formidable military forces but also a dynamic and strong economic power as key means for retaining the international leadership role.

(3) Post-Cold War U.S. Defense Posture Realignment

If the post-Cold War U.S. national strategy reflects U.S. intent in international affairs and provides basis for the U.S. foreign policy, the post-Cold War U.S. defense strategy and posture reflects U.S. capability to project power in support of the changed U.S. national security policy. The post-Cold War U.S. defense posture is indispensable means of securing U.S. national interests in the post-Cold War era. Changes in national security strategy accompanied the recalibration of defense strategy and military posture. In the following, major changes in the U.S. defense posture will be reviewed. In order to fully comprehend the post-Cold War U.S. role enactment, the actual changes in defense posture should be carefully assessed against national security strategy reports.

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the disintegration of the Soviet Union removed the threat of communism that had long determined the direction of U.S. security strategy and contributed to the emergence of new strategic environment. For over five decades, U.S. strategic thinking had been dominated by concerns for bipolar rivalry and containment; however, that paradigm shifted.[115] Without a competitive super power to contain, there was a widespread recognition of the need for a new defense paradigm. Consequently, U.S. policymakers found themselves reviewing military strategy, force structure, and defense budget.

Apparently, in order to respond to changing security environment, the U.S. was determined to readjust it defense structure. The readjustment had two-fold meanings. On the one hand, defense planners have confronted pressure from Congress to cut down or

[115] Haass, Richard N. "Paradigm lost." *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (1995): 43.

put caps on defense budget.[116] Sluggish economic condition further strengthened the case for defense entrenchment, compelling defense planners in Washington to adjust overall U.S. defense posture suitable for renewed security environment.[117] On the other hand, new strategic environment required realignment and reduction of forward deployed forces whose posture was to contain Soviet aggression. In fact, the historic pattern of U.S. force level had been a rapid mobilization of forces in response to external crisis followed by a rapid force reduction after a war ended.[118] Once a threat was met, there was a return to the status quo ante. This also holds for the post-Cold War U.S. defense strategy.

Changes in Defense Budget and Defense Posture

The changes in force level and defense expenditure do not necessarily account for changes in strategic thinking, nor all resources the U.S. commits for its security. However, the changes in figures of troop numbers and budget do reflect that how much resources U.S. policymakers are determined to provide to protect national interests and meet renewed security challenges. In other words, even though we allow variations in strategic focus from administration to administration, still some sense of strategic shift can be grasped by investigating changes in military personnel and defense spending level.

Reduced external threat was immediately translated to pressure for reduced military expenditures. Since the mid-1980s the U.S. governments undertook substantial reductions in defense spending. <Figure 11> shows U.S. military spending had dropped after the Reagan era military spending hike in the early-1980s. Even though a through analytical assessment would require a close examination of defense spending composition, it seems clear that year 1986 was turning point for U.S. defense spending,

---

[116] Apple Jr., R. W. "Bush is reported ready to retreat on military money." *New York Times*, March 18, 1990.
[117] Gordon, Michael R. "Pentagon Drafts Strategy for Post-Cold War World." *New York Times*, August 2, 1990.
[118] Kane, Tim. "Global US Troop Deployment, 1950–2003." *Heritage Foundation* (2004).

after which the spending showed a sharp decreasing trend. Between 1989 and 1991, for example, the defense spending dropped by 16 %.

Figure 11. U.S. Military Spending (1980-2000)



Date Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Historical chart of U.S. defense spending since World War II as shown in <Figure 12> demonstrates that defense budget drawdown from the FY1986 peak to the FY1997 trough is actually about the historical range.[119] In the post-Cold War world, defense spending got cut significantly during the second term Bush years and Clinton years, and the U.S. seemed to have tried to reap the so-called the peace dividend in the 1990s thanks to reduced security threats.

[119] CSIS report presented that after the Korean War the defense budget fell by 43% and that Post-Vietnam War dropping rate was of -33% and Post-Cold War -36%. Murdock, Clark A., Kelley Sayler, and Ryan A. Crotty. "The Defense budget's double whammy: drawing down while hollowing out from within." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 1 (2012).

Figure 12. U.S. Military Spending (1951-2011)



Date Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Figure 13. U.S. National Defense Spending as Share of GDP



Date Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

As shown in <Figure 13>, defense spending as share of GDP also shows a decreasing trend, falling from 6.3% in 1986 to about 4% in the early 1990s, which continues to go down to nearly 3% in the 2000s.[120] After all, even though U.S. defense

[120] The U.S. defense spending was 9.3% of GDP in 1962, 7.4% in 1965, and 9.4% in 1968 respectively, and during the 1970s and 1980s average defense spending was 5-7% of GDP. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

planner recognized the end of Cold War meant not just the end of Communist threat but the emergence of new threats, adjustment to lower defense spending was surely underway. The U.S. managed to reduce military spending, shifting resources from the Cold War arms competition to new security challenges such as weapons of mass destruction, long and medium range missiles, and drugs.

Besides decreasing defense spending, the new security environment also called for readjustment in global defense posture. Since 1950, the U.S. had forward deployed its troops around the world. Between 1950 and 2000, an average of 2.3 million military personnel was on duty every year, and on average 22% of all U.S. troops were stationed on foreign soil during that period.[121] During the past 60 years, there have been more than 50 countries that hosted at least 1,000 U.S. servicemen. Foreign deployments have been heavily concentrated in Europe and East Asia. During the second half of the 20th century, 52 % of deployed troops were in Europe and 41 % in East Asia.[122]

Beginning in the late 1980s, major initiatives by the U.S. security policymakers were undertaken to review defense posture as well as overall force level. Major focus of the reviews was the reduction of military personnel and units. First of all, from 1989 to 1992, then Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff, Colin Powell, developed the concept of Base Force.[123] Base Force called for reduction of the total active military force from 2.1 million to 1.6 million. In terms of organization, General Powell's Base Force demanded that Army be reduced to 12 divisions, the Air Force to 16 tactical fighter wings, the Navy to 450 ships and 12 aircraft carriers. Second, in 1993, Secretary of Defense Lee Aspin initiated an overall reassessment of defense concepts and plans.[124] The result, Aspin's *Bottom Up Review* (BUR), requested further downsizing of military forces. The total military force was recommended at 1.4 million level. Accordingly, the BUR decided that

---

[121] Of this average, 535,000 troops were deployed on foreign territory per year from 1950 to 2000.

[122] Kane (2004).

[123] Powell, Colin L. "US forces: Challenges ahead." *Foreign Affairs* (1992): 32-45; Jaffe, Lorna S. *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C. Joint History Office, 1993.

[124] Aspin, Les and Colin L. Powell. *Bottom-Up Review*. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 1993.

Army can function with only 10 division, Navy with 11 carrier battle groups, and Air Force with 12 active fighter wings.[125]

Figure 14. Number of U.S. Troops in Foreign Countries



Source: Retrieved by author from the troop deployment dataset (1950–2005) of the Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>.

Based on reduced threat assessment, the U.S. began to draw down the size of deployed troops. The major post-Cold War drawdown of U.S. forces abroad started in the early 1990s. As shown in <Figure 14>, the number of U.S. troops in foreign, once shot up after the Korean War and the War in Vietnam, began to fall dramatically, making the departure of the global military posture from the Cold War stance. In 1995, the number dropped to nearly 200,000. In term of percentage point of the deployed forces out of total U.S. troops, <Figure 15> shows that there had been a sharp decline after the Cold War, marking the lowest point of 13.7 % in the mid-1990s.

[125] For both of the two reviews, force reduction, even though it was major part of the force reviews, was not the only concern. Two reports recognized that force restructuring should be based upon the force requirements for dealing with "two near simultaneous major regional conflicts", also known as "1+1 strategy."

Figure 15. Percent of U.S. Troops Deployed in Foreign Countries



Source: Retrieved by author from the troop deployment dataset (1950–2005) of the Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>.

Troop drawdown by region reveals more interesting observations. During the Cold War era, U.S. troops were stationed in allies of Europe and East Asia, such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as part of the strategy of containment and deterrence. As expected, a great number of U.S. forces returned home both from Europe and East Asia; however, as <Figure 16> illustrates, the magnitude of reduction in Europe far exceeded that of East Asia. Between 1981 and 1985, the average number of U.S. troops in Europe was 316,629. However, the number was slashed by nearly two-thirds after the Cold War to 163,867 between 1991 and 1995, making 48% decrease. That force was reduced further down to an average of 109,452 troops between 1996 and 2000. For the same period, the number of U.S. troops in East Asia declined from 103,391 (1981-85) to 83,859 (1991-95), with a 19% decrease. After the Cold War, more than 130,000 U.S. troops returned home from Germany, which had maintained the highest U.S. troop level during the entire Cold War.[126] The actual reduction of military personnel was

[126] Between 1981 and 1985, on average 251,997 U.S. troops stationed in Germany, but the number went down to 120,879 for 1991-95 and dropped further to 62,667 for 1996-2000 average.

accompanied by a decline in the number of military units across different military services. Since 1990, the number of active Army division had been reduced from 18 to 10, Navy aircraft carriers from 15 to 11, and Air Force fighter wings from 24 to 13.[127]

Figure 16. U.S. Global Troop Deployments by Region



Source: Retrieved by author from the troop deployment dataset (1950–2005) of the Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>.
Note: Data for the year 2000s includes troop numbers up to the year 2005.

Summary

The unexpected sudden collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically transformed the international security environment. Starting the later 1980s, when the Soviet economy was slipping into decline, the U.S. policy makers readjusted national security strategy in order to better meet security needs. First, containment strategy toward the Soviet Union was revised to reflect much reduced threat. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not immediately lead to abandonment of the policy of curbing Russia's expansionism, and the U.S. was determined to remain vigilant against Russia's continued

[127] Gargan, John J. "To defend a nation: An overview of downsizing and the US military." *Management*, 2-3 (1999), p. 228.

threats. However, the U.S. policy makers gradually relaxed their hardline containment policy, giving more focus on détente and deterrence than containment. Second, global security competition gave way to regional security challenges. The sudden end of the Cold War compelled American policy makers to shift strategic focus to regional threats, centered on weapons of mass destruction and rogue states in the Persian Gulf and the Korean peninsula. Primary goal of the U.S. security strategy was to check the rise of potential hostile powers.[128] Third, the U.S. attempted to readjust its relations with great powers, most notably Germany and Japan. The major goal of readjustment was to have them under the influence of the U.S. In particular, the U.S. policy makers wanted other great powers to follow the rules of economic and political life that govern the international system. Fourth, the U.S. recognized that after the end of the Cold War, its national power would continue to rely on the strength of its economy. The U.S. policy makers emphasized the need for not only skilled diplomacy and formidable military forces but also a dynamic and strong economic power as key means for retaining the international leadership role.

Changes in national security strategy accompanied the recalibration of defense strategy and military posture. First, as the Cold War threat of communist expansion dwindled, the U.S. military strategists attempted to devise a new security strategy that would replace containment. The U.S. military shifted its focus from maintaining defense posture for global security competition with the Soviet Union to increasing defense readiness for regional security challenges. As potential new threats, the U.S. military strategists pointed to hostile military powers, or so-called rogue states. In particular, for areas of potential military conflicts, they made references to the Persian Gulf and Korean peninsula. For instance, the Bottom-Up Review gave special consideration to a scenario that hypothesized that the two 'nearly simultaneous' conflicts would occur in the Persian

[128] In that regard, it is often argued that with the end of the Cold War rivalry, the U.S. national security strategy should abandon hegemonic strategy of containment and embrace relatively restrained strategy of offshore balancing. See Layne (1997); Mearsheimer, John J. "The future of the American pacifier." *Foreign Affairs* (2001): 46-61.

Gulf and Korea and, therefore, stressed the need to enhance the joint ROK-U.S. defense posture in preparation for a major regional contingency on the Korean peninsula.[129]

Second, accordingly the U.S. defense posture, while maintaining major framework of forward overseas deployment, was restructured in ways in which its military forces could be better prepared to respond to regional security challenges. The essentials of force restructuring was realignment and reduction. However, in the face of increased domestic demand for peace dividend and the Congressional pressure, the U.S. defense budget cut and troop reduction were the most visible part of the force restructuring. Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. policy makers took substantial reductions in defense spending. As share of GDP, the U.S. defense spending maintained decreasing trend from 6.3% in 1986 to about 4% in the early 1990s, and to nearly 3% in the early 2000s. The U.S. military officials also undertook massive scale of reduction of troops while keeping the most essential military capability intact. A great number of U.S. troops returned home both from Europe and Asia. Between 1981 and 1985, for example, the number of U.S. forces in Europe was about 316,000; however, the number dropped to nearly 163,000 in the early 1990s, making 48% decline. For the same period, the U.S. troops in East Asia declined from 103,000 to 83,000 with a 19% decrease. The reduction of military personnel was also accompanied by a decline in the number of military units across different military services.

Meanwhile, the U.S. defense planners began to implement a series of critical force enhancements to improve mobility, flexibility, and efficiency of military forces, in order to compensate the troop reduction available and better prepared to meet regional security challenges. Regarding security partnership, the U.S. policy makers were determined to expand and adapt security partnership and alliances built during the Cold War to new security environment. Addressing regional security challenges in close cooperation with security partners and allies, the U.S. policy makers assumed, would give the U.S. opportunities to protect and advance U.S. security with fewer resources, freeing some resources to be invested in other areas. Lastly, while the U.S. was

[129] Aspin and Powell (1993), Section III.

determined to reduce its nuclear arsenals through strategic arms reduction talks with Russia, the U.S. stated that it would retain the capacity for extended nuclear deterrence. Indeed, the Bottom-Up Review detailed plans for increasing offensive nuclear capability.

2. Post-Cold War U.S. Security Strategy for North East Asia

According to Holsti's role theory, actors behave based on the role prescription given by external agents. As discussed in the previous chapter, a state in a bilateral alliance is expected to play a certain role prescribed by its alliance partner. That does not necessarily mean that role prescription by much stronger alliance partner dictates a state's foreign policy decision. Every states tend to enjoy some level of autonomy, and they cannot play the role exactly as was prescribed by its alliance partner. But at the same time, they cannot be completely free from the constraints of role prescription. Often times the gap between the role performance and role prescription by its alliance partner can be the source of alliance discord. Therefore, in order to make sense of an intra-alliance relation, it is necessary to analyze what kind of role, whether explicit or implicit, a stronger alliance partner designates to its weaker partner.

Against this theoretical backdrop, in the following alliance role prescription for its allies in East Asia by the U.S. will be reviewed. For that, official documents of U.S.'s national security strategy and foreign policy towards Northeast Asia will be closely examined. Based on the analysis, the role prescriptions that the U.S. in the post-Cold War era had against South Korea and Japan will be constituted respectively. More importantly, questions regarding how a certain role that U.S. wanted its alliance partner was formed and changed over time and what factors affected in shaping role prescription will be carefully addressed.

(1) Review of U.S. National Security Strategy towards South Korea and Japan

The U.S. National Security Strategy of 1987 (NSS 1987), published during the Reagan administration, was the first NSS ever published by the U.S.[130] In NSS 1987,[131] the U.S. strategic thinking toward Japan and South Korea is specified.

The U.S. recognized cooperation with Japan as basic to the U.S. relationships in the region. The Reagan administration understood the U.S.-Japan security treaty provides a basis for broad spectrum of economic, social, and political associations. It seems clear that the U.S. was expecting and thus encouraged Japan, then the world's second greatest economic power, to assume increased security roles. The U.S. welcomed Japans redefinition of its self-defense goals, in particular Japan's suggestion of sea lane protection and increased military capability and defense spending. The report says, "Japan's defense spending remains small as a share of its huge economy . . . But the constant and substantial growth of that spending over the last fifteen years, and particularly over the last five years, is significant. Japan's recent decision to spend more than one percent of its GNP on defense is especially noteworthy."[132] At the same time, however, the trade dispute between the U.S. and Japan was conspicuous. The report points out, "Japanese economic relations have become a source of political tension. The Japanese trade surplus is the biggest in history. This surplus cannot be sustained and must be brought into better balance."[133]

The U.S. recognized the alliance with South Korea as of exceptional importance, mainly out of security concerns regarding North Korea. North Korea, the report attested, "still has armed forces that far exceed those of the South in quantity, are

---

[130] Since the ratification of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, the U.S. Presidents have been required to submit to Congress an annual report outlining the national security strategy that the President will pursue in office. In order to meet the deadline required by the new act, NSS 1987 was rushed and thus reflected limited strategic thinking. The U.S. National Security Strategy Archive. <http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=48>.

[131] Reagan, Ronald. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1987*. White House, 1987.

[132] Ibid, p. 15.

[133] Ibid, p. 15.

newly strengthened by additional Soviet weapons, and are in the hands of a government whose aggressive demeanor and tendency to act unexpectedly is well known."[134] The U.S. military presence in South Korea, therefore, was deemed important both for regional stability and local security. The U.S. also was paying close attention to the political development in Seoul. While the U.S. pledged support for South Korea democratic transition, the U.S. did not lose sight of continued security threat from North Korea. The report says, "[T]he United States hopes to use its influence to encourage Koreans in this democratic change. We do so, however, in careful ways that respect Korean traditions and political realities, and are mindful of the constant security threat.[135]

In NSS 1988,[136] the U.S. continued to encourage Japan to increase its defense budget, modernize its military forces, and carry out its legitimate defense capabilities. The U.S. recognized Japan's effort to implement Five Year Defense Plan (1985-1990) and increase defense spending more than five percent a year. Furthermore, the U.S. pushed Japan to voluntarily assume more responsibility in its own defense, by pointing out that "During the past ten years, a consensus has emerged in Japan that Japan should undertake the primary responsibility to defend its homeland, territorial seas and skies, and its sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles."[137]

In the U.S. policy makers' assessment, South Korea's military, despite significant growth, was still outnumbered by North Korea. The U.S. worried about the fact that North Korea was backed militarily by the Soviet Union and controlled by aggressive government. The U.S. also hinted the possibility of conflict over trade policy. However, the U.S. concern over South Korea looked pale when compared to its concern with Japan. NSS 1988 notes that, "The Republic of Korea is our seventh largest trading partner; significant market and investment opportunities for U.S. firms exist. Market

---

134 Ibid, p. 15.
135 Ibid, p. 15.
136 Reagan, Ronald. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1988*. White House, 1988.
137 Ibid, p. 30.

access barriers are coming down, but not fast enough, and much more remains to be done."[138]

The U.S. National Security Strategy 1990, reported after the fall of Berlin wall, was replete with optimistic overtone of the U.S. position in the coming new world order. What is notable is that, NSS 1990 highlighted the U.S. expectation for Japan's new leadership role as new great powers, together with Germany. The report noted:

> One of the dramatic strategic developments of the 1990s will be the new role of Japan and Germany as successful democracies and economic and political leaders. U.S. policy has long encouraged such an evolution. It will provide powerful new reasons to maintain the partnerships—the Atlantic Alliance, the EC, and the U.S.-Japan security alliance—that have fostered reconciliation, reassurance, democracy, and security in Europe and Asia in the postwar period.[139]

NSS 1990 stressed that Japan's importance to the U.S. security policy is now global. The U.S.-Japan relationship, the report stated, is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world, and it was in the interest of the U.S. to preserve it.[140] Meanwhile, the U.S. policy makers, commenting on South Korea's diplomatic offensive, expressed full endorsement of South Korea's efforts to improve inter-Korean relations.[141]

In NSS 1991, the U.S. policy makers defined the emergence of Japan and Germany as great powers as one of the most important developments of a new era, and they considered it as 'a major success of America's postwar policy.' The U.S. encouraged them to embrace more responsibility as economic and political leaders. Defying the idea that the U.S.-Japan alliance is nothing but a legacy of the Cold War, the report stressed that the alliance is needed all the more in the post-Cold War era as Japan's role expands. In particular, pointing to the Gulf crisis, the U.S. directly addressed the issue of Japan's increased burden sharing. The report says:

---

[138] Ibid, p. 31.
[139] Bush, George H. W. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1990.* Brassey's, 1990, p. 6
[140] Ibid, p. 12.
[141] Ibid, p. 12.

> The Gulf crisis has also reopened, with a new sense of urgency, the question of responsibility-sharing—not only with respect to sharing the costs and risks of Gulf operations, but also with regard to sharing the costs of U.S. forces defending Europe and Japan. Our allies are doing more, as befits their economic strength, but the issue may grow more acute as we and they adjust to a new era.[142]

The U.S. wanted to see the U.S.-Japan security relationship to extend beyond its traditional confines and into regional and global cooperation in areas of not only security but also refugee relief, non-proliferation, and the environment.[143] Noting the lasting trade friction, NSS 1991 stated that economic competition "must be managed if we are to preserve the partnerships that have fostered reconciliation, reassurance, democracy and security in the postwar period."[144]

On the Korean peninsula, the U.S. made it clear that North Korea's failure to observe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations was the most pressing security concern.[145] Since the Korean peninsula with formidable fighting powers on both sides possessed the greatest potential for conflict, the report cautioned that troop reductions must be carefully measured against North Korea's actions even though South Korea's growing strength allows the U.S. to reduce its military footprints. In the long term, the report envisioned that the ROK-U.S. relations can "move towards a security partnership in which the Korean armed forces assume the leading role.[146] At the same time, the U.S. expressed its support for South Korea's confidence-building measures and efforts to resume inter-Korean talks as a first step to lasting peace and reunification.

Summary

On the whole, the U.S. continued to push Japan, which was emerged as a political and economic powers, to assume increased security responsibility. The U.S.

---

[142] Bush, George H. W. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1991*. Brassey's, 1991, p. 6.
[143] Ibid, p. 9.
[144] Ibid, p. 6.
[145] Ibid, p. 9.
[146] Ibid, p. 28.

policy makers assumed that the post-Cold War realignment of its defense posture required its allies to fill in security gaps caused by the U.S. troop reduction and defense budget cut. Meanwhile, the major U.S. concern on the Korean peninsula was North Korea's increasing nuclear and missile capability. The review of the post-Cold War U.S. national strategic framework can be summarized as in <Table 3>.

Table 3. U.S. Role Conceptions of South Korea and Japan

	South Korea	Japan
NSS 1987	· Faced with constant security threat · North Korea's military capability far exceeds that of South Korea, strengthened by Soviet weapons · Critical period of political development (democratic transition)	· US-Japan alliance as a foundation for regional policy · Japan redefinition of defense goals (defense of sea lanes) · Yet, small defense spending as a share of its economy · Japan should increase foreign assistance · World's second largest economic power · Japan's trade surplus as a source of political tension
NSS 1988	· ROK-US alliance vital to regional stability · North Korea's forces exceed South Korea's in quantity · Encouraged Koreans toward democratic change · Seventh largest trading partner; market and investment opportunities for U.S. firms	· Cooperation with Japan, basic to UR relations in the region · US-Japan relation as a foundation for broad spectrum economic and political relations · Encouraged Japan to modernize its forces in order to carry out legitimate defense responsibilities. · The economic relations with Japan is an integral part of U.S. national security strategy · Economic imbalance is unsustainable and source of political tension and must be addressed · Encouraged to increase foreign assistance
NSS 1990	· U.S. security commitment remains firm	· US-Japan alliance as centerpiece of U.S. security policy

	· Endorse Seoul's effort to have South-North dialogue	· Japan's importance is global for the U.S. · Sharing of leadership responsibility
NSS 1991	· Call for more open economic and political systems · Encourage North-South talks · Area of greatest potential danger. Yet, growing strength of South Korea permits U.S. to reduce military presence · Call for self-reliance—the Korean armed forces should assume the leading role in the long run	· Emergence of Japan and Germany as a major success of America's postwar strategy · Responsibility sharing with Japan and Germany and other allies, growing role of Japan and Germany · Global partnership with Japan beyond its traditional confines · Trade imbalance remains substantial, reducing the imbalance remains a priority · Encourage Japan to round out its own self-defense capabilities

(2) The Post-Cold War U.S. Defense Posture Realignment in East Asia

Since 1980s the U.S. began to recognize the renewed importance of the Asia-Pacific as economic power house. Economically, Asian region had surpassed Europe as America's largest trading partner in the early 1980s, and the margin continued to grow. At the same time, the Post-Cold War realignment of global military posture also called for a major overhaul of the U.S. military presence in the region. The decision was guided by both internal and external conditions. Externally, as the Soviet's power waned the U.S. recognized the reduced traditional threat from Soviet expansionism. China's continued 'open door policy,' initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, also challenged the assumption that the U.S. military presence was necessary to contain the expansion of the Communist powers.[147] Domestically, the U.S. had confronted with growing pressure for defense budget reduction out of concerns of growing budget deficit. Starting in the 1980s, the Congress attempted to address budget constraints by readjusting military force structure in East Asia as part of the global readjustment. In light of this both external and

[147] Lee, Chae-Jin. *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*. JHU Press, 2006, p. 133.

internal developments, the U.S. policy makers had strong incentives to reassess the U.S. military posture and security arrangements with its allies in East Asia.

Since George H. W. Bush took office, Congressional debate on troop reduction in East Asia got into full swing. In March 1989, Robert J. Mrazek, House Representative, calling for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, asserted, "Overwhelmingly, the American people recognize that at this particular juncture—considering the investment of almost $100 billion since 1954—that the South Koreans can pretty well take care of themselves. … Our commitment to the security of South Korea is what has enabled it to become the dynamic economic power that it has become."[148] In June 1989, U.S. senator Carl Levin at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged that only 10,000 troops should remain in South Korea in five years.[149]

In July 1989, the Congress adopted Nunn-Warner Amendment to the 1989 Defense Appropriation Bill to address the issue of budget deficit by thinning out the U.S. troops in East Asia. In view of reduced regional threat, East Asian allies' economic prosperity, and domestic calls for peace dividend, the amendment stipulated that the U.S. should implement partial and gradual withdrawal of ground troops, transferring partial security burdens to South Korea and Japan. The Nunn-Warner Amendment mandated a reduction in U.S. troop strength in Korea from 43,000 to 36,000 by the end of calendar year 1991, according to the U.S. 8th Army.[150] The amendment contained provisions for a three-phased withdrawal plan, but no specific end troop level was specified. In November 1989, the Bush administration accepted the amendment.

---

[148] Higgins, Alexander. "Baker: Premature to Talk of a U.S. Withdrawal from Korea." *Associated Press*. March 14, 1989. <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Baker-Premature-to-Talk-of-a-US-Withdrawal-from-Korea/id-de41853a6c4e5a3638180a216e7c6664>. Secretary of State James Baker said that while it is premature to talk about troop withdrawal, the Bush administration is pressing South Korea to increase defense burden sharing.

[149] Halloran, Richard. "Washington Talk; U.S. Considers the Once Unthinkable on Korea." *New York Times*. July 13, 1989.

[150] Kirk, Jeremy. "USFK, South Korea officials discuss alliance." *Stars and Stripes*. March 7, 2003.

East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) 1990

In accordance to the 1989 Nunn-Warner Amendment, the U.S. Department of Defense in April 1990 established "The East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI)" that delineated a detailed plan to readjust US military posture in East Asia in order to accommodate changing global and regional realities.[151] According to the plan, only about 17% of U.S. military forces were to be allocated to Asia, and only about 6% was to be deployed forward with 70% of the deployed in Japan and Korea.[152] US domestic considerations were also taken into account. EASI 1990 stated, "Significant reductions in the defense budget, generated by domestic perceptions of a diminished Soviet threat as well as fiscal pressure, are probable. At the same time, it is appropriate to expect our prosperous Asian allies—Japan and South Korea—to assume greater responsibility for their own defense and, by so doing, to contribute more directly to the stability of the region."[153] The report reassured that both Japan and South Korea can contribute more to ease the U.S. burden for mutual defense.

Despite the abrupt changes in international and regional realities, the report assumed, U.S. regional interests in Asia remain similar to those it pursued in the past. As major U.S. interests in Asia, the report postulated: protecting the U.S. from attack; supporting US global deterrence policy; preserving political and economic access; maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony; strengthening the Western orientation of the Asian nations; fostering the growth of democracy and human rights; deterring nuclear proliferation; and ensuring freedom of navigation. And as means to preserve those interests, the three major elements of U.S. Asian strategy—forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangement—would remain valid.[154]

---

[151] U.S. Department of Defense. *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century (EASI I)*. Washington DC: Report to Congress, April 1990.

[152] EASI (1990), p. 5.

[153] Ibid, p. 1.

[154] Ibid, p. 7.

The report discussed how the U.S. can reduce and restructure its military presence in East Asia and argued that specific ways its Asian allies can increase their participation in regional stability and ROK-US bilateral security objectives were: deter North Korean aggression; encourage North-South talks and reduce political and military tensions on the peninsula; and transition U.S. force from a leading to a supporting role. Accordingly, the U.S. strategic plan for South Korea was two folds: ground force restructuring and force reductions. The report assumed that the U.S. will "draw down ground force and modify command structures so as to transition from a leading to a supporting role for U.S. forces."[155] And regardless of force reductions, the U.S., the report stressed, will continue to encourage the Koreans to increase their defense spending, not only to compensate for U.S. troop reductions but also to increase Seoul's contribution to the cost of U.S. military presence. With the Korean economy thriving, the report stated, Seoul can now afford to contribute more to its own defense.[156]

For South Korea, EASI 1990 contained provisions for three phases of troop reduction, which can be modified according to regional responses. In phase one (1 to 3 years), 7,000 troops would be withdrawn. The second phase (3 to 5 years) would be implemented based on the outcome of the first phase. The final phase would be implemented within five to ten years unless regional stability is not shaken. The report stressed that through the successful completion of the earlier phases the role, the Koreans would be ready to take the lead role in their own defense.

The report reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan relationship is the critical linchpin of US Asian security strategy and that it is the U.S. interest to maintain forward deployed forces in Japan.[157] While leaving the U.S. force structure intact and maintaining

---

[155] Ibid, p.9.

[156] The report specifically stated, "The consultation on restructuring the ROK-U.S. security relationship held during Secretary of Defense Cheney's visit to Seoul in February 1900 mark the beginning of a process that will ultimately transition U.S. forces from a leading to a supporting role in ROK defense matters." EASI (1990), p. 12.

[157] The report stated two reasons. First, the geostrategic location of bases. They are essential for providing regional stability and deterrence in Northeast Asia. Second, the cost effectiveness of U.S. presence, thanks to Japan's burden sharing, compared to anywhere else (p. 9).

substantial air and naval presence, the report assumed that measured reductions of ground and air forces would take place. For phase I, the level of U.S. military presence was to withdraw about some 5,000 to 6,000 while seeking increased Japanese support.

More importantly, the document worried that US-Japan relationship could be strained by bilateral trade disputes. From the U.S. side, for example, there would be considerable domestic pressure to reduce U.S. presence in Japan unless Japan funds U.S. military presence to the maximum appropriate level. Even though Japan's financial contribution for U.S. military presence in Japan had increased,[158] the report stressed, it is appropriate for the U.S. to seek additional cost sharing because "Japan accrues significant benefits from U.S. security efforts regionally and, to a great extent, globally."[159] Accordingly, one of the key elements of U.S. strategy was to encourage Japan to increase its territorial defense capabilities and to provide increased financial support of U.S. forces in Japan.[160] For defense capability, for example, Japan was encouraged to enhance its ability to defend its sea lanes out to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles and to increase interoperability with U.S. military weapons systems through maximum procurement for the U.S.[161]

In conclusion, the EASI 1990 provided the basic framework for adjustments of U.S. troops in the region, and at the same time, the report was an attempt to delineate relative roles and missions between the U.S. and its East Asia allies. The report claimed that "A clear definition of the relative roles and missions assured by the U.S. and particular allies has proven most productive in the past and has the greatest prospect for success over the next decade."[162] For the U.S. policy makers, allies' commitment to

---

158 In 1990, Japan paid approximately 35 to 40 % of the total costs associated with U.S. military presence in Japan.

159 EASI (1990), p. 10.

160 It is important to note that the U.S. recognized the possible impact that Japan's remilitarization would have for its neighbors. The report says, "Increases in Japanese military strength undertaken to compensate for declining U.S. capabilities in the region could prove worrisome to regional nations, especially if they perceive Japan is acting independent of the U.S.-Japan security relationship." EASI (1990), p. 5.

161 EASI (1990), pp.11-13.

162 EASI (1990), p. 9.

assuming greater responsibility for their defense was essential in the on-going effort to restructure the U.S. force and reduced the ground forces forward deployed in East Asia.

East Asia Strategic Initiative II (EASI II) 1992

In order to address questions raised by the Congress to reassess regional security policy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,[163] U.S. Department of Defense reviewed the assumptions and strategy of the 1990 EASI report. The report was updated in July 1992. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the coalition defeat of Iraq forces required the U.S. to adapt its strategy towards Asia-Pacific to changing regional and international environments. Interestingly however, the EASI 1992 report found that despite the end of the Cold War, unlike Europe, East Asia was still rife with potential threats and uncertainties. For one thing, communist countries such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Vietnam, though weakened, were still on the scene. And as ideological battle died out, there emerged equally contentious regional issues such as historical enmity and territorial disputes. Most of all, North Korea with its formidable conventional military forces and thinly-guised nuclear ambitions was undergoing political transition which would drive the Korean peninsula more unstable.[164] Against this backdrop, the 1992 EASI recognized that the key U.S. interests in Asia remain the same: commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any regional hegemonic power. The core of military strategy to preserve the interest was the forward presence of the U.S. forces in the region.[165]

Despite persistent uncertainty and increasingly high U.S. economic stake in the region, when reflecting much reduced regional threat perception, U.S. domestic

---

[163] This Congressional initiative refers to Defense Authorization Act for the FY1992-1993.

[164] Despite South Korea's effort to improve inter-Korean relations, the security situation on the Korean peninsula, the report found, remained uncertain and problematic. The report concluded, "Until North Korea implements agreements of monitoring and inspection of its nuclear program, the military situation in Korea will remain threatening." See U.S. Department of Defense. *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century* (EASI II). Washington DC: Report to Congress, 1992, p. 5.

[165] EASI (1992), pp. 1-3.

conditions, and allies' military capability, the U.S. force restructuring and troop reduction seemed inevitable. Based on the phased plan of EASI 1990, the 1992 report reaffirmed that phased reductions of US forces in Asia of 10-12% will take place, that is around 15,250 troop reduction of out the approximately 135,000 force level. Force strength reductions, the report suggested, were further to be implemented, reducing the total force level in Asia Pacific to about 100,000. <Table 4> presents a summary of phased U.S. troop reduction plan as detailed in the document. In phase II, U.S. forces in Asia was to be structured for an essentially maritime theater, placing a premium on naval capabilities, supported by essential ground and air forces. Continued reductions in combat forces and restructuring of forces in Korea were to be implement in phase III.[166]

Table 4. Phased U.S. Troop Reductions in East Asia

Country Service	1990 Strength	Phase I (1990-92) Reductions	1993 Strength	Phase II (1992-95) Reductions	1995 Strength (Approx.)
Japan	**50,000**	**4,773**	**45,227**	**700**	**44,527**
Army	2,000	22	1,978	-	1,918
Navy	7,000	502	6,498	-	-
Marines	25,000	3,489	21,555	-	21,511
Air Force	16,000	560	15,440	700	14,740
Korea	**44,400**	**6,987**	**37,413**	**6,500**	**30,913**
Army	32,000	5,000	27,000	-	27,000
Navy	400	-	400	-	400
Marines	500	-	500	-	500
Air Force	11,500	1,987	9,513	-	9,513
Philippines	**14,800**	**3,490**	_	-	-
Army	200	-	relocated	-	-
Navy	5,000	-	elsewhere	-	-
Marines	900	672	In region	-	-
Air Force	8,700	2,818		-	-
Sub-Total	109,200	15,250	83,640	7,200	76,440
Afloat forces	25,000		25,800		25,800
Total	135,000		109,440		102,240

Source: U.S. Department of Defense. EASI (1992).

[166] Ibid, pp. 17-21.

Note: Navy forces refer to shore-based. Force reduction in the Philippines was the result of the Mt. Pinatubo's eruption followed by the Philippine Senate's failure to ratify an arrangement for extended used of the Subic Naval base. In November 1991 phase II troop adjustment in Korea was postponed by the United Stated because of the renewed nuclear threat from North Korea.

Subsequently, as <Table 4> shows, about 7,000 troops were withdrawn from South Korea between 1990 and 1992, completing phase I of the amendment. However, phases II and III were put on hold after North Korea's nuclear program raised tensions. In November 1991, ROK and U.S. agreed to delay the second phase of the plan until the threat of North Korea's nuclear program disappears. As uncertainty in North Korea persisted, in July 1992, the United States decided to delay the second phase of reductions. In 1992, 36,450 American troops stationed in South Korea. After going through North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the U.S. became more determined to remain in the region. The U.S. through "The East Asia Strategic Report (EASR)" published in 1995 announced that the force level in East Asia would be maintained around 100,000.[167]

For South Korea's defense, EASI 1992 highlighted that the transformation of ROK-U.S. alliance relations, which traditionally had been marked by so-called patron and client relations, is an essential element of long-term U.S. strategy in East Asia. Reflecting both the maturity and growing capabilities of the ROK armed forces, the report argued for the transition of South Korean military to the lead role in its own defense. As a preliminary step, a set of measures was introduced to redefine ROK-US. .military relations: a Korean general was appointed as Senior Member of United Nations Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC); partial security responsibility of the Joint Security Area (JSA) was handed over to the Korean Army; Korea-US Combined Field Army (CFA) was to be dissolved in 1992; a Korean Army four-star general was appointed as the commander of Ground Component Command (GCC) for the first time; negotiations on the transfer of the peace time operation control was initiated.[168] These measures contributed to "the Koreanization of the Korean defense,"

[167] U.S. Department of Defense. *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*. Washington, D.C., 1995.
[168] EASI (1992), pp.19-20.

transforming the role of the U.S. forces in South Korea form "leading' to "supportive." In addition, if the North Korean threat dramatically diminishes, the report assumed, even the Combined Forces Command (CFC) may be disestablished as the final step in the transition to a South Korea's leading role.

In the report, the U.S. policy makers took highly of the agreement with South Korea on new cost-sharing arrangements. The report considered the initiative as Seoul's desire to provide more support for U.S. military presence in the region. Bush administration asked Seoul to substantially increase its contribution to defense cost sharing, and in June 1991, U.S. and South Korea agreed that Seoul would gradually increase its share of stationing cost of US forces in South Korea and assume one-third of the cost by 1995.[169] To add, the ROK and U.S. agreed in 1988 to relocate all U.S. military units out of metropolitan area of Seoul, and the ROK promised to provide facilities at its expense for the relocated unites.[170]

The 1992 report reaffirmed that U.S. recognizes Japan as a key ally and the cornerstone of U.S. forward deployed defense strategy in East Asia. For U.S. military strategists, who needed foreign bases for forward deployed forces, Japan afforded a geostrategic, stable, secure, and low-cost environment for U.S. troops.[171] Major force readjustment in Japan for phase I targeted restructuring and downsizing of selected Marine units. The phase II adjustments involved minor overall change, including small reductions of U.S. Air Force. After the implementation of phase II, the U.S. expected there will be little change in U.S. forces in Japan.

As for the U.S.-Japan relations, the report placed more focus on on-going burden sharing with Japan. For sharing roles and mission, the U.S. encouraged Japan to concentrate on defense of the home islands and sea lanes and upgrade its missile defense

---

[169] In 1991, South Korea contributed $150 million, which was a 115% increase from the 1990 contribution of $70 million. In 1992, contribution to U.S. forces in Korea was $180 million, which was a 20% increase from the previous year. Based on the agreement, further increases were anticipated to reach one-third of costs, which will be about $900 million in 1995. EASI (1992), p. 27.

[170] EASI (1992), p. 27.

[171] Ibid, p. 18.

capability while the U.S. assumed the role of responding to local and regional contingencies. In other words, the U.S. forces in Japan were committed not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace and security in East Asia.

The U.S. also encouraged Japan to step up its financial burden sharing, and Japan agreed to assume more responsibility. Under the Special Measures Agreement signed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and former Foreign Minister Nakayama, Japan pledged to increase defense contributions substantially and assume three-quarters of the stationing costs of U.S. forces by 1995. The U.S. policy makers interpreted Japan's willingness to defray defense cost as an expression of value that the Japanese government places on the U.S.-Japan security relation.

(3) Post-Cold War Military Balance in East Asia

Compared to sharp decline of U.S. forces in Europe, drawdown of troops in East Asia was modest. Going through the postwar occupation in Japan and the Korean War, U.S. military presence has become a key feature of East Asian security, and U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea have been a bedrock to U.S. engagement in the region. According to U.S. Department of Defense records, in 1953 more than 300,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, and the force level was stabilized between 50,000 and 60,000 during the 1960s and 1970s. Gradual withdrawal of forces continued through the 1980s, reaching 34,830 troops in 1993.[172]

The actual force level of the U.S. troops in Japan seems to prove that U.S.-Japan alliance has been the linchpin of East Asian security order. Even though the alliance was wrought for post-war occupation, US-Japan alliance has evolved into long-standing and steadfast alliances, responding to the threat of communist China and the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, <Figure 17> shows, the U.S. troop level in Japan was maintained between 43,000 and 50,000. Even after the demise of Soviet Union, US forces in Japan were not dramatically cut down as in Germany.

[172] Kane (2004).

Figure 17. The Post-Cold War US Troop Reductions in East Asia



Source: Retrieved by author from the troop deployment dataset (1950–2005) of the Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis.
Note: Figures do not include the U.S. afloat forces in East Asia.

Instead, major drawdown of US forces in Asia mostly took place in Philippines as shown in <Table 5>. For Japan and South Korea between 1991 and 1995, the actual number of U.S. troops deployed is roughly consistent with the proposed troop reduction plan specified in EASI 1992. After the demise of the Soviet threat, average force level of U.S. forces in South Korea between 1991-1995 reduced by more than 16% as compared to the average between 1986 and 1990. EASI 1992 suggested to further cut down 6,500 troops in phase II (1992-1995). However, thanks to the renewed North Korea threat, the force level in South Korea nearly remained the same up to the year 2000, with only 1% decrease.

Table 5. U.S. Troop Deployments in East Asia (Five-Year Average)

	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000
East Asia	103,361	109,288(+5.7%)	83,859(-23.3%)	78,306(-6.6%)
Japan	47,721	48,804(+2.3%)	44,235(-9.4%)	41,016(-7.3%)
South Korea	39,731	43,823(+10.3)	36,689(-16.3%)	36,314(-1%)
Philippines	14,853	15,547(+4.7%)	2,020(-87%)	73(-96.4%)
Etc.	1,055	1,114	914	903

Source: Retrieved by author from the troop deployment dataset (1950–2005) of the Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis. ( ) refers to increase/decrease rate compared to previous period.
Note: Figures do not include the U.S. afloat forces in East Asia.

<Table 6 > provides the balance of power index for East Asian powers around the time of the first Persian Gulf War. First of all, power index demonstrates that in 1990 Japan emerged as the second largest economy in the world, with GDP of over $ 3 trillion, which was half of the U.S. and three times bigger than U.K.'s. Germany ranked the third with $1.7 trillion, followed by France and Italy.[173] Yet, Japan's military spending did not reflect Japan's increased industrial power, largely due to constitutional constraint. While Germany and France spent more than $ 70 billion a year for defense, Japan's military expenditure ranked sixth followed by U.K. and Brazil, with $ 47 billion.[174] South Korea succeeded in post-war economic recovery and emerged as a new industrialized power. Yet, South Korea economic power looked pale compared to Japan, whose economy was more than 10 times greater than that of South Korea. The index also clearly demonstrates that former soviet powers—China and Russia—remained relatively weak.

[173] The World Bank.
[174] SIPRI.

Table 6. The East Asian Balance of Power in 1990

Power	Potential power		Actual power		
Index	GDP (billion $)	Population (million)	Army manpower (thousands)	Military Spending (billion $)	Nuclear warheads stockpile
U.S.	5,979	249	732	527	21,392
Japan	3,103	123	156	47	-
South Korea	284	42	650	15	-
China	356	1,118	2,300	19	232
Russia	516	147	1,473	N/A	37,000
North Korea	N/A	19	1,000	N/A	-

Sources: Figures for GDP and total population, the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/); figures for Army manpower, CSIS (*The Military Balance in Asia, 1990-2011: A Quantitative Analysis*, 2011); figures for military spending, SIPRI (constant U.S dollar in 2011); figures for nuclear stockpile, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945−2010).

Summary

So far we have discussed the shifts in the U.S. strategic framework for East Asia. Major elements of the post-Cold War East Asian security and military strategy are as follows. First, decreased threat perception increased domestic demand for reaping a peace dividend. Therefore, America's post-Cold War restructuring of defense posture was guided by budget-driven approach. As the threat of communist expansionism dies out after the demise of Soviet Union, the U.S. found that containment strategy in global scale was too costly and no longer relevant, and as postulated in National Security Strategy in 1990, the U.S. reviewed its grand strategy and shifted to a regional strategy of flexible response in order to better respond to both anticipated and unanticipated security threats. Confronted with fiscal pressure after years of increase defense spending started in the early 1980s, the Bush administration (1989-1993) slashed defense spending and attempted to make defense posture thinner and more efficient. Reaping a peace dividend became an important part of the U.S. security policy.

The same was true for the post-Cold War U.S. force readjustment in East Asia. The U.S. policy makers attempted to secure and advance economic interest. Asia-Pacific during the Cold War had become economic power house of the world and America's major trading partner. The U.S. economic interest in the region became increasingly

higher. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, factors of instability and uncertainty remained in the region. North Korea with its nuclear ambition and delivery system posed the great security threat to the U.S. interest in the region. Faced with the increasing domestic pressure for defense budget cuts on the one hand and potential security threats on the other, what the U.S. government attempted to do can be called "doing more of the same for less."[175] As specified in the U.S. national security strategy documents, the U.S. policy makers thought that the end of the Cold War provided the U.S. opportunities to maintain security with fewer resources. <Figure 18> depicts the conceptualization of the U.S. needs for redefinition of the security partnership with its East Asian allies.

Figure 18. Redefinition of the U.S. Security Role Conceptions towards South Korea and Japan



[175] Douglas and Tow argued that the theme that runs throughout the efforts of the Bush and Clinton administration to establish a post-Cold War strategy for the Asia-Pacific is the priority given to the delivery of a "peace dividend" to U.S. citizens. Stuart, Douglas T., and William T. Tow. *A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-power System in Asia*. Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 6.

Second, as the first corollary to the decreased threat perception and increased demand for a peace dividend, the U.S. undertook defense posture restructuring, with focus on major drawdown of forces in Europe and Asia. As a result, 48% of the U.S. troops in Europe returned home as the Cold War ended. The U.S. troops in Asia also declined; however, being cognizant of danger and instability that abrupt and drastic troop reduction would bring out in the region, the U.S. proposed to drawdown its forces in East Asia in a gradual manner. The U.S. security strategists crafted a phased plan to reduce troops deployed in South Korea and Japan, and the review of actual troop deployment reveals that the U.S. carried out troop reduction as planned.

Table 7. The Composition of U.S. Forces in Japan and South Korea by Service in 1990

Host Country	Japan	South Korea
Total	**50,000**	**44,400**
Army	2,000	32,000
Navy	7,000	400
Marines	25,000	500
Air Force	16,000	11,500

Source: EASI (1992).

Meanwhile, the comparison of troop level and composition between the U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan deserves close attention. During the Cold War, there had been a division of security roles between U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan, roles that coincide with respective security roles that the U.S. prescribes to each country. The major role of the U.S. forces in Japan was to provide immediate reinforcement in case of North Korea's invasion or possible regional contingencies. The U.S. forces in Japan during the Cold War mainly consist of Marines and Air forces, which can be swiftly deployed, and the greater part of the U.S. forces in South Korea was ground forces. South Korea had been a bulwark against communist expansion. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union left that strategy irrelevant. Yet, even after the decline of communist powers, Japan hosted relatively more troops, and as <Table 7> shows Marines accounted for half of the U.S. forces in Japan. This imbalance of force composition means that the

division of security roles would be continued. Freed, though not completely, from the traditional duty of defending the Korean peninsula, operational flexibility of the U.S. forces in Japan was to be further extended.

Third, as the second corollary to the decreased threat perception and increased demand for a peace dividend, the U.S. encouraged Japan and South Korea to assume more security responsibility. The U.S. felt a strong need to compensate for the troop reductions by means of strong U.S. security commitment and increased ally support for their own security. Adjusting the pace and extent of the transfer of burdens based on economic and military capability, the U.S. attempted to build more mature and more reciprocal economic, political, and military partnership with its East Asian allies. Accordingly, the U.S. encouraged its allies in the region to assume greater responsibilities. Transfer of security roles meant the redefinition of security arrangements—objectives, missions, respective roles, and burden sharing. As we have discussed, the U.S policy makers encouraged Japan, the second biggest economic power, to play a leading role in regional and global affairs and South Korea to assume more role in its own defense.

3. Post-Cold War ROK-U.S. Alliance Management

Signed in 1953, the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty had served as the legal basis for the U.S. military presence in South Korea, and the U.S. forces in Korea have contributed to peace and stability through capability aggregation. With the security guarantee provided by the U.S. in case of North Korea's military aggression, maintaining tight alliance partnership with the U.S. has been the major pillar of South Korea's security policy during the Cold War. In addition, the U.S. provided South Korea with military and developmental aid as well as access to its markets. In that way, South

Korea's security became structurally dependent on the U.S. Such partnership was often referred as "patron-client relations."

(1) Dyadic Relations and South Korea's Role Conceptions

Dyadic Relations

Around the time of the end of the Cold War, the traditional patron-client relationship between South Korea and the U.S. underwent a meaningful change. Several factors contributed to the change. First, the decline of the Soviet Union led to reduced threat perception. After major security threat is gone, the rationale for providing security commitments to other countries was losing ground. Second, the U.S. deficit financing to maintain its security posture became unsustainable. As in <Figure 19> and <Figure 20>, the Reagan administration's expansive military spending to maintain hardline stance against the Soviet Union incurred budget deficit, and trade imbalances with other industrial power further exacerbated America's economic condition. Last but not least, allies who were under the U.S. security umbrella during the Cold War emerged as new industrial powers. In the mid-1980s, South Korea with high growth rate was rapidly catching up with industrialized economies.[176] These factors combined compelled the U.S. policymakers to redefine its parameters of security commitment to its allies and demand its allies for responsibility sharing.

[176] For South Korea's strategy for late industrialization, see Amsden, Alice Hoffenberg. *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. Oxford University Press, 1992.

Figure 19. U.S. Federal Budget Surpluses and Deficits (1969-1997)



Source: Office of Management and Budget, "Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits: 1789–2019." The White House, Washington D.C. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/>.

Figure 20. U.S. Trade Deficit (1970-1995)



Source: Economic Indicator Database. "U.S. Trade in Goods - Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis vs. Census Basis: 1960-2013." U.S. Department of Commerce, June 4, 2014.

Figure 21. U.S. Economic and Military Aid to South Korea (1946-1995)



Source: Retrieved from USAID, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants." <http://www.usaid.gov/>.

The Reagan administration pushed for a gradual change in security assistance policy to its allies, including South Korea. The U.S. had been extended both economic and military aid to rebuild the war-torn South Korea as the first line of defense against communist expansion. In 1956 alone, the U.S. offered economic assistance of $385 million and military assistance of $467 million, for the total of $852 million. South Korea's defense expenditure in 1956 was about $100 million. As seen in <Figure 21>, economic aid, then, was gradually decreased to less than $200 million during the 1970s. The Carter administration offered annually about $50 million on average. In 1982, the Reagan administration suspended the economic aid for South Korea. The military grant followed similar pattern, with the exception of a spike during the Vietnam War. U.S. military aid was also terminated after 1986.[177]

The Reagan administration advanced to South Korea its demand for increased responsibility sharing. At the 20th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 1988, South Korea, for the first time since defense treaty had been signed, agreed to bear financial

[177] For detailed analysis of the U.S. military aid to South Korea, see Choi, Tae Y., and Su G. Lee. *Effect Analysis of US Military Aid to the Republic of Korea*. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, 1989.

burden by allocating separate budget for cost sharing and provide $45 million financial support for the U.S. forces in Korea. In 1990, South Korea's pledge increased to $70 million. In April 1990, South Korea pledged to increase its host nation support to $150 million, which included labor cost for Korean employees. Since 1991, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to settle South Korea's cost sharing regularly through the Special Measures Agreement (SMA).

Since the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) did not stipulated on labor cost,[178] the U.S. and South Korea had to conclude SMA, which was to avoid conflict with SOFA and establish legal basis upon which South Korea can underwrite labor costs for Korean employees hired by USFK. At the first SMA in 1991, South Korea's share was agreed on $150 million, three times bigger as it was in 1988. The cost shared by South Korea was to be used for labor, military construction, and logistic support. In the agreement, South Korea pledge to gradually increase the SMA fund up to $300 million by 1995.[179]

In bilateral trade with the U.S., South Korea, starting in the early 1980s, began to run a surplus. In 1984, South Korea enjoyed a surplus of $3.6 billion and continued to have a gain, reaching a peak of $9.5 billion in 1987 as illustrated in <Figure 22>. The

[178] Article 5 (Facilities and Areas-Cost and Maintenance) of SOFA states, "1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the Republic of Korea all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in the Republic of Korea. 2. It is agreed that the Republic of Korea will furnish facilities and districts for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the United States."

[179] The United States and South Korea, the Agreement reads, "Have agreed to take the following special measures relating to Article V of the Status of Forces Agreement which sets forth the principles on the sharing of expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces: Article 1. The Republic of Korea will bear, for the duration of this Agreement, in addition to those cots stipulated in Article V, paragraph 2 of the Status of Forces Agreement, a part of the expenditures for the employment of the Korean employees of the United States armed forces and may bear parts of other expenditures when the Republic of Korea deems it necessary. Article 2. The Republic of Korea will determine, for each fiscal year of the Republic of Korea, the actual amount of the expenditures that the Republic of Korea will bear under Article 1 of this Agreement and will promptly notify the United States of America of such determination."
<http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/pages/viewer/archiveViewer.jsp?archiveEventId=0050752334&singleData=Y>.

U.S. policymakers increasingly view South Korea as a competitor in the market, not only as a security client.

Figure 22. South Korea's Trade Balance with the U.S. (1965-1995)



Source: Korea International Trade Association. <http://stat.kita.net/>.

In order to address increasing trade imbalance, the U.S. policymakers introduced measures to put pressure on South Korea to lower trade barriers and appreciate South Korean currency. Between 1980 and 1988, the U.S. filed some fifty-seven cases of unfair traders against South Korean firms. In addition, various nontariff barriers, targeting South Korea's imported goods, were also introduced.[180] The most effective measure was "Super 301 provisions" of the U.S. trade act, which mandated the U.S. government to identify unfair traders and negotiate the elimination of trade barriers. As a result, starting the early 1990s, South Korea's exports to the U.S. was greatly reduced by such trade measures by the U.S., and trade imbalance.[181]

[180] Kim, Samuel S., ed. *Korea's Globalization*. Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 82.

[181] For details of trade friction, see Kim, Kihwan. "The Political Economy of US-Korea Trade Friction in the 1980s: A Korean Perspective." In *US-Korea Economic Relations,* Hoover Institution, Stanford University, edited by Ramon Myers (1991).

South Korea's Role Conception as a Faithful Ally and Regional-subsystem Collaborator

While such significant changes in bilateral security arrangement, cost sharing, and force level were underway, bilateral relations remain solid largely thanks to President Roh's unwavering commitment to the alliance. It can be seen that he simply inherited the policy of the previous administrations. However, it should be noted that the Roh administration was under external and internal pressure to redefine the ROK-U.S. alliance. The end of the Cold War and South Korea's increased power served to undermine the rationale for South Korea's dependence on the U.S. In addition, nationalism elevated through the democratization of domestic politics pushed the government to reevaluate the ROK-U.S. relations during authoritarian regimes. In that context, fundamental shift in alliance relations marked by termination of military and economic aid and the U.S. request for cost sharing might have create a rupture in alliance. However, President Roh's receptive attitude to the alliance readjustment was driven by his conviction that the U.S. military presence in Korea is vital to national security until South Korea's defense capability grows strong enough to address external security threats.[182]

The Roh administration defined the role of the U.S. military presence not just deterrent against North Korea but also a balancer in the region. President Roh was convinced that the U.S. disengagement would inevitably lead to regional instability and escalating arms race.[183] Even though the Cold War ended, therefore, President Roh expected the U.S. to assume the role of a regional balancer and play a critical stabilizing role. In a meeting with President Bush and his national security advisers, President Roh unequivocally delivered this point:

> U.S. forces play a critical role. They are a deterrent to North Korea and a major element in the overall balance of power in Asia. If the Asia-Pacific countries are growing

[182] Rho, Taewooo. *Hyiogorok ha-kwon: Jeonhwangiui Daejeonryak [Memoir: Grand strategy during a Turning Point]*, Seoul: Chosun Newspress, 2011, p. 433.
[183] Ibid, p. 410.

> rapidly—and they are as a result of U.S. help—they will be able to pay a little of this debt to the U.S. We have these security discussions. We will endeavor in them in increase our share of the defense burden.[184]

In summit meetings with the U.S., President Roh reiterated this point, giving the U.S. policymakers assurance of his commitment to the bilateral alliance. Later, President Roh even suggested President Bush to upgrade the ROK-U.S. relations into a special relationship like the one between the U.S. and U.K.[185]

In that way, post-Cold War U.S. readjustment of security parameters in South Korea progressed favorably and in close coordination. President Roh convinced the U.S. that South Korea will "continue to play a more positive role in bilateral relationship—not only in military but in economic relations," and President Bush welcome the idea of South Korea playing more of a leading role and said "the more Korea can do, the more we can remain in Korea."[186] The Roh administration's effort to achieve self-reliant defense posture was centered on the tight security ties with the U.S. The Korean government, for example, limited the recovery of operation control to peacetime control only out of the concern that dual operational authority can undermine the ROK-U.S. joint defense posture.[187] In its diplomatic efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, the Korean government recognized that the ROK-U.S. alliance would be the vital element for success.

(2) *Nordpolitik*

---

[184] Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with President Roh Tae Woo." The White House, Washington DC. October 17, 1989. In the meeting, President Roh explained to President Bush *Nordpolitik*, and Bush promised his support, by saying "We watch your relations with North Korea with favor and support. We have no objections to improving your relations with the socialist bloc. I assure you, we will never surprise you with North Korea."

[185] Roh, Tae Woo (2011), p. 409.

[186] Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with President Roh Tae Woo." The White House, Washington DC. June 6, 1990.

[187] Ibid, pp. 401-02.

South Korea's Diplomatic Offensive against Pyongyang

The U.S. post-Cold War force restructuring in South Korea raised tensions;[188] however, the Bush administration's plan (EASI 1991 and 1992) was played out in local, regional, and international situations, markedly different from the Cold War. Internationally and regionally, the collapse of Soviet empire changed threat perception of regional powers. Even though there remained Russian military force in the Far East and communists powers, the threat coming from communist expansionism greatly diminished. Even though China's power was growing, China's relative power did not pose direct security threat to regional powers. After all, U.S. force readjustment in East Asia was the outcome of the changed security landscape.

More meaningful change that could have impact on ROK-U.S. relations was taking place in South Korea. Under the name of so-called *Nordpolitik* (Northern Politics),

[188] The U.S. troop reduction from South Korea was a recurring theme. In July 1969, President Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine, later called the Nixon Doctrine. The overall message was that America's role in East Asia would be limited, and America's engagement would be selective. Between 1970 and 1971, some 20,000 US troops returned from South Korea despite fierce opposition from Seoul. As a result, the troop level fell from 63,000 in 1969 to 43,000 in 1971. The U.S. unilateral decision to withdraw forces notwithstanding Seoul's troop deployment to Vietnam thereby contributed to "self-reliance of national defense" by the Park Chung Hee's regime. For Nixon's troop reduction, see Jonsson, Gabriel. "The Peace-keeping Role of the American Troops in South Korea." *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*,20-1 (2011): 155-182. During the Carter administration (1977-1981), troop reduction issue almost consumed the ROK-U.S. alliance management. On May 5, 1977 President Cater announced a plan to withdraw U.S. Forces in Korea completely between 1978 and 1982. Two reasons were behind the decision of complete withdrawal. First, U.S. thought that China or Soviet Union would not encourage or support actions which would raise the risk of war on the Korean peninsula. Second, Cater administration figured that South Korea was economically and militarily capable of its own defense. The plan was not implemented thanks to North Korea's formidable military capability. In February 1978 President Carter stated that troop reduction would be postponed until stability could be assured on the Korean peninsula. See U.S. National Security Council. "U.S. Policy in Korea." Presidential Directive/NSC 12. May 5, 1977 <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd12.pdf>; Taylor, William J., Jennifer A. Smith, and Michael J. Mazarr. "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970–1990." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* (1990): 256-286. A series of troop withdrawal plans by the U.S. policy makers wakened South Korea's policy makers to realize that South Korea's desire to keep a certain U.S. forces was not the first priority of the U.S. force deployment policy. Rather, it was determined by the U.S. strategic need to realign overseas forces based on threat assessment and domestic conditions.

the Korean government undertook significant turn in foreign policy orientation.[189] Taking advantage of changed power politics in the region and increased economic and diplomatic capability, the Korean government took initiative and established diplomatic relations with countries in the former Communist bloc in order to shape regional power relations in South Korea's favor. After entering into diplomatic relations with Hungary and Poland in 1989, South Korea and the Soviet Union had summit talk in 1990 under the support of the U.S. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korea normalized relations with Russia in 1991. Don Oberdorfer captured the fundamental change as follows, "Prodded and induced by the ROK, the Soviet Union was transformed over the next two years from godfather, superpower guarantor, and economic benefactor of North Korea to partner and, in some respects, client of South Korea."[190] Furthermore, on August 24, 1992 South Korea put an end to hostile relations and established diplomatic ties with China, which had remained cautious and insisted separation of politics from economics.[191]

Nordpolitik was in a sense diplomatic offensive against North Korea. The political objective of *Nordpolitik* was to create an atmosphere of rapprochement that is conducive to the stability of the Korean peninsula in the short run and peaceful national reunification in the long run.[192] By building diplomatic and economic ties with Moscow and Beijing, two patrons of Pyongyang, South Korea hoped North Korea to be pushed to transform its socio-political system and integrate with the international community. In other words, the Korean government envisaged that the nearest and surest way to ensure peace and unification was to push Beijing and Moscow, North Korea's two biggest allies,

---

[189] It was then Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk who first called *Nordpolitik* named after the West German *Ostpolitik* policy with East Germany. Oberdorfer, Don. *The Two Koreas: a Contemporary History*. Addison-Wesley, 1997, p. 187.

[190] Oberdorfer (1997), p.197.

[191] Yet, China tried hard to manage the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea in a way that did not alienate North Korea. Oberdorfer (1997), pp. 239-248.

[192] In his February 1988 inauguration, President Roh mentioned, "we expect resorting to dialogues and coexistence in reconciling the trend of national self-respect so as to bring about a rapprochement along the truce line and thus to accomplish national reunification." Roh, Tae Woo. *Korea, a Nation Transformed: Selected Speeches of President Roh Tae Woo*. Presidential Secretariat the Republic of Korea, 1990.

to encourage Pyongyang to follow their path. South Korea's will to active diplomatic campaign was clearly delivered to Pyongyang through formal pronouncement of the "July 7 Declaration," in which President Roh urged the two Koreas to overcome antagonistic sentiment to build inter-Korean cooperation under the structure of a "single national community."[193]

South Korea's proactive diplomatic offensive to improve inter-Korean relations by wooing support from North Korea's allies produced significant outcomes. In the early 1989, North and South engaged in highly level discussions, and Seoul wooed support from Moscow and Beijing and persuaded North Korea to give up its opposition to separate membership of the UN.[194] In September 1991, South Korea and North Korea became members of the UN marking a major victory for Seoul. Based this improved relations, South and North Korea agreed to forswear the development and possession of nuclear weapons and signed "Basic Agreement (Reconciliation, nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South)" which called for reconciliation and non-aggression.[195]

U.S. Response to South Korea's Diplomatic Initiative

If *Nordpolitik* was an attempt to pursue independent foreign policy, South Korea's "new thinking" might have been inconceivable unless there was support or at least political room for maneuver given by the U.S. The U.S. worried about the possibility of South Korea's policy shift harming U.S. security interest or reducing its influence on the Korean peninsula; however, overall the U.S. policy makers welcomed and supported South Korea's diplomatic offensive.

---

[193] Ha, Yong-chool. *Bukbang Jeongchaek: Kyiown, Jeongae, Yeonghyang [Nordpolitik: Origin, Development, Effect]*. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2003.

[194] Sanger, Davie E. "North Korea Reluctantly Seeks U.N. Seat." *New York Times*. May 29, 1991. <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/29/world/north-korea-reluctantly-seeks-un-seat.html>.

[195] For full-text of the agreement, see "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges And Cooperation between the South and the North." <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor-VTK-1991-12-13-agreement-on-reconciliation-non-agression-exchanges.pdf.>.

On the one hand, the U.S. was cautious about South Korea's independent diplomatic initiative. Even though improved inter-Korean relations would have contributed to the stability in the Korean peninsula, the U.S. responded with circumspection. For one reason, the way *Nordpolitik* was implemented was problematic. The Korean government took its diplomatic moves with little coordination with the U.S. 7 July Declaration was drafted without prior consultation with the U.S. Either, South Korea did not fully consulted the U.S. over the Basic Agreement with North Korea in 1991.[196]

However, the more pressing concern for the U.S. was South Korea's position regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Even though South Korea and North Korea might sign a non-aggression pact and a denuclearization agreement, the U.S. assumed that unless North Korea takes concrete and sincere steps to alleviate tensions the military situation on the Korean peninsula remains threatening.[197] U.S. stance towards North Korea's nuclear program proves the point. North Korea signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but refused to allow international inspections of nuclear facilities, arguing that the complete withdrawal of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea is an essential prerequisite. In late 1991, U.S. completely withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. In December 1991, Seoul and Pyongyang signed Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which forbidden the possession of nuclear weapons. As an effort to further reduce military tensions, South Korea and the U.S. in January 1992 announced the suspension of the "Team Spirit," joint US-South Korea military exercise, and North Korea ratified IAEA safeguard agreement in April 1992. However, North Korea failed to clear suspensions of its covert nuclear program, and the North Korea refused negotiations on inspections over North Korea's nuclear facilities.[198] In January 1993, U.S. and South

---

[196] Oberdorfer (1997), p. 297.

[197] The U.S. policy makers did not recognize North Korea as a reliable negotiation partner. Sigal, Leon V. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton University Press, 1999; Cotton, James. "North-South Korean relations: another false start?." *The World Today* (1989): 104-108.

[198] IAEA and the international non-proliferation community suspected there may be a discrepancy between

Korea announce to resume Team Spirit drill, and North Korea terminated all negotiations and communications with South Korea.

After all, the U.S. policymakers had resounding concerns over North Korea's nuclear capability. Even though North Korea agreed not to possess nuclear weapons, North Korea did not implement nuclear agreements and accept effective and enough monitoring and inspection of its nuclear program, which would dispel suspensions over its nuclear weapons capability. In the meantime, North Korea continued to build up its massive conventional military forces. The U.S. was convinced that despite South Korea's peaceful diplomacy, the situation on the Korean peninsula would remain uncertain and problematic unless North Korea takes necessary steps to mitigate tensions and relieve concerns about its nuclear program.[199]

Despite this concern, however, the U.S. supported the South Korean initiative to improve inter-Korean relations by revising its policy toward the Korean peninsula.[200] Confronted with defense budget pressure and defense posture readjustment, the U.S. had little reason not to support South Korea's diplomatic offensive unless it hurts U.S. strategic interests in the region. The U.S. policy makers estimated *Nordpolitik* as "active and constructive" policy.[201] The U.S. supported South Korea's new policy scheme. First, the U.S. supported South Korea's efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, by reducing tensions with Pyongyang. After the unfriendly standoff caused by the North Korean link to the bombing of a Korean airliner in 1987, the U.S. supported ease of isolation of North Korea by opening and allowing bilateral dialogue and changes, lifted travel restrictions. In a meeting with President Reagan President Roh suggested the U.S. take some steps in coordination with South Korea's moves.[202] In January of 1989, U.S. and North Korean

---

declared and actual volumes of plutonium extracted from reprocessed fuel.

199 EASI II (1992), p. 5.

200 Scalapino, Robert A. "Asia and the United States: The Challenges Ahead." *Foreign Affairs* (1989): 89-115.

201 Oberdorfer (1997), p. 298.

202 In October 1988, White House approved the State Department's plan with four points. First, a new policy of encouraging unofficial, nongovernmental visits by North Koreans to the U.S. Second, easing of stringent financial regulations. Third, permissions for limited commercial export of American goods. Fourth, renewed permission for substantive discussions with North Korea in neutral settings. Oberdorfer

diplomats met in Beijing and discussed security and political issues in the Korean peninsula.[203] Second, the U.S. supported South Korea's move to build diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and China. In July 1988, at request of the South Korean government, the U.S. government through its diplomatic channels passed the "July 7 Declaration" document to the governments of Soviet Union and China. On 3 June 1990, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz arranged President Rho a meeting with President of the Soviet Union Gorbachev, visiting the U.S. In three months, South Korea and the Soviet Union established a diplomatic relations. Third, the U.S. policy makers withdrew all nuclear weapons from South Korea. In September 1991, President Bush announced the presidential nuclear initiative to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. U.S. officials explained that the decision was made, in part, to persuade North Korea to allow IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities.[204] The U.S. decision not only helped easing of tensions on the peninsula but also empowered South Korea's diplomatic offensive to push Pyongyang to the path of reform and openness.

Summary

While the end of the Cold War provided a sense of identity crisis for South Korea's policymakers as to whether South Korea would continue the traditional patron-client relations with the U.S., the Roh administration assumed the role of a *faithful ally* and *regional-subsystem collaborator* and envisaged a more active role in the alliance. Since the Roh administration expected the U.S. would continue to play to role of *regional leader/protector* and *stabilizing force*, the U.S. post-Cold War defense posture readjustment and the transfer of security burden, which could have generated intra-alliance conflict, could proceed without a hitch. *Nordpolitik* was in a sense a policy with high risk, which could endanger relations with the U.S., if not fully coordinated. Yet, the

(1997), pp. 194-95.

[203] "U.S., N.K., Diplomats Held Substantive Talks in Beijing," *The Korean Herald*, January 27, 1989.

[204] "The Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from South Korea." The Nuclear Information Project. September 28, 2005. <http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm>.

Roh administration convinced the Bush administration that South Korea's policy shift was to play the role of *mediator-integrator*, integrating former Soviet countries into global market economy, which is compatible U.S. interest. At the same time, South Korea's acceptance of the post-Cold War alliance realignment was accompanied by a parallel demand for the U.S. to enhance self-reliance in defense.

Table 8. South Korea's Post-Cold War Alliance Role Conceptions

Role Type	Description
Faithful ally	Ally that honors alliance commitments through mutual assistance and cooperative efforts to address common security challenges
Regional-subsystem collaborator	Ally that has strong commitments to cooperative efforts with the U.S. to build peace and stability in the region

Nordpolitik was South Korea's bold attempt to enhance security environment by taking a leading role in alleviating security threat in the Korean peninsula. South Korea's diplomatic offensive has following implications for South Korea's security role conceptions. First, it was relatively independent foreign policy designed to advance South Korea's security interest. If previous attempts were driven by security anxiety caused by the U.S. troop reduction, *Nordpolitik* was an active diplomatic effort that seized upon changes in international politics to advance national security interest.[205] The Korean government utilized both internal and external environment.[206] The Korean

[205] Lee, Ming. "Seoul's searching for *Nordpolitik*: Evolution and Perspective." *Asian Perspective*, 13.2 (1989): 2141-2178.

[206] It is argued that "relative negligence" of the U.S. opened a room for South Korea to act on its will. During the post-war era and the Cold War, the U.S. maintained the grand strategy of preponderance. However, the U.S. gradually turned to the policy of offshore balancing, providing a window of opportunity for South Korea's policy reorientation. See Jeon, Jae-seong. "Rohtaewoo haengjeongbuui bukbangjeongchaek gyeoljeongyoingwa ihuui bukbangjeongchaek byeonhwagwajeong bunseok [Determinants of the Roh administration's Nordpolitik and process of change of the policy]." In Ha, Yong-chool. *Bukbang Jeongchaek: Kyiown, Jeongae, Yeonghyang [Nordpolitik: Origin, Development, Effect]*. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2003, p. 32; Jeon, Chae-Sung. "The Northern Policy: Analysis of Determinants in Roh Tae Woo Administration`s Nordpolitik." *Journal of World Politics*, 24-1 (2002): 259-279; Kim, Yeon-cheol. "Rhotaewoo jeongbuui bukbangjeongchaekgwa nambukgibonhabuiseo [Roh administration's Nordpolitik and Inter-Korean Basic Agreement]." *Critical Review of History*, 97 (2011): 80-110.

government took advantage of rapprochement among major powers, utilized its economic prowess to establish diplomatic relations with communist countries, and pushed North Korea to follow suit.

Second, South Korea's diplomatic offensive against North Korea marked a departure from the traditional patron-client relationship. Rather than relying on the U.S. security guarantee, South Korea's policy makers took an initiative in reducing security threat and sought to improve inter-Korean relations. South Korea's gaining autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S. was possible because there was common interest. It was for the benefits of both countries that South Korea assumes more responsibility in maintain stability in the Korean peninsula. The discussion of the transfer of peace time operational control made in the early 1990s could be the case in point. In South Korea the issue of operational control was framed as the issue of sovereignty and operational autonomy.

However, in fact, it was the Bush administration who was more willing to hand over financial and political burden that come came with military control over the Korean forces. The U.S. was forced to redefine its security parameter and commitment to its allies in order to reduce the burden of maintaining extensive military posture established during the Cold War. In February 1990, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney presented the growing concerns from the Congress and American people over excessive burden the U.S has to shoulder for the defense of South Korea as a key rationale for the transfer.[207] The transfer marked the beginning of the transformation of the U.S. role in South Korea from leader to supporter.

4. Post-Cold War U.S.-Japan Alliance Management

Since the end of the World War II, Japan's security policy had been predicated upon the widely-shared view that U.S.-Japan security alliance formed in 1952 was

[207] The transfer of peacetime operational control completed on December 1, 1994.

indispensable. For the Japanese policymakers, the U.S. security deemed essential for post-war recovery. Meanwhile, Japanese military capability and defense posture were limited to the defense of homeland by domestic legal and normative constraints.[208] The Japanese constitution formally outlawed war as a means to settle international disputes.[209] Coming into effect on 3 May 1947, the constitution, technically imposed by the U.S. occupational forces, renounced the sovereign right of belligerency. The article also stipulated that standing military force with war potential would not be maintained. Therefore, even though Japan possessed de facto military forces called Self-Defense Forces (SDF), they were prevented from taking any independent military actions, if not related to the defense of homeland. For the U.S. military strategists, U.S.-Japan alliance with its military presence in Japan served as the linchpin of the U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As the post-war Japan maintained an exclusive defense-oriented policy, the burden of deterring Soviet expansionism was disproportionately borne by the U.S.[210]

(1) Dyadic Relations and Japan' Role Conceptions

---

[208] Katzenstein, Peter J. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in postwar Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 96; Cronin, Patrick M., and Michael J. Green.*Redefining the US-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*. No. 31. DIANE Publishing, 1994; Hughes, Christopher W. "Japanese military modernization: in search of a "normal" security role." *Population*, 127 (2005): 127-3; Boyd, J. Patrick, and Richard J. Samuels. "Nine lives?: the politics of constitutional reform in Japan." *East-West Center*, Washington, DC: Policy studies, 19 (2005); Berger, Thomas U. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Vol. 272. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

[209] Article 9 of the chapter II (Renunciation of War) reads, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. "The Constitution of Japan." <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.htm>.

[210] Christensen notes, "The U.S.-Japan alliance had often been viewed in the United States as lopsided and unfair because the United States guarantees Japanese security without clear guarantees of even rudimentary assistance from Japan if US forces were to become embroiled in a regional armed conflict." Ikenberry, G. John, and Michael Mastanduno, eds. *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia University Press, 2003, p.31.

Dyadic Relations

During the Cold War, the U.S. provided security guarantee to Japan even after Japan made economic success and became strong enough to provide its own security, mainly because it was interest of the U.S. to thwart Communist expansion and maintain stability and economic order.[211] The U.S. provided strategic deterrence, including nuclear umbrella, security commitments, and forward deployed forces. For its part, Japan provided basing rights and logistics support, under which the U.S. could operate its military forces for its own security interest in the Asia Pacific Region. This security arrangement, albeit asymmetrical, suited U.S. security strategy since it required strong and prosperous Japan in order to check the communist expansion and maintain stability in East Asia.[212]

However, changes international security landscape inevitably led to changes in U.S.-Japan alliance management. During the Cold War, Japan was bent on economic development while relying on U.S. deterrence capability and nuclear umbrella for its security. However, as the Japanese economy grew and trade relations between U.S. and Japan became increasingly competitive, the U.S. began pressure Japan to assume more security burden.[213] U.S. domestic circumstances—budget deficit incurred by Cold War

---

[211] According to Robert Art, the U.S. did so for three reasons, other than geopolitical logic of deterring Soviet threat. First, historical reason. The U.S. did not want Japan as the World War II aggressor to rearm. Second, stability reason. The provision of the U.S. security to Japan was needed to assuage the fears of Japan's neighbors and help foster economic openness. Third, non-proliferation reason. The U.S. thought extending nuclear umbrella to Japan was necessary to discourage Japan to acquire its own nuclear weapons. Art also cites Israel's case as a convincing example. See Art, Robert J. "A defensible defense: America's grand strategy after the Cold War." *International Security* (1991), pp.22-23.

[212] Richard Betts argues that in terms of the domino theory, the defense of Japan was intrinsic interests to the U.S. while the defense of South Korea were derivative. Richard K. Betts writes, "[T]he United States committed itself militarily to NATO and the Mutual Security Treaty with Tokyo because it cared (intrinsically) about Western Europe and Japan, while it committed itself militarily in Korea and Vietnam because it cared (derivatively) about Western Europe and Japan. Betts, Richard K. "Wealth, power, and instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War." *International Security* (1993), p. 43. On derivative and intrinsic interest, see also Richard K. Betts, "Southeast Asia and US Global Strategy," *Orbis*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 354-362.

[213] Giarra, Paul S., and Akihisa Nagashima. "Managing the new US-Japan security alliance: Enhancing structures and mechanisms to address post-Cold War requirements." In Green and Cronin. (Eds.). *The*

military spending, stagnant economy, and Japan-bashing—combined with the U.S. reassessment of Japan's economic and military capability forced the U.S. strategic thinkers to redefine the role of Japan not only in the bilateral relations but also in regional and global arena. The Secretary of State James Baker's following remark reflects the attitude felt by the U.S. policymakers:

> At Treasury, Tokyo had required a lot of my attention, particularly on market-opening and exchange-rate issues. I had called for a "global partnership" with Japan while still Secretary of the Treasury, but now at the State I could actually implement it. Of course, I would once again have to be mindful of domestic considerations, as Japan-bashing had become a prominent Democratic campaign theme, notably in the primary campaign of Representative Dick Gephardt. *Our goal had to be to try to turn Japan from an inward-looking, mercantilist economic giant to an outward-looking economic and political power with strong ties with the United States*.[214]

Since the end of World War II Japan had relied on a national strategy called Yoshida Doctrine, forged by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida envisioned that through a rapid post-war economic recovery Japan would be able to regain its influence and standing in the world. Thus, the Yoshida Doctrine placed highest national priority to economic development and technological advances, while calling for low diplomatic profile and defense posture. Rooted in pacifism and realistic idea of capitalizing on external forces, it was a pragmatic approach in which Japan can attain security cheaply from the U.S. at the expense of its autonomy and the U.S. military presence on its territory.[215] The Yoshida Doctrine was the basic tenet of Japan foreign policy during the

---

US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (1999).

[214] Baker, James A. *The Politics of Diplomacy*. New York, 1995, p. 44.

[215] It is often argued that Japan's foreign policy was reactive in nature, which means Japan would change would policy not because strategic concern but because outside pressure. See Calder, Kent E. "Japanese foreign economic policy formation: explaining the reactive state." *World Politics*, 40-04 (1988): 517-541. However, rejecting arguments that Japan lacked a national strategy thanks to the constitutional restraint, Richard Samuels argued Japan's foreign policy was guided by strategic thinking. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's grand strategy and the future of East Asia*. Cornell University Press, 2011. For Japan's strategic thinking, see also Pyle, Kenneth B. "Restructuring Foreign Policy and Defense Policy: Japan," In Brook, Christopher, and Anthony McGrew, eds. *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*. Routledge (1998), pp. 121-36; Nara, Hiroshi, ed. *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

Cold War. The U.S. repeatedly attempted to get Japan to increase its share of defense, but Japan rejected on the basis of Japan's pacifist postwar constitution.

U.S. Call for Security Burden Share and Japan's Role Conception

The threat of New Cold War in the late 1970s pushed the U.S. to alter its overall defense posture. In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded into Afghanistan. In response to the Soviet act of aggression, the Reagan administration took a hard stance against the Soviet Union and went on to upgrade U.S. military capability, including nuclear weapons. Even though Reaganomics was marked by large scale tax cuts and reduced public spending in order to boost domestic demand, the Reagan administration in fact significantly increased public expenditures, primarily the defense expenditure. The U.S. defense budget rose from $267 billion in 1980 (4.9% of GDP and 22.7% of all public spending) to $393 billion in 1988 (5.8% of GDP and 27.3% of all public spending). During most of the Reagan years, military spending was about 6% of GDP, which was the highest since the Vietnam War.[216]

As such, U.S. effort to contain the Soviet Union in the 1980s played out in a domestic background that was different from the past. During the early years of the Cold War, the U.S. with its preponderance of power supported its allies and countries who stood against the communist line. Through Marshall Plan, the U.S. gave economic support to help rebuild European economies in order to prevent the spread of communism. For its East Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, for example, the U.S. provided both military and financial aid to help them resist the Soviet expansionism. However, the strength of the U.S. economy, though strongest in the world, was weakened, thanks to growing trade and budget deficits.

In order to strike a balance between strategic need and necessarily resources, the U.S. had to turn to its allies. In particular, the U.S. repeatedly encouraged among

[216] Office of Management and Budget. "Historical tables: Budget of the United States Government 2013." White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/hist.pdf>.

others Germany and Japan to assume more responsibility in security of its own and region because of their increased economic status.[217] German and Japan in the 1970s, once the villains and defeated parties of World War II, recovered from post-war misery and reemerged as the leading industrialized economies after the U.S., with potential of being great powers. It would have been logical for the U.S. to demand these allies to assume more security responsibility as their GDPs increase.[218]

Japan responded to America's demand for more security role. In response to America's repeated requests, Japan committed to shouldering the financial cost of the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. In 1978 as part of host nation support program, the Japanese government introduced the so-called "sympathy budget (*omoiyari yosan*)" system. The measure was taken under the reason that Japan should help the U.S. to deal with financial difficulties at the time of strong yen. Even though such payment was not an obligation under US-Japan alliance treaty, Japan determined to underwrite the costs for constructing shelters and buildings for military personnel and their families and other facilities. The U.S. and Japan concluded a five-year special measures agreement in which Japan promised to pay labor costs and utility bills of U.S. forces. In November 1978, Defense Cabinet Secretary Shin Kanemaru and U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown agreed that Japan would offer about $33.3 million as part of labor cost.[219] In 1984,

---

[217] Germany and Japan certainly had the potential to be great powers. Germany and Japan at that time could not be considered great powers, however, because they lack the requisite military capabilities, especially strategic nuclear arsenals that would give them deterrence self-sufficiency. Kristof, Nicholas D. Kristof. "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous." *New York Times*, January 11, 1993, p. Al. Another popular intellectual view hold that Japan and Germany would carve out niches in international politics as the first "global civilian powers." Maull, Hanns W. "Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers." *Foreign Affairs* (1990): 91-106. In a similar fashion, as civilian powers, Funabashi argued, they will eschew military strength in favor of economic power, work through international institutions to promote global cooperation, and "furnish international public goods, such as refugee resettlement, national disaster relief, development of economic infrastructure, and human resources improvements." Funabashi, Yoichi. "Japan and America: global partners." *Foreign Policy* (1992), p. 37.

[218] Zbigniew Brzezinski once remarked that it would be logical to assume Japan with its economic power to increase its share of defense. That Japan spends only 1% of its GDP on defense means, he argued, other states should spend more for common defense. See Jin, Chang-soo and Cheolsoo Kim. Eds. *Mi-ildongmaeng: Anbowa Milyakui Yeoksa [U.S.-Japan Alliance: History of Security and Secret Agreement]*. Seoul: Hanwool Academy, 2006, p. 330.

[219] Yoda, Tatsuro. "Japan's host nation support program for the US-Japan Security Alliance: past and

Japan's burden sharing totaled $2 billion, and Japan's host nation support continued to increase through the first special measures agreement in 1987.[220]

Besides financial support, the Japanese government officially expressed willingness to assume more responsibility in the division of security effort between the U.S. and Japan. Japan's acceptance of increased role, for example, was clearly delivered to the U.S. during a U.S.-Japan summit meeting in 1981. Japan promised to improve defense capability not only in its territories but also in sea lanes and to alleviate the cost of U.S. military presence in Japan. Joint Communique following discussions between President Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister stated:

> The President (Reagan) and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the foundation of peace and stability in the Far East and the defense of Japan. In insuring peace and stability in the region and the defense of Japan, they acknowledged the desirability of *an appropriate division of roles between Japan and the United States*. The Prime Minister stated that Japan, on its own initiative and in accordance with its Constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding sea and air space, and *for further alleviating the financial burden of U.S. forces in Japan*. The President expressed his understanding of the statement by the Prime Minister.[221]

Japan's recognition of the need for redefining US-Japan alliance relations was reconfirmed afterwards. Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, visiting the U.S. for the 9th G7 Summit held at Williamsburg in May 1983, hinted that Japan had a debt owed to the U.S. and pledged to make Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Pacific, assisting the U.S. in defending against the Soviet threat. The Japanese government in the 1980s embarked on enhancing defense capability and increased its

---

prospects." *Asian Survey*, 46-6 (2006), p. 940.

[220] The host nation support includes both financial support for salaries for local labors, covered by Special Measures Argreement, and facilities, covered by the Facilities Improvement Program. In 1991, Japan supplied the U.S. by far the most generous host nation support with $3.3 billion. Nelms, Larry W. *Japanese Host Nation Support: Future Outlook*. National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 2-8.

[221] "Joint Communique Following Discussions with Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan." May 8, 1981 <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/50881b.htm>.

defense spending accordingly.[222] As <Table 9> demonstrates, despite being only 1% of GNP, Japan's defense budget kept increased thanks to strong yen. In 1988, Japan's defense budget ($45 billion) was close to leading European countries such as France, Germany, and U.K.[223]

Table 9. Japan's Defense Expenditure, 1955-86

	Defense spending (billion yen)	Change in amount over previous year	Ratio to GNP (%)	Ratio to general account budget (%)
1955	134.9	-3.3	1.78	13.61
1960	156.9	0.6	1.23	9.99
1965	301.4	9.6	1.07	8.24
1970	569.5	17.7	0.79	7.16
1975	1,371.3	21.4	0.84	6.23
1978	1,901.0	12.4	0.90	5.54
1979	2,094.5	10.2	0.90	5.43
1980	2,230.2	6.5	0.90	5.24
1981	2,400.0	7.6	0.91	5.13
1982	2,586.1	7.8	0.93	5.21
1983	2,754.2	6.5	0.98	5.47
1984	2,934.6	6.5	0.99	5.80
1985	3,137.1	6.9	0.99	5.98
1986	3,343.5	6.6	0.99	6.18

Source: Mason, Thomas David, and Abdul M. Turay. *US-Japan Trade Friction: Its Impact on Security Cooperation in the Pacific Basin*. Macmillan, 1991, p. 138.

Despite substantial increase in host nation support and defense spending, however, Japan did not fundamentally review its security policy and the security alliance with the U.S. until the demise of the Soviet Union. One could argue that Japan had little incentive in transforming the security arrangement with the U.S. From a realist perspective, the threat coming from the Soviet Union was gradually dissipating, and

[222] For a discussion on the rise of new strategic perspective, "military realism," expressed by Prime Minister Nakasone in the early 1980s, see Mochizuki, Mike M. "Japan's search for strategy." *International Security* (1983): 152-179.

[223] According to SIPRI, the defense spending of the U.S. was $557 billion, calculated in constant 2011 U.S. dollars. France, Germany, U.K, and Japan spent $69 billion, $68 billion, $58 billion, and $45 billion respectively. <http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expenditure+database+1988-2013.xlsx>.

China under the leadership of reform minded Deng Xiaoping, was focused on economic development and thus did not pose significant threat to Japan. Therefore, while there was mounting pressure from Washington for Tokyo to assume more share of the alliance burden, the utility of the U.S.-Japan alliance itself was rarely questioned. The Japanese policymakers had given the high priority to economic development. Japan's economy was prospering, and there seemed little reason to challenge the status quo, the principal element of which was U.S. security guarantee. Therefore, the issues of debates were about host nation support, missile defense, and military procurement policy. The U.S. pressure for fundamental readjustment of the security alliance had to face Japan's domestic legal and ideational constraints, which dictated the orientation of the Japanese security policy. As a result, the overhaul of asymmetrical security relations in ways in which reflect Japan's increased economic and military power was delayed.

Like other former postwar Japanese Prime Ministers, Toshiki Kaifu, assuming his position in August 1989, had to reaffirm Yoshida Doctrine and define Japan's role in the world mainly in economic dimensions.[224] Tendency to be dependent on the U.S. persevered. Even though Kaifu recognized the growing pressure for Japan's more active political role, Kaifu was a Japanese pacifist. For example, in August 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kaifu demonstrated his commitment to a peaceful vison by attending the memorial ceremonies at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and paying a visit to Okinawa where nearly 270,000 Japanese died during the World War II.[225] The peace constitution and the alliance with the U.S. had served as the two pillars of postwar Japanese foreign policy. As the U.S. policymakers began to push Japan to assume more active security role, however, the two pillars became increasingly at odds with each other.

---

[224] Kaifu articulated his vision for Japan as follows: "As long as military force was the dominant factor in the international order, the contribution a nonmilitary country like Japan could make naturally was limited. . . Japan has both the chance and the duty to apply its economic and technological strength, along with its store of experience and its conceptual ability, to the creation of a new framework for international relations." Kaifu, Toshiki. "Japan's Vision." *Foreign Policy* (1990): 28-39.

[225] Tamamoto, Masaru. "Trial of an Ideal: Japan's Debate over the Gulf Crisis." *World Policy Journal* (1990), p. 92.

(2) U.S.-Japan Trade Disputes

Trade friction between Japan and the U.S. could not be divorced from America's push for Japan's burden sharing. The two countries had been the largest trading partner. For Japan, the U.S. was the source of agricultural goods and high technology, while Japan provided the U.S. market high-quality and reasonably priced consumer products and industrial equipment. Since the 1960s, Japanese economic growth had been called a "miracle," making average 10% growth of GNP until the 1970s, 5% until the 1980s.[226] Japan, surpassing U.K. and West Germany, emerged as the second largest economy in the world. Since the mid-1970s, Japan's export to the U.S. dramatically increased, making trading imbalance between the U.S. and Japan wider.

Even though Japan in response to the pressure from its trading partners introduced liberation measures into its economy, the Japanese trade surplus was unstoppable. Increasing trade imbalances between the U.S. and Japan heightened trade tension, and the bilateral trade relations aggravated to the extent that might endanger security alliance. As <Table 10> shows, Japan's exports to the U.S. increased sharply, creating trade imbalances with significant gap. In 1981, for example, the U.S. lost almost $16 billion in trade with Japan, and out of the total U.S. trade deficit 56% was attributable to trade with Japan. In 1977 U.S. and Japan conflicted over the steel and iron trade. In the late 1970s the fear of America's auto markets being eaten by Japanese auto makers gripped the U.S. policymakers.

Table 10. The Japan-U.S. Trade Balance between 1975 and 1986

Year	Total US imports from Japan (US $ million)	Total US trade balance (US $ million)	US trade balance with Japan (US $ million)	Total US trade deficit attributable to Japan (%)
1975	11,257	8,903	-1,690	-
1976	15,531	-9,483	-5,335	56
1977	18,565	-31,091	-7,999	26

[226] For Japan's post-war economic success, see Johnson, Chalmers. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975*. Stanford University Press, 1982.

1978	24,540	-33,947	-11,580	34
1979	26,260	-27,536	-8,631	31
1980	31,216	-25,481	-10,410	41
1981	37,597	-27,978	-15,801	56
1982	37,683	-36,444	-16,989	47
1983	41,306	-62,013	-19,629	32
1984	57,135	-107,838	-33,560	31
1985	68,783	-132,130	-46,152	35
1986	81,911	-152,657	-55,029	36

Source: Scott C. Flanagan. "Political and Cultural Dimensions of Trade Friction." In Mason, Thomas David, and Abdul M. Turay (Eds.). *US-Japan Trade Friction: Its Impact on Security Cooperation in the Pacific Basin*. Macmillan, 1991, p. 33.

Japan Bashing and 1988 Trade Bill

The mounting trade deficit became the main topic of political conversation. U.S. attitudes toward Japan became increasing intolerable, leading to wide-spread anti-Japanese sentiment called Japan bashing. Japan's industrial prowess continued to grow, so did the fears of Japan's encroachment into American market share. Michael Armacost the U. S. Ambassador to Japan (1989 to 1993) observed as following:

> In the 1980s familiar complaints about Japan were that the Japanese were protectionists, that they were taking a free ride on Western defenses, that they shirked their international responsibilities, and that they coveted the status of a major power without accepting the responsibilities that such a status implied. … Many in the United States derided the pro-Japanese officials in the government, calling them "Cherry Blossom Protection Association" or "Chrysanthemum Club."[227]

The U.S. trade deficit continued to grow even after the Plaza Accord (1985) appreciated the yen's value. In 1988, it exceeded $60 billion.[228] The U.S. policymakers sought to make necessary adjustment to address trade imbalance. The result was the 1988 Trade Bill in the Congress. The bill was designed largely to provide leverage to liberalize the Japanese market.

---

[227] Armacost, Michael H. *Friends Or Rivals?: The Insider's Account of US-Japan Relations*. Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 18-19.

[228] As noted earlier, the U.S. trade deficit from trade with South Korea in 1988 was about $9 billion.

In that context, U.S. demand for Japan's burden sharing came with pressure for trade liberalization and U.S. troop reduction. On the one hand, U.S. Congress heavily criticized Japan for free-riding, claiming that unequal security relation is hurting U.S. economy. U.S. Congressmen argued that increasing deficit in trade balance was largely attributable to the U.S.' lopsided security guarantee for Japan. On the other side, the U.S. initiative to reduce military footprints in East Asia posed a significant security challenge for Japan. For the Japanese policymakers, power vacuum created by the withdrawal of U.S. forces might be the source of regional instability.

Meanwhile, the danger of trade disputes hurting security ties loomed large even for the U.S. As have been discussed, the U.S. policymakers in its East Asian security strategy reports made clear that the U.S. should not let trade frictions erode security ties with Japan based on nuclear umbrella and the mutual defense treaty. In the early 1990s, when trade imbalance with Japan over autos and auto parts was heatedly debated, some in the U.S. have suggested that U.S. use its security ties to twist Japan's arm on trade.[229] However, Joseph Nye, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for international affairs asserted that cars and aircraft carriers should be in separate realms. Even though using security guarantee as a bargaining chip against Japan might work in the short term, he argued, "After a few episodes, Japan might decide to alter its long term strategy so that it could be free from such pressure in the future."[230] Nye's message was that even though trade gap is enormous, the U.S. should also be concerned about the cost of losing Japan because U.S. deployed its military forces in Japan for its own security interest, not just to defend Japan.

Even though both American and Japanese officials were loath to discuss the link between high politics and low politics, security and trade issues could not be easily separated for the following reasons that are interrelated. First, American public assumed

---

[229] Fallows, James. "Containing Japan: Japan's One-Sided Trading Will Make the U.S-Japanese Trading Partnership Impossible to Sustain—Unless We Impose Limits on Its Economy." *Atlantic Monthly* 263, no. 5 (May 1989): 40-62.

[230] "Leadership and Alliances: American Strategy in East Asia" *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Volume 6 Issue 01, September 1995, pp 52 - 54

that the U.S. security guarantee is lopsided while there is no immediate security threat in East Asia. Second, the cost of security commitment to alliance partner loomed bigger because the U.S. economy was in bad shape. Third, because of the zero-sum nature of bilateral trade, growing trade deficit incurred from commodity trade with Japan engendered antipathy towards Japan's mercantilist trade policy. Many American auto makers in the 1980s thought that the Japanese are taking away their jobs. No matter how hard government officials tried, they could not totally prevent trade friction from undermining, though not breaking apart, alliance relations.[231] Jeffrey Garten, the Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade and a chief negotiator in auto negotiations with Japan, said in an interview:

> We have no intention of undermining the security relationship with Japan or using our military presence there as a tool of trade. . . .But do the economic tensions slowly undercut the *trust* that has to underlie security ties? The answer has to be *yes*. Over a long period of times, absent an identifiable enemy, there is no precedent in history for strong security ties in the face of a highly unbalanced economic and commercial relationship.[232]

Summary

While Japan stepped up its efforts in cost-sharing, Japan's alliance role conceptions were still anchored in the traditional role of *protectee* and *internal development*. Even though the Communist threat greatly diminished, Japan continued to rely on the U.S. security guarantee. Counting on the U.S. role of *a regional leader and protector*, the Japanese policymakers expected the U.S. to do the heavy lifting in regional

---

[231] Mason David argues that "As with the trade issue, elected officials in the U.S., fearing the political consequences of bucking the tide of popular sentiment on burden sharing issues, have remained more inclined to exploit these issues for short term advantage, especially in election years, than to argue for the critical importance to U.S. security of a continued relationship with Japan." David, Mason T. "Introduction: The Strategic Context of U.S.-Japan Trade Friction." In Mason, T. D. & Turay, A. M. (Eds.). *US-Japan Trade Friction: Its Impact on Security Cooperation in the Pacific Basin*. Macmillan, 1991, p.3.

[232] Quoted from Sanger, David E. "The Nation: Car Wars; The Corrosion at the Core of Pax Pacifica." *New York Times*. May 14, 1995.

security in return for the provision of a forward floating base to the U.S forces. First, rooted in Yoshida Doctrine, Japan's interests lay in reducing security burdens so that it can divert resources into other sectors, such as economy and social welfare. Second, keeping low military profile was required to prevent political resistance not only from domestic political forces but from its neighbors and economic powers in the region.[233] Third, while the Cold War geopolitics was coming to an end, the Soviet military presence in the Far East forced Japan to find measures to hedge against potential threat and acquire whatever security it can get from the U.S. In that way, Japan's security dependence gave the U.S. political leverage to advance its interest in U.S.-Japan relations.

Table 11. Japan's Post-Cold War Alliance Role Conceptions

Role Type	Description
Protectee	Ally that allude to the responsibility of U.S. to defend its country, while not displaying any serious security commitment toward the external security environment in a way that is commensurate with its economic power.
Internal Development	Ally that attempts to direct most of its efforts and resources toward internal development

Japan's effort to underwrite the cost of the U.S. forces in Japan was buried when trade imbalance expanded and laid bare the asymmetric imbalance in security relations. The emergence of growing friction over bilateral trade problems served to intensify tensions over the proper distribution of strategic responsibilities and financial burdens. The Japanese policymakers attempted to accommodate the pressure coming from trade imbalance with the U.S. Meanwhile, one might argue that the Japanese government knew the U.S. would not use security guarantee as an instrument of negotiation and that the U.S. Department of Defense would assure the Congress of the strategic value of U.S-Japan security ties. However, the Japanese government not only addressed trade policy but also stepped up defense share by increasing defense budget and introducing

[233] For the interrelation between Japan's military and economic interests in North East Asia, see Hunt, K. "Japan's security policy." *Survival*, 31-3, (1989): 201-207.

"sympathy budget." In other words, out of fear of trade issues hurting security relations, the Japanese government attempted to extend its security role, primarily in economic terms.

In a sense, one can argue that the U.S. security officials' efforts to prevent trade issues from eroding security relations worked as a pressure to make Japan to assume more security responsibility. In order to avoid making imbalance in defense burden sharing a target of criticism, the Japanese policymakers pursued "internalization of Japan" and expanded its defense budget, host nation support for the U.S., official development assistance, and its monetary contributions to the international financial institutions. For the U.S. security officials, Japan's "sympathy budget" would have served to allay Congressional criticism of Japan's security free-riding, let alone its real effect.[234]

In sum, against the backdrop of diverging security interests, the U.S.-Japan relation was on the verge of a crisis, if not collapse. Stephen Walt argued that alliances can deteriorate or eventually collapse if there is a significant shift in one of the following three factors: threat perception, declining credibility, and domestic politics.[235] The empirical analysis has found that three factors are closely interconnected, rendering the alliance vulnerable. In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, dyadic-level approach finds that shifts in external environment and trade disputes led to a crisis in alliance. While the eclipse of the Cold War did not fundamentally undermine the original rationale behind the U.S.-Japan alliance, shifts in the external security environment diluted the unifying force in alliance.

Trade and security imbalances between the U.S. and Japan became a serious domestic political issue, particularly in the U.S. During the Cold War the two countries tended to play down economic interests in favor of strategic concerns. However, that tendency had diminished. American public began to recognize that the benefits of the alliance were biased towards Japan and became increasingly disquieted by Japan's

---

[234] In that context, the U.S. trade or security negotiations with Japan can be understood in the framework of the two-level analysis proposed by Robert Putnam. Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International Organization*, 42-03 (1988): 427-460.

[235] Walt, Stephen M. "Why alliances endure or collapse." *Survival*, 39-1 (1997): 156-179.

growing industrial prowess and Japan's tendency to evade international responsibility. Changing view of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the U.S. served to create an environment in which readjusting of the alliance yields national interests as well as domestic political benefits that outweigh strategic costs of pressing Japan.

Figure 23. The Deterioration of the U.S.-Japan Alliance



Policymakers on both sides began to question the credibility of its alliance partner. There was growing doubts in the U.S. about whether Japan is genuinely committed to providing necessary assistance to the U.S. security efforts. On the Japanese side, growing self-confidence as a result of economic achievements was translated into growing intolerance towards the blunt U.S. demands for security burden sharing and trade liberalization. Japan did not view its trade policies as unfair, and many Japanese, instead, argued that the trade imbalance is attributable to faulty U.S. business practices.[236]

For U.S. policymakers, Japan's role in international arena deem extraordinary weak compared with its industrial power. The anomaly in Japan's power portfolio was that it was an economic giant and military pygmy. The American's growing intolerance of the lack of reciprocity led to the demands for Japan to shoulder additional international

[236] One notable example was an immensely popular essay, *The Japan that Can Say "NO,"* co-authored by Shintaro Ishihara, Minister of Transport and later Governor of Tokyo and Akio Morita, chairman of Sony. Morita, Akio, and Shintaro Ishihara. "The Japan That Can Say No." *The New US-Japan Relations Card* (1989): 4-62.

responsibilities and security burdens. To be more specific, the U.S. pressured Japan to undertake economic reforms to liberalize its economy; to increase its conventional defense efforts and share of the costs of U.S. military deployments; to help securing safe passage of oil containers in the Persian Gulf; to contribute to international peacekeeping; and to expand international aid. Here the divergence of bilateral role perceptions began to form. While the U.S. policymakers hoped Japan to increase its contributions to assisting the U.S. policy goals, what Japanese policymakers wanted from the U.S. was continued assurance of American leadership.

CHAPTER IV. 1991 GULF WAR AND ALLIANCE ROLE PERFORMANCES

1. Gulf War and Coalition Support

(1) Overview

The first major crisis for the U.S. after the end of the Cold War unfold in the Middle East. The first Persian Gulf War broke out on 7 August 1990, five days later when Iraqi military forces invaded and occupied Kuwait. Kuwait, along with Saudi Arabia, was the major oil supplier to the U.S. For Iraq, the invasion was an act of economic war. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait for stealing oil from a disputed supply and flooding the world oil market, thereby pushing oil prices down.[237] Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait and declared it a province of Iraq.

The U.S. involvement in Kuwait was immediate. President Bush believed that Saddam Hussein would continue his course to invade Saudi Arabia and take control of the region's oil supplies. Saudi Arabia turned to the U.S. for help. In the defense of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. initiated a massive troop deployment known as Operation Desert Shield, the first phase of the Persian Gulf War. Starting on 7 August 1990, U.S. troops began to move into Saudi Arabia to protect Saudi's oil fields. For Operation Desert Shield, initially 230,000 U.S. troops arrived in Saudi Arabia, but when Iraq continued to build its military force in Kuwait, the U.S. deployed additional 200,000 troops to prepare for a military action.[238]

---

[237] In July 1990, Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of breaking with Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production quotas and over-producing crude oil for export, which depressed prices, and thereby deprived critical oil revenues. Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Rautsi. "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait." *Survival*, 33-1 (1991): 18-30.

[238] U.S. Department of Defense. "The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline." <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45404>.

At the same time, the U.S. sought multilateral support in the UN. Right after Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait, the UNSC, on 2 August 1990, immediately passed Resolution 660, condemning Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.[239] As Iraq defied the Security Council, on August 6 UNSC imposed economic sanctions against Iraq (Resolution 661) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,[240] followed by its declaration that Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was null and void (Resolution 662) on August 9. The U.S. continued to call for Iraq to withdraw, threatening to extend trade embargo against Iraq through UN.

While U.S. policymakers were formulating offense plans, on 29 November the U.S. succeeded in obtaining a UNSC resolution (Resolution 678), which set 15 January 1991 as a deadline for Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and authorized the use of force to uphold resolution if Iraq does not comply.[241] Traditionally Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union. However, to gain support for their dramatic internal changes, the USSR did not block the American plan. Resolution 678 made it clear that if Iraq did not implement the resolution by 15 January 1991, U.N member States were authorized to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660. The UNSC Resolution 678 helped the U.S. to form an international military coalition to wage a war against Saddam Hussein.[242]

---

[239] The voting was 14 in favor, 0 against and 1 abstentions. Yemen did not participate in voting. U.N. Security Council Resolution.

[240] The resolution was adopted by 13 votes in favor, Chile, Cuba and Yemen abstained from voting.

[241] Resolution 678 was adopted by 12 votes in favor, 2 against (Cuba, Yemen), and 1 abstention from China. China had usually vetoed such resolutions authorizing actions against a state in defense of sovereignty. China, many assumed, abstained in an attempt to ease sanctions placed on China after the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Shichor, Yitzhak. "China's Voting Behavior in the UN Security Council." *China Brief*, 6-18 (2006): 4-6.

[242] Resolution 678 stated "*Mindful* of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security; *Determined* to secure full compliance with its decisions; *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter: 1. *Demands* that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so; 2. *Authorizes* Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph l above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore International peace and security in the area; 3. *Requests* all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 above; 4. *Requests* the States concerned to keep the

The deadline came, but Iraq did not respond. Iraq defied all the multilateral efforts to force Iraq to change its course of action and roll back its forces from Kuwait. A coalition of UN forces began to build up around Kuwait. On January 16, U.S. Congress granted President Bush the authority to wage war and attack military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. On the next day, Operation Desert Storm, the second phase of Gulf War began with air strikes. The 36 members of the international coalition forces led by the U.S. initiated massive air campaign to destroy Iraq's command and control centers, air defense system, and other key military installations. Iraq responded by launching Scud missiles at U.S. military bases in the region.[243]

After weeks of air and missile operations, President Bush on February 22 gave Iraq an ultimatum to withdraw forces unconditionally from Kuwait by noon February 23, 1991. On February 24, the ground war began. The U.S. and coalition forces, under the leadership of General Schwartzkopf, entered Kuwait and Iraq and defeated Iraqi forces in only four days.[244] On March 3, U.S. and Iraqi military leaders sat down to discuss terms for a cease-fire and end the war. Iraq conceded to a cease-fire and agreed to abide by all UN resolutions. On March 6, President Bush officially announced the liberation of Kuwait. On April 6, the U.S. accepted and signed official truce with Iraq. It was a swift and decisive victory for the U.S. and coalition forces.

(2) U.S. Call for Support

The Persian Gulf War was a war waged by coalition forces from 36 nations. As the U.S. military strategists were designing operational plans to dispel Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, the Bush administration began to organize multinational coalition forces.

Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 above; 5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter." U.N. Security Council Resolution. <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/678(1990)>.

[243] Iraq also targeted military facilities in Israel. Attacking Israel was a stratagem to persuade all the neighboring Arab nations to join the Iraqi cause.

[244] *Operation Desert Sabre* was the U.S. name for the air offensive against the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations between 24th and 28th of February 1991, which was part of Operation Desert Storm.

During August 1990 through 1991, 28 foreign countries deployed military forces in the Persian Gulf. In addition, 8 other countries have provided non-military support, such as transportation and medical units, to the coalition efforts, for a total of 36 members of the international coalition forces.

The U.S. call for support was made either head-to-head or state-to-state manner. The President Bush personally called over sixty heads of state, requesting support for the U.S.-led coalition. The U.S. efforts also included foreign trips by senior U.S. administration officials to garner material and financial contribution. The real champion of travel was Secretary of State James Baker, who between August and November in 1990 traveled more than 100,000 miles and held over 200 meetings with leaders of governments and foreign ministers.[245] James Baker called his journey "tin cup trip."

Gulf War Contributions

In the following, contributions made by coalition partners of the U.S. will be reviewed. Among different types of contributions, this research focuses on military and financial support as key assistances to the Persian Gulf War coalition. The two types of contributions are significant in this research in that military and financial supports are costly for donor states. In particular, the decision to deploy combat units into a battle field would be the most risky behavior because of the possibility of casualties and ensuing domestic backlash. For that matter, the levels of military and financial contributions can be regarded as a level of commitment by a coalition partner to the coalition leader. The more the contributions, the more commitment to the coalition leader.

The total military contributions from foreign countries to the international coalition included the following: 245,000 troops, 64 warships, 650 fixed-wing combat aircraft, and 2,600 armored vehicles, including 1,300 tanks.[246] <Table 12> presents a list

[245] Head, William P. and Earl H. Tilford (Eds.). *The Eagle in the Desert: Looking back on US Involvement in the Persian Gulf War*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996, p. 38.

[246] U.S. Congress. "Review of Persian Gulf Burden Sharing" Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress. Washington D.C., May 14, 1991.

of coalition forces by troop strength and major warfare for each country. The U.S., coalition leader, deployed 697,000 troops for Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Strom. Adjacent countries of Iraq and Kuwait who were instantly threatened by Iraq's aggression responded to the crisis by sending troops. For example, Saudi Arabia immediately deployed 100,000 soldiers for fear of possible attack of Iraqi forces to seize oilfields. U.K., a staunch ally of the U.S., sent some 50,000 soldiers to support military operations. Some countries participated in the international military coalition with non-combat units. Spain sent 3,500 troops for logistics support, and South Korea supported the coalition with medical teams and air transportation units.

Table 12. Allied Participation in the Multinational Force

Country	Personnel	Unit / Equipment
United States	**697,000**	
Argentina	300	1 frigate and 1 destroyer
Australia	1,230	1 destroyer, 3 frigates, and 2 support ships
Bahrain	700	1 infantry company, 1 F-5 aircraft squadron, 1 F-16 aircraft squadron, and 1 helicopter squadron
Bangladesh	2,330	1 brigade and 1 battalion
Belgium	550	2 frigates, 2 minesweepers, and 1 support ship
Canada	1,370	1 CF.1 8 aircraft squadron, 1 signal squadron, 1 detachment, 1 destroyer, 1 frigate, and 1 support ship
Czechoslovakia	140	1 chemical weapons decontamination unit
Denmark	90	1 frigate
Egypt	39,160	2 battalions, 2 divisions, 1 regiment, and 1 logistics support command
France	19,330	11 aircraft detachments (Atlantique, C-135. C-160, Mirage 2000. Mirage F-l, Mystere-Falcon, Puma helicopter, Transall C-160, and Tristar aircraft), 3 aircraft squadrons (F-l and Jaguar aircraft), 16 ships, 1 brigade, 1 battalion, 3 batteries, 2 regiments, 2 support groups, 1 section, and 1 countermeasure detachment
Germany	700	8 shies (to the eastern Mediterranean)
Greece	210	1 frigate (to the eastern Mediterranean)
Hungary	40	1 medical detachment
Italy	1,310	1 Tornado aircraft squadron, 2 corvette ships, 3 frigates, and 1 support ship
South Korea	160	Field hospital and 5 C-130 aircraft with crews
Kuwait	7,800	3 aircraft detachments (C-l 3, C-9, and Hawk aircraft), 4 aircraft squadrons (A-4, Gazelle, F-l aircraft), 1 Puma

		helicopter squadron, 2 ships, 2 marine teams, 5 brigades and 1 battalion
Morocco	1,880	1 regiment and 1 battalion
Netherlands	1,000	4 frigates and 1 support ship
New Zealand	50	1 C-l 30 aircraft detachment
Niger	480	1 battalion
Norway	60	1 frigate
Oman	940	1 brigade, 4 aircraft squadrons (Hunter, Jaguar and Strikemaster aircraft), 1 support aircraft detachment, 2 landing crafts, and 2 patrol boats
Pakistan	8,700	2 brigades
Philippines	300	Medical team
Poland	200	Medical team
Portugal	N/A	Medical team and field hospital
Qatar	1,580	1 helicopter squadron, 2 aircraft squadrons (Alpha and Mirage F-l aircraft), 1 Hunter aircraft detachment, and 1 mechanized battalion
Romania	N/A	Field hospital
Saudi Arabia	137,160	Entire armed forces, including 4 aircraft detachments (F-15, F-5, and Tornado aircraft), 16 aircraft squadrons (C-130, E-3A, F-15, F-5, Hawk, KE3A, RF-SE, Strikemaster and Tornado aircraft), 13 brigades, 37 battalions, and 23 ships
Senegal	500	1 infantry battalion
Sierra Leone	30	Medical team
Spain	770	6 frigates
Syria	14,800	1 armored division, 1 special forces battalion, 1 brigade, and 1 regiment
Turkey	100,000	N/A
U.A.E.	1,450	1 battalion, 2 aircraft detachment6 (C-130, Mirage 111 aircraft), 1 helicopter squadron, and 7 aircraft squadrons (Aeromacchi, Hawk, Marchetti, and Mirage aircraft)
United Kingdom	31,930	5 aircraft squadrons (Buccaneer, Jaguar, and Tornado aircraft), 7 aircraft detachments (BA ii! -125, C-130, Nimrod, Tornado, VC-10 and Victor aircraft) 3 helicopter squadrons (Lynx, Puma, and Gazelle helicopters), 1 CH-47 helicopter detachment, 2 brigades, 2 batteries, 1 division, and 21 ships

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office. *Persian Gulf: Allied Burden Sharing Efforts*. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. December, 1991, p. 17.
Note: Number refers to military personnel assigned in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, or other regional states. South Korea's contribution only includes medical personnel.

In the face of mounting budget pressure, the total cost of Desert Shield and Desert Strom was unbearably large for the U.S. policymakers. According to a report

prepared in consultation with the DOD, State Department, and Treasury Department, the cumulative cost associated in the Persian Gulf War amounted to $ 61.1 billion as of October 1992. <Table 13> reflects that nearly half of the cost was used for personnel and operational support.

Table 13. Full Desert Shield/Desert Storm Costs

Item	Total Costs ($ in Billions)
Airlift	3.2
Sealift	5
Personnel	7.5
Personnel Support	6.8
Operating Support	21.4
Fuel	4.8
Investment	8.4
Military Construction	0.4
Other Personnel Benefits	3.6
Total	**61.1**

Source: Office of Management and Budget. "US Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions to Offset Such Costs, as required by Section 401 PL 102-25." Executive Office of the President. October 15, 1992.
Note: Operating Support refers to the cost of needed repair, rehabilitation and restoration of military equipment due to climatic conditions and combat stress.

Foreign financial contribution was crucial for the U.S. First of all, the idea of deficit financing of a war was implausible. At that time budget deficit was a major concern for the U.S., and the Department of Defense faced heavy pressure from Congress to balance defense budget requirements with growing domestic demand for non-security areas. The U.S. also needed to obtain substantial financial assistance to be directed to those who suffered from financial losses as a result of their support for the UN economic sanction against Iraq. For example, Turkey's participation in the UN trade embargo resulted in economic losses for Turkey since oil had been exported through Iraq-Turkey pipelines. Even politically, foreign financial assistance, together with military support, constituted the integral part of garnering domestic support in making a

case of offensive against Iraq. James Baker noted that "[A]t a time of economic uncertainty at home, it would be politically impossible to sustain domestic support for the operation, unless we demonstrated that Uncle Sam wasn't footing the bill while others with pockets as deep as ours sat on the sidelines."[247] In sum, the U.S. was in need of foreign financial contributions to offset costs of war and to garner both domestic and international support.

Table 14. Foreign Financial Contributions for the Persian Gulf War ($ in million)

	Commitments			Receipts		
	1990	1991	Total	Cash	In-kind	Total
GCC States	6,845	30,138	36,983	32,694	4,307	37,001
Saudi Arabia	3,339	13,500	16,839	12,809	4,046	16,854
Kuwait	2,506	13,500	16,056	16,015	44	16,059
UAE	1,000	3,088	4,088	3,870	218	4,083
Germany	1,072	5,500	6,572	5,772	683	6,455
Japan	**1,680**	**8,332**	**10,012**	**9,466**	**546**	**10,012**
South Korea	**80**	**275**	**355**	**150**	**101**	**251**
Other	3	26	29	8	22	30
Total	9,680	44,271	53,951	48,090	5,659	53,749

Source: Office of Management and Budget (1992): Table 13.
<http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/>.
Note: In 1992, South Korea agreed to provide in-kind support for non-Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations in FY 1992 in an amount equivalent to the difference.

For the U.S., nearly 88% of the total cost of war was offset by foreign contributions. <Table 14> specifies the amount of contributions, pledged and actually made by each country. Out of the total receipt ($53 billion), contributions from GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE—covered more than half of the total costs.[248] The financial pledge had been almost fulfilled. Other than

[247] Baker (1995), p. 288.
[248] Founded in May 1981, GCC member state included Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.

GCC support, Japan's support was remarkable. Japan offered more than $10 billion in the form of both cash and in-kind, and it accounted for 18% of the total cost. Germany also defrayed 12% of the cost, with $6 billion.

2. South Korea's Role Performance and U.S. Response

(1) Gulf War and ROK-US Alliance Burden Sharing

U.S. Call for Support and South Korea's Response

South Korea responded swiftly to the U.S. tin cup mission—request for international military and financial support—which started early September 1990 after the UN had passed the Resolutions 660 and 661. When the UN-imposed withdrawal date of Iraqi forces out of Kuwait—15 January 1991—neared, the Korean government decided to contribute to the U.S.-led coalition by deploying a medical support unit to Saudi Arabia.

Starting early September 1990, the U.S. encouraged South Korea to assume its fair share of responsibility for opposing the Iraqi aggression. On 7 September, President Bush delivered his message through the U.S. Ambassador to Korea Donald P. Gregg to request South Korea to honor UN resolutions, including trade sanctions against Iraq.[249] Stressing that the shape of the post-Cold War world would be dependent upon America's commitments to its friends, President Bush singled out South Korea, along with Japan, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, among those that will provide financial aid or supplies to the U.S.-led coalition.[250]

---

[249] Ministry of Defense. *Kukgoon Gulfjeonjaeng Pabyeongsa [History of Troop deployment to the Persian Gulf War by the Korean Military]*. Seoul: Institute of Military History, 2013, p. 40.

[250] McNulty, Timothy J. "Bush Seeks Help With Gulf Bills: Allies Asked To Bear Their 'Fair Share.'" *Chicago Tribune*. August 31, 1990.

The President Bush also sent a mission to South Korea to coordinate the economic and military aid.[251] The mission headed by the Secretary of Treasury Nicholas Brady was dispatched to South Korea and Japan to "twist their arms a little bit," in Bush's words, and fund the coalition's activities.[252] On 7 September, in a meeting with Nicholas Brady, President Roh delivered his willingness to offset U.S. costs for the Gulf War.[253] Pressure also came from the U.S. Congress. In a congressional hearing held on 19 September, Stephen J. Solarz, chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, urged South Korea to make financial and military contribution.[254] The exact level of support being sought was not specified, however. Donald Gregg maintained the Korean government should make its own decision. Much of the congressional criticism targeted tepid responses from Germany and Japan.

Shortly after the tin cup missions, various commitments were made to support multinational forces. As a result of consultations with foreign nations through diplomatic channels, commitments to the U.S. came in three principal forms: cash, in-kind airlift and sealift, and in-kind material and equipment. In late September, Congress established the Defense Cooperation Account (DCA) to receive financial contributions and expanded the Department of Defense's authority to accept monetary contributions from foreign governments and international organizations.[255] Initially, South Korea, after negotiations with the U.S., pledged to provide $80 million for U.S. incremental costs, composed of $50 million in cash and $30 million worth of in-kind support.[256] At the

---

[251] Sterngold, James. "Confrontation in the Gulf; Brady finishes tour." *New York Times*. September 8, 1990; Rise, James. "Brady Seeks $25 Billion in Allied Aid." *Los Angeles Times*. September 5, 1990.

[252] Head and Tilford (1996), p. 38.

[253] Ministry of Defense (2013), p. 43.

[254] U.S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Asian Response to the Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. One Hundred First Congress, second session, September 19, 1990.

[255] US Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 1992, appendix 4.

[256] Ibid, appendix 5.

same time, the Korean government began to examine its plans for military support as presented in <Table 15>. After review, the Korean government decided to negotiate with the U.S. in the order of plan A, B, and C.

Table 15. Review of Plans for Military Contribution

Support Plan		Considerations
A	Non-deployment / logistic assistance	· Inevitability of assuming financial and monetary burden
B	Deployment of non-combat unit	· Loss of deterrence capability · Minimize casualty · Cooperative stance with the U.S.
C	Deployment of combat unit	· Significant loss of deterrence capability · Hostile relations with Iraq and pro-Iraq forces · Upgrade of national prestige

Source: Ministry of Defense (2013), p. 45.

Troop Dispatch

On 24 September 1990, the Korean government announced a comprehensive support plan for the U.S. For monetary support, South Korea pledged to offer $120 million for military activities and $100 million for other nations significantly affected by the war, for a total of $220 million. The plan also included the deployment of a non-combatant medical unit.[257] On 21 January 1991, the Korean National Assembly passed a motion regarding deployment of the medical unit, against partial opposition. On 24 January, a medical unit of 150 personnel was sent to Saudi Arabia.

In a month later, when the U.S. with Congressional and public support behind was about to launch a military operation against Iraq, South Korea decided to make a supplementary military and monetary support. The Korean government developed plans for additional support, which included additional non-combatant troop dispatch. On 7 February, the Korean National Assembly approved a plan to dispatch an air

[257] Ministry of Defense. *Defense White Paper 1991*. Seoul: Defense Ministry, 1991, p. 81.

transportation unit of some 160 personnel and 5 C-130s to help the allies. The air force unit operated in Al Ain, UAE, providing transportation support to assist U.S. military operations. As of February 1992, South Korea provided 89 airlift support, with estimated value of $45 million.[258]

Table 16. Plan for Additional Monetary Contribution

A	· $500 million (including the first support of $220 million)
B	· $350 million (amount that U.S. demanded in 1990)
C	· $490 million
D	· $450 million (considering Japan's contribution and its ratio of GNP)

Source: Ministry of Defense (2013), p. 61.

Financial Contribution

Additional financial contribution was also made to offset U.S. war cost. Initially, the Korean government pledged to make $220 million contributions to the international coalition. Allegedly, South Korea's 1st financial support fell far short of the U.S. demand, $350 million.[259] Thus, in January 1991 when military offensive against Iraq was imminent, the Korean government reviewed its plan for additional monetary support as in <Table 16>. Finally, the Korean government decided to give another $280 million made up of cash, in-kind material, and in-kind airlift and sealift, for the total of $500 million.[260] <Figure 24> presents South Korea's burden sharing as of May 1991.

[258] US Department of Defense (1992), appendix 8.
[259] Ministry of Defense (2013), p. 61.
[260] US Department of Defense (1992), appendix 5-7.

Figure 24. South Korea's Contribution to U.S.-led Coalition in 1991

1. Participation in international military coalition
   - Units/Personnel: 154 member medical team delivered to Saudi Arabia (value: $14 million)
   - Equipment: 5 C-130s with crews
2. Financial contributions
   - Contributions to significantly affected states
     - GCFCG: $ 98 million
   - Contributions to other military forces
     - $ 15 million in supplies for Egypt and Morocco
     - $ 30 million to United Kingdom
   - Contributions to international organizations
     - IOM: $ 500,000
     - UNESCO: $ 30,000
     - ICRC: $ 30,000
   - Contributions to other foreign countries
     - GCFCG: $ 17 million

Source: U.S. Congress. "Review of Persian Gulf Burden Sharing." Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 14 May 1991, p. 67.

The U.S. policymakers appreciated South Korea's contribution, though limited. In an Oval office meeting with the Minister of National Defense Lee Jong Koo, President Bush expressed his gratitude about South Korea's cooperation. Bush said:

> I want to say we are pleased with the cooperation there. I want you to tell him that the fact that we are occupied as we are in reversing Saddam Hussein's aggression, we are not losing interest in the security of other parts of the world, particularly Korea. . . . You offered a medical support team. Very generous.[261]

At the news of South Korea's decision to deploy an air transportation unit, the President Bush, through a personally handwritten letter to the President Roh, expressed his gratitude for South Korea's additional support to help allies.[262] After all, South Korea's assistance during the Gulf War led to the enhancement of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The

[261] Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong Koo." The White House, Washington DC. September 11, 1990.

[262] Ministry of Defense (2013), p. 71.

solidified bilateral relation, in turn, empowered South Korea's diplomatic initiative—*Nordpolitik*—to improve inter-Korean relations.

(2) Summary and Analysis

South Korea's military and monetary contributions to offset incremental burden of the war was welcomed by the U.S. policymakers. Given South Korea's industrial power and security dependence on the U.S., South Korea's contribution was modest, if not limited. South Korea emerged as the world's 10th largest trading nation and 7th largest trading partner of the U.S. Yet, South Korea's financial support ($500 million) can be easily dwarfed by Japan's ($13 billion), even when we consider that Japan's GDP wise economic power was about ten times bigger than South Korea's.

The same was true for South Korea's military assistance. One might argue that South Korea's troop deployment was driven by the fear of abandonment, triggered by the U.S. troop withdrawal plan. By that time, as have been discussed above, a major change in U.S. defense posture in South Korea was being implemented. In response to the Nunn-Warner Act of 1989, the U.S. policymakers set forth a detailed plan for phased troop in reduction. For many in Seoul, the U.S. troop drawdown signaled gradual disengagement, creating fear of abandonment. South Korean media brought up the possibility of the relocating some of the U.S. forces in Korea to the Gulf region, if the war would prolong. However, given South Korea's military support during the Vietnam War, the provision of medical and air-lift support with some 300 non-combatant soldiers can hardly be interpreted as a bold move to buy America's strong security commitment. The deployment of 300 non-combatant troops cannot be matched by Italy's and Australia's military contribution. Military assistance by South Korea roughly matched Poland and Czechoslovakia, who did not have a formal security agreement with the U.S. Yet, there was no indication of alliance conflict over coalition support, and South Korea and the U.S. preserved solid bilateral relations.

U.S. Role Expectations

In the role-based perspective, South Korea's coalition support and the U.S. response to it can be read as the result of converging security role conceptions between Washington and Seoul. As we have noted, the post-Cold War U.S. security framework toward South Korea, in the early 1990s, was focused on upgrading South Korea's defense capability in deterring North Korea's aggression. The U.S. policymakers urged South Korea to enhance its deterrence capability by modernizing its forces and play more active role in maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula. In the face of mounting pressure for defense budget cut and continued North Korean threat, the U.S. effort to realign its defense policy toward South Korea was concentrated on increasing South Korea's force augmentation and cost sharing, rather than redrawing its defense parameters or transferring major security responsibility to South Korea. The U.S. policymakers gradually transformed the security role of the U.S. from leading to support. Yet, the scope of the ROK-U.S. security alliance remained local.

In that context of the U.S. role prescription vis-à-vis South Korea, what the U.S. policymakers wanted was South Korea's commitment to defray incremental cost of war. The U.S. mission to Seoul sent to negotiate South Korea's war contribution did not specifically address its demand for direct military support. Instead, bilateral negotiation was focused on South Korea's financial commitment which would correspond to its increased industrial power. In that sense, South Korea's role performance during the Persian Gulf War, which included both military and financial support, lived up to the U.S. expectations.

South Korea's Role Performance

In order to make sense of the ROK-U.S. alliance behavior based on role-based approach, two observations should be pointed out. First, bilateral negotiations on contribution was conducted simultaneously with negotiation on defense burden sharing for the U.S. forces in Korea. In 1988, South Korea for the first time agreed to bear

financial burden by allocating separate budget for defense burden sharing. Accordingly, South Korea transferred $ 45 million and $70 million in 1989 and 1990 respectively, and in 1990, South Korea pledged to increase its host nation support to $150 million. Further, in January 1991, South Korea and the U.S. concluded SMA, in which South Korea pledged to gradually increase fund up to $ 300 million by 1995. A month later, in February, the issue of making additional financial and military contribution to the Gulf War was decided in a cabinet meeting. It can be assumed that if the U.S. had been bore grudge on the outcomes of earlier negotiations on defense burden sharing, the U.S. should have expressed frustration and twisted South Korea's arm to make more contribution. However, apparently the U.S. did not. As have noted, the U.S. requested $350 million, and in response South Korea initially offered $220 million and later gave another $280 million, plus medical and air transportation support with some 300 troops. That is to say that the U.S. embraced South Korea's role enactment in support of the U.S.

Second, the U.S. gave positive support to South Korea's diplomatic offensive to improve inter-Korean relations. Since he took office, the President Bush had been supportive of South Korea's *Nordpolitik*.[263] In a summit meeting held after the end of the Gulf War, Bush reaffirmed his commitment to it. Indeed, South Korea's diplomatic initiative was expedited after the Gulf War. In September 1991, two Koreas became members of the UN Further, as the U.S. withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, Seoul and Pyongyang in December 1991 signed Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which forbidden the possession of nuclear weapons. All of these would have been impossible had the U.S. found South Korea's security role conception was misconceived or against the interest of the U.S.

[263] The President Bush remarked, "The United States applaud President Roh's creative diplomacy and supports his plan to create a commonwealth between the North and the South as a step toward reunification. President Roh's unification formula is based on principles that we share—independence, peace, and democracy—and it is my hope that the resumption of other forums of inter-Korean dialog will lead to institutions that will serve as a basis for eventual reunification." See Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Remarks Following Discussions with President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea." The White House, Washington DC. October 17, 1989.

Figure 25. Role-based Approach to the ROK-U.S. Relations during the Gulf War



3. Japan's Role Performance and U.S. Response

(1) Gulf War and U.S.-Japan Alliance Burden Sharing

The Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was a defining moment for U.S.-Japan security relations. Japan often claimed itself as an equal partner of the U.S., but the crisis clearly demonstrated the limitation of Japanese foreign policy. While the U.S. was seeking to organize a broad international coalition under the auspices of the UN, Japan

faced a fundamental challenge whether it could transcend the Yoshida doctrine and redefine its rules for handling international security issues. Notwithstanding economic and industrial power, Japan's political role in the U.S.-led coalition was marginal. Japan could not provide anything beyond monetary contribution to the U.S. The Kaifu cabinet attempted to deploy peace-keeping force under the UN, but failed to gather domestic support. Japanese policymaker's indecisive and late response brought severe criticism from U.S. and other Western countries. Therefore, even though Japan made significant financial contributions, Japan earned little gratitude.[264] Instead, Japanese foreign policy was derided as "check book diplomacy."

Japan's Initial Reaction

Japan's initial reaction to Saddam's invasion into Kuwait was swift and responsive. Immediately after the invasion, the Japanese government officially condemned Iraq's aggression. After freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, Prime Minister Kaifu expressed Japan's willingness to implement economic sanctions in accordance with the UN resolution 661. Japan announced its support for UN resolutions, which nullified Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and called for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops, the safe release of all hostages, and thereby restoration of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf.

Getting beyond this initial diplomatic support, however, proven difficult. After timely diplomatic responses, the Japanese government proved to be ill-prepared to redefine its security roles and respond decisively to external security crisis. Japan's UN peacekeeping mission was confined to financial support rather than personnel support. Rooted in Yoshida Doctrine, Japanese foreign policy traditionally had avoided to use its political capital and assume political responsibility on issues that Japanese government deemed were not directly related to its national interest. Japan's poor response came as

[264] After the war ended, the Kuwaiti government published a full-page advertisement in major newspapers including *New York Times* and to thank members of U.N. coalition for liberating its country. Japan was absent from the list. "Japan's New Frustration." *Washington Post*, March 17, 1991.

no surprise to some Japan specialists. Confronted by external difficulties, Michael Armacost, U.S. Ambassador to Japan (1989-93), recalled, "Japanese leaders had become accustomed to react by keeping their heads down, minimizing the risks, and leaving security responsibilities to others—mainly to the United States."[265]

Outraged by Iraq's aggression and disregard for the UN resolution that U.S. went great lengths to draw consensus on, the Bush administration began to draw coalition contributions from its partners and allies that were essential for both practical and political reasons. James Baker recalled the necessity of mobilizing international support as follows:

> From a domestic political standpoint as well as a moral one, we needed to insist upon substantial financial commitments from other countries to help underwrite the costs of the operation. The President was prepared to bear the brunt of the burden, in that if forces were required to eject Iraq from Kuwait, Americans would die in the Gulf. The very least we could expect in return was that the countries we were helping, and all our other allies with sakes in the crisis should join not only in supplying forces to the extent they could, but also in financing the costs of Operation Desert Storm.[266]

The U.S. policymakers understood that costs of war would be staggering and felt an obligation to make money to help offset the severe economic loss that the trade embargo would incur on coalitions partners, especially Egypt and Turkey. At the same time, domestic consideration also could not be ignored. At a time of economic difficulties at home, Washington knew that it would be impossible to draw and sustain domestic support for military operation unless other countries are also paying the bill and taking necessary risks.

---

[265] Armacost, Michael H. *Friends Or Rivals?: The Insider's Account of US-Japan Relations*. Columbia University Press, 1996, pp.99-100.

[266] Baker (1995), pp.287-89.

U.S. Call for Support and Japan's Response

While the dissolution of the Cold War threat reduced U.S. leverage against its allies over burden sharing, the U.S. wanted Japan to share security burdens with the U.S. in the face of international security crisis. The U.S. motivation for Japanese contribution can be explained under following considerations. First, the U.S. deemed that Saddam's ill-devised aggression put Japan's economic interest stake. The strategic importance of the Gulf region for Japan in terms of oil supply, safe passage of trade cargos, and markets was all too clear. While Japan as a non-oil nation was entirely reliant on imported oil, Japan relied on Persian Gulf nearly 70% as a percent of total oil consumption.[267] The stability of the region was essential to the economic health of not just the Western world but also Japan. Armacost writes, "An administration that was preparing to deploy troops halfway around the world to defend oil regarded as more critical to European and Japanese prosperity than to its own would surely expect its allies to help with the costs and risks of that effort."[268]

However, the Gulf crisis was not a pressing concern for most Japanese politicans and public. Japan's pacifist orientation was reflected in the absence of public discussions about the justice of the international coalition and Japan's foreign policy choices, not to mention debates on Japan's contributions. Japanese business community was concerned about the crisis in Iraq; however, they expected that the situation in the Gulf would be stabilized sooner or later. They assumed that since Japan had diversified sources of oil, they could easily get energy supplies even if they had to pay a higher price. Armacost as U.S. Ambassador to Japan, having in mind the unique history and the constitution of Japan with respect to military engagement, hinted to Japanese officials that it would be better for Japan to consider performing noncombat duties in the Gulf region so that Japan could be seen as an active participant in international multilateral

[267] Terasawa, Katsuaki L., and William R. Gates. "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons learned and implications for the future." *Defense Analysis*, 9-2 (1993), p. 175.

[268] Armacost (1996), p.101.

security effort. However, Armacost's suggestion met with little action from key members of the Japanese political establishment. For most Japanese, he regretfully recalls, the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait was a "fire on the other side of the river."[269]

In a telephone conversation made on 13 August 1990 with Toshiki Kaifu, the President Bush requested not only financial but also military contributions from Japan.

> The President (Bush): *I wanted to touch base with you on the economic side and military side*. Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Australia a have agreed to contribute naval forces. I also think that Spain and Italy will do the same. *I would certainly encourage as much support as Japan can give on the economic and military side*. One we are looking at is giving help to the countries that are making the largest sacrifices: Turkey, Jordan and Egypt.
>
> Any support you can give on the military side would be helpful. I know in the last Persian Gulf crisis Japan helped to defray some of the costs. Anything that Japan can do would be appreciated. *I would like you to consider a direct Japan contribution to the multinational naval force*. I realize that would be a watershed event in the post-World War II history of Japan, but *if it could be worked out it would really send a signal that Japan was a full participant in the western alliance*. This would protect our common interests and would show Japan in a common alliance to protect against Saddam Hussein.
>
> The multinational peacekeeping effort will probably be coordinated through the UN military staff committee and perhaps Japan could participate in those consultations. *Although these issues require further consultation, initial ideas being kicked around are mine sweeping and ships to carry equipment to Saudi Arabia—* something of that nature. The big thing is, the more that Japan can do to emphasize Japan making a full commitment, the better for everybody.[270]

Prime Minister Kaifu pledged cooperation, but he gave a skeptical response to Bush's call for military support on the scene, citing legal constraints and domestic opposition.

---

[269] Prime Minister Kaifu had been scheduled to visit to the gulf region on August 14, 1990. However, senior Foreign Ministry officials did not wish to expose the prime minister to Arab's request for help, nor did they think Mr. Kaifu was in position to respond. They opposed the trip, and the trip was postponed. See Armacost (1996), pp.100-102.

[270] Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan." The White House, Washington DC. August 13, 1990.

> Prime Minister Kaifu: The people here on our side have already agreed to extend as much cooperation as possible in the economic field, especially for Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt. These countries be visited by Foreign Minister Nakayama, and I have already instructed the Foreign Ministry to explore what cooperation would be possible at this stage.
>
> With respect to the military side that you have touched upon, because of our constitutional constraints and Diet resolutions, it is almost a national policy in this regard so it would be next to unthinkable to participate directly in the military sphere. Perhaps this point is already known to the military people concerned in your government. It is not immediately possible to take part in the multinational naval force.[271]

On August 15, 1990 the U.S. government sent general guidelines of Japan's coalition contributions through U.S. Embassy in Japan after the President Bush talked to the Prime Minister on the phone. Washington requested financial support for the coalition; economic assistance for those who suffer from trade embargo such as Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan; additional host nation support; and Japanese personnel contributions to support the coalition. Since Japan had already agreed to write checks, the last one was particularly prickly request. Yet, Ambassador Armacost at that time enumerated possible responses to the military part, for the Japanese government's consideration. These included medical support, logistic support to the coalition forces in transporting personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia, refugee evacuation support in Kuwait, and participation in the multinational naval force through the dispatch of minesweepers to help clear the Gulf and transport vessels to carry equipment from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. He emphasized that the quick, substantial, and visible Japanese response is important if bilateral relationship was to be maintained in good health. What Washington at the initial states wanted the most from Japan, He writes, was "the deployment of a Japanese ship manned by Japanese personnel and bearing a Japanese flag as a symbol of Tokyo's involvement in a common effort."[272]

---

[271] Ibid.

[272] Armacost (1996), p.102.

Armacost discussed the contents of desired Japanese contribution with Vice Minister Kuriyama, but his response was mixed. Kuriyama readily expressed willingness to offer more than financial subventions. But at the same time he stressed the political and constitutional difficulties associated with the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Forces, including minesweepers. Kuriyama hinted that providing even non-combatant military support to the coalition would be improbable.[273]

U.S. Push for Military Participation

Days later, the U.S. dispatched a team of officials—tin cup mission—from State Department, Department of Defense, and NSC to encourage Japanese decisions. However, as Japanese policymakers struggled to determine the forms and levels of support, decisions did not come easily. The Japanese government seemed unable to approach decisions with a sense of urgency because all the usual constraints were in the way. Besides constitutional constraints, bureaucratic and political resistance were there. The Finance Ministry was reluctant to release necessary funds, and the political establishments were reluctant to consider urgent security measures, which would enable Japan to send Japanese personnel for logistical support.[274] There seemed to be no likelihood of Japan to dispatch minesweepers.

The Japanese government officially announced its first support package on August 29, 1990. The package included financial support to Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan—neighbors of Iraq and Kuwait—in the form of loans and grants, medical support, supply of service support equipment, and transportation of various nonlethal items through commercial aircrafts and ships.[275] Hours before making a public announcement of the package, Kaifu called President Bush and explained the package. The conversation started with Kaifu's excuse of not making military contribution. Kaifu said,

---

[273] Ibid, pp.102-103.
[274] Ibid, p.104.
[275] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Section 2. Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis." In *Diplomatic Blue Book*, 1991.

"Accordingly, we have considered all of the options open to us to see how we can help, with the exception of sending our self-defense forces, which has significant constitutional limitations."[276] Besides military assistance, the issue of Japanese host nation support, which Prime Minister Kaifu pledged to make, was not addressed, and the amount of financial contribution was not specified.[277] Kaifu later notified President Bush that Japan's financial support to the multinational forces would amount to $1 billion.

Japan's support package, however, failed to meet U.S. officials' expectations and raised frustrations. What Washington wanted logistic support; however, many of U.S. specific requests were not reflected in the package. The requests for logistic assistance such as transport aircraft and ship were denied for the reason of legal grounds and bureaucratic resistance. Armacost gave a concrete example to describe how the negotiation for Japan's contribution was conducted, regarding airlifting of U.S. troops and military supplies to the Gulf:

> Prolonged consultation among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation, and Japan Airlines yielded a cumbersome and ultimately unworkable plan that would have required several transfers of equipment to different planes at stops en route. Only non-military supplies were to be transported, and JAL insisted on reserving the right to inspect cargo.[278]

Ultimately the plan of relying on Japanese airlift was dropped, and the U.S. decided to charter its own airplanes.

While Washington's official response to Japan's package was muted, the U.S. exasperation with the level of Japan's assistance was not concealed. In response, President Bush decided to send cabinet-level envoys to press Japan. Secretary of the

---

[276] Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan on August 29, 1990." The White House, Washington DC. August 29, 1990.

[277] Critics of Japan speculated that the Japanese government attempted to temper global expectations about how much Japan would contribute by not specifying financial support. Sterngold, James. "Confrontation in the Gulf: Japan Putting Limits on Aid To Nations Hurt by Embargo." *New York Times.* August 29, 1990.

[278] Armacost (1996), p.106.

Treasury Nick Brady and Deputy Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger were assigned to twist Japan's arms. On September 7, 1990 they arrived in Japan, and in meetings with Japanese cabinet members, they outlined U.S. request of $3 billion, which far exceeded Japan's initial proposal of $1 billion. Ryutaro Hashimoto, Finance Minister, asserted that no further contribution would be possible during the fiscal year.[279] The U.S. representatives had to come back without much visible result.[280] The U.S. policymakers became more blunt in expressing their frustrations over Japan's indecisive response.

U.S. Resentment over Japan's Attitude

While the alliance did not reach a breaking point, the U.S.-Japan relation, once hailed as the most important and reliable one, became filled with friction and mutual recrimination, with its tone becoming increasingly acrimonious.

The U.S. Congress got furious and did not hesitate to press Japan for more assistance. On 12 September 1990, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to a military spending bill by a vote of 370 to 53.[281] The amendment, also known as Bonior Bill, required Japan to pay for all deployment costs associated with U.S. troops stationed in Japan, including the salaries of U.S. personnel. And if the Japanese government refused to comply, the bill required to withdraw U.S. troops in Japan at a rate 5,000 per year, beginning at the end of 1991.[282]

---

[279] Allegedly, Treasury Secretary Brady pressed Hashimoto by saying 'Do you want me to report to the President Bush that I'll come back empty-handed?' Hidetoshi Sotoka et al. (2006), p. 380.

[280] Armacost (1996), p.108

[281] The bill (H.Amdt.712.) was amendment to H.R.4739—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991—sponsored by Congressman David E. Bonior in 101st Congress (1989-1990). U.S. Congress. Legislation. <http://beta.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-bill/4739/amendments>.

[282] Senator John McCain termed the Japanese meager contribution as a "contemptible tokenism." In his words, the "contemptible tokenism of the actions of the Japanese government merits nothing but the world's contempt and American hostility." Congress also instructed President Bush to convey in his meeting with the foreign leaders, that "failure by any country to actively contribute its military assistance in the most appropriate manner could have a detrimental impact on its bilateral relations with the United States." LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: US-Japanese Relations Throughout History*. WW Norton & Company, 1998. p. 388.

For its part, the Japanese policymakers did not hide their dismay over U.S. In response, Taizo Watanabe, spokesman of Foreign Ministry said, "Some of those 370 Congressmen may not be aware that Japan is the biggest supporter of United States forces overseas. … We hope that once they know the full magnitude of what we are doing, their appreciation will increase."[283] Other Japanese officials warned that the idea of cutting down 5,000 troops a year would destroy not only the national interest of Japan, but of the U.S. as well. Defense Agency Director General Ishikawa stated that Japan had not asked for the stationing of U.S. forces and added that Japan would tell U.S. forces to "please go home."[284] Notwithstanding such concerns, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution signaling that if allies do not make appropriate level of contributions to the coalition, they have to face downgrading of U.S. security commitment. The resolution explicitly targeted Germany and Japan.[285]

The Japanese policymakers quickly reacted to Congressional pressure. Immediately after the Congress' decision, on the night of September 13, Kaifu made an urgent call to President Bush, having dinner with Barbara. Kaifu explained Japan's plan for additional monetary support for frontline states and multinational force. President Bush replied:

> In Congress there are always people trying to blame Japan, Germany or somebody else. They see us spending large amounts of money and sending fine young people to the Middle East, where they might be in harm's way. So I can understand why Congress wants others to do more.[286]

On the next day, Prime Minister Kaifu officially announced that Japan would offer another $3 billion in support of the U.S., making Japan's total monetary contribution $4 billion. The officials said that $2 billion will used for economic aid to

---

[283] Weisman, Steven R. "Confrontation in the Gulf; Japan Defends Aid in Mid-East Effort." *New York Times*. 14 September 1990.

[284] *Japan Times*. September 30, 1990.

[285] Armacost (1996), p.109.

[286] Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan, September 13, 1990." The White House, Washington DC. September 13, 1990.

Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, which includes $600 million to make up for financial loss incurred by joining sanctions against Iraq, and $1 billion for the multilateral military effort in the Gulf. In addition, Kaifu announced that Japan would seek to pass a legislation to make necessary amendment and create an unarmed, civilian United National Cooperation Corps, through which Japan would support UN peacekeeping missions by sending vehicles, medial aid, and other items. Kaifu's suggestion, however, faced domestic political opposition, and the peace keeping operations bill drifted over time.[287] Despite Japan's belated effort, however, the U.S. officials regarded Japan's plan "too little, too late."

As the January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait approached without any conciliatory signs from Saddam Hussein, the U.S. was ready to gather additional support from its allies and partners. For the U.S., mobilizing coalitions and deploying troops was one thing, and conducting military operation was another. The U.S. urged the Japanese government to make new and substantial support. During the G-7 ministerial meeting, on 21 January 1991, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady met the Japanese Finance Minister Hashimoto to discuss the multilateral coalition's financial needs. Secretary Brady appealed for $9 billion, and Japan this time responded in a timely manner and pledged to support. Japan's timely decision helped dissipate criticism of Japan in the United States.[288] <Figure 26> details Japan's contribution to international coalition in 1991. After all, Japan's financial contribution made during the Gulf crisis totaled $13 billion.

[287] Armacost observed that the delay in the passage of the bill was attributable to the interplay of two considerations. He writes, "international concerns encouraged the LDP to seek the swift passage of a peacekeeping operations bill, while domestic realities required it to secure the acquiescence of some opposition votes to put together the necessary majority in the Upper House." Armacost (1996), p.114.

[288] Armacost (1996), pp.118~124.

Figure 26. Japan's Contribution to US-led Coalition in 1991

1. Participation in international military coalition
   - None
2. Financial contributions
   - Contributions to significantly affected states
     - GCFCG: $ 2.126 billion
   - Contributions to other military forces
     - United Kingdom ($ 50 million)
     - Egypt ($ 32 million)
     - Syria ($ 28 million)
     - Morocco ($4 million)
     - Bangladesh ($2 million)
     - Qatar ($2 million)
     - Senegal ($2 million)
     - Pakistan ($2 million)
   - Contributions to international organizations
     - IOM: $ 17 million
     - UNHCR: $ 7.7 million
     - ICRC: $ 3 million
   - Contributions to other foreign countries
     - GCFCG: $ 481 million

Source: U.S. Congress. 1991. "Review of Persian Gulf Burden Sharing." Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 14 May 1991, p. 66
Note: GCFCG refers to the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group.[289]

After the truce was signed on 3 March 1991, Japan made belated efforts to address post-Gulf War problems. In April, Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to clear sea lanes for trade. Overall circumstances made the dispatch possible: military leaders of Self-Defense Force had strongly urged the deployment; after facing internal criticisms, Foreign Ministry had become responsive; military risks associated with the minesweeping mission dramatically decreased; and Japanese economic interests was at stake in securing safe passage of trade cargoes. After the Gulf War, Japan

[289] The Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group (GCFCG) was created in 1990 to distribute international assistance for Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey during the Gulf War. Members of the GCFGC include the Group of Seven industrial powers—Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the U.S.—as well as South Korea and the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar.

suddenly seemed determined to exercise a more active diplomacy in the Middle East. Noting this unexpected behavior of the Japanese, Armacost wrote in a sarcastic manner:

> Not the least of the ironies in this affair [Japan's dispatch of four minesweepers to the Gulf] was the fact that Japan's deployments were undertaken without benefit either of PKO legislation—the UN Cooperation Bill having failed in the Diet—or a revision of the Self-Defense Force Law. As usual, the Japanese government demonstrated flexibility when it perceived compelling reasons to do so.[290]

Although President Bush himself did not publicly express his exasperation, U.S. officials and public did not hide their disappointment over Japan's self-indulgent attitude during the crisis. After the crisis, a press poll found that Americans were still upset after receiving $13 billon. More than 70% of Americans surveyed thought that Japan did not contribute its fair share.[291] Another poll showed that 30% of Americans had lost respect for Japan just because of its attitude during the crisis—no other country showed any comparable decline except China. And most notably, there was the exclusion of Japan by the U.S. from postwar diplomatic events celebrating the victory. Immediately after the end of war, Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama, unlike his Western counterparts, was not invited by the U.S. to visit Washington. Meanwhile, Germany, who offered $6 billion and contributed merely a symbolic military support by dispatching an air unit to Turkey, was invited.[292] Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, stated that "Had Japan not given such a vast sum [of $13 billion], the American reaction undoubtedly would have been worse, but it was bad enough: American felt that Japan's support of the coalition was slow, grudging, and inadequate, especially since three-fourths of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East."[293] After all, the U.S. policymakers' perception that Japan was taking refuge behind its Constitution

---

[290] Armacost (1996), p.124.

[291] Samuelson, Robert. "The Japan problem." *Washington Post*, April 10, 1991.

[292] Purrington, Courtney. "Tokyo's policy responses during the Gulf War and the impact of the "Iraqi Shock" on Japan." *Pacific Affairs* (1992), pp. 169-70.

[293] Holbrooke, Richard. "Japan and the United States: ending the unequal partnership." *Foreign Affairs* (1991), p. 51.

and leaving all the hard works regarding international peace and stability to the U.S. was solidified. The Gulf crisis resulted in a crisis in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

(2) Summary and Analysis

Although Japanese policymakers swiftly sided with the U.S., condemning Iraqi's aggression and freezing economic assets in Iraq, it proved impossible for them to move beyond making monetary support and provide military assistance. Even though the U.S. was aware of the peace constitution that constrained Japan's military involvement in the Gulf crisis, the U.S. policymakers pushed Japan to make proper military assistance. Yet, it was impossible for the Japanese government to gather necessary domestic support needed to send military personnel in support of the multinational forces. The U.S. policymakers were frustrated about that the Japanese government, appealing to the constitution, was unprepared for even a minimal military role in the region.

In the role-based perspective, Japan's coalition support and the U.S. response to it can be read as the result of divergent security role conceptions between Washington and Tokyo. Japan's security role performance during the Gulf crisis was far short of what the U.S. policymakers had prescribed to the post-Cold War Japan. Japan's indecisive and passive response to America's demand compelled the U.S. policymakers with congressional back- up to twist Japan's arms and exact more support. Yet Japan could not get beyond financial assistance, ended up offering $13 billion. Japan's "too little, too late" response bought about international embarrassment.

U.S. Role Expectations

The U.S. role prescription about Japan underwent significant change as the Cold War struggle wound down. With much of the Cold War threat is gone, many both in the U.S. and Japan began to question the validity of the bilateral alliance. The focus of bilateral relations shifted from security to economic issues. The issue of trade

imbalance was magnified as a new controversy. During the Cold War, pressing security needs overrode economic concern. Despite the U.S. policymakers were aware of long-term implications of trade deficits incurred from trade with Japan, they maintained that trade dispute should not undermine bilateral security cooperation with Japan, which had long served as the linchpin of the U.S. security policy in the region. However, unconstrained by the desperate need to preserve the alliance, that argument gradually lost support. Instead, many in the U.S. pointed out lopsided security commitment to Japan is largely responsible for economic difficulties at home. Such demand from domestic audience coincided with the strategic shift of the grand U.S. national strategy from containment to preponderance, and to offshore balancing. As the U.S. realigned its defense posture to meet new security challenges, the U.S. sought to redefine its security parameters towards Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance gradually transformed from an asymmetrical one into relatively equal partnership.

The Bush administration expected Japan to assume increase security role that is commensurate with its increased industrial power and international standing. During the 1980s, Japan emerged as the second largest economy, with potential to be a new great power. As Japan's national interest became global, the U.S. policymakers assumed, Japan should behave accordingly. During the Gulf crisis, Armacost stressed that, "Naturally we would expect your [Japanese] response to reflect what your national interests and your stature in the international community require. Predictably, your American friends hope you will be generous and far-sighted."[294] Even militarily, the U.S. policymakers assumed that Japan's military capability should no longer be strictly confined to the defense of Japan. Even though Japan's military spending had been kept under 1% of GDP, Japan's defense budget in 1990 was the fifth largest in the world. With this background, the U.S. urged Japan to shift away from the traditional foreign policy grounded on Yoshida doctrine and play an active role in maintaining regional and global security order.

---

[294] Armacost (1996), p.116.

Japan's Role Performance

Despite renewed U.S. expectations regarding Japan's security, Japan was unprepared to enact new security role conceptions. Japanese policymakers seemed to be content with the traditional security formula: granting basing right to the U.S. in exchange of security guarantee and unclear umbrella. Even after the end of the Cold War, Japan could not easily break from the tendency to rely on the U.S., leaving major security burdens in the region to the U.S. Despite substantial military capability, Japan's security responsibility was confined to the defense of Japan and adjacent waters. Armacost points out that Japan's foreign policy was still predicated on the Yoshida doctrine.

> One could argue that Japanese policy during the Gulf War was not a radical departure from long-established policy lines and was notably successful in traditional terms. After all, Japan placed no Japanese citizens in harm's way. Its contributions were mainly hortatory support and cash. It suffered no distribution of its oil supplies; indeed, the price of petroleum fell. Its hostages were returned unharmed. Its relationship with the United States survived. No irretrievable decisions to abandon the Yoshida tradition were reached. And while its $13 billion subvention to the multilateral coalition was far from trivial, it paled in significance to the price the Japanese government and industry would have paid had there been a disruption in the oil supply or a major price increase.[295]

The Gulf crisis proved that Japan was ill-prepared to assume proactive role in support of the U.S. Without clearly defined security role enactment, the Kaifu cabinet walking eggshells was busying trying not to upset the U.S. Armacost observed that "Japan's action appeared to be prompted more by the sting of international criticism or the fear of diplomatic isolation than by the pursuit of a clear-cut foreign policy design."[296] Kaifu belatedly tried to step up its support by providing non-combatant military support under the flag of UN However, he lacked political power of command and thus failed to gather domestic support to make timely contribution.[297] After all, the

---

[295] Armacost (1996), p.126.

[296] Ibid, p. 100.

[297] Allegedly, at that time the actual political power was in the hands of Ichiro Ozawa, secretary general of

crisis in the Persian Gulf was the crisis of Japan's security role conception. Content with traditional security role conception confined to Japan's own security, Japan failed to adjust to new security role conceived by the U.S. policymakers.

As illustrated in <Figure 27>, seen from the role-based approach, the alliance discord between the U.S. and Japan resulted from the fact that Japan was unprepared to take a new post-Cold War security role that the U.S. policymakers wanted Japan to assume. Despite pressing demand from the U.S. for proactive contribution, Japanese policymakers could not provide even non-combatant military contribution to the multinational forces, taking refuge behind the peace constitution. Japanese policymakers' serious concern that the dispatch of SDFs to the Persian Gulf would violate the constitution led the U.S. policymakers to abandon the hope of Japan playing a more proactive security role under the purview of the bilateral alliance treaty.[298] A U.S. state official rightfully captured American resentment towards Japan's foreign policy orientation and claimed, "The key question American should ask themselves is, how long are we prepared to be loyal allies of Japan and act as volunteer Hessians serving Japanese interests, without demanding genuine military reciprocity?"[299] Ultimately, the Gulf War challenged Japan's security role conceptions, and the U.S. delivered clear message that Japan should transform itself from "consumer" to "provider" of regional and international security and be ready to participate fully in managing post-Cold War international security

LDP, who was dubbed the "shadow shogun" thanks to his influence. Hidetoshi Sotoka et al. (2006), pp.398-99.

[298] Buckley, Roger. *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Book 21). Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 152.

[299] Olsen, Edward. "Target Japan as America's Economic Foe." *Orbis*, 36-4 (1992): 491-503.

Figure 27. Role-based Approach to the U.S.-Japan Relations during the Gulf War



CHAPTER V. POST-GULF WAR ROLE ENACTMENT AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

1. U.S. Security Strategy toward Northeast Asia

(1) Post-Gulf War U.S. National Security Strategy

The U.S. defeated Saddam Hussein with unprecedented multinational cooperation supported by the UN. Such elated mood of the victory in Kuwait was reflected in NSS 1991. The President Bush stated that "new world order" is not yet fully in place but it is surely coming, and that the U.S. will continue to *play a leading role*, shaping the world order based on democratic values and open and free market economy.[300] Indeed, the crisis in Middle East caused by Iraq's invasion into Kuwait was an exemplar of new crisis or instability that the U.S. would confront in the post-Cold War era. The report stressed that isolation cannot be an option when states in the world are deeply interconnected. However, a post-Cold War grand strategy that would replace containment was yet to be formulated.

The controversy over the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) prepared by Pentagon is another indication that the crafting a comprehensive strategy was not an easy task.[301] Not intended for public release, the initial version of the DPG was leaked to the mainstream media on March 27, sparking a public controversy about foreign policy of the U.S.[302] The report was widely criticized because it called for a policy of

---

[300] Bush, George. National Security Strategy of the United States. 1991. Brassey's, 1991.

[301] The document dated February 18, 1991 was also known as the Wolfowitz Doctrine since it was authored by Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

[302] Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992; "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival'," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992. Part of the draft copy is also available online. <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf>.

unilateralism and pre-emptive military strategy in order to prevent the rise of any other rivals. The draft stated as follows, echoing Mearsheimer's vision of offensive realism.[303]

> Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. ... We must maintain the mechanisms for *deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role*.[304]

The report was later rewritten under the close scrutiny of Secretary Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and published in April 1992 with much of the imperialist overtone of the earlier version watered down.[305]

The Strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement"

The new Clinton administration presented "Engagement and Enlargement" as a new grand strategy to replace containment. If the U.S. during the Cold War had focused on containing global threats to market democracies, Clinton asserted, the U.S. now should seek to expand the community of market democracies.[306] The Clinton administration's "Engagement and Enlargement" doctrine was clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement policy papers released in 1994, 1995, and 1996. The papers stressed that in order to protect and advance U.S.

---

[303] Mearsheimer (2001).

[304] "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival'," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

[305] National Security Council. *The Defense Planning Guidance: FY 1994-1999*. April 16, 1992. <http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/pdf/2008-003-docs1-12.pdf>.

[306] U.S. Department of State. "Address by President Bill Clinton to the UN General Assembly." Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. September 27, 1993. <http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm>.

interests, it is imperative to remain engaged abroad, particularly where important national interests are at stake. The 1994 report stated:

> It is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies has increasingly disappeared—that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people. We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive.[307]

Three principal policy goals of the U.S. security strategy cutting through security policy papers during the mid-and-late 1990s were: 1) to sustain its security with military forces that are ready to fight, 2) to bolster America's economic revitalization, and 3) to promote democracy abroad. As his winning campaign slogan—"It's the economy, stupid"—signified, the Clinton administration gave U.S. economic interests high priority in foreign policy. The Clinton doctrine—democratic enlargement—heralded that the days of geopolitics gave way to geo-economics.[308] During the whole Clinton administration (1997-2001), the concept of "Engagement and Enlargement" served as the linchpin of the U.S. foreign policy.

The key components of the Clinton administration's military strategy to support the national security strategy of democratic enlargement were the promotion of stability and flexible and selective engagement. Drawing from the NSS 1995, National Military Strategy of the U.S. 1995 highlighted that new national security strategy called for "flexible and selective engagement, involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment."[309] Setting the promotion of stability and thwart of aggression as two key military objectives, the report stressed the role of peacetime engagement, deterrence, and conflict prevention. The

---

[307] Clinton, Bill. "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." (1994), p. i.

[308] Brinkley, Douglas. "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine." *Foreign Policy* (1997): 111-127.

[309] Shalikashvili, John M. "National Military Strategy of the United States American: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement." Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1995), pp. i-ii.

report added that the strategy will be facilitated by the two complementary concepts of overseas presence and power projection.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997 and the National Military Strategy 1997,[310] which was guided by QDR 1997, continued to recognize the importance of promoting regional and international stability in support of the national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. QDR 1997 presented "shaping, responding, and preparing" as key three elements of the U.S. defense strategy. The report specified as following: "In order to support this national security strategy (engagement and enlargement), the U.S. military and the Department of Defense must be able to help shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future."[311] Such basis of military strategy lasted until the 9/11 attacks in 2001 forced the U.S. policymakers to fundamentally review its security strategy.

Summary

In sum, after the splendid victory in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. policymakers recognized that international environment mandated that the U.S. should remain engaged in regions where the U.S. national interests are stake. The engagement and enlargement aimed to promote U.S. strategic and economic interests constituted the core of the U.S. national security strategy. As the Cold War geopolitics gradually gave way to geo-economics, the spread of free-market democracy served as the linchpin of the U.S. foreign policy. The Persian Gulf War also demonstrated that while the threat of global war was greatly diminished, the risk of regional conflict was not. The need for global containment was replaced by the need for regional defense. In response, the U.S. pursued the military strategy of flexible and selective engagement, while promoting regional and

[310] Shalikashvili, John M. "National Military Strategy of the United States American: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now." Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1997).

[311] Cohen, William S., ed. *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. DIANE Publishing, 1997, p. 4 of Section III. QDR 1997 was the first QDR ever published by the congressional mandate.

international peace. With economic competitiveness as a hallmark of the U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. policymakers understood that it became essential to have its allies and friends share responsibility for regional and global security.

(2) U.S. Security Strategy toward North East Asia

As the U.S. military strategy shifted from containment to regional defense, the U.S. policymakers recognized the enormous strategic and economic importance of East Asia. In the early 1990s, East Asia emerged as bigger trading partner of the U.S. than Europe. The U.S. trade volume with East Asia was one third greater than the total trade with Europe. While the overly military activism in the region downshifted after the Cold War drew to close, East Asia remained an area of massive concentration of military power and regional security threat.

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 1992 expressed the U.S. urge to encourage Japan to assume greater security responsibility both by increasing its defense capability and share of financial support for the U.S. troops stationed in Japan. The report stated:

> We will continue to encourage in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently allies' defensive capabilities to deal with threats they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for US forward deployed forces that contribute to their security. Japan's contributions in securing maritime approaches is one example. We will also persist in efforts to ensure an equitable, two-way flow of technology in our security cooperation with advanced allies.[312]

Expecting its allies to assume more responsibility for their defense, the DPG 1992 stressed that the realignment and reduction of the U.S. forward-deployed forces should be carefully measured against allies' willingness to assume more security responsibility.

[312] U.S. National Security Council (1992), p. 22.

Based on the planned withdrawals specified in the EASI 1990, the reported anticipated that more than 25,000 troops would be withdrawn from East Asia by December 1992.[313]

On the Korean peninsula, the DPG 1992 pointed out that the U.S. regional security concerns are intensified by North Korea's relentless efforts to develop nuclear weapons and proliferate advanced delivery systems. Despite the planned troop reduction in South Korea, the U.S. defense planners affirmed to maintain sufficient defense capabilities in coordination with South Korea to defeat North Korea if deterrence fails. Notably, while the U.S. reaffirmed its support for peaceful unification, the DPG 1992 specified that the U.S. should plan to maintain the security alliance with unified Korea.[314]

The U.S. defense strategy published in 1993 stressed the strategic importance of East Asia and the need for strong U.S. military position.[315] The ultimate goal of the U.S. security strategy in region was to ensure security environment and promote conditions in which market economies and democracies could flourish. Therefore, while the U.S. was realigning its force structure and reducing the size of military based the "Base Force" concept articulated in the Bottom-Up Review (1993),[316] U.S. security strategy in East Asia stressed that the U.S must maintain a significant military presence in the area. In doing so, the report argued that sufficient forward military presence in East Asia was required to deter threats to U.S. political and economic interests, to safeguard sea lines of communications, and to prevent the rise of potential regional hegemon. Preserving vigorous security alliances, especially with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the report assumed, was an integral part of the strategy. For the U.S., the best way to downsize force structure and reduce military budget without undermining defense posture was to encourage its allies and friends to assume greater security responsibility. The report stated:

---

313 Ibid, p. 22.

314 Ibid, p. 23.

315 Cheney, Dick. *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993.

316 Jaffe (1993); Aspin and Powell (1993).

> We should continue to encourage Japan and South Korea in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats and responsibilities they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for U.S. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security.[317]

In the age of regional defense strategy, the most pressing regional security concern for the U.S. in East Asia was the military threat posed by North Korea, in particular its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Plans to reduce troops from South Korea had been suspended thanks to the problem posed by Pyongyang's nuclear crisis. The report said, "Although we have begun some reductions in our forces as part of shifting greater responsibility to our ally, we must maintain sufficient military capabilities together with the Republic of Korea to deter aggression by the North or to defeat it should deterrence fail."[318] Meanwhile, the U.S. urged Japan's contributions to maritime security in the region as well as an equitable two-way flow of defense technology in close cooperation with the U.S.

Nye Report

The East Asian Strategic Report (EASR) 1995 was another strong case for the deep U.S. engagement in East Asia.[319] Also known as the Nye Initiative, or the Nye Report, named after the Assistance Secretary of Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region, the report reaffirmed strong U.S commitment to the region and its allies. Defining the American security presence as "oxygen" for East Asian development, the report among other things emphasized the importance of a stable military presence in the region.[320] Specifically, as the post-Cold War force reduction was leveled off, the report reaffirmed that the U.S. forward presence, without further downsizing, will maintain the existing

---

[317] Cheney (1993), p. 22.
[318] Cheney (1993), p. 23.
[319] Perry, J. William. *United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995.
[320] Ibid, p. 1.

level of about 100,000 troops. According primacy to the U.S.-Japan relations, the report also highlighted the need to strengthen U.S. bilateral alliance in advancing America's economic, political, and security interests.

The report defined the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the most important bilateral relationship and the linchpin of the U.S. security strategy in the region. Recognizing the geostrategic importance of Japan and its support, the report stated:

> United States security policy in Asia and the Pacific relies on access to Japanese bases and the Japanese support for the United States operations. . . . United States bases in Japan are well-located for rapid deployment to virtually any trouble spot in the region. Given the great distances associated with the Pacific theater, assured access to bases in Japan plays a critical role in our ability to deter and defeat aggression.[321]

Regarding a division of security roles and mission, the U.S. encouraged Japan to move beyond the defense of the home islands and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles and to contribute more to overall regional security while the U.S. assumes principal responsibility for power projection and nuclear deterrence. The U.S. also expected Japan to be integrated with theater missile defense system. In sum, given Japan's economic and political weight, the U.S. expected Japan to play the role of strategic partner in U.S. efforts in shaping a stable regional and global order.

The report stressed that the U.S. will be dedicated to security ties with South Korea in order to deter North Korean aggression. Based on the treaty commitment and the U.S. forces in Korea, the U.S., the report clearly stated "would automatically and immediately be involved in any conflict."[322] Accordingly, in terms of force structure, the U.S. placed emphasis on sustainability and logistics infrastructure, the key elements of rapid response and reinforcement capability. The report also suggested that reflecting growing maturity and capabilities of the Korean forces, as well as Korean people's increasing desire, making South Korea to play the leading role in its own defense is a long-term goal of the U.S. policymakers. At the same time, the U.S. encouraged South

[321] Ibid, p. 25.
[322] Ibid, p. 26.

Korea to continue to increase its host nation support. For the benefits of cost sharing, the report said that it is actually less expensive for the U.S. to maintain its forces forward deployed than in the continental U.S. (CONUS).[323]

1998 The East Asia Strategic Report

The East Asia Strategic Report 1998 reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the region, articulated in the Nye Report. The report regarded strong military presence and alliance partnership as a cornerstone of the U.S. security strategy—promoting democratic market economies and enhancing security—in the region. One noticeable change in the 1998 report is that in addition to the commitment of the 100,000 forces level in the foreseeable future, the U.S. stressed the need to promote a variety of other public and private interactions with the region. The U.S. engagement in the region, the report asserted, includes "everything from conventional diplomacy to international trade and investment to people-to-people contact in educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges."[324] This comprehensive engagement that combines political, military, diplomatic, and social interactions to protect and promote U.S. national interests in Asia was referred to as "Presence Plus."

The U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. forces in Japan constituted the key component of credible deterrent posture and operational flexibility in the region. Recognizing the extending contribution of the alliance to the defense of Japan and regional peace and stability, the U.S. positively assessed join efforts to redefine the purpose and role of the alliance. The report appraised that the 1996 Joint Declaration and 1997 Revised Defense Guidelines marked a new era in bilateral relations. As will be discussed in more detail, the new Guidelines provided the basis for effective security cooperation in case of regional crisis.

---

[323] Ibid, p. 24.

[324] Perry, J. William. *United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1998, p. 9.

For the U.S. policymakers, the Korean peninsula remained the area of uncertainty. As the U.S. security strategy shift from worldwide strategy deterrence to local deterrence, the Korean peninsula emerged on of the focal points in deterring actions in localized areas. In particular, the U.S. expressed its concern over new security challenge triggered by North Korea's August 1998 missile launch on top of the uncertainty over North Korea's commitment to the Agreed Framework. In the strategic environment, maintaining strong South Korea-U.S. deterrent posture, the report assumed, was of paramount importance. Hoping to build a lasting security partnership with South Korea, the U.S. welcomed President Kim Dae-Jung's affirmation that the reunification of the Korean peninsula would not invalidate the value of the bilateral alliance and the U.S. military presence in the Korean peninsula.[325] In sum, the East Asian Security Report 1998 reaffirmed the U.S. intention to maintain strong military presence in the foreseeable future, while increasing efforts to deepen relations and share security responsibility with its allies and friends.

Summary

Table 17. U.S. Role Conceptions of South Korea and Japan

	South Korea	Japan
DPG 1992	**"Deter North Korean Aggression"** · Intensified security concerns by North Korea's WMD and delivery systems · Despite some reductions as part of shifting greater responsibility to South Korea, the U.S. must maintain sufficient military capabilities together with South Korea to deter aggression by the North or to defeat it should deterrence fail1	**"Japan's Active Security Role"** · Encourage to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase defensive capabilities to deal with threats Japan face and to assume a greater share of financial support for US forward deployed forces · Equitable, two-way flow of technology in our security cooperation · Japan's contributions in securing maritime approaches

[325] Perry (1998), p. 62.

	· Support its peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the Korean people · Plan to maintain an alliance relationship with a unified democratic Korea	· Plan to continue to safeguard critical SLOCs
EASR 1995 "Deep Engagement"	**"Effective Deterrence"** · ROK-US alliance central to the stability of the Korean peninsula · Advanced manufacturing economy · US remain committed to the security treaty, focused on deterring aggression from North Korea · Division of security labor (based on comparative advantage): South Korea—ground forces, U.S.—naval, air forces, intelligence, satellite · Transition of South Korea to the leading role in its own defense, a long-standing policy goal of the U.S. → US will continue to shift gradually from "a leading to supporting role" in deterrence, US emphasis on sustainability and logistic infrastructure, as the means to reinforce US forces rapidly · Cost sharing and host nation support: $300 million for FY 1995, US expects South Korea's cost-sharing to increase as its economy grows · North Korea, a source of unpredictability and potential danger · Full implementation of the Agreed Framework · Support inter-Korean talks	**"Strong U.S. military presence"** · US-Japan alliance the linchpin of the US security policy in Asia → US security policy relies on access to Japanese bases and Japanese support for the U.S. operations, US bases in Japan are well-located for rapid deployment to virtually any trouble spot in the region · Division of security labor: Japan in defense of home islands and sea lane (1,000 nautical miles), US responsible for power projection and nuclear deterrence · Exploring in missile defense · Cost sharing: Japan provides the most generous host nation support ($5 billion, annually) · Technology sharing: two-way · Japan's new global role involves greater Japanese contribution to regional and global stability · The world's largest ODA provider

	“Strong Deterrent Posture”	**“Regional and global partnership”**
EASR 1998 “Engagement Plus”	· Still remained a tinder box, with potential flash points from North Korea · New challenges emerged: 1998 North Korea’s missile launch and uncertainty over its adherence to the Agreed Framework · Deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression · Lasting security partnership, even after reunification of the Korean peninsula · Growing global role of South Korea	· U.S. forces in Japan, critical component of U.S. deterrent and rapid response strategy · 1996 Joint Declaration, 1997 Revised Defense Guidelines, a new era in U.S.-Japan relations · Effective defense cooperation in “situations in areas surrounding Japan” · Complementary security roles: U.S. has more equipment in common with Japan than any other ally

As the U.S. left the post-Cold War transition period and entered a new era, the U.S. policymakers after initial alignment and reduction of its forces grew determined to maintain a significant level of forward forces deployed to allies and friends in East Asia. Reflecting changes in strategic environment, the U.S. attempted to reorient bilateral alliance partnerships, redefining security parameters and respective security roles. At the same time, the U.S. encouraged its allies to increase their security and cost burden sharing, commensurate with their increased economic, political, military capability. Different U.S. security role conceptions vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan are summarized in <Table 17>. Expanding both the scope and degree of bilateral alliance relations, the U.S. attempted to transform U.S.-Japan alliance into a global partnership based on shared values, mutual interests, and complementary capability. The U.S. urged South Korea to make contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts and non-proliferation.

2. ROK-U.S. Alliance Management

(1) Democratization and South Korea's Role Conceptions

Democratization as a Source of New Security Role Conceptions

The early 1990s marked a watershed in the progression of the South Korean politics from authoritarian military regime toward genuine democracy. President Kim Young-Sam was elected in 1993, and that was South Korea's first electoral transition from a military ruler to a civilian politician. The Kim administration, breaking away from past military governments, embarked on sweeping social, economic, and political reforms with a promise to create a "New Korea."[326] In terms of foreign policy, the Kim administration set up a goal of a "New Diplomacy" with five fundamentals: globalism, multi-dimensionalism, regional cooperation, and future orientation. The Kim administration's vision of "SegyeHwa" (Globalization) was, Samuel Kim writes, "a way of projecting and enacting a new Korean national identity and role conception, moving away from and beyond inter-Korean competition to the center of the action not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in the world community."[327]

While South Korea's foreign policy aimed at a high profile in international arena, major change in policy was limited to economic sector. South Korea remained committed to World Trade Organization (WTO) after it replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in January 1995. On 12 December 1996, South Korea joined Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a club of developed economies. Notably, economic reform, needed to join the Paris Club, OECD, was driven by the external inducement or pressure, particularly the U.S. Since the mid-1980s, U.S. began to pressure South Korea for market opening. In 1997, the U.S. invoked

---

[326] Cha, Victor D. "Politics and Democracy under the Kim Young Sam Government: Something Old, Something New." *Asian Survey* (1991): 849-863.

[327] Kim, Samuel S., ed. *Korea's Globalization*. Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 244.

the Super 301 (Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974) in order to open the auto market. Gradually, the U.S. pressure expanded to include other sectors such as intellectual property and capital market.[328] In 1988, South Korea emerged as the fifth largest market for U.S. exports after Canada, Japan, Mexico, and U.K.

The election of the President Kim Dae-Jung in December 1997 marked a deeper democratic progress, making the first electoral power transition from a civilian leader to another. This democratic progress bolstered the confidence of a power elite with relatively liberal political outlook, different from the conservative establishment.

South Korea's policy shift toward North Korea constituted the central element not only in South Korea's foreign policy but also in ROK-U.S. relations.[329] The President Kim under the support of the liberal elite took different approach to North Korea. In his inaugural address delivered on February 25, 1998, He unveiled the policy of engagement with North Korea, widely known as the sunshine policy. The sunshine policy was in a stark contrast to the containment or reciprocity-oriented policy of the previous Kim Young Sam administration. While the Kim administration set reunification as the ultimate goal and called for self-reliance in foreign policy, President Kim did not want to pursue engagement policy at the expense of the alliance relations with the U.S. During the Clinton administration, President Kim managed to maintain cooperative relations on North Korean issues.

In 2003 Roh Moo-Hyun sworn in as the President. The election of the President Roh is to some extent attributable to the rise of a new political generation called "386." The 386 generation is a reference to an educated group of generation in their thirties or forties who went to college and participated in the pro-democracy and anti-military dictatorship movements in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s. As their backgrounds

---

[328] Gills, Barry K. "Economic liberalisation and reform in South Korea in the 1990s: A 'coming of age' or a case of 'graduation blues'?" *Third World Quarterly*, 17-4 (1996): 667-688.

[329] The Institute for Peace Affairs. "Kimdaejung dangseonjaui tongil, oeigyo, kukbangbubun daeseon gongyak [President-elect Kim Dae-Jung's campaign promise in unifications, foreign and defense policy]." *Unification Korea*, Vol. 169 (January 1998): 108-111; Park, Kun-Young and Uk-sik Jeong. "Kimdaejung-Bush jeongby sigyi hanmigwangye [ROK-U.S. Relations during Kim Dae-Jung-Bush Administration]." *Critical Review of History* (2009): 140-168.

imply, the 386 generation had distinctive inclination towards both domestic and international politics. First of all, they gave the utmost value to political freedom. During the 1960s and 1970s, the old generations tended to give priority to economic development, security, and survival; demands for building democratic political order were put on hold. However, after going through authoritarian political control, the 386 generation was more concerned about political liberalization, quality of life, social safety net, and economic justice.

Second, they had tendency to question the uncontested acceptance of the ROK-US alliance partnership. Parents of the 386 generation, who experienced the Korean War, appreciated the U.S. military engagement and saw the utility of keeping strong alliance partnership with the U.S. as a useful deterrent against Pyongyang. Meanwhile, with little recollection of the armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, the 386 generation deemed that the ROK-U.S. alliance was a strategic tool for the Cold War and thus no longer relevant for the post-Cold War environment.[330]

Third, consequently they had an altered view of the U.S. Unlike the old generations, who viewed the U.S. as a security guarantor and economic supporter, the 386 generation regarded the U.S. as a supporter of the authoritarian governments in South Korea. In particular, they hold the view Washington and the Korean governments were in accomplice relations on the massacre at Kwangju in 1980.[331] Increasingly younger generations viewed that the U.S. was no longer a staunch ally who fought against North Korea, but an empirical state that colluded with the past military regimes in order to secure military footholds in the region. Consequence of these tendencies was growing assertiveness against the asymmetric alliance and the increased demand for independence from the U.S.

---

[330] Onish, Norimitsu. "U.S. and South Korea Try to Redefine Their Alliance." *New York Times*. December 26, 2003.

[331] For the reason, they point to the fact that at the time of the Kwangju democratic movement in 1980, the United States retained military control of both peacetime and wartime. They claim that the military crackdown was impossible without implicit consent of the U.S.

The Roh administration was considered the most liberal government ever formed in Korea's history as a modern state.[332] The President Roh himself entered into politics with an activist agenda. As a lawyer, he gained his political reputation over relentless attitude towards the authoritarian regime, in particular the military crackdown in Kwangju. The Roh administration's domestic and foreign policy orientations reflected aforementioned tendencies of the 386 generations. According to a poll in December 2002 by the Pew Research Center, 44% of Roh's compatriots viewed the U.S. unfavorably. The study also found that some three-quarters of Koreans believed that U.S. foreign policy failed to consider other countries' interests.[333]

As a result, the Roh administration stressed the desire for self-reliance, which, in turn, was translated to demand for more equal relations with the U.S. on the one hand, and independence in policy towards North Korea on the other.[334] First, President Roh advocated a more equal partnership with the U.S. rather than the traditional patron-client relations. During the Presidential campaign, Roh stressed that given South Korea's increased power, the ROK-U.S. alliance should be transformed into a more reciprocal and equal relationship. In his visit to ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, he stressed that ROK-U.S. relations should change from the vertical ones of the past to horizontal and mutually beneficial relations.[335] In inauguration speech, he affirmed that he would bring that vision to office. Roh stated:

> This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. Alliance. It has made a significant contribution in guaranteeing our security and economic development. The Korean people are deeply grateful for this. We will foster and develop this cherished

---

[332] Lee, C. M. "Reassessing the ROK-US alliance: transformation challenges and the consequences of South Korea's choices." *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 57-2 (2003): 281-307.

[333] Moon, Ihlwan and Mark L. Clifford, Stan Crock "The Politics of Peril." *Businessweek*. February 23, 2003.

[334] Cha, Victor D. "Anchored or Adrift?." *Strategic Asia*, 4 (2003): 109-130.

[335] Government Information Agency. *Je16dae Daetongryeongjik Insuwiwonhoe Baekseo: Daehwa [White Paper by the Commission on the 16th Presidential Transition: Dialogue]*. The Commission on Presidential Transition, 2003, p. 378.

> alliance. We will see to it that the alliance matures into *a more reciprocal and equitable relationship*.[336]

On such an equal footing, he pledged, the Korean government would pursue the self-reliant defense, the revision of SOFA, and the wartime OPCON transfer.

Meanwhile, taking a pragmatic view of the alliance, President Roh never attempted to undermine it. Drawing a clear line between anti-Americanism and a call for self-reliance in defense, Roh stressed that what he had in mind is that South Korea deserves a security role that corresponds to its economic power.[337] Yet, his vision for independence challenged Washington's leadership in its alliance with South Korea. In a speech he said, "Although we don't know if it might take 10, 20, or 30 years, someone has to consider an independent defense. Senior military officials have to prepare a plan for a special emergency situation when the U.S. Army moves away."[338]

Second, the Roh administration attempted to take initiative in dealing with North Korea and pursue an autonomous North Korea policy. The Roh administration set the establishment of peace regime in the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian regional cooperation system as the primary goal of foreign security policy, and improving relations with North Korea constituted the core and prerequisite for the success of the policy. Since Roh was convinced that peaceful solution is the only way to the denuclearization of North Korea,[339] Washington's hardline stance against North Korea stood as a major obstacle in pursuing foreign security goals. The Roh administration attempted to induce policy changes in the U.S. side. A policy report, prepared by chief security advisers to President Roh, suggested that as part of the solution to the North Korean nuclear stalemate, the U.S. policymakers should assume a forward-looking approach, stop pressing North Korea, and instead adopt a

---

336 "Roh Moo Hyun's inauguration speech." *BBC News*, February 25, 2003.

337 Government Information Agency (2003), p. 390.

338 French, Howard. "Seoul Looks to New Alliances." *New York Times*, January 26, 2003.

339 National Security Council. *Yukseongeuro Deudneun Rohmoohyun Daetongyreongui Yoigyoanbo Gusang [Real Voice of President Roh Moo-hyun on Foreign and Security Policy]*. Office of Unification, Foreign, and Security Policy, Blue House, 2006, pp. 16-19.

compromising position.[340] President Roh himself also stated that once President Bush confirmed that every option, including the preemptive use of force, is on the table with North Korea, he came determined to prevent a possible war even risking intra-alliance conflict with the U.S. if necessary.[341]

Later, President Roh's vison for self-reliance in foreign policy and regional cooperation led to so-called "regional balancer initiative." In the early 2005, President Roh started exploring the concept that the Korean government would play a balancer's role as a middle power in the region. In March 2005, he stated that "we are now beefing up nation power, enabling us to play a balancing role in Northeast Asia."[342] Further, speaking at a military academy, Roh said "We are more qualified to talk about peace than anyone else… We shoud play a balancing role not only on the Korean peninsula but also for the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia…The map of power could shift, depending on which choice we make."[343] The balancer initiative reflected Roh's desire to play the role of balancer between the U.S. and China, on the one hand, and between Japan and China on the other.[344] President Roh's exploration of South Korea's role as a balancer brought about controversy and heavy criticism and did not last long.[345] As expected, the harshest criticisms of the initiative came from the U.S.

---

[340] Park, Kun-Young et al. *Hanbando Pyeonghwabogoseo: Hanbando Uigyigeukbokgwa Pyeonghwajeongchakui Banggeobron [A Comprehensive Solution to the Korean Peninsula Problems]*. Seoul: Hanwool, 2002.

[341] Government Information Agency (2003), p. 390.

[342] Roh, Moo Hyun. "Address on the 86th March 1st Independence Movement Day." Office of the President, March 1, 2005.

[343] Roh, Moo Hyun. "Address at the Commencement Ceremony of the Korea Third Military Academy." Office of the President, March 22, 2005.

[344] A senior official of NSC explained the concept as follows: "The order in which Korea plays one leg of the three-way alliance with the U.S. and Japan was a product of the Cold War… Korea wants to extract itself from a stand-off centered on the peninsula between a Southern alliance of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan …and a Northern alliance of North Korea, China, and Russia." Funabashi (2007), p. 253.

[345] For controversy and debates about the "balancer" initiative, see Moon, Jeong-In. "Rohmoomhyun 'sin yoigyo' yeoddeohkwy bolgeokinga: donbukah gyunhyeongja yeokhalron [How to make sense of New Diplomacy of President Roh: Northeast Asia Balancer argument]." *Chosun-ilbo*, April 11, 2005; Choe, Sang-Hun. "South Korea's 'balancer' policy attacked." *New York Times*, April 9, 2005; Pollack, Jonathan D. "The strategic futures and military capabilities of the two Koreas." *Population* (m) 48 (2005): 22-7; Lee, Chae-Jin. "The Limits of South Korea's Strategic Choices." *Asia Policy*, 3-1 (2007): 71-74; Park,

Anti-Americanism

While there might be many different causes of the rise of Anti-Americanism in South Korea, it can best be understood in the context of changing domestic political landscape in South Korea.[346] What was limited to the leftist minority had gradually come to the fore of political movements. In the late 1980s, when a highly repressive and authoritarian regime gave way to a democratic government, South Koreans did not embrace pro-American stance that prevailed society during successive military regimes in the past. Instead, as transition to democracy began, South Korea witnessed the growth of anti-Americanism. During the pro-democracy movements, mostly led by college students, protests targeted American facilities in Seoul such as U.S. Embassy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. military garrison in Yongsan. Even though many Koreans remained friendly to Americans and respected democratic principles of the U.S., young generations in South Korea did not hesitate to criticize U.S. foreign policy.[347]

Sudden rise of anti-American sentiments in the early 2000s came as shocking for those who expected the deepening of the alliance based on the sustainment of the ROK-U.S. military alliance after the Cold War, growing economic ties, and increased

---

Yeong-june, "Donbukah gyunhyeongjarongwa 21segyi hankook yoigyo [Northeast Asian balancer discourse and South Korea's diplomacy in the 21st century]." *Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History,* 28-1 (2006).

346 While many assumed that it was new nationalism among Korean youth that generates anti-Americanism, others pointed to the fact anti-Americanism was the result of the effect of democratization within Korea and the trans-nationalization of political movements. Bong and Moon challenged the simplistic explanation of generational change and instead illustrated that the surge of anti-Americanism was "rather stable and practical responses to the new disruptions and changes in the bilateral relationship," irrespective of generation and of sentiment towards the U.S. Bong, Youngshik, and Katharine HS Moon. "Rethinking Young Anti-Americanism in South Korea." *The Anti-American Century* (2007): 77-108. Some argued Korea's changing demographic structure is a major factor for rising Anti-Americanism. Kim, S. H. "Anti-Americanism in Korea." *Washington Quarterly*, 26-1 (2002): 109-122. Some others pointed to other aspects of the ROK-US relations such as economic and political dominance and U.S. capitalistic culture as the source of anti-Americanism. Shin, G. W. "South Korean anti-Americanism: A comparative perspective." *Asian Survey* (1996): 787-803.

347 Shorrock, Tim. "The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americanism," *Third World Quarterly*, 8:4 (1986), pp. 1195-1218; Kim, Jinwung. "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Causes." *Asian Survey*, 29:8 (1989).

social and cultural exchanges. Arguments of interdependence suggest that growing mutual interest would promote cooperative relations while reducing friction between members. If that is true, the ROK-U.S. alliance should have been a prime example. With the rise of the 386 generation, however, there was a growing call for assertiveness against asymmetric alliance with the U.S. Based on growing national confidence in economic power and enhanced military capability, more people began to question the legitimacy of U.S. military presence in South Korea and U.S. foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula. It was such change in the political platform upon which President Roh could defeat his pro-U.S. conservative opponent.[348] President Roh argued that South Korea should take a more independent stance from the U.S. in engaging North Korea. Many Koreans feared that uncompromising attitude of the U.S. might derail South Korea's efforts at reconciliation with the North Korea and unification.[349]

It was a tragic incident happened in June 2002 that sparked a massive ant-American campaign in South Korea. On 13 June 2002, two South Korea middle school girls were killed in an accident. The accident and the subsequent investigation spread anti-American sentiment into the wide social array of the Korean society, ranging from the elites, government officials, and non-governmental organization to the middle class, and to the younger generation. In accordance with the SOFA, the U.S. soldiers involved in the incident were not tried in the Korea court martial but in the U.S. court martial. The U.S. soldiers in the end found not guilty. The decision angered the Korean people. The anti-American movements surged. In June, there had been nearly 300 demonstrations against U.S. forces in Korea. Thousands of people participated in a series of candlelight vigils in front of the U.S. embassy. They cried "Yankee go home" and demanded the revision of the SOFA and even the complete removal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

---

[348] Kim, Seung-Hwan. "Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United States, 2001-2004." In *Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the US-ROK Alliance* (2004): 24-35; Bak, Sang-Mee. "South Korean Self-Identity and Evolving Views of the United States." In *Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the US-ROK Alliance* (2004).

[349] Lee, Chae-Jin. *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*. JHU Press, 2006, pp. 275-295.

The balance between positive and negative sentiments toward the U.S. shifted. According to a survey conducted in 2002, negative feelings toward the U.S. (63%) was greater than the positive feelings (37%).[350]

The Pursuit of Engagement Policy with North Korea

South Korea's engagement policy started from the Kim administration stressed peaceful coexistence and economic assistance rather than regime change, and this policy shift faced harsh criticism from those who were not ready. In that way, the sunshine policy lacked wide domestic consensus both in political circles and domestic opinion.[351]

U.S. policymakers, including the hawkish in Congress, had mixed views on South Korea's engagement policy with North Korea. In fleshing out the policy with feasible solutions to North Korean issues, the Kim administration advocated a comprehensive approach that addresses North Korea's economic, security, and political issues with support from the U.S. The President Kim in June 1998 suggested the U.S. policymakers to review its North Korea policy and adopt an engagement policy with Pyongyang.[352] Regretfully, North Korea's provocations—alleged operation of nuclear reactor and the launch of ballistic missiles—in August 1998 undermined South Korea's attempt to secure support from Washington. The U.S. Congress adamantly responded to North Korean aggression by implementing the Omnibus Appropriations Act for the fiscal year 1999, which froze KEDO funds and mandated an overall intra-agency review of U.S. policy towards North Korea.[353] In the face of a tough response from the U.S., whether the Kim administration's dovish engagement policy could be continued was unclear.

---

[350] Kim, Seung-Hwan. "Anti-Americanism in Korea." *Washington Quarterly*, 26-1 (2002), p. 109.

[351] For the review of the sunshine policy in domestic political context, see Shinn, Rinn-Sup. "South Korea: "Sunshine Policy" and Its Political Context." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1999.

[352] Nicholas D. Kristof, "Seoul Leader Asks End to Sanctions on North Koreans," *New York Times*, June 2, 1998.

[353] For details of South Korea's policy coordination with the U.S. on the Sunshine policy, see Shinn (1999), pp. 25-27.

Roh administration's policy towards Pyongyang inherited the Kim's, reflecting policy preferences for self-reliance and independence. When it comes to its policy toward North Korea, growing populations challenged the conventional approach based on threat, deterrence, U.S. security guarantee, and isolation. Instead, many Korean citizens assumed that with increase economic and military power, South Korea alone is capable of dealing with threats coming from North Korea. Many of the 386 generation thought that the U.S. policy towards Pyongyang was obstructing not supporting South Korea's effort to improve inter-Korean relations.[354] During the presidential campaign, Roh utilized the growing fear among the Korean public that U.S. unwillingness to tune its policy toward Pyongyang into South Korea's policy of engagement might in the end could precipitate an unwanted military conflict.[355]

Consequently, the Roh administration's policy toward North Korea was in conflict with the Bush's strategy of global terrorism. The Roh administration promoted a policy of engagement with Pyongyang under the principle of peace and prosperity. However, the U.S. seemed remain committed to the strategy of containment against North Korea. The. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in line with Bush's "axis of evil" statement, called the North Korean government a terrorist regime at a U.S. Congressional Committee.[356] Therefore, what caused more concern for the Roh administration was not so much threat coming from North Korea's aggression as the hardline stance of the U.S. policymakers towards Pyongyang. In particular, the Roh administration worried that the Bush doctrine of preemptive strike might trigger an all-out war on the Korean peninsula.

Divergence in North Korean policy between South Korea and U.S. was highlighted when the Roh administration seemed to be tolerant of a series of aggressions by North Korea. On 20 February 2003, a North Korean fighter jet violated South Korean airspace over the Yellow Sea. The incursion was the first violation of airspace in almost

---

354 Lee (2006).

355 Snyder, Scott. "South Korea's Squeeze Play." *The Washington Quarterly*, 28-4 (2005), p.99.

356 French, Howard. "Reversals in U.S.-South Korea Links, and Some Jagged Fault Lines," *New York Times*. February 11, 2003.

20 years and came right after Pyongyang threatened to abandon the armistice if the U.S. would impose sanctions on North Korea. This angered the U.S. because the incursion happened amid nuclear standoff after Pyongyang had admitted to running a nuclear weapons program.[357] Five days later, on 25 February, North Korea launched a missile that crashed in the East Sea. The U.S. urged North Korea not to conduct missile test. The CIA Director George Tenet testified before the Senate Arms Committee that North Korea had a missile that can reach the West Coast of the U.S.[358] Despite heightened tensions, however, President Roh said that he would push for reconciliation with North Korea and called for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear standoff. Roh's effort to mediate the crisis contributed to the growing tension between Seoul and Washington.

To make things worse, on 1 March 2003, North Korean fighter jets intercepted and threatened to attack a U.S. spy plane on a surveillance mission over the East Sea. No shots were fired, but a senior American military official said, "It's worrisome because they are creating their own drumbeat."[359] In response, White House spokesman said President Bush would consult with allies to determine the best way to protest the incident, and the U.S. Defense Department announced that the U.S. will deploy more heavy bombers near North Korea to protest the North Korea's reckless actions and bolster U.S. defense posture.[360] While the U.S. military officials were upset by the failure of South Korea to join the U.S. in condemning North Korean behavior, South Korea called for U.S. restraint. President Roh frustrated the U.S. by saying that the spy plane incident was a very predictable because of increased U.S. aerial surveillance of the North's nuclear activities and the U.S. should not go too far in pressuring North Korea.[361] The Roh administration's attitude confirmed the perception on the part of the U.S. that South Korea was betraying the ROK-U.S. alliance.[362]

---

357 "North Korean fighter jet crosses border." *USA Today*. February 20, 2003.

358 Choe, Sang-Hun. "North Korea Launches Anti-Ship Missile." *Bangor Daily News*. February 25, 2003.

359 Schmitt, Eric. "North Korea Mig's Intercept U.S. Jet on Spying Mission." *New York Times*. March 4, 2003.

360 Kelley, Matt. "U.S. Repositioning Bombers near N. Korea." *Beaumontenterprise*. March 5, 2003.

361 "Roh's words reveal gulf with Washington." *Reuters*. March 06, 2003.

362 Snyder (2005).

The U.S. Responses to South Korea's All-out Appeasement Policy

As anti-Americanism in Seoul became more visible and the Roh administration continued to create discord with Washington, many in Washington began to voice displeasure towards South Korea.[363] Many American media pundits even demanded a relocation or reduction of American troops deployed in South Korea, forcing South Korea to choose between siding with Washington or taking another path.[364] Richard Allen, writing for *The New York Times*, stated,

> Among the modifications Washington should now consider is the continued presence of 37,000 United States troops in harm's way, especially now that the harm can come from two directions—North Korea and violent South Korean protesters. We must make clear to the South that while we will honor the terms of our mutual defense treaty, which means that we will respond to any aggression by the North, *we will not stay where we are not wanted*. The first step should be to reduce our military presence on the peninsula by 25 percent by the end of 2004. After that, we should pull out roughly 10,000 troops a year for the following three years. If Seoul is serious about neutrality, then it can plan to assume eventual responsibility for its own frontline defense with its more than 600,000 well-armed troops.[365]

In February 2003, former Secretary of State James Baker, hinting a reference to the case of the Philippines, warned South Korean delegation from the National Assembly that the U.S. would make less commitment by withdrawing U.S. troops.[366]

A couple of days after the spy plane incident, the Bush administration signaled that the U.S. was willing to disengage militarily from the Korean peninsula. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, at the Pentagon town hall meeting on 6 March 2003, stated that some American military units out of 37,000 should leave South Korea and that some

---

[363] Bandow, Doug. "Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment." *Parameters*, 33-2 (2003).
[364] Safire, William. "Three-Ring Circus." *New York Times*. January 2, 2003.
[365] Allen, Richard V. "Seoul's Choice: The U.S. or the North." *New York Times*. January 16, 2003.
[366] Kim, Byong-guk, and Anthony Jones, eds. *Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, p. 223.

of the U.S. troops should be relocated out of North Korean artillery range.[367] Defense Secretary noted,

> We still have a lot of forces in Korea arranged very far forward, where it's intrusive in their lives, and where they really aren't very flexible or usable for other things. And here's South Korea with a GDP that's probably 25, 35 times North Korea's, and has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of up-front deterrent that is needed. And we of course have comparative advantages with respect to an air hub or a sea hub and reinforcement. So we are what the new president for Korea, for example, ran and asked that we look at how we might rebalance our relationship and our force structure. So we are—General LaPorte is engaged in that process, and it's a consultative process with the South Korean government. And I suspect that what we'll do is we'll end up making some adjustments there. Whether the forces would come home or whether they'd move farther south on the peninsula, or whether they would move to some neighboring area are the kinds of things that are being sorted out.[368]

Remarks by Donald Rumsfeld caused shock and confusion among the Korean officials.[369] In response, the new Roh government sent a message that U.S. troops are wanted in South Korea.[370] Prime Minister Goh told the American ambassador in Seoul, Thomas Hubbard, that "The role of the U.S. troops as a tripwire must be maintained. … It would be inappropriate to talk about redeploying U.S. troops at this time, given the tension surrounding the nuclear issue."[371] The U.S. responses to anti-Americanism and growing self-reliance in South Korea were a clear message to the Roh administration that South Korea's neutral stance risked creating fissure in the ROK-US alliance.

---

[367] "U.S. 'may withdraw from S. Korea' " *CNN*. March 7, 2003.

[368] Dunham, Will. "U.S. Considers Withdrawing Troops from South Korea." *Free Republic*. March 6, 2003.

[369] Marquand, Robert. "Rethinking US troops in S. Korea: Rumsfeld comments spark debate over moving soldiers back from northern border." *Christian Science Monitor*. March 10, 2003.

[370] Kirk, Don. "'Trip wire should remain' against North: Seoul makes case for U.S. presence." *New York Times*. March 7, 2003.

[371] Brooke, James. "Threats and Responses: Seoul: Musing on an Exodus of G.I.'s, South Korea Hails U.S. Presence." *New York Times*. March 8, 2003.

(2) North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Growing Divergence in Remedy

Nuclear Threat from Pyongyang

After the Cold War ended, the single most important security challenge that South Korea and the U.S. faced in common was North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. While the spread of weapons of mass destruction emerged replacing the Soviet Union as the most serious security threat for the U.S. security officials, North Korea had been a key challenger for the international non-proliferation regime.[372] For years, in order to negotiate an end to North Korea's nuclear and missile development, the U.S. had pursed a various policy measures including military cooperation with South Korea and Japan, wide-ranging economic sanctions, and export controls.

The first major nuclear crisis happened in 1994. Since 1992 IAEA inspectors had reported that North Korea cheated on its commitments under the NPT, and North Korea refused IAEA's request for special inspections.[373] On 12 March 1993, amid demands for special inspections of suspected nuclear sites, North Korea officially announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In June 1993, following talks with U.S., North Korea suspended its decision of withdrawal. The U.S. granted assurances against the use of force, and North Korea agreed to follow IAEA safeguards. In February 1994, North Korea finalized an agreement with the IAEA to allow inspections of its

---

[372] The U.S. officials assumed that even though North Korea had not been allowed to reprocess nuclear materials since 1989, North Korea secretly obtained a couple of bombs' worth of plutonium without declaring honestly to the IAEA. Carter, Ashton B., William J. Perry, and John M. Shalikashvili. "A Scary Thought: Loose Nukes in North Korea." *Wall Street Journal*. February 6, 2003. In late 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that North Korea had accumulated about 12 kilograms of plutonium, which is enough for making one or two nuclear weapons.

[373] In 1994, the Director of the CIA stated that there was a good change that Pyongyang already possessed one or two nuclear weapons, based on estimates of the amount of plutonium that had been obtained from reactors. Although some viewed the estimate as a worst case scenario, all U.S. agencies agreed that the U.S. had an urgent interest in rolling back North Korea's nuclear program. Cronin, Richard P. "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: US Policy Options." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1994.

nuclear facilities. However, as North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect a plutonium plant at Yongbyon, the IAEA and the U.S. pushed North Korea to allow full inspection of the reprocessing plant in accordance with safeguard agreements. In June 1994, this time North Korea announced it would no longer participate in the IAEA.

In response, the U.S. engaged in a major diplomatic initiative with North Korea in order to encourage North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs in return for suspension of sanctions and provision of aid. In June 1994, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited and negotiated a deal with North Korea in which North Korean President Kim Il Sung confirmed his willingness to freeze nuclear weapons program and resume high-level talks with the U.S. On 12 October 1994, the first nuclear crisis was resolved as the U.S. and North Korea adopted the "Agreed Framework" in Geneva. Under the agreement, Pyongyang was to allow IAEA inspections and freeze its nuclear facilities in exchange for energy support.[374] In March 1995, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational consortium consists of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, was formed to finance and construct light water reactors (LWR) for Pyongyang.

The second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002 unfolded under the background of growing divergence between Washington and Seoul on threat perception of North Korea. Different threat perception led to different approach to North Korea. With increased economic power and military capability, the Korean government become more confident in dealing with North Korea. The result was the implementation of engagement policy. With increased domestic demand for self-reliance in security, South Korea reviewed the Cold War policy towards Pyongyang based on threat and sought new strategy less dependent on the U.S. Meanwhile, North Korea's nuclear ambition emerged

[374] In October 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, under which North Korea agreed to freeze its plutonium reprocessing program, allow special inspections, and remove 8000 spent nuclear fuel in exchange for energy assistance from the U.S. including funding for the construction of light water nuclear reactors (LWRs). IAEA. "Agreed Framework Between The United States of America And The Democratic People's Republic of Korea." IAEA INFCIRC/457. November 2, 1994. <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf>.

as one of the pressing security concerns for the post-Cold War America; therefore, the need for policy coordination with U.S. escalated.

U.S. Policy toward North Korea

The Clinton administration (1993-2001) carefully engaged with North Korea to work toward the elimination of threat coming from nuclear weapons and long range missiles. Despite North Korea's rogue behaviors, the Clinton administration did not define North Korea as an irrational state bent on terrorism and understood that engagement with negotiation would be the best policy for North Korea's nuclear threat. Clinton officials believed that North Korea's threatening posture is a result of security dilemma that North Korea faced in the post-Cold War order.[375] The Clinton administration saw North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs as means to secure its regime after its Cold War allies—Russia and China—distanced themselves from Pyongyang. Given economic difficulties and international isolation North Korea faced, the Clinton administration figured that various carrots could persuade North Korea to change its course. The engagement policy was an instrument to build trust, resolve nuclear standoff, and reduce insecurity.

However, Clinton did not push for the dovish policy toward Pyongyang in the very beginning. It was a strategic policy choice made after going through a political tug of war with North Korea. Indeed, the Clinton administration inherited the first Bush administration's hawkish policy toward North Korea. While the U.S. did not openly coerce North Korea with the threat of use of force to abandon its nuclear programs, the U.S. with a clear of goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula carefully monitored North Korea's nuclear-related activities and was ready to employ coercive measures including military options in case the situation became worse or diplomatic solution failed.

---

[375] Cha, Victor D. "Korea's Place in the Axis." *Foreign Affairs*, 81 (2002): 79.

U.S. responses to the 1993 nuclear crisis demonstrate that the Clinton administration did not send conciliatory gesture to Pyongyang at the onset. Although the new Clinton administration was ready to talk with North Korea, the relations between North Korea and the IAEA began to deteriorate. In the early 1993, North Korea continued to reject the IAEA's request for special inspections on nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. In June and July 1993, the Clinton administration had talks to negotiate a nuclear deal in which North Korea agreed to consider following the IAEA nuclear safeguards provided the U.S. would support North Korea in obtaining light water reactors. Despite high-level talks, however, the Clinton administration maintained a hardline stance against North Korea. Visiting South Korea in July 1993, the President Clinton highlighted the danger of North Korea's nuclear and missile developments and the transfer of weapons technology to other rogue states. He warned that if North Korea would continue to develop and use nuclear weapons, the U.S. would immediately retaliate, and that would mean the end of the Kim Jung-Il's regime.[376]

As the nuclear impasse prolonged, the Clinton administration continued to take tougher stance. In May 1994, North Korea announced that it would extract plutonium from nuclear sites at Yongbyun, the Clinton administration announced its plan to impose economic sanctions against North Korea if it would not permit the IAEA inspection of the sites. The Clinton administration also decided to resume Team Spirit exercise, ROK-U.S. joint military drill.

As North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship continued, the Clinton administration even contemplated on wielding military power in order to stop North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the spring of 1994, the U.S. almost went to war against North Korea.[377] William Perry, then Defense Secretary, and Ashton Cater, then Assistance Defense Secretary confessed that the Pentagon had detailed plans for striking North Korea's nuclear facilities. They recalled,

---

[376] Berry Jr, W. E. *North Korea's Nuclear Program: the Clinton Administration's Response*. Institute for National Security Studies. U.S. Air Force Academy, 1995, p. 14.

[377] Don (1997), pp. 313-16.

> The two of us spent much of the first half of 1994 preparing for war on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea had ejected the international inspectors at its nuclear reactor facility at Yongbyon and began steps that would have led in a few months to the extraction of enough plutonium to build about six nuclear bombs. Such a development would have created unacceptable dangers to the region and to our own security. Consequently, we readied a detailed plan to attack the Yongbyon facility with precision-guided bombs. . . . Since we fully understood the dangers of a war with North Korea, we proceeded in a manner that would avoid that war, if possible. But we believed that the nuclear program on which North Korea was embarked was even more dangerous, and were prepared to risk a war to stop it. As we entered into negotiations to shut down Yongbyon, we made our willingness to use military force crystal clear to the North Koreans by positioning forces to strike Yongbyon and reinforcing our military units that were deployed to defend South Korea against an onslaught from the north.[378]

Apparently, to face the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Clinton administration prepared a pre-emptive strike. This case demonstrates that the Clinton was not willing to tolerate a nuclear North Korea and even determined to risk another war on the Korean peninsula.

Agreed Framework and Shift to the Policy of Engagement

Fortunately, the war was avoided. As the threat of preemptive strike prompted North Korea to threaten to withdraw from the IAEA and even bombard Seoul,[379] Washington negotiated a resumption of bilateral talks in June 1994. The Clinton administration attempted to add carrots to stick in order to resolve nuclear crisis, which marked a policy shift toward engagement. In October, the United States and North Korea completed negotiations in Geneva and signed the Agreed Framework. The U.S. promised to help with the construction of two LWRs and supply fuel oil to solve North Korea's energy shortage under the condition that North Korea would shut down its nuclear sites. On 20 October 1994, President Clinton sent a letter to Kim Jung-Il. He

---

[378] Carter, A. B. and Perry, W. J. "Back to the Brink." *Washington Post*, October 20, 2002.

[379] On 19 April 1994, Park Yong Su, a North Korean nuclear negotiator, warned, "If you force us to go to war, we will go at any time." He even did not hesitate to threaten that North Korea would turn Seoul into a sea of flames. "Kim's Nuclear Gamble: Chronology." *PBS*. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/etc/cron.html>.

wrote that, "I will use the full powers of my office to facilitate arrangements for the financing and construction of a light-water nuclear power reactor project within the DPRK, and the funding and implementation of interim energy alternatives for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." In addition, Clinton confirmed, "In the event that this reactor project is not completed for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of my office to provide, to the extent necessary, such a project from the United States, subject to the approval of the U.S. Congress."[380]

The Clinton administration's extensive review of U.S. policy toward North Korea in 1999 concluded that the elements of diplomacy combined with a relaxation of economic pressures on Pyongyang could advance U.S. security interest on the Korean peninsula. The policy review team, led by William Perry special advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, argued in the report that the Agreed Framework should be preserved and implemented by the U.S. and its allies. The report stressed, "[I]f stability can be preserved through the cooperative ending of DPRK nuclear weapons-and long-range missile-related activities, the U.S. should be prepared to establish more normal diplomatic relations with DPRK and join in the ROK's policy of engagement and peaceful coexistence."[381]

As a means to security stability, the Perry report recommended that through negotiations with North Korea the U.S. seek complete and verifiable assurances that North Korea does not have a nuclear weapons program. The report called such measures as a two-path strategy. The first path involves a new, comprehensive approach to negotiations with North Korea. On this path, the U.S. would negotiate the complete cessation of nuclear and long-range missile programs and create a condition for a more durable peace in North East Asia. Then, the U.S. and its allies would reciprocate North

---

[380] Niksch, L. A., Nowels, L. Q., Pregelj, V. N., Shinn, R. S., & Sutter, R. G. "Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (November, 1994).

[381] "U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Perry Review." Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 106th Congress. Washington DC, October 13, 1999. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg62724/html/CHRG-106hhrg62724.htm>.

Korea's concession by reducing pressures on North Korea. If short, if North Korea takes necessary and verifiable step toward denuclearization, the U.S. would in return lift economic sanctions, resume trade, and normalize relations with Pyongyang. However, the report also recommended the U.S. to prepare a second path of containment in case North Korea rejects the first path. On the second path, the U.S. could not eliminate North Korean threat through negotiation, the U.S. would act to contain the threat and take measured actions to bring back North Korea to the first path.

The Clinton administration's engagement policy culminated in the Secretary of States Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in 2000 for talks to negotiate a missile deal with Kim Jong-Il. After six hours of serious talks with Kim Jung-Il, Albright said,

> I explained to Chairman Kim America's vision for relations between our countries free from past hostility, relations which contribute to peace and stability throughout the region, and which support the process of reconciliation between the North and the South. Chairman Kim was quite clear in explaining his understanding of U.S. concerns. Indeed, during the October 23 mass performance we attended together, an image of the DPRK Taepodong missile appeared. He immediately turned to me and quipped that this was the first satellite launch and it would be the last.[382]

Albright described Kim Jong-Il as a very practical and serious person, not as an irrational leader.

Bush's Hardline Stance against North Korea

The Bush administration (2001-09) started out with a policy of cautious engagement towards North Korea. Bush's initial policy toward North Korea drew on an extensive policy review in the early 1999 by a Republican working group chaired by Richard L. Armitage. The Armitage report represented the Bush administration's approach to North Korea because many important officials such as Paul Wolfowitz and

[382] Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. Press Conference, Koryo Hotel, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 24, 2000. As released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. <http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/001024b.html>.

Carl Ford participated. Armitage became the Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush administration. The comprehensive approach suggested by Armitage report was to prepare to accept North Korea as a legitimate actor if North Korea would take meaningful steps toward denuclearization. While enhancing deterrence capability was a central component of the comprehensive, the report recommended the U.S. government to implement deterrence or containment strategy after diplomacy failed. The goal of diplomacy, the report argued, should be to inform North Korea that the path for economic aid, security assurance, and diplomatic normalization with the U.S. was open if North Korea choose to abide by the Agreed Framework.[383]

Shortly after taking office, the Bush administration undertook a comprehensive review of U.S. policy towards North Korea. The reformulated policy, issued June 2001, echoed the Armitage report. President Bush directed his national security team to discuss improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs, and a less threatening conventional military posture. The discussions should be pursued, he insisted, in the context of a comprehensive approach to encourage progress toward inter-Korean reconciliation, a constructive relationship with the U.S., and greater stability in the region. "If North Korea responds affirmatively and takes appropriate action," President Bush promised, "we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps."[384]

The Bush administrations' policy toward North Korea underwent fundamental change after the events of September 11, 2001.[385] President Bush's national security team neither launch a comprehensive approach, directed by the policy review in June

---

[383] Armitage, Richard L. "A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea." *Global Security*. March 1999. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/1999/forum159.html>.

[384] The Office of the Press Secretary. "Statement by the President." Washington DC. June 13, 2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html>.

[385] There is a view that the inherent perception gap of North Korea does not directly result in the differences in foreign policy. Rather what mattered was the specific situation that each administration faces. The different approaches towards North Korea between the Clinton and Bush administrations were not caused by the perception gap, but they varied with specific international situations. See Hwang, J. "Realism and US foreign policy toward North Korea: The Clinton and Bush administrations in comparative perspective." *World Affairs* (2004): 15-29.

2001 nor initiated high-level bilateral talks with North Korea. Instead, following the 9/11 attacks, Bush adopted much harder stance against North Korea than before, by linking North Korea to the war on terrorism. In his January 2002 State of the Union address, Bush included North Korea in the "axis of evil" countries along with Iraq and Iran. He stated:

> Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. . . Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom . . . States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. . . America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. [386]

President Bush appeared to consider North Korea as a reckless and aggressive state with which the United States would be unable to negotiate. The State of the Union address hinted that U.S. would adopt a hawkish policy and punish Korea's rogue behavior if North Korea refuses to cooperate.

President Bush harbored a deep animosity towards North Korea, and it was shared by most officials in the Bush administration. Key security officials were skeptical about whether the U.S. through engagement policy could induce North Korea to cooperate and achieve a satisfactory result. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor

[386] Bush, G. W. "State of the Union Address: Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." White House, Washington DC. January 29, 2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

in the Bush administration published the Republican view on North Korea in Foreign Affairs. She noted:

> The principal concerns are nuclear threats from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world and the possibility of unauthorized releases as nuclear weapons spread. . . . The regime of Kim Jong Il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign. But North Korea also lives outside of the international system. Like East Germany, North Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime just across its border. It must fear its eventual demise from the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, too, has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy. The development of WMD thus provides the destructive way out for Kim Jong Il. . . . The United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively. The Clinton administration has failed here, sometimes threatening to use force and then backing down, as it often has with Iraq.[387]

Amid growing nuclear tensions in December 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned North Korea that the U.S. could fight and win two regional conflicts and advised Pyongyang not to become emboldened by the Bush administration's focus on Iraq. Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that North Korean nuclear crisis was a greater danger immediately to U.S. interests than Saddam Hussein.[388] Even though there remained a chance for a dialogue with Pyongyang, the Bush administration officials believed that the U.S. needed to step back from engagement policy and approach North Korea with a more resolute and decisive manner.

Following the 9/11, the Bush administration's hardline policy toward North Korea began to take shape. The Nuclear Posture Review report, issued in January 2002, stated that a North Korean attack on South Korea constitutes an immediate contingency against which the U.S. should plans for the use of nuclear weapons. The report claimed, "North Korea and Iran have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor

---

[387] Rice, C. "Promoting the national interest." *Foreign Affairs*, 79 (March/April 2000), p 45.

[388] Gittings, John and Suzanne Goldenberg. "Rumsfeld gets tough on North Korea." *Guardian*. December 24, 2002.

terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs."[389] The National Security Strategy 2002 defined North Korea as one of the most significant security threats.[390] The Bush administration's North Korean policy was implemented in the context of the global war on terrorism. The Clinton administration's cautious engagement policy gave way to the hawkish containment policy.

Divergent Approaches to North Korea and 2002 Nuclear Crisis

While the Kim Dae-Jung's administration pursued a conciliatory policy towards North Korea, President Bush since took office made it clear that he would not be fooled by North Korea. The first summit meeting between President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung held in March 2001 revealed perception and policy gap between the two leaders.[391] In a press conference with President Kim, President Bush claimed he did not fully trust Pyongyang's self-proclaimed peaceful intentions given the nature of North Korean regime. Instead of endorsing "Sunshine" policy, Bush stressed the untrustworthiness of North Korea. He said:

> Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements. And that's part of the issue that the President and I discussed, is when you make an agreement with a country that is secretive, how do you—how are you aware as to whether or not they're keeping the terms of the agreement.
>
> The President [Kim Dae-Jung] was very forthright in describing his vision, and I was forthright in describing my support for his vision, as well as my skepticism about whether or not we can verify an agreement in a country that doesn't enjoy the freedoms that our two countries understand—don't have the free press like we have here in America.[392]

---

[389] U.S. Department of Defense. *Nuclear Posture Review Report*. 2002. <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

[390] Bush, G. W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Executive Office of the President. Washington DC, 2002. pp.13-16.

[391] Cossa, R. A. "US-Korea: Summit Aftermath." PacNet, Pacific Forum. Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001). <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0111.pdf>.

[392] Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea." News Release. March 7, 2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html>.

President Bush from his early days in the office seemed to have skepticism of South Korea's "Sunshine" policy and strongly emphasized a pragmatic approach in dealing with North Korea. Even though he promised support for Kim's engagement policy, Bush wanted President Kim to take a realistic view and to convince Kim Jung-Il to make necessary concessions that need to be made. In contrast to President Kim, President Bush was determined to apply strict reciprocity to North Korea. While the U.S. was looking forward to have dialogue with North Korea, President Bush affirmed, any negotiation with North Korea would require complete verification of the terms of an agreement.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration's hardline policy combined with President Kim's sunshine policy, created tension in bilateral relations. Preoccupied with the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, The Bush administration's stance toward North Korea turned increasingly inflexible. Bush denunciated North Korea as part of an axis of evil and threatened to take preemptive actions against Pyongyang. During President Bush's visit to Seoul in February 2002, there seemed no sign of narrowing the policy gap between the two leaders. Even though President Kim reiterated that there were no major differences between the U.S. policy and the Korean policy, President Bush could not hide his deep skepticism against Kim Jung-Il. He said:

> I made it very clear to the President that I support his sunshine policy. And I'm disappointed that the other side, the North Koreans, will not accept the spirit of the sunshine policy. . . . I will believe—I will not change my opinion on the man, on Kim Chong-Il, until he frees his people and accepts genuine proposals from countries such as South Korea or the United States to dialog, until he proves to the world that he's got a good heart, that he cares about the people that live in his country. I am concerned about a country that is not transparent, that allows for starvation, that develops weapons of mass destruction.[393]

[393] George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference with President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea in Seoul, South Korea," *The American Presidency Project*. February 20, 2002. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73261>.

South Korea's reaction to this policy was largely negative. Bush's public display of aversion against dangerous North Korean regime led to the rise of resentment against the U.S. policy in South Korea. Many in South Korea believed that the U.S. hardline stance encouraged North Korea to be nuclear armed. For the majority of South Koreans, what threatened peace on the Korean peninsula was the Bush administration's policy preference for military solutions and unilateralism, rather than North Korea's conventional forces and nuclear weapons.[394] Many in South Korea even believed that the United States was escalating the possibility of a crisis on the peninsula with its preemptive strategy.[395]

The confrontation between U.S. and North Korea in 2002 over North Korea's secret nuclear program further deteriorated already strained relations. The U.S. intelligence reported that North Korea was running a covert uranium enrichment facilities. In October 2002, James Kelly, assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs visited and confronted Pyongyang with evidence that North Korea was secretly developing a highly enriched uranium program. A top North Korean official reportedly confirmed the allegations.[396] On 12 October 2002, the U.S. State Department announced that North Korea acknowledged secret nuclear weapons program. Richard Boucher State Department spokesman said:

> The United States was prepared to offer economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people, provided the North were dramatically to alter its behavior across a range of issues, including its weapons of mass destruction

[394] Park, H. J. "Divergent Threat Perceptions on North Korea. Forging New US-ROK Political Relationships." The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation (2005). <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/programs/program_pdfs/rok_us_park.pdf>.

[395] Kim, S. H. "Anti-Americanism in Korea." *Washington Quarterly*, 26-1 (2002): 109-122.

[396] According to an account of CNN, Kang Suk-Ju, the first minister of External Affairs of North Korea, told James Kelley that, "Your president called us a member of the axis of evil. ... Your troops are deployed on the Korean Peninsula. ... Of course, we have a nuclear program." North Korea also claimed it had finished reprocessing more than 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. President Bush found the news troubling. Kelly Wallace, John King and Andrea Koppel. 2002. "Rumsfeld: N. Korea may have nuclear weapons already." *CNN*. October 17, 2002.

> programs. . . . In light of our concerns about the North's nuclear weapons program, however, we are unable to pursue this approach.[397]

The State Department stated that the secret uranium program constituted a violation of North Korea's international obligations under the Agreed Framework, NPT, and IAEA safeguards.

The 1994 Agreed Framework quickly unraveled. At the urging of the U.S., KEDO suspended heavy fuel shipments to North Korea in November 2002, which prompted, for North Korea's part, heavy criticism of the U.S. failure to observe its obligation. In December 2002, North Korea removed seals and surveillance equipment from nuclear reactor located in Yongbyon and expelled IAEA inspectors. Following the collapse of this agreement in 2002, North Korea claimed that it had withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003 and once again began operating its nuclear facilities.[398]

While the U.S.-North Korea relations shifted toward a more hostile stance, the policy cooperation between Washington and Seoul that was essential in resolving nuclear standoff seemed aloof. Indeed, policy gap between South Korea and the U.S. became almost unbridgeable after President Roh took office. South Korea was more concerned with North Korea's nuclear crisis rather than the U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. The Roh administration wanted to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis through the "Policy for Peace and Prosperity," which retained the general framework of the sunshine policy of engagement.[399] In order to achieve the policy goal of maintaining a sustainable peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the Policy for Peace and Prosperity suggested South Korea promote regular talks with North Korea, expand inter-Korean relations, and contribute to regional peace and stability.[400] As outlined in his

---

[397] U.S. Department of State. "North Korean Nuclear Program." Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman. Washington, DC. October 16, 2002.

[398] Manyin, M. E., Chanlett-Avery, E., & Marchart, H. "North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004." Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, Washington D.C. (2005, January).

[399] During the presidential campaign, Roh consistently subscribed to the view that the Sunshine Policy should be carried on in order to achieve the existence and prosperity of South Korea.

[400] Kang, I. D. (2003). "Toward peace and prosperity: The new government's North Korea policy." *East*

inaugural address, Roh stressed that a peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear crisis through dialogue was the only option, and that unnecessary escalation of military tension should be avoided at all costs. Roh's continuation of the conciliatory policy even in the face of North Korea's acknowledgement of its secret nuclear programs directly clashed with the Bush's strategy of hawkish containment. While the Bush administration was open for talks with Pyongyang, South Korea's engagement policy with the lack of reciprocity appeared to be merely a policy of appeasement responsible for undermining U.S. nonproliferation policy.

The uncompromising stance of the Bush administration toward North Korea nuclear program coupled with suspicion that the U.S. might pursue regime change helped raised suspicion of America's intentions and anti-American sentiments in South Korea. The younger generation of South Koreans feared that Bush would not be engaged in dialogue with North Korea and that pre-emptive strategy would cause calamity on the peninsula. For them, it was the Bush administration's ABC (anything but Clinton) North Korea policy, which encouraged North Korea's nuclear weapons development.[401] For that reason, they considered President Bush is more threatening than Kim Jong-Il, which puzzled many Americans as North Korea was on the nuclear brink.[402] Such view was clearly expressed by Roh. He said at his transition committee office:

> I am skeptical whether so-called 'tailored containment' reportedly being considered by the United States is an effective means to control or impose a surrender on North Korea. I doubt if the policy would work in controlling North Korea. Success or failure of a U.S. policy toward North Korea isn't too big a deal to the American people, but it is a life-or-death matter for South Koreans. Therefore, any U.S. move should fully consider South Korea's opinion.[403]

Asian Review, 15, 3-18.

[401] Park, H. J. (2005). Divergent Threat Perceptions on North Korea. Forging New US-ROK Political Relationships. The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 2005.

[402] Cha, V. D., & Kang, D. C. "The Korea Crisis." *Foreign Policy* (2003), p.26.

[403] Brooke, James. "Threats and Responses: Weapons; South Opposes Pressuring North Korea, Which Hints It Will Scrap Nuclear Pact." *New York Times*. January 1, 2003.

The Roh administration judged its primary threat to be the possibility of a military confrontation between U.S. and North Korea and a preemptive war against North Korea by the U.S., rather than North Korea's nuclear weapons. While the U.S. judged North Korea's WMD capability combined with its missiles to be a direct, immediate threat, the Roh administration viewed North Korea's nuclear program as a deterrent and bargaining tool.[404] Therefore, the Roh administration placed policy focus on easing tension between Washington and Pyongyang and thereby preventing a war on the Korean peninsula, rather than denuclearization.

(3) Summary

To conclude, the ROK-U.S. security alliance was in dissonance incurred from the increasingly divergent approach in dealing with North Korea's nuclear programs. Seemingly, in terms of cost sharing, South Korea strived to meet U.S. expectation for South Korea's financial contribution to the common defense. As <Table 18> demonstrates, South Korea continued to increase its share for the stationing cost of the U.S. forces in Korea. However, the more pressing bilateral security concern for the U.S. was North Korea's nuclear threats. South Korean policymakers' security role conceptions and performances were out of joint with out of sync with U.S. policymakers' role prescription.

Table 18. South Korea's Cost Sharing, 1991-2004

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Method	1st SMA			2nd SMA				3rd SMA				4th SMA		
	1/3 of total stationing cost of the USFK, not including labor cost			10% increase from the previous year				Reflected South Korea's GDP and price index				8.8% increase from the previous year		
Cost Sharing ($ mil.)	150	180	220	260	300	330	363	314	339	390	444	472	557	622

Source: Park, Hwee-Rhak, An Analysis on Cost Sharing Status and Lessons for South Korea: Focused on Theories and Practices." The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies, 103 (2014), p. 174.

[404] Sheen, Seongho. "Grudging Partner: South Korea." *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 30-2 (2003): 96-103.

President Roh advocated the role of *active self-reliance* and *mediator-integrator*. The Roh administration affirmed strong commitment to self-reliant defense policy and promoted a change in ROK-U.S. relations from vertical one to horizontal and more equal one. When making policy decisions regarding North Korea, the Roh administration attempted to give priority to South Korea's interest, rather than yielding to regional and global strategy of the U.S. In addition, the Roh administration assumed that South Korea as a middle power can play a balancer's role in the region, mediating tensions between the U.S., and China and between Japan and China.

Table 19. South Korea's Alliance Role Conceptions

Role Type	Description
Active Self-reliance	Ally that promotes the element of policy of self-determination, indicating that it will make policy decisions according to the state's own interest
Mediator-integrator	Ally that perceives it has capability and is responsible for fulfilling special tasks to prevent conflicts between others states

The primary source of the change in South Korea's role conception was demographic and generational shift in political culture. South Korea's post-Cold War domestic politics was marked by the rise of young, liberal, and progressive political power group. Unlike conservative voices, the progressives demanded South Korea break away from dependence on the U.S. The rise of anti-American sentiment, triggered by tragic incidents, was in a way an expression of growing assertiveness that reflected Korean people's demand for more independent and equal relations with the U.S.

South Korea's engagement policy towards North Korea was also based on growing confidence in military, economic, and political capability. Shifting away from the traditional North Korean approach of isolation or condition-based support, South Korea's policymakers placed emphasis on peaceful co-existence and unconditional economic assistant. While the U.S. policymakers supported the policy shift on principle, they harbored concern for medium or long-term implications of the policy. They

concerned about the possibility of losing influence on the Korean peninsula and being pressed both by Seoul and Pyongyang to relinquish its traditional security obligations and assume limited role.

South Korea's growing assertiveness and engagement policy led to widening gaps in threat perception of and approach to North Korea's nuclear problem between Seoul and Washington. The chasm between the two grew much wider after the 9/11 attacks awakened American policymakers to the danger of nuclear weapons. While South Korea was absorbed in improving inter-Korean relations, the U.S. had global concerns about nuclear and missile proliferation.

Figure 28. The Deterioration of the ROK-U.S. Alliance



All of these developments led to increasingly strained alliance partnership. As summarized in <Figure 28>, in the case of the ROK-U.S. alliance in the early 2000s, domestic politics played the utmost importance role in undermining the alliance. Demographic and generational changes led to increasing demand for self-reliance in South Korea's foreign policy and the establishment of the progressive regime. Policymakers and influential elite in Seoul became increasingly reluctant to bear the cost of losing autonomy and thus attempted to improve their position by readjusting, if not attacking, the existing alliance arrangement. Democratization of South Korea should have brought South Korea and the U.S. closer based on similar political values. Yet,

different threat perception of North Korea and the increasing concern about the U.S. hardline stance against Pyongyang put the alliance in jeopardy. This observation attests to the fact that the ROK-U.S. alliance was not rooted in narrow calculations of power, threat, and interest but also in political leadership, values, identity, and perceptions.

On the U.S. side as well, 9/11 attacks contributed to the rise of neo-conservative voices. Awakened from the danger of WMD in wrong hands, North Korea's nuclear program emerged as existential threat to the U.S. security. At the same time, South Korea's open-ended engagement policy toward North Korea, increasing demand for self-reliance in security, and anti-American sentiment impaired the credibility of South Korea as a reliable ally.

Figure 29. Different Threat Perception and Divergence of Role Conceptions



Seen from the role-based approach, security role conceptions between South Korea and the U.S. was diverging. South Korean policymakers' efforts to achieve political self-determination led to greater assertiveness in foreign policy, and divergent threat perception of North Korea led to ROK-U.S. policy rift over North Korea. The ROK-U.S. security alliance which had been served as a major pillar for maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia began to show a sign of faltering.

3. The U.S.-Japan Alliance Management

(1) Japan's Search for New Security Role after the Persian Gulf War

After the end of the Gulf War, regional and international security environment changed, and accordingly the U.S.-Japan security alliance underwent subtle but important changes. The splendid victory of the U.S. in the Gulf War marked a structural change in the international system: the beginning of the unipolar moment. The end of bipolarity forced Japan to reassess its security policy and find ways to facilitate its security interest in the region. Besides, while the Soviet threat subsided, North Korea and China posed increasing threat to Japan. More importantly, the U.S. pushed Japan to assume a greater share of the alliance burden as evidenced during the Gulf War. Amid these changes, the readjustment of the U.S-Japan security alliance came as the most important security challenge that Japan faced in the post-Cold War order.

Driving Factors for Change in Alliance Role

Above all, the structural change resulting from the U.S.-led coalition's victory in the Gulf War led Japan to readjust its security interest and policy. To be sure, as a result of shift in power balance, Japan's stance toward the alliance relations with the U.S. became more complex. On the one hand, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had been the major security threat for both the U.S. and Japan, undermined the sense of common interest. As a result, the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance which had been supported by ideologically inspired security rationale during the Cold War put into serious question.[405] The relative and absolute costs and benefits of maintaining the bilateral security treaty came to the surface and caught public attention. On the other hand, America's predominant power and position in the world which became

[405] Tsuneo, Akaha. "US-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Ambiguous Adjustment to a Changing Strategic Environment." In Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (Eds.). *Japanese Foreign Policy Today: a Reader*, 2000. p.186.

indisputable after the Gulf War forced Japan to carefully manage the alliance in ways to facilitate its national interest without sacrificing U.S. security commitment because the region was still unstable.[406] Besides shift in power balance in the region, Russia still left considerable amount of military of forces in the Far East. The enduring U.S.-Japan trade disputes—trade deficits in the U.S.—gave the U.S. more political leverage. After all, keeping a proper balance between U.S. demands for increased alliance support and domestic constraints became the pressing security concern for Japan.

Second, after the threat of the Soviet expansionism evaporated, China and North Korea posed strategic threats to Japan. In particular, Japan increasingly viewed China's rise as a long-term security concern. During the post-war era, Japan adopted the strategy of engagement with China. In order to maintain stability in the region and maintain prosperity, Japan engaged China on economic and cultural areas. For its part, post-Mao China, under Deng's leadership, focused on economic reform and modernization. Mutual economic interdependence increased. That was in part possible since China, despite historical antagonism against Japan, could be assured by the U.S.-Japan alliance which functioned as a check on Japan's potential military adventurism.

By the 1990s, however, Sino-Japanese relations gradually deteriorated. For one thing, China became much more economically prosperous. As China's economic sphere of interest extended, economic competition between China and Japan intensified. The two countries had to compete for resources and markets. For another, China's economic success combined with Japan's long-lasting economic recession translated into a subtle change in the regional balance of power, which emboldened China. Growing disagreement between China and Japan was illustrated by diplomatic clashes over China's nuclear tests. As China became increasingly assertive in relations to Japan, more Japanese became wary of China's growing power and assertiveness in the mid and long-

---

[406] Tow observes that "The end of bipolarity has forces Tokyo to reassess its politico-strategic identity…the key question facing Japan after the Soviet Union's demise is to what extent the US-Japan mutual security treaty will continue to facilitate Japan's interest in maintaining regional and global stability without it needing to move away from its preferred image as a pacifist state." Tow, William. W. *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001. p.48.

term perspective. These factors led Japan to review its strategy of economic engagement with China. Japan's foreign policy vis-à-vis China gradually leaned toward a balancing strategy motivated by a desire to curb China's growing influence and power. By the early 2000s, Japan's policy towards China became focused on engaging and constraining China in the region.[407] In doing so, Japan wanted the U.S. to be involved in the region, and strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance was a major component of Japanese foreign policy.

Japan also perceived increasing security threat from North Korea. Indeed, as one of the neighboring powers that would be affected by potential instability on the Korean peninsula, Japan have long recognized that the maintaining stability of the Korean peninsula is essential to Japan's security. The post-Cold War order in East Asia—the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations—rendered North Korea more vulnerable. Abandoned by its Cold War allies, Russia and China, which established normal relations with South Korea, North Korea was increasingly isolated, and its economy was crippled. North Korea's response to this political trap and economic decline was a more aggressive policy. North Korea strived to acquire nuclear weapons and delivery capability and confronted regional powers. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and nuclear standoff in 1993 created serious security concern for the Japanese.[408] At the Pyongyang's announcement of NPT withdrawal, the Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa described North Korea's nuclear ambition as a great security threat to Japan.[409]

While Kim Il-Sung's death and 1994 Agreed Framework offered some hope for North Korea's policy change and peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis,

---

[407] Green, M. *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*. Macmillan, 2003, pp.103-105.

[408] Christopher Hughes claims that Japan's perception of North Korean nuclear threat was sophisticated and that Japan's policymakers viewed the North Korean issue not simply as a military security one, but also as a political issue that affects the U.S.-Japan alliance and domestic stability. Hughes, C. W. "The North Korean nuclear crisis and Japanese security." *Survival*, 38-2 (1996): 79-103.

[409] Jameson, Sam and Teresa Watanabe. "Seoul Sees 'Grave Threat' in North's Move." *Los Angeles Times*. March 13, 1993.

the hope proved to be short-lived. In September 1998, North Korea fired a Taepodong-1—a two stage medium-range ballistic missile—across Japan, displaying its increased missile capability.[410] The Japanese official did not hesitate to deplore North Korea's action. The Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu Nonaka called the firing an extremely dangerous act.[411] North Korea's missile firing triggered a public uproar, and the Japanese defense planners were gripped with fear that the entire Japan was now within the range of North Korea's missile attack.[412]

Third, Japan was under a growing pressure Washington to redefine alliance arrangement. The military and ideological confrontation with the Soviet empire during the Cold War provided justification for the U.S. to protect Japan while Japan was geared toward economic revitalization. For the U.S. the U.S.-Japan security relations, though lopsided and unfair, served U.S. security interest. However, after the Soviet military threat was virtually removed and the Gulf War ended with America's victory, the U.S. began to question the value of the asymmetric alliance with Japan.[413] As trade relations with the U.S. remained competitive, the U.S. Congress pushed Japan to assume more security burden, and Japan was forced to make necessary adjustments to the security alliance.

Lastly, the 1991 Gulf War served as a turning point for Japanese foreign policy. Humiliation Japan sought from the international community forced Japan to search for its international responsibilities. Japan's "too little, too late" response to the U.S. call for support revealed that that Japan was ill prepared to the demands of international

---

410 Sadaaki Numata, spokesman for the Foreign Ministry announced that, "We are seriously concerned about this because the deployment of missiles by North Korea does affect Japanese security and it also affects peace and stability in Northeast Asia. It also is of serious global concern, in terms of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." WuDunn, Sheryl. "North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory." *New York Times.* September 1, 1998.

411 In fact, North Korea's missile program had been the subject of Japan security policy since the 1990s. Japan's early concern about North Korea's missile program was illustrated by 1995 Diplomatic Blue Book and the 1995 Defense of Japan, White Paper. Both documents claimed that North Korea's missile capability emerged as a major security threat to Japan.

412 Gitting, John. "North Korea fires missile over Japan" *The Guardian*, September 1, 1998.

413 Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. University of Washington Press, 2007, p.3

community and the U.S. As have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, Japan could not provide military support to the U.S.-led coalition effort due to constitutional restriction and normative constraint. When asked to provide support to the international coalition, the Japanese government became paralyzed. Instead of providing direct or indirect military support, Japan ended up only defraying war expenses. Even Japan's total support of $13 billion was the result of the U.S. push for more financial support. After all, even though Japan's financial support was the second largest after the U.S., Japan received little compliments. Instead, the international community derided Japan's support as "checkbook diplomacy." Such experience and recognition of incompetence in responding to external crisis gave Japan a sense of urgency.[414] The Gulf War, in that way provided Japan an opportunity to fundamentally review its foreign policy and make necessary adjustments in its legal system in order to assume more security responsibility.[415]

Implications of Japan's Inclination towards the U.S.

All of these factors draw Japan closer to the U.S. Japan knew that the job of addressing security challenge coming from China and North Korea cannot be done by Japan alone. The U.S. possessed more diplomatic and economic leverage against China and North Korea, so Japan could use its security tie with the U.S. as a counter-weight to them. Therefore, a key part of constraining China and dealing with North Korea was a reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance.[416] More importantly, with this emerging threats, Japan could not risk of being abandoned by the U.S. while the U.S. as the only global superpower was demanding that Japan increase burden sharing. In the post-Cold War era, there was no other power or regional security institutions available that can

---

[414] In a statement at the opening of the 199th session of the Diet, Prime Minister Kaifu confided that "events in the autumn of 1990 as the most severe trial we have faced since the end of the war." Buckley (1995), p. 152.

[415] Purrington (1992).

[416] Kamiya, Matake. "Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia." In Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, (Eds.). *Japanese Foreign Policy Today*. New York: Palgrave, 2000. pp. 237-240.

guarantee Japan's security. Thus, it was in Japan's interest to continue to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Japan's increased reliance on the U.S.-Japan alliance introduced new power dynamics in the region. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the common goal of containing the Soviet threat was disappeared, and the order of East Asian regional became unstable. Geopolitics in East Asia made the relations among the three great powers in the region—U.S., China, and Japan—more complex and intertwined.[417] As Japan and the U.S. improved their bilateral relations, China carefully monitored their moves with fear of being isolated by democratic pro-U.S. block. As the U.S. engaged China economically and politically, then Japan became wary of the bilateral discussions.[418] At the same time, Japan and China had their own relations, mostly economic, and the U.S. had worry about being left out of East Asia, where important economic interest was at stake.

(2) Japan's Security Role Conceptions

Japan's increased security dependence on the U.S. was evidenced by Japan's incremental military role in the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty. After the Gulf War, growing political uncertainty in East Asia and threat perception of China and North Korea led Japan to appreciate the value of tight security ties with the U.S. Japan's renewed emphasis on the U.S. security commitment accompanied the need for more activist security posture and increased roles and missions of the SDF in reciprocal manner. Consequently, Japan grew determined to enhance its defense capability, including power projection capability of the SDF and missile defense system. As the Gulf War experience demonstrated, this was also encouraged by the continued U.S.

---

[417] Pyle, Kenneth B. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. Public Affairs, 2007, pp. 312-13.

[418] As is widely known, when Henry Kissinger secretly visited China in 1971 without notifying Japan, Japan felt betrayed. While Japan under the U.S. pressure opposed China's entry into the United Nations, the U.S. announced a plan for a Sino-U.S. summit talk.

pressure on Japan to assume more security responsibility that stretches beyond cost sharing. Gradually, external pressure that Japan should not confine its contributions to financial area was taken seriously by Japan. Even from within, voices that Japan should expand its security role with the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance emerged. In the following, Japan's post-Cold War effort to redefine its security role in the U.S.-Japan alliance and thus to provide a more robust defense capability in close coordination with U.S. will be reviewed.

Japan as a Normal State

Japan's post-Gulf War effort to redefine its security role was articulated in Ichiro Ozawa's normalization thesis. In his book, *Blue Print for Japan*, Ozawa, split from LDP and leading a political coalition called "Japan New Party," insisted that Japan take more assertive role in international arenas.[419] Ozawa argued Japan needs to rearm in order to participate more actively in the UN peacekeeping activities. For that purpose, he proposed adding another paragraph to Article 9—the no-war clause—of the constitution, which would enable the SDF to deploy its forces overseas for the purpose of international peacekeeping activities.[420] Meanwhile, Ozawa's focus on peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the UN did not necessary mean loosening of the security ties with the U.S. His foreign policy proposals stressed strengthening security ties with the U.S., and he even suggested that Japan end the trade disputes by making necessary concessions. In sum, awakened from humiliation in the Gulf War, he called for legal and military reform to transform Japan into what he called a "normal nation."[421]

---

[419] Ozawa, Ichiro. *Blueprint for a New Japan: the Rethinking of a Nation*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994.

[420] Samuels (2007), p.67.

[421] In a way, one could argue that Japan's policy shift started at the end of the Gulf crisis. Political moves to draw a bill that would enable deployment of the SDF for overseas peacekeeping missions started in 1991. Immediately after the Gulf War, Japan dispatch a SDF unit to the Persian Gulf on a minesweeping mission. The PKO bill (international Peace Cooperation Law) was eventually passed the Diet in June 1992, creating a legal foundation for Japan's subsequent personnel contributions to UN-sponsored peacekeeping in areas such as Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda.

Japan's foreign policymakers began to think Japan could use its increased defense capability as a tool not only for a self-defense but also for international peacekeeping and peace building efforts. The August 1994 "Higuchi Commission" advisory report to the Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa represented Japan's policy shift.[422] After reviewing Japan's basic defense posture, the report concluded that Japan should extricate itself from the passive security policy of the past and play an active role in shaping a new order, and that capability upgrading and organizational improvement should be made accordingly. As major principles of a new security policy, the report emphasized: 1) promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale, 2) enhancement of the functions of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, and 3) possession of a highly reliable and efficient defense capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability. Notwithstanding its focus on multilateralism, the report was hardly a call for independent security policy from the U.S. The report stressed that close and broad cooperation between Japan and the U.S. is essential in making multilateral security cooperation effective. In sum, what the report suggested was multilateral cooperation centering on the U.S.

The Reinvigoration of the Alliance and the Institutionalization of Japan's Expanded Security Role

If the 1995 Nye Report was the recognition of renewed importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance by Washington, the 1995 National Defense Program Guideline (1995 Guideline) was Tokyo's recognition of the significance of the bilateral alliance in the post-Cold War era. Japan's security policy shift to increased multilateral cooperation centering on the U.S. was clearly reflected in the guideline. The role of Japan's defense capability was redefined. The guideline expanded the role of the SDF from the exclusive national defense to increased commitment to regional and global security concerns.

[422] Advisory Group on Defense Issues. The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century. Tokyo: Advisory Group on Defense Issues, 1994.

Besides national defense, the guideline specified in chapter III that the role of Japan's defense capability should include contribution to the creation of a more stable security environment though participation in international peace cooperation activities. In response to regional security challenges, the guideline stated:

> Should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan, which will have an important influence on national peace and security, take appropriate response in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations, for example, by properly supporting the UN activities when needed and by ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.[423]

At the same time, the guideline reaffirmed the security partnership with the U.S. is indispensable not only to Japan's security but also to regional peace and stability. In order to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, the guideline stressed, "it is necessary to make efforts 1) to promote exchange of information and policy consultation, 2) to establish an effective posture for cooperation in operational areas, 3) to enhance broad mutual exchange in the areas of equipment and technology, and 4) to implement various measures to facilitate smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan."[424] This was Japan's affirmation that its expanded security role would be played out in close coordination with the U.S.

Based on this extensive security policy review by each government, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and President Clinton issued a joint statement on 17 April 1996. They stressed the significant value of the alliance between two countries. Prime Minister Ryutaro confirmed that Japanese defense capabilities in the post-Cold War era would play appropriate roles that are commensurate with its power as stated in the 1995 National Defense Program Outline. He also stressed that the U.S. deterrence remained the security guarantor for Japan. For its part, President Clinton convinced Japan of the

---

[423] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *National Defense Program Outline in December 1995*. National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996, 1995. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/defense96/index.html>.

[424] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1995), Section I (Purpose).

U.S. security commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to regional stability. In order to meet that commitment, he noted that about 100,000 U.S. military personnel would be maintained in East Asia. In order to enhance the credibility of their bilateral security relations, two leaders agreed to undertake efforts in the following areas: 1) continued close consultation on defense policies and military posture, 2) review of the 1978 Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in view of the changes in the post-Cold War environment, 3) mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, 4) preventing proliferation of WMDs, and 5) cooperation on ballistic missile defense.[425]

Based on the joint declaration, in September 1997 the U.S. and Japan through extensive consultations completed a new guideline for defense cooperation that reflected dramatically altered security environment of the post-Cold War era, replacing the original Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation signed in 1978.[426] The new guideline suggested three basic categories of defense cooperation: 1) under normal circumstances, 2) in case of an armed attack against Japan, and 3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. What was notable about the new guideline was that the U.S. and Japan, giving a large portion of the guideline, placed a special emphasis on the need for close and dense coordination "in situations around" Japan that would have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. While the 1997 guidelines' section on cooperation in areas surrounding Japan and vague and tentative, the new guidelines specified the cooperation in three subcategories: 1) cooperation in activities initiated by either government, 2) Japan's support for U.S. forces' activities, and 3) U.S.-Japan operational cooperation.[427]

---

[425] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century." April 17, 1996. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/security/security.html>.

[426] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." September 1997. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>.

[427] The first category (Cooperation in activities initiated by either government) included relief activities, search and rescue missions, and evacuation operations. The second category (Japan's support for U.S. forces' activities) referred to provision of Japanese facilities and rear area support (supply, transportation, and maintenance). The third category (U.S.-Japan operational cooperation) comprised measures to ensure safe navigation in territorial waters and air space and mutual exchange of security-related information.

In order to authorize the SDF to conduct missions indicated in the new guidelines, relevant legislation was needed. In April 1998, the Japanese government submitted related bills to the Diet. In 2000, the Diet enacted the bills, which would underlie a legal basis of military cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.[428] The significance of this change was that Japan substituted the exclusive defense security policy, which had underlain the post-war Japanese security posture, with a more active defense policy.[429]

The Armitage Report, issued on Issued on October 11, 2000 represented American needs to redefine bilateral security relations and reaffirm its commitment to Japan's security.[430] Welcoming Japan's increasing activism, the report suggested Japan make further efforts in order to meet new regional and global security challenges. The report noted:

> *Japan's prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation*. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. *But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner*.[431]

For its part, the report claimed, the U.S. should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, and facilitate a greater two-way flow of defense technology. In addition, the report, referring to the prolonged economic recession and

---

[428] The Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.

[429] Park, Cheol Hee. "From Exclusive Defense to Active Defense: Changes in US-Japan Alliance, threat Perception and the Politics of Japanese Defense Policy Change." *Korean Journal of International Relations,* 44-1 (2004): 169-190.

[430] Armitage, Richard, and Joseph Nye. "The United States and Japan: advancing toward a mature partnership." *INSS Special Report,* 11 (2000). The Report was prepared by a study group under the leadership of Richard Armitage, former Defense Department official. The group consisted of prominent figures such as Kurt Campbell, Michael Green, James A. Kelly, Joseph Nye, Paul Wolfowitz, and so on. Richard Armitage was later appointed as Deputy Secretary of State by the President Bush.

[431] Armitage et al. (2000), p.3.

stagnation of Japan, suggested that "an economically healthy Japan is essential to a thriving bilateral partnership."[432] The U.S. government should, the report indicated, encourage Japan to introduce reforms which would facilitate its economic recovery.

Prime Minister Koizumi and the Revival of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Following on the series of bilateral defense negotiations to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance during the 1990s, the U.S. maintained strong commitment to the defense of Japan, and Japan was gradually taking on regional and global security roles centering on the mutual security alliance. Koizumi gave the priority to restoring the relations with the U.S. after sour experiences of trade wars.

The newly elected Prime Minister Koizumi visited the U.S. in June 2001 and established a trusting relationship with President Bush. Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush announced the "Partnership for Security and Prosperity." In the document, two leaders reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan would be the cornerstone of pace in the Asia-Pacific region and that they would intensify security consultations to implement the Defense Guidelines.[433] In addition, at the ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the U.S-Japan security treaty, the two countries described each other as "indispensable partners."[434] The Japanese officials commented that once Koizumi came into office, the U.S.-Japan relations had been supported by strong trust at the highest level and the close personal tie helped ease tensions arising from trade

---

[432] Ibid, p.5.

[433] Office of the Press Secretary. "Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi." The White House, June 30, 2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/2001/06/20010630.html>.

[434] Visiting Washington in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Minister for Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka stated, "Peace is not without cost, but the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the United States, will continue to be as sensitive as possible to those concerns. Although the Cold War is over, uncertainty and instability persist in the Asia Pacific region. The need for effective deterrence remains undiminished." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka at the Ceremony in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty." September 8, 2001. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/fmv0109/010908-2.html>.

disputes.[435] For Washington, Koizumi's reaffirmation of taking more security role and implementing economic reform measures helped relieve fears that Japan might be reluctant to be a pro-active alliance partner.

Japan's Military Build-Up

Japan's policy shift towards proactive security was underpinned by continued military build-up of the Japanese defense forces. After the end of the Gulf War, Japan had made rapid progress in terms of its operational capability centered on the U.S.-Japan alliance. First of all, Japan made steady and significant progress in building a robust military force despite legal constraints on the expansion of the SDFs. While the SDFs underwent a quantitative build-down of its traditional capability, the SDFs through Mid-Term Defense Programs, continued to upgrade its military capabilities, acquiring significant firepower and high sophisticated weapons systems.[436] In order to implement military modernization, the defense budged during the 1990s, and to the early 2000s, remained stable around 6% of the total government expenditure despite the 1% ceiling of GNP. Since 2000, Japan's force build-up shifted its focus on force projection capability, completion of which would enable Japan to be ready for its security role in "areas surrounding Japan" in concert with the U.S.[437] At the same time, Japan, spurred by North Korea's missile threat, stepped up cooperation with the U.S. on missile defense. Conclusively, in 2003, Japan announced plans for BMD system consisting of Aegis-based defense system and interceptor missile.

---

[435] Yoshida, Reiju. "Koizumi-Bush friendship one for the ages." *The Japan Times*. 29 June 2006.

[436] For Japan's post-Cold War military build-up, see Hughes, Christopher. *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*. No. 368-369. Routledge, 2013, pp.67-96.

[437] Samuels, Richard J. ""New Fighting Power!" Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security." *International Security*, 32-3 (2008): 84-112.

(3) Summary

The shameful experience in the Gulf War provided Japan an opportunity to redefine its role in the U.S.-Japan security relations. Japanese policymakers tried to restore strained relations with the U.S., and lasting uncertainty in the region and potential threat from China and North Korea drew Japan closer to the U.S. Shifting away from the traditional stance of finding refugee behind domestic legal and normative constraints, Japanese policymakers suggested that Japan with its economic and military power can play an active role in addressing new regional and global security challenges. Ozawa's normal state argument and 1994 Higuchi report were an expression of willingness to take more assertive role in international arenas.

In that way, the U.S. and Japan in close coordination realigned their security arrangements in order to adjust to the post-Cold War security environment. Roughly speaking, the process of realigning the U.S.-Japan security alliance went through the three stages. First, the two countries had to identify common security goals and interests. Then, the two countries reviewed security policy, military capability, and respective security roles. Lastly, based on the assessment, the U.S. and Japan realigned its defense policy and force posture and redefined security roles in the alliance in order to achieve the common security goals. In that regard, the 1996 U.S.-Japan joint declaration on security alliance and the 1997 Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation through Security Consultative Committee were the product of the security realignment between the U.S. and Japan in the post-Cold War era.

The U.S. policymakers welcomed Japan's increasing activism, but at the same time, they wanted to make sure that Japan's expanded security role conception would be played out in close coordination with the U.S. The 1996 Joint Declaration and new guidelines for defense cooperation established institutional foundation in which Japan can contribute to regional security in close coordination with the U.S. As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance had been transformed from one exclusively oriented toward defense of Japan to one committed to regional security as well. In that way, Japan's security role

was gradually transformed from a rear base for U.S. military operations in the region to that of active participant in the regional balance of forces.[438]

Table 20. Japan's Alliance Role Conceptions

Role Type	Description
More equal alliance partner	Ally that plays a proactive role in common security efforts with the U.S. by upgrading defense capability, sharing security burdens, and providing complementary forces in close coordination.
Regional-subsystem collaborator	Ally that displays far-reaching commitments that go beyond financial contributions to cooperative security efforts with the U.S. in promoting and protecting peace and stability in the region

Japan's new security role conceptions are summarized in <Table 20>. After a brief drift, Japan again gravitated towards the U.S and envisaged a proactive role in the alliance. Japanese policymakers assumed the role of *more equal alliance partner* and *regional-subsystem collaborator*. Breaking away from the traditional security role, Japan's foreign policy gradually shifted from exclusive defense to active defense. Japan began to transform itself from an "economic giant and political pygmy" to a "normal and proactive actor" in the international arena, whose role is firmly anchored in the U.S.-Japan alliance. If the security agreements made during the 1990s were the affirmation of mutual security commitment, the U.S. call for support in the wake of the 9/11 attacks put Japan's security role conceptions vis-à-vis the U.S. to the test.

[438] Smith, Sheila A. "The evolution of military cooperation in the US-Japan alliance." In Michael Green and Patrick Cronin (Eds.). *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations (1999): 69-93.

CHAPTER VI. 2003 IRAQ WAR AND ALLIANCE ROLE PERFORMANCES

1. Iraq War and Coalition Burden Sharing

(1) Overview

Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. became determined to respond to the attack with military forces against terrorists and any countries or groups which supported them. The first response was the war in Afghanistan to hunt Osama Bin Laden, the prime suspect of the 9/11 attacks. Afghanistan was a haven for the terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda, headed by Bin Laden. The U.S. accused the Taliban, the ruling power in Afghanistan, of protecting Bin Laden and requested the Taliban to extradite him. However, as the Taliban requested evidence to prove that Al-Qaeda involved with the 9/11, the U.S. rejected the Taliban's requests for negotiations and initiated military actions.[439]

Following retaliatory air strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan, President Bush argued that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and his support for terrorist groups made disarming Saddam Hussein's regime a number one security priority. On 8 November 2002, UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441, which mandated Iraq to admit UN weapon inspectors into the country. Iraq appeared to comply with the resolution; however, when the verification was still in process, Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair accused Saddam Hussein of hindering UN inspections and possessing nuclear weapons and cruise missile. Seeking no further UN resolution, Bush on 17 March 2003 issued an ultimatum to Iraq, giving 48 hours to surrender.[440]

---

439 "Bush rejects Taliban offer to hand Bin Laden over." *The Guardian*. October 14, 2001.

440 The Library of Congress. "Iraq overview." Library of Congress Web Archives. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/lcwa/html/iraq/iraq-overview.html>.

On 20 March 2003, the U.S. initiated military action against Iraq in order to "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."[441] The U.S. invasion into Iraq signaled the start of the long conflict later known as the Iraq War, which lasted until December 2011 when the U.S. completed its withdrawal of forces. The war was an armed conflict that consisted of two phases. The first was brief, offensive war fought between March and April 2003. The multinational forces mainly consisted of combat units from the U.S., U.K. Australia, and Poland invaded Iraqi and toppled down the government of Saddam Hussein. Bush declared an end to major combat operation on 1 May 2003.

(2) The Formation of the International Coalition

The collapse of the Saddam's regime followed by the second phase of war. During the 2nd phase, the U.S. formed multinational coalition forces to help the newly formed Iraqi government secure stability and democracy in Iraq. As the war continued, the U.S.-led coalition forces faced fierce insurgency opposing the occupying forces. The U.S. responded with surge of troops in Iraq. Reportedly, the U.S. at one time had deployed more than 170,000 troops in Iraq.[442] As Iraqi forces began to assume responsibility for security and public opinion favored troop withdrawals, members of coalition gradually pulled out their forces. In December 2011, after eight years of struggle, the U.S. completely withdrew its forces from Iraq.

The U.S. established a multinational coalition to disarm Iraq and mobilized supports from countries around the world. On March 27, 2003 President Bush announced that 49 countries were committed to the coalition and the number were still growing.[443] Contributions from member states ranged from direct military support, logistical and

---

[441] Office of the Press Secretary. "President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom." March 22, 2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html>.

[442] O'Hanlon, Michael E., Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, and Ian S. Livingston. *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*. Brookings Institution, 2007, p. 28.

[443] Office of the Press Secretary. "Coalition Members." March 27, 2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html>.

transportation support, to humanitarian and reconstruction aid. As of March 2003, total U.S. troops deployed in Iraq was 150,000, and the number of other coalition forces was about 23,000, constituting 24% of total troops in Iraq. Between December 2003 and May 2007, 39 countries made troop commitments to the U.S. efforts in Iraq. As of May 2007, 25 coalition nations were contributing about 12,600 troops, which constituted 12.6% of the total multinational forces in Iraq.[444] Beside force commitment, international donors met in Madrid in October 2003 to make monetary assistance for the U.S.-led coalition and reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure. The coalition members with the highest amount of financial pledges are listed below.

Table 21. Top 10 Countries with Financial Pledges to the U.S.-led Coalition

Country	Amount pledged as of December 2003 (millions of $)
U.S.	18,600
Japan	5,000
U.K.	847
Kuwait	500
Saudi Arabia	500
Spain	300
South Korea	260
Canada	244
European Union	233
UAE	215

Source: O'Hanlon, Michael E., Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, and Ian S. Livingston.*Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*. Brookings Institution, 2003, p. 12.

[444] US Government Accountability Office. "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments." Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington D.C. (May 9, 2007), pp. 1-5.

2. South Korea's Role Performance and the U.S. Response

South Korea provided a significant level of support for the U.S. war on terrorism in two phases. The first phase (November 2002 - March 2003) involved the deployment of medical and engineering units. The second phase (September 2003 - March 2004) of coalition support involved the dispatch of some 3,000 troops in response to the U.S. request for additional support for stabilizing and reconstructing operations. The size of South Korea's troop dispatch was the second largest after the British. South Korea's financial contribution was also significant. South Korea offered approximately $270 million through UN organizations and the U.S.[445] Despite South Korea's troop commitment and financial support, the U.S. policymakers did not fully appreciate South Korea's contribution. What used to be the best relation abruptly turned into the worst in a short period. Mutual repugnance was intensified enough to threaten the continuation of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

(1) 1st Deployment (November 2002 - March 2003)

Initial Response

While the U.S. was building an international coalition and gearing up for a war against Iraq through 2002 and early 2003, the Korean government remained cautious. South Korea's early strategy in its approach to the Iraq War was to walk the diplomatic fine line. On the one hand, South Korea, as a traditional ally of the U.S., had to condemn Saddam's alleged production of WMDs and support the U.S. coalition effort. On the other hand, however, South Korea did not want to be involved in military engagement with Arab oil suppliers. South Korea relied on the Middle East for oil imports, and the

[445] United States Department of State. "Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction." Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (July 2008).

region had emerged as important market for Korean firms. In addition, diplomatic neutrality was deemed necessary in order to avoid domestic backlash flamed by growing anti-American sentiment among the Korean public.

When the prospect of a war in Iraq began to emerge, President Kim Dae-Jung's administration tried to maintain neutral stance on the U.S. war efforts. When President Bush made a speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002, accusing Iraq of developing WMDs, the Korea government remained calm and did not respond to it. South Korea's strategy was to buy time and not to reveal its stance on Iraq until necessary. Domestically, anti-Americanism was sparked by the tragic death of two Korean middle school girls by a U.S. military vehicle in June 2002.[446] Internationally, there seemed to be no consensus on how to deal with Iraq. The combination of both domestic and international circumstances forced the Korean government to refrain from actively supporting U.S. policy in Iraq. Faced with such pressure, the Korean government favored the idea of U.S. getting international legitimacy through UN over unilateral action. Yet, Korea's policymakers figured that at the end of the day the support for the U.S. would be inevitable. President Kim expressed his support for the U.S. efforts to gain a UN resolution on Iraq as an alternative to rely on the use of force.

Preference for multilateral approach in solving the Iraq problem was largely shared by the leaders of other countries as well. President Kim and leaders attending the 4th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) held in Copenhagen, Demark in September 2002 called for their support for a multilateral approach through UN in dealing with Iraq's WMD programs.[447] Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, who chaired the ASEM summit, told that "We stress the needs of a multilateral approach to the Iraq problem and we fully support the work undertaken by the UN secretary general and the Security Council to deal with the Iraq issue."[448]

---

[446] Moon, Chung-in. "Changing South Korean perception of the United States since September 11." *Asian Studies*, 50 (2004): 45-57.

[447] ASEM member states include the 15 European Union member states and 10 Asian countries—Japan, China, South Korea, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

[448] "Asia, Europe agree on multilateral approach to Iraq." *Kodo News International*. September 23, 2002.

U.S. Call for Support and South Korea's Response

On 8 November 2002, UNSC unanimously passed the resolution 1441 to give Iraq a final opportunity to follow disarmament.[449] After that, the U.S. asked South Korea and some 50 other nations around the world of their intentions of support. Allegedly, on 20 November 2002, the U.S. sent the first request to Seoul through the U.S. Ambassador, which included humanitarian support, post-war reconstruction, logistical support, equipment, mine sweeping, combat service support, and etc.[450] In December 2002, Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, visited Seoul and discussed Iraq issues with President Kim.[451] Armitage's visit was regarded as a U.S. diplomatic offensive to elicit South Korea's support for Washington's possible military action against Iraq.

At that time, Armitage's visit might have put the Korean government in tough position because of nuclear crisis in North Korea and rising anti-American mood. In October 2002, James Kelly, assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs visited and confronted Pyongyang with evidence that North Korea was operating a covert uranium-enrichment program. On 12 October 2002, the U.S. State Department announced that North Korea acknowledged secret nuclear weapons program. In response, North Korea in December 2002 removed seals and surveillance equipment from nuclear reactor located in Yongbyon and expelled IAEA inspectors.

As official request from the U.S. came, the Korean government gradually leaned toward provision of support, overcoming ambivalent attitude toward U.S. effort. Allegedly, on 27 December 2002, the Korean government delivered its intention through U.S. Embassy in Korea to deploy a military engineering unit to Iraq. In February 2003, the outgoing President Kim made it clear that South Korea would provide support if necessary. On 10 February, Prime Minister Kim Suk-Soo during an interpellation session

---

449 The U.S., U.K., and other members of the coalition of the willing declared that Iraq was still in violation of the resolution 687. Efforts aimed at a new resolution authorizing the invasion that was aborted owing to resistance from other members of the Security Council including veto-wielding members.

450 Ministry of National Defense. *Participatory Government: Defense Policy*. Seoul, 2003, p. 216.

451 "US Seeks Asian Support on Iraq." *BBC NEWS*. 9 December 2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2556843.stm>.

at the National Assembly suggested that if a war would occur, South Korea could send non-combatant troops to Iraq and the force level would be similar to the deployment to East Timor.[452]

At the continued request from the U.S., the President Roh Moo-Hyun, newly sworn in on 25 February 2003, succeeded the President Kim's position. The request was even delivered to the newly elected Roh administration on the president's inauguration day by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on February 25, 2003.[453] At that time, the U.S. policymakers were expecting South Korea to assist the U.S. with its forces, carrying out humanitarian mission and helping to train Iraqi security forces.[454] On March 10, Washington delivered the second official request with the form of non-paper through U.S. Embassy in Korea. The U.S. official request included the following: 1) military support including infantry and engineering unit, 2) sending specialists on WMD and explosive ordnance disposal, 3) units capable of decontamination after CBR attacks 4) medical and humanitarian support.[455] In principle, Blue House accepted the U.S. request to assist U.S. war effort. After Ra Jong-Il, National Security Adviser, briefed U.S. request during a meeting with senior presidential staff in March, the Roh administration began to discuss its assistance options for a war in Iraq.[456] Meanwhile, on March 13, the U.S. and U.K gave up demands for additional UNSCR to authorize the use of force. On

---

[452] "Participation of non-combat units in the War in Iraq." *Hankook-Ilbo*. March 21, 2003.

[453] Secretary Powell reported that he somehow relieved discord in the relationship with the President Roh, but he failed to win any visible pledges of support for U.S. military action in Iraq or U.S. hard-line policy towards North Korea's nuclear program. Struck, Doug. "Powell Makes Few Gains on Asia Tour; Secretary Unable to Win Pledges of Support on North Korea, Iraq." *The Washington Post*, February 25, 2003.

[454] Expecting South Korean and Japan to show active response, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice harbored that "It was deeply offensive to those countries [South Korea and Japan] to see their contributions ridiculed by others as insignificant, and it was annoying to us that the military action against Saddam was dubbed unilateral." Rice, Condoleezza. *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*. Random House LLC, 2011, p. 204.

[455] March 10, 2003. National Security Adviser Ra Jong-il, during a chief secretary meeting presided by the President Roh, made public that the U.S. requested South Korea's troop commitment to U.S. efforts in Iraq. "U.S. calls for South Korea's support in Iraq, the government considering deployment of non-combat units." *Hangyeong Press*, March 10, 2003.

[456] "Korea yet to Decide Level of Support for U.S.-Led War with Iraq." *Yonhap News Agency*, March 13, 2003.

18 March, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell declared that all diplomatic efforts to resolve Iraq crisis ended to no avail, and President Bush gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to leave Iraq in 48 hours.[457] The U.S. initiated an offensive military operation against Iraq on 20 March.

The Roh administration attempted to maintain a neutral position, but mounting pressure from the U.S. and increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula over North Korea's secret nuclear program compelled the newly elected liberal government to support the U.S. war effort. During the presidential campaign, Roh gained reputation with a pledge of assertiveness against the asymmetric alliance relations with the U.S., and Roh's victory reflected growing public anger against the U.S. military presence and aggressive U.S. policy regarding North Korea. However, the Roh administration acknowledged that national security interest would be better served by fulfilling alliance duty.

South Korea's Effort to Soften U.S. Stance against Pyongyang

In its approach to the U.S.-led coalition support, the Roh administration was more concerned with North Korea's renewed nuclear crisis and, more importantly, hawkish U.S. policy. As we have discussed, President Roh succeeded predecessor's policy of engagement with North Korea and strived to improve inter-Korean relations. In dealing with North Korea's nuclear crisis, the Roh administration worked hard to find a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Roh administration judged its major threat to its security is a possible war on the Korean peninsula or sudden regime collapse, rather than North Korea's secret uranium enrichment program. Therefore, easing tensions between Washington and Pyongyang and preventing Washington from resorting to the use of force was the top priority for the Roh administration.[458] While military attack against

---

[457] DePalma, Anthony. "Threats and Responses: An Overview: March 17, 2003; Diplomatic Impasse, a U.S. Ultimatum to Iraq, and Civilian Fears." *New York Times*. March 18, 2003.

[458] Sheen, Seongho. "Grudging Partner: South Korea." *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 30-2 (2003): 96-103.

Iraq became inevitable and imminent, the Bush administration's uncompromising stance against Pyongyang, for the fledging Roh administration, was more worrisome because it might trigger a war between the U.S. and North Korea. Indeed, as North Korea's nuclear crisis continued, worries of possible preemptive attack by the U.S. against nuclear facilities in Yongbyon spread out.[459]

Under these circumstances, the Roh administration's final decision to join the Iraq War coalition was made to soften U.S. hardline stance against Pyongyang.[460] Initially, President Roh attempted to maintain distance, but at the repeated requests from Washington, the Roh administration reversed its policy toward the U.S. and began to acquiesce to the U.S. call for support. President Roh's chief aide, Ryu In-Tae told civil leaders that the military participation in Iraq is imperative to prove alliance commitment and thereby gain leverage against the U.S. over North Korean nuclear policy.[461]

President Roh himself affirmed that providing military support to the U.S. in accordance to mutual security treaty is necessary to gain influence on U.S. policy towards Pyongyang and find diplomatic solution to North Korean nuclear crisis. The Korean government grew determined to help the U.S. when it was signaling a desperate call for support. President Roh framed the assistance as a means to soften U.S. stance again North Korea, and the strategy seemed to work in the spring of 2003. In his speech to the National Assembly delivered on April 2, 2003, President Roh stressed that the troop dispatch was necessary to repair damaged ROK-U.S. relations and that rather than confronting the U.S. on the issue of legitimacy of attacking Iraq, showing cooperative effort would contribute to the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.[462] On 2 April

---

[459] Many in South Korea even thought that North Korea's bid for nuclear weapons was spurred by the Bush administration's hard-line policy towards Pyongyang. Lee, S. J. "Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean Attitudes." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 17-1 (2005): 81-104.

[460] Lee, G. Geunwook. "South Korea's Faustian attitude: the republic of Korea's decision to send troops to Iraq revisited." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19-3 (2006): 481-493.

[461] French, Howard W. "A Nation at War: The Asian Arena; South Korea Agrees to Send Troops to Iraq." *New York Times*, April 3, 2003.

[462] Government Information Agency. "President Rho Moo-Hyun's Speech at the National Assembly, April 2, 2003." Archive of the Participatory Government, 2008, pp. 279-280. Yet, by claiming that South Korea should choose the ROK-U.S. alliance instead of the moral high ground, the speech implied that the U.S.

2003, the National Assembly passed a bill to deploy Korean forces to Iraq with 179 votes in favor and 68 against.

After the bill was passed, the first troop deployment to Iraq was made. On April 30, 2003, nearly a month later after the war started, a small contingent of 600 medical personnel—the 320th Medical Assistance "Jema" Unit—and military engineers—the 1100th Construction Engineer "Seoheui" Unit—were sent out to Iraq in support of U.S.-led coalition. Located in Nassiriya, predominantly Shia areas about 350 km South of Baghdad, Seoheui and Jema units provided construction and medical support.[463] On 1 May 2003, President Bush made the historic "Mission Accomplished Speech," signaling that the U.S. had completed major combat activity and was moving into a stabilization and reconstruction period.[464] In order to assist post-war reconstruction effort in Iraq, South Korea sent additional 300 personnel of military engineering unit. The additional dispatch arrived in Iraq in mid-May 2003.

(2) 2nd Deployment (September 2003 - March 2004)

While President Bush declared victory and vowed to search for WMDs, the search had been largely unsuccessful. More importantly, in the ensuing stabilization effort after occupation of Iraq, U.S-led coalition faced strong militant Iraqi insurgency, which caused massive American casualties. For the U.S., the reconstruction of Iraq was slow and expensive, much more than it expected. The situation forced the Bush administration to solicit additional coalition support from its allies and partners.

U.S. Calls for Additional Support and South Korea's Operation Linkage

---

had gone to war for the wrong cause, displeasing the Bush administration. Funabashi, Yoichi. *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*. Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p. 230.

463 Ministry of National Defense (2003), p. 107.

464 "Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan" *CNN*, May 1, 2003. <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/central/05/01/afghan.combat/>.

While stories of possible U.S. request and supplementary troop dispatch by the Korean government were being reported since July 2003,[465] the official U.S. request for additional support came in September 2003. Visiting Seoul for the 4th Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) talks, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz delivered U.S. request for assistance to Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan.[466] The U.S. requested additional military contingent unit to Iraq, and Foreign Minister Yoon replied that the Korean government would oblige with additional support.[467] On September 4, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless and U.S. Ambassador to Korea Thomas C. Hubbard visited Blue House and requested Foreign Minister Yoon and Chief Security Advisor Ban Ki-Moon to support the U.S. with a sizable troops.[468] Allegedly, they pushed South Korea to make a division-level military deployment capable of independent and sustainable combat operations, which amounts to approximately 5,000 to 7,000 personnel.[469]

The U.S. aggressively attempted to garner additional economic and military assistance both at home and internationally. On September 7, 2003 President Bush addressed the nation. The goal in Iraq, he stressed, was to build a decent and democratic society, and the job would take time and require sacrifice. "Yet we will do what is necessary," he said, "we will spend what is necessary to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote freedom and to make our own nation more secure."[470] In

---

[465] Schmitt, Eric. "After the War: Peacekeeping; Up to 30,000 Troops from a Dozen Nations to Replace Some G.I.'s in Iraq." *New York Times*, June 19, 2003.

[466] Lee (2006), p. 269. South Korea and the U.S. agreed to establish FOTA at the 34th SCM held in December 2002 out of mutual consent to strengthen their alliance by developing additional institutions for addressing global challenges. Major issues of concern were 1) North Korea's nuclear program and 2) diverging strategic interest complicated by societal change in South Korea. Kwak, Kwang Sub. *US-ROK Alliance, 1953-2004*. Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 2006, p. 211.

[467] Hong, Kyudok. "The impact of NGOs on South Korea's decision to dispatch troops to Iraq." *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 12-2 (2005), p. 31.

[468] Government Information Agency (2008), p. 229.

[469] Kim, Jong-Dae. *Rohmoohyun, Sidaeui Moontukeul Neomda [Roh Moo-Hyun, Crossing the Threshold of the Age]*. Seoul: Tree and Wood, 2010, pp. 118-26.

[470] "President Bush Addresses the Nation." *PBS*. < http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house-july-

the address, he laid out a plan to submit to the Congress a request for $87 billion. In two weeks, President Bush called for international support at the UN. In an address to the UN General Assembly, he stressed that the primary goal of Iraq coalition is to build self-government for the Iraqi people and that nations should stand together in rooting out terrorism and promoting democracy.[471]

As additional military support seemed inevitable in the face of strong request from Washington, the Korean government attempted to use the troop dispatch as a means to induce the U.S. to take a more flexible stance on the North Korean nuclear issue. Although head officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were skeptical about the linkage, the Roh administration, in particular the National Security Council, pushed the idea, calling it a presidential directive. On September 26, Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, in a meeting with Secretary of State Powell, proposed to link the troop dispatch with the U.S. policy toward North Korea. Admittedly, Foreign Minister Yoon told Powell that President Roh "would not consider sending any troops to aid in Iraq unless the United States gave ground on North Korea," and Powell became extremely angry and said, "This not how allies deal with each other."[472] Policy makers of the U.S. were infuriated about South Korea's Operation Linkage.[473]

After United Nations endorsed the international military presence in Iraq, the Korean government took advantage of it and pledged additional support. On 16 October 2003, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1511, which authorized a longer temporary occupation of Iraq.[474] The Council also urged states to contribute to international coalition to maintain security and return order.[475] Two days later after the

---

dec03-bush_iraq_speech/>.

[471] United Nation. "Statement by His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush, President of the United States of America Address to the United Nations General Assembly." September 23, 2003. <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/usaeng030923.htm>.

[472] Sanger, David. "Intelligence Puzzle: North Korean Bombs." *New York Times*, October 14, 2003.

[473] Funabashi (2007), pp. 230-32.

[474] In discussions, Council members were given with a choice between ending the occupation and approving temporary occupation of Iraq by multinational forces. They chose the latter option, but insisted power to be returned to the Iraqi people as soon as possible.

[475] U.N. Security Council, "Acting Unanimously, Calls for Power to be Returned to Iraqi People 'As soon

UN passed the resolution, the Roh administration announced that South Korea would sent additional forces without specifying number or character of troops. On 18 October 2003, the Korean government laid out policy guideline for additional troop dispatch. First, South Korea would provide more troops to bolster U.S. efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq. Second, the government would decide on the size, composition, and timing of the troop deployment after carefully considering U.S. request, the Korea military's capability, and public opinion. Third, in order to examine security environment in Iraq, South Korea would send a research group to Iraq.[476] On 20 October 2003, during APEC summit in Bangkok, Thailand, President Bush and President Roh held a summit meeting. President Roh explained that after considering comprehensive review of the Iraq situation, the importance of the ROK-US alliance, and Korea's national interest the Korean government had decided to send additional troops to contribute to stability and reconstruction in Iraq.[477] President Bush, in return, expressed his gratitude to President Roh for providing additional support.[478] When asked about the mission and scale of

as Practicable.'" October 18, 2003. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7898.doc.htm>.

[476] President Roh was buoyed by the polls that showed that while the vast majority of South Koreans opposed troop dispatch without U.N. support, 70 percent of the people supported the idea with U.N. backing. "South Korea Pledges More Troops for Iraq," *Washington Post*. 18 October 2003.

[477] Without specifying specific numbers and character of the deployment, President Roh stated that he needed more time to make such an important decision. Right after the summit meeting, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice remarked, "The President was able to thank President Roh for the commitment that South Korea has made, in principle, to help with troops for Iraq. It is a matter that they will discuss over the next period of time as to exactly what composition or what the nature of those forces have been — will be, but the President reiterated his agreement in principle that South Korea should be very involved in the reconstruction of Iraq. Of course, the South Koreans have also committed financial resources of $200 million over the next three years to Iraqi reconstruction." White House Archives. "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice on the President's Bilateral Meetings." JW Marriott. Bangkok, Thailand. October 20, 2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031020-1.html>.

[478] President Bush also stated that the U.S. has no intention of conducting preemptive strike against North Korea and that the U.S. expects North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. U.S. Government Printing Office. "Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea." White House, Washington DC. October 20, 2003. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1364.pdf>.

reinforcements, Bush replied, "The more you can dispatch, the more appreciative we will be."[479]

Rupture in Negotiation and South Korea's Growing Demand for Self-Reliance

As the Roh administration was determined to place cap on the number of troop dispatch through internal discussions with NSC, South Korea's deployment plan failed to meet expectations of Washington. The U.S. requested South Korea to commit a brigade or division level of forces which is capable of conducting sustainable and independent stabilization operations. In early November 2003, the Roh administration sent the Korean delegations for negotiations with U.S. defense officials on the additional troop deployment. The delegations led by Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-Hyuk met U.S. officials—Richard Armitage Deputy Secretary of State, Paul Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of State, James Kelly Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Stephen Hadley Deputy National Security Advisor—and outlined South Korea's plan for the deployment. However, the meetings failed to reduce the gap between U.S. demand and South Korea's support.[480] In a meeting at the Department of Defense, for example, Lee Soo-Hyuk proposed a plan to send 500 to 1,000 troops. At such a small figure, a U.S. senior official said that "we thought we had misheard Lee."[481]

The two parties maintained different stance on every aspects of troop deployment—size, character, timing, and location. First, the U.S. requested Seoul to make a division-level deployment; the Roh administration, however, pledged no more than 3,000 personnel, consist mainly of non-combat units to provide reconstruction and humanitarian support rather than public security or counter-insurgency operation that U.S. desperately needed as situations in Iraq got worse. Second, while the U.S. requested the second deployment to be made in the early 2004, South Korea wished it to be made after April 2004, considering upcoming national election. Third, the U.S. wanted the

---

[479] Fubanashi (2007), p. 234.
[480] "ROK-US, second day of negotiation over military participation." *Yonhap News*, November 7, 2003.
[481] Fubanashi (2007), p. 236.

Korean forces to be deployed to Mosul, a large city in Northern Iraq, to replace the U.S. 101 Airborne Division.[482] However, the Roh administration, for fear of potential casualty and domestic backlash that would ensue, opted to send the troops to a place where security condition is relatively stable.[483] The delegation came back without any result.

The U.S. and South Korean defense chiefs got together in Seoul and discussed cooperation in Iraq in the 35th Security Consultative Meeting. On 17 November 2003, Minister of National Defense Cho Young-Gil and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a joint statement. The two defense chiefs agreed on the need to assist Iraqi people to rebuild their nations based on democratic principle. Defense Minister Cho vowed to provide additional forces to Iraq. Yet, he made it clear that troops would not exceed 3,000 and that the major task of the Korean unit would be confined to reconstruction effort. In addition, South Korea pledged to offer $260 million for Iraq reconstruction. Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his appreciation for South Korea's support, repeating that it is up to each sovereign nation to decide on the level of military assistance. However, he was disappointed and complained to General LaPorte, Commander of the USFK, saying "How can South Korea just send 3,000?"[484]

Although the Roh administration committed to the provision of additional support, the ratification and actual deployment had been delayed because of division of opinions among people and between government departments. After two South Korean engineers died in Iraq in late November 2002, public opinion was divided. There had been public demonstrations for both and against the troop deployment. Progressive supporters who were sympathetic to the idea of gaining independence from U.S. opposed troop deployment and called for the revision of SOFA. They saw the deployment plan as supporting the inhumane invasion of Iraq by the U.S. On the other hand, conservative

---

[482] Hong (2005), p. 31. Yu, Wong-won. "Which Unit Will Be Dispatched to Iraq? Possibility of Dispatching Special Commando Brigade." *Choson Ilbo,* September 29, 2003.

[483] "Rupture in troop negotiation, early return of the Korean delegation." *Yonhap News*, November 8, 2003.

[484] Fubanashi (2007), p. 237.

groups supporting the alliance with U.S. backed the decision to send additional troops for the purpose of national interest and consolidating the ROK-US alliance.

The government departments were divided between "self-reliance (or independence) faction" and "alliance faction." While the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) were attentive to the U.S. request for a large scale combat force,[485] NSC tried to minimize the size of troops and confine the mission of the Korean forces in Iraq to non-combat operations. The NSC branded high-ranking diplomats in MOFAT, especially members of the North American Division, as pro-America. Meanwhile, Vice Chief of NSC Lee Jong-Seok who was in charge of inter-Korean relations and security issues represented the "self-reliance faction." Lee concerned that putting Korean soldiers in harm's way would endanger President Roh's political standing because his political supports favored equal relations with the U.S. The progressive elements in the Roh administration often cited the public opposition to the deployment in order to minimize the size and role of the deployment.[486]

After the UN passed the resolution 1551 to urge international community to assist Iraq coalition, public opinion tilted toward additional deployment. According to a poll in October, 64.9 percent supported the second dispatch of troops to Iraq.[487] Yet, some of the civic groups vehemently opposed South Korea's support to the Iraq war, and the progressives in the NSC exploited public opposition in order to manage the size, timing, and role of the deployment troops. In the meantime, Lee in November 2003, publicly declared that Korea's military support would not exceed 3,000 personnel.[488]

---

[485] MND and MOFAT were receptive to the U.S. requests and supportive of claims to increase Korea's military contribution to the Iraq coalition. The MND suggested division-level troop deployment of would not significantly diminish Korea's deterrence capability against North Korea. MOFAT favored the South Korea's active military role in Iraq as it deemed necessary to dispel growing skepticism in the U.S. government and public about Seoul's role in the ROK-U.S. alliance and to repair strained relations with the U.S. Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan and Ambassador to the U.S. Han Sung-Joo represented the voices of so-called "alliance faction" and argued for satisfying U.S. demands out of strategic and diplomatic concerns.

[486] Hong (2005), p. 39.

[487] Ibid, p. 36.

[488] Lee, Jong-Heon. "S. Korea may send fewer troops to Iraq." *United Press International*. November 4, 2003.

The NSC's decision came as a blow to the conservative "alliance faction," which supported the idea of sending a large scale combat-capable force. The decision sparked a power struggle between the two factions inside the Roh's administration. President Roh's decision in consultation with the NSC to limit the size of the deployment created concerns in the conservative elements of the government, who worried that reduced commitment to the U.S. might cause a rift in the alliance and curtail Korea's strategic interest.

By the end of December 2003, conflicts between the two departments erupted in public. Allegedly, South Korean diplomats in the MOFAT evaluated the Roh administration's policy toward the U.S. as naive and unrealistic and thus damaging the ROK-U.S. alliance. Senior Foreign Ministry officials were quoted as saying that "working the NSC and Lee Jong-Suk was like dealing with the Taliban because they are so radical and have anti-U.S. instincts while having sympathy for Pyongyang."[489] This event forced the Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan who clashed with Lee over the troop deployment issue to resign over his failure to have Foreign Minister Officials under his control.

South Korea's Final Decision and U.S. Resentment

On 17 December 2003, South Korea finalized a plan for the second dispatch after heated debates for months. Defense Minister announced that South Korea would send another 3,000 troops to Iraq. The government stressed that the primary mission of troops would be peacekeeping rather than combat and that the forces would be placed in a safe location. Allegedly, the numbers fell well short of what Washington wanted since at that time some 37,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Seoul under mutual defense treaty.[490] A week later, the bill for additional dispatch passed the Cabinet meeting. The

---

[489] Scofield, David. "Clearing the Nuclear Fog over North Korea" *World Press Review*. January 22, 2004; Foster-Cater, Aidan. "North Korea-South Korea Relations: Peace economics?" *CSIS*. Comparative Connections (2006). <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0504qnk_sk.pdf>.

[490] Bicker, Amy "S. Korea to Send 3,000 Troops to Iraq." *Voice of America*. 2003.

President Roh approved the bill, saying that it would improve ties with the U.S. as nuclear standoff with North Korea continued. On 13 February 2004, the National Assembly passed the bill for the second deployment, with a majority of members supporting the decision.

Even after the Assembly ratified the deployment plan, actual troop deployment was delayed for security and domestic reasons. Among other things, the Roh administration put off the deployment in order to buy time to negotiate for the location of the Korean troops to be stationed. For the Roh administration, avoiding unnecessary casualties was priority in additional troop deployment. The issue of location was finally resolved as the U.S. agreed to South Korea's request to be deployed to Arbil, an autonomous region of northern Iraq.[491] The deployment was also postponed because in March 2003 President Roh was impeached for violating a law banning intervention in elections, illegal campaign donations, and economic mismanagement.[492] After temporary step-down, President Roh was reinstated in May after the Constitutional Court overturned the impeachment.

As the deployment was further delayed passing the May 2004, the ROK-U.S. alliance suffered serious strains. The U.S. Pentagon in mid-May announced a plan to shift 3,600 soldiers from the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division stationed in South Korea in support of U.S. military operation in Iraq.[493] The decision to move a combat brigade from South Korea to Iraq reflected the fact that the U.S. is struggling to meet the level of troops needed to carry out counter insurgency operations in Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon, a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution, commented that "the redeployment is necessary because nearly the entire 10-division Army is committed to Iraq and Afghanistan … The Army is so stretched that you have to consider radical things

---

491 Hong (2005), p. 42.

492 Spencer, Richard. "South Korea's leader impeached over gaffe." *Telegraph*. 13 March 13, 2004.

493 On 17 May 2004, President Bush notified President Roh of the U.S. decision to redeploy 3,600 U.S. troops to Iraq. During the summer of 2004, the mission of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, Strike Brigade, changed from deterring aggression against South Korea to fighting insurgents in Iraq. Ham, Walter T. "Strike Brigades Vets to Mark Deployment Anniversary." U.S. Army. May 13, 2014. <http://www.army.mil/article/125843/_Strike_Brigade__vets_to_mark_deployment_anniversary/>.

like that."[494] Meanwhile, the U.S. officials stressed that the reduction in troops in South Korea would not diminish the ROK-U.S. combined capability to deter North Korean aggression. "Due to our strengthened posture and the ability to quickly reinforce capabilities throughout the region," said Richard Lawless, deputy undersecretary of Defense for Asia Pacific policy, "we can deploy forces from Korea without assuming additional operational risks."[495]

In addition, on 6 June 2004, the U.S. representatives at the FOTA meeting informed South Korea of a plan to withdraw 12,500 troops by end of 2005 over a couple of stages. U.S. officials indicated that the plan was consistent with the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) and that some 6,500 troops would withdraw from South Korea by 2004, and another 6,000 by the end of the year 2005.[496] The U.S. announced the plan with little forewarning, and South Korea's policymakers were caught by surprise. Even though Rumsfeld said the troop reduction would not undermine U.S. deterrence capability, the plan immediately created security anxiety in South Korea.

After Washington briefed about the planned troop realignment and reduction in South Korea based on GPR, critics in South Korea immediately took issue with GPR, arguing that increasing operational inflexibility of the U.S. forces would not only infringe on South Korea's military sovereignty but trigger a negative response from China and North Korea. In response, the Pentagon expressed strong regret to South Korea's Foreign Ministry about the way the GPR discussed in South Korea.[497]

While Washington's decisions were largely driven by strategic needs for force augmentation in Iraq and realignment of the global defense posture, they stirred speculation that the decisions were attributable the irritation that U.S. policymakers felt

---

494 Bowman, Tom. "U.S. to Shift 3,600 Troops from S. Korea to Iraq: Army Struggling to Quell the Growing Insurgency." *Sun National*. May 18, 2004.

495 Schrader, Esther and Barbara Demick. "Troops in S. Korea to Go to Iraq: Shift of a Unit Reflects the War's Strain on the Military and a Change in Pentagon Policies." *Los Angeles Times*. May 18, 2004.

496 Kim, Y. and Kim, M. "North Korea's Risk-taking vis-à-vis the US Coercion in the Nuclear Quagmire." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 19-4 (2007), pp. 51-69.

497 Gross, Donald G. "US–Korea relations: strains in alliance, and the US offers a nuclear deal." *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, 6-2 (2004).

over South Korea's attitude towards the U.S. A U.S. ministerial-level official implied that the decision to reduce U.S. troops in Korea was an emotional reaction by Donald Rumsfeld and other DOD officials to South Korea's anti-American sentiment and assertiveness, rather than a result of careful and deliberate consideration.[498] Some in South Korea even speculated that the U.S. plans to shift forces to Iraq and downsize U.S. Forces in Korea were punishment for the insufficient and delayed troop deployment.[499] Notwithstanding the real U.S. intention behind the decisions, the fact that the major security decisions were made without close consultation with South Korea's policymakers can be read as a sign of the drifting alliance.

After the U.S. decision to relocate and drawdown its forces in Korea, the Roh administration stepped up its efforts to dispatch additional troops. The members of the advance party was sent to Iraq on 3 August. On 28 August 2004, the second dispatch of 2,200 troops mainly consists of military engineers was deployed to Arbil. In November, another 800 troops were dispatched to augment the Zaytun Unit, and the combined unit in Arbil was about 3,600.

Despite South Korea's troop deployment, the ROK-U.S. alliance remained strained. President Bush in his acceptance speech, September 2004, expressed his appreciation by mentioning eight countries and their leaders who supported the U.S. While Bush praised Japan for its support, South Korea and President Roh were not mentioned at all.[500] Clearly it was a reflection of the Bush administration's assessment of South Korea's response. In addition, during presidential campaign, both candidates affirmed that military option—a policy of preemption—would not be ruled out in dealing

---

498 Cossa, Ralph A. "Silence Loose Cannons in S. Korea-U.S. Relations." *Sentinel*, November 8, 2004.

499 The decision came as a shock even to many Korea officials who had denied the possibility of shifting U.S. forces to Iraq. Hong (2005), p. 43.

500 Bush stated, "Our allies also know the historic importance of our work. About 40 nations stand beside us in Afghanistan, and some 30 in Iraq. I deeply appreciate the courage and wise counsel of leaders like Prime Minister Howard, President Kwasniewski, Prime Minister Berlusconi and, of course, Prime Minister Tony Blair... That would be nations like Great Britain, Poland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Denmark, El Salvador, Australia, and others." "President Bush's Acceptance Speech to the Republican National Convention." *The Washington Post*, September 2, 2004.

with North Korea's nuclear program.[501] In short, the strained bilateral relations over different approach to North Korea and South Korea's response to the U.S. war on terrorism was not recovered. Despite South Korea's significant contribution to Iraq, the ROK-U.S. alliance was drifting with both parties questioning the future of the alliance.

Financial Contribution

South Korea's military assistance to the U.S. led coalition came with financial contribution for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction in Iraq. In April 2003 South Korea initially pledged $10 million for humanitarian assistance for Iraqi refugees. By making such donations, South Korea earned a standing on the Donor Committee of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), one of the principal vehicles for delivering international donor assistance to Iraq.[502] Along the time South Korea's official pledge of economic assistance increased to $60 million. On 23 October 2003, a donors' conference for Iraqi reconstruction was held in Madrid. At the Madrid Conference, representative of 37 countries, the European Commission, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund pledged their support, with a total of about $32 billion to Iraq's reconstruction through 2004 and 2007.[503] At the Conference, South Korea announced firm pledge with $200 million over five years on top of $60 million already earmarked.[504] At the 35th annual Security Consultation Meeting between the ROK and U.S., Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld expressed his appreciation for South Korea's additional economic support. As of December 2007, South Korea's financial

---

[501] Bong, Youngshik, and Katharine HS Moon. "Rethinking Young Anti-Americanism in South Korea." in *The Anti-American Century* (2007): 77-108.

[502] The IRFFI was a multilateral mechanism with two Iraq Trust Funds (ITFs), one managed by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the other by the World Bank.

[503] The U.S. pledged $18.6 billion in grants, and Japan pledged $5 billion. The Bank and IMF pledged of $3 billion and $2.5 billion respectively. United Nations. "Madrid Conference." International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.

[504] U.S. Department of State. "Section 2207: Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction." Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (July 2008). < http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/2207/c26518.htm>.

pledge ranked 7th after Japan ($4.9 billion), Iran ($1 billion), Italy ($835 million), U.K. ($650 million), Kuwait ($500 million), and Saudi Arabia ($500 million).[505]

In addition to the initial pledge of $260 made in Madrid, South Korea made additional offer. At the launching of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI), South Korea pledged another $200 million, half of which was in the form of soft loans provided by Korea's Economic Development and Cooperation Fund to help rebuild and develop Iraq's oil industry. Yet, South Korea's pledge still looked pale in comparison with Japan's support, $4.9 billion. South Korea and Iraq also agreed to strengthen economic ties in construction of infrastructure, energy, and information technology.[506]

(3) Analysis and Summary

South Korea's Role Enactment and Divergent Threat Perception on North Korea

South Korea's search for new security role conceptions was largely driven by democratic progress. Successful democratization and industrialization bolstered the confidence of the Korean public, and political elite with relatively liberal political outlook rose to power. This demographic change and growing confidence were translated into growing assertiveness against the allegedly asymmetric alliance and increasing demand for autonomy in the ROK-U.S. relations. The uncontested acceptance of the ROK-U.S. security partnership was put into question. President Roh attempted to transform the alliance from the traditional patron-client relation into a more equal and reciprocal partnership.

Roh administration's policy towards North Korea also reflected policy preferences for self-reliance and independence. When it comes to its policy toward North Korea, growing populations challenged the conventional approach based on threat,

---

[505] Blanchard, Christopher M., and Catherine Marie Dale. "Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction." *Congressional Research Service* (2007).

[506] Stangarone, Troy. "Taking a Larger Role in International Affairs: Korea's Growing Efforts in Peacekeeping Missions and Development Aid." *Korea Economic Institute*. August 2007. <http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/august%2007.pdf>.

deterrence, U.S. security guarantee, and isolation. Instead, many assumed that with increased economic and military power, South Korea alone is capable of dealing with threats coming from North Korea.

The result was growing divergence in threat perception of North Korea between South Korea and the U.S. policymakers, which emerged as a grave menace to the ROK-U.S. alliance.[507] For the majority of South Koreans, it was the Bush administration's hardline stance, preference for military solutions, and regime change policy that encouraged North Korea to pursue nuclear programs. Roh utilized the growing fear among the Korean public that U.S. unwillingness to tune its North Korean policy into South Korea's policy of engagement might in the end could precipitate an unwanted military conflict. Meanwhile, the U.S. policymakers identified North Korea, who abandoned the obligations of the Agreed Framework, as a source of unpredictability and potential danger. Particularly, with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, North Korea with nuclear weapons emerged as an existential security threat. Consequently, the Roh administration's policy toward North Korea clashed with the Bush's strategy of global terrorism. Felt betrayed by strong anti-American sentiment, the hawkish U.S. policymakers accused the Roh administration of appeasing and even helping North Korean regime. All of these developments—South Korea's growing assertiveness in foreign policy and different threat perception—served to create rupture in the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Divergence of Role Conceptions/Performances between South Korea and the U.S.

Similarly, the thinly veiled frustration of the U.S. in response to South Korea's commitment to the U.S. efforts in Iraq can be understood as the result of divergent security role conceptions between two allies. As have been discussed, the U.S. policymakers had confidence in maintaining lasting security partnership with South

[507] Park, Hyeong Jung. "Divergent Threat Perceptions on North Korea." In *Forging New US-ROK Political Relationships* (2005).

Korea, even after reunification of the Korean peninsula. As the alliance partnership was being transformed into a power management instrument, the U.S. expected South Korea to increase its regional and global role. However, South Korea's role performance as a reliable security partner fell short of the role that the U.S. prescribed to South Korea.

The U.S. policymakers expected South Korea to make significant level of military as well as economic assistance in ways that satisfy the U.S. strategic and political needs for the reconstruction and stabilization missions in Iraq. South Korea's financial support to defray the cost of war deemed essential as the U.S. strategic goal in Iraq extended beyond offensive operation to defeat Saddam's regime and included the process of nation-building. The U.S. alone could not afford to bear the financial burden of rebuilding Iraq.

Besides monetary assistance, what the U.S. policymakers wanted from South Korea and other allies and friends more than anything else was military commitment both for political and strategic concerns. First, foreign troop contributions deemed essential in gaining legitimacy in its military action against Iraq. Failing to draw a UNSCR that would have authorized the use of force against Iraq, the U.S. unilaterally decided to invade Iraq. Much to the dismay of the U.S. policymakers, traditional allies and friends of the U.S., most notably Germany and France, did not follow suit. In that way, South Korea's military commitment became more desperate for the U.S. Allies' troop commitment would have served to justify the U.S. unilateral decision to dismantle Iraq's WMD.

Second, apart from legitimacy, foreign military contributions would also directly satisfy U.S. strategic needs. After Bush's declaration of victory in May 2003, the U.S., under the consent of the UN, established multinational coalition forces in Iraq for reconstruction mission. The mission proved much more difficult and time-consuming than the U.S. policymakers thought. The U.S. forces faced fierce counterinsurgency battles in Iraq. American casualties soared, creating domestic backlash. Under such circumstances in Iraq, U.S. pushed its allies to send ground troops, capable of conducting stabilization operation. South Korea, a staunch ally of the U.S. with comparative

advantage in ground forces, was a well-qualified supporter. In October 2003, the Turkish government in response to the U.S. request decided to send some 10,000 troops to Iraq. However, in the face of strong domestic opposition, Turkey revoked the plan, which served to raise the expectation of the U.S. policymakers for South Korean boots on the ground. After all, the U.S. tin cup mission urged South Korea to send a division-level military unit, capable of independent and sustainable combat operations, which amounted to approximately 5,000 to 7,000 personnel.

However, South Korea's response diametrically opposed to U.S. expectations. First of all, the Korean policymakers hesitated to make coalition support on account that the U.S. invasion into Iraq lacked legitimacy under international law. While the U.S. grew determined to initiate offensive operation against Iraq, President Kim and the incoming President Roh favored diplomatic solution through UN over the use of force. Second, even when South Korea under the U.S. pressure decided to make force commitment, South Korea's troop dispatch plan was in disagreement with the U.S. in every aspect: size, mission, component, and location of troops. Even though President Roh finally acknowledged that South Korea's national interests would be best served by complying U.S. request, the final plan largely reflected the demands of self-reliance faction. Contrary to the U.S. expectation, South Korea opted to send 3,600 non-combatant troops consist of engineering and medical personnel to Arbil, where security condition was far stable than Mosul. There was wide-spread perception in the U.S. that South Korea is a "risk-averter." Third, the Roh administration attempted to balance the U.S. call for military support against the need for U.S. consent in its appeasement policy against North Korea. By promising troop commitment to the U.S., Roh attempted not only to repair strained relations over anti-American protests, but to soften the U.S. hardline stance against North Korea's nuclear ambition.[508] Roh's attempt to link troop deployment to North Korea received a cold reaction from the U.S. After all, even though South Korea made relatively significant level of military support, compared to other

[508] Kihl, Young W. *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture*. ME Sharpe, 2005, pp. 328-29.

allies and friends, South Korea's role performance was still at odds with the U.S. role prescriptions. The divergence of role conceptions between South Korea and the U.S. is summarized in <Figure 30>.

Figure 30. Role-based Approach to the ROK-U.S. Relations during the Gulf War



What is notable about the ROK-U.S. relations during the Iraq War is the role of North Korean factor. President Roh linked troop support to North Korean policy. In that way, Roh admitted to himself that the U.S. holds the key to North Korean problem. The persistence of North Korean threat, despite South Korea's peaceful gesture, gave more leverage to the U.S. in drawing out support from South Korea. Roh's attempt to gain

self-reliance led to undermining alliance cohesion, which in turn contributed to the increase of abandonment threat. The irony is that South Korea's attempt to increase autonomy produced an effect direct opposite to what was intended. With increased leverage, the U.S. pushed South Korea to comply with the U.S. role prescription. The U.S. opted for arm-twisting to exact coalition support from South Korea.[509] After all, South Korea's foreign policy became hostage to North Korea's nuclear threat.

3. Japan's Role Performance and U.S. Response

At the request of anti-terrorist support from the U.S., Japan, under the top-down leadership by Prime Minister Koizumi, responded at an unprecedented manner and speed. From the very beginning the Japanese government promised its support for the war against terrorism. Under Koizumi's bold and unusual leadership, the LDP coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) to contribute to the U.S.-led international campaign against terrorism. The Japanese government swiftly addressed legal constraints in providing military support by enacting necessary laws that would enable force dispatch constitutional and dispatched Japanese SDFs to Iraq. Japan's military assistance to the War in Iraq, though limited, was significant since it marked the first post-war Japanese military deployment made in direct support of the U.S.

(1) Japan's Initial Response

[509] In January 2003, James Baker, former Secretary of State, pressed the delegation from National Assembly, by saying that "Does South Korea want to be like the Philippines?" Kim, Pyong-guk, and Anthony Jones, eds. *Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, p.223.

Japan's Initial Response and Seven Point Plan

U.S. initiative in the war on terrorism and Japan's coalition support were played out against the backdrop of all-time high relations between the U.S. and Japan, driven in part by good chemistry between two leaders. Prime Minister Koizumi swiftly and boldly responded to the 9/11 crisis. Although domestic criticism of the military relationship between the U.S. and Japan existed incurred by a U.S. submarine's accidental sinking of a Japanese fishing boat carrying high school students, Koizumi committed to support the U.S. war on terrorism.[510] Within an hour after the 9/11 attacks, Koizumi established a liaison office at the Crisis Management Center, which was later upgraded to the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters headed by Koizumi himself.[511] The next morning, Koizumi called upon a National Security Council meeting at the Prime Minister's official residence. After the meeting, Koizumi described the 9/11 terrorist attacks as "grave challenges not only to the U.S., but also to the entire democratic society" and ordered to reinforce the security to defend facilities and establishments related the U.S. forces in Japan from any unexpected terrorist attacks. He stressed that Japan was resolved to support the U.S. and would spare no effort in providing necessary assistance.[512]

On 19 September 2001, Koizumi laid out seven-point plan in response to the terrorist attacks in the U.S. In stark contrast to Kaifu regime's response in 1991, Koizumi declared that Japan would make preparations to dispatch the SDFs to provide logistic, medical, and other military support to the U.S. if the U.S. would plan to take retaliatory action against terrorists behind 9/11. He also affirmed that Japan would take swift legal

---

[510] Before 9/11 attacks, the domestic opposition to the U.S.-Japan alliance had increased in Japan. The criticism was triggered by a rape of a 12-year old Japanese girl by three American soldiers in Okinawa, 1995 and an American submarine's accidental sinking of a Japanese fishery training vessel carrying high school students off the coast of Hawaii in 2001. As a means to appease domestic anger, Prime Minister Koizumi provided assistance to victim's family of the attacks.

[511] Midford, P. "Japan's response to terror: dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea." *Asian Survey,* 43-2 (2003), p. 330.

[512] Prime Minister's Official Residence. "The Ninety Fifth Meeting of the Security Council." September 12, 2001. <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumiphoto/2001/09/12anpo_e.html>.

steps to allow the SDF to engage in military support for the U.S. The seven-point emergency plan comprised the following measures: Japan would 1) take steps to enable Japan's SDFs to provide logistical support to the U.S. military in the event of a retaliatory strike in areas such as medical services, transportation and shipment of supplies, 2) take steps to strengthen security measures at important facilities in Japan, including U.S. military bases, 3) dispatch SDF ships to gather information, 4) further strengthen international cooperation over immigration control, 5) provide humanitarian and economic aid to neighboring and related countries, including provision of emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India, 6) take steps to help refugees, who may flee areas affected by the potential U.S. military action, possibly as part of humanitarian aid by the SDF, and 7) cooperate with other countries and take appropriate steps so that there will be no confusion in the economic systems of Japan or the rest of the world.[513]

In the announcement, however, Koizumi provided few details on what kind of specific support would be extended by Japan and stressed that the SDF's actions would be limited to missions that do not involve the use of force. Later on that day, Koizumi had a meeting with Howard Baker, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and explained him the contents of the seven-point measures. Koizumi also told Baker that Japan would donate $10 million to a private group in the U.S. collecting funds for the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a token of sympathy. To prepare for the attack against Afghanistan, President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell met leaders of its allies, including Japan, to help build a worldwide coalition for the war against terrorism.

It only took a couple of days for Prime Minister Koizumi to demonstrate Japans' determination to commit the Japanese military to support U.S. counter-measures against terrorism. On 21 September 2001, when the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, stationed in Yokosuka, departed its base as part of the U.S. Naval Forces in Japan to be deployed in preparation for the expected war in the Middle East, Koizumi ordered the Japanese Navy to escort USS Kitty Hawk out of Japanese territorial waters. Specifically, he committed three naval destroyers and other naval vessels from Japan's Marine SDF to

[513] "Koizumi starts preparations so SDF could support U.S." *Japan Times*. September 20, 2001.

provide support for the U.S. Forces in the Indian Ocean.[514] Although this was a largely symbolic move, the SDF's military support assured the U.S. that the U.S.-Japan security policy upgraded since the mid-1990s would be honored in times of crisis.[515]

On September 25, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Washington and pledged Japan's support for the imminent military operations. Koizumi laid out the seven-point measures and pledged to send the SDFs in support of U.S. military retaliation and enact a new law which would allow the SDF to support U.S. military action. Japan's proactive stance in support of the war on terrorism was welcomed by President Bush. Bush mentioned that the U.S. and Japan would cooperate in the battle. He added that Japan's responses such as cutting off terrorist funding, providing aid to refugees, and extending assistance to Pakistan were also grateful.[516] By promising its strong commitment to the U.S., Japan stood out among the U.S. allies.

U.S. official request for Japan's military support was immediately delivered to Tokyo. On 26 September 2001, Howard Baker said that Washington expected Japan to send the SDF troops in support of the U.S. While It was reported that the Japanese government was considering sending C-130 aircrafts to assist in transport missions and neighboring countries prior to dispatching land forces, Koizumi reiterated the final decision to dispatch would be made after careful consideration of the situation in the Persian Gulf.[517]

Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

As U.S. military actions impended in the Indian Ocean, the Japanese government rapidly reevaluated of the operational limitations of its military forces and

---

514 "U.S. Carrier Leaves Base In Japan." *Associated Press*. September 21, 2001.

515 Katzenstein, P. J. *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*. Routledge, 2008, p.236.

516 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to the United States of America." 26 September 2001. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/pmv.html>. On 21 September 2001, Japan decided to take emergency measures to assist Pakistan, which included bilateral assistance worth approximately $40 million.

517 "Baker hopes Japan will send SDF to Iraq, Koizumi to contemplate." *Kyodo News*. Sept 26, 2001.

Japan's role in supporting the U.S.-led military coalition. The Koizumi government moved quickly to avoid painful experience in 1991. Early in October, the Japanese government formulated a new law to provide legal basis of dispatching the SDFs to the Indian Ocean. On 5 October 2001, bills for the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law along with revisions to the SDF law, which were necessary to supplement existing legislation and enable the SDFs to support international military operations against terrorism, were submitted to the Diet.[518] Koizumi, with his top-down leadership, pushed for the approval of the bills.

Three weeks later after the 9/11 attacks, Operation Enduring Freedom began, and the U.S. courted support from its allies. On 7 October 2001, the international coalition against terrorism began retaliatory operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Initially the coalition forces was sustained by the support from Western powers, such as U.K., Italy, Australia, Canada, and etc. With no East Asian allies supporting the coalition, the U.S. urged support from Japan. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage expressed his hope that Japan would pass the bill and cooperate with the U.S. in its campaign against terrorism. Armitage asked Japan for cooperation in the U.S.-led war against terrorism by demanding Shunji Yanai, Japanese Ambassador the U.S., to "show the flag." Armitage explained that "The term 'show the flag' may show that the government of Japan, representing the people of Japan, is involved fully in this campaign." He also added that, "I also think it's very helpful that we don't find ourselves in the situation of 10 years ago (during the 1991 Persian Gulf War) when Japan didn't show a flag at all."[519] Many in Japan, questioning the meaning of Armitage's remark, took it as the U.S. exhortation for Japan to step up for the war support.

---

[518] The official English title of the bill was "The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations." The bill was designed to open the way for the SDF to provide rear-area logistic support for the anticipated U.S.-led military operations against terrorism. Another bill was to revise the SDF law to allow Japanese troops to protect their own facilities as well as U.S. military bases in Japan.

[519] "Armitage wants bills on SDF role passed soon." *The Japan Times*. October 7, 2001.

On the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leader's meeting held on 20 October 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi met President Bush and discussed Japan's response to the terrorist attacks in the U.S.[520] While Koizumi made clear that Japan would not participate in the use of force, Koizumi confirmed that Japan was willing to provide military support in logistics and transportation. Assuring the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill, Koizumi also informed President Bush that assignment of new roles to the SDFS was gaining domestic support. President Bush expressed his appreciation for Japan's support and suggested Japan's contribution to the peace building in the Middle East by noting that efforts towards reconstruction of Afghanistan would be necessary in the future.[521]

(2) Koizumi's Leadership and Japan's Proactive Support

Provision of Rear-area Support

In October 2001, Japan expressed a strong show of support to the U.S. in the war on terrorism by passing the significant Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. With strong domestic support, the bill passed the Lower House on 16 October. On 29 October, then the Upper House voted on the bill.[522] The ruling coalition in support of Koizumi prevailed. The bill was enacted and entered into law.[523] By passing the legislation, the

---

[520] Members on the U.S. side at the meeting included Secretary of State Colin Powell, Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker, Chief of Staff to the President Andrew Card, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice. On the Japan side, there were Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kosei Ueno and others.

[521] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Outline of the Japan-United States of America Summit Meeting," October 20, 2001. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/2001/us.html>

[522] The legislation was subjected to a debate that was almost perfunctory, amounting in total to 62 hours, as compared to 179 hours for the Peacekeeping Organization Cooperation Law of 1992 and 154 hours for the Guidelines legislation of 1999.

[523] At the same time, the political majority made concessions to the opposition party. The bill had a two-year time limit, and required that the Diet approve any deployment within 20 days of the dispatch of the SDF. To minimize chances of conflict with the Peace Constitution, the bill also stipulated that the transportation of ammunition and arms in foreign territory was not allowed. A news survey indicated that

Japanese government paved the way to contribute actively and on its own initiative to the international effort to prevent terrorism. By modifying the prior policy of non-involvement, the new law allowed the SDFs to provide military support in the Middle East. The law also allowed Japanese forces to use their weapons not only to protect themselves but also to protect others who are on the scene and have come under the SDF's control while conducting their duties.[524] The passage of the law signaled that Japan would take a significant step toward becoming a more active international power that would contribute to international peace building efforts. For the U.S., it meant that Japan continued to uphold long-standing the U.S.-Japan alliance as the linchpin of security in the region and around the world.

Once the legal ground was established, the Japanese government demonstrated pro-active stance in the coalition effort. On November 9, Japan dispatched *Kurama* and *Kirisame*, naval destroyers, and *Hamana*, the replenishment ship, to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area support for the on-gong war in Afghanistan. On November 16, the Koizumi Cabinet announced Basic Plan regarding response measures based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. The plan laid out specifics of basic points regarding search and rescue activities, scope of areas in which support activities by the SDFs would be conducted, and designation of such areas; size, composition, and equipment of the SDFs which conduct search and rescue activities in the territories of foreign countries; and the duration of the dispatch.[525] On December 2, the first flotilla of Japanese naval vessels arrived the Indian Ocean and supported the U.S. military operation, supplying fuel to the U.S.S. Sacrament. It was the first Maritime SDF's military activity in the Indian Ocean since the end of the World War II.

On November 25, the Japanese government, based on the Basic Plan, ordered the dispatch of a second flotilla of naval ships to the Indian Ocean. Consisted of a supple

---

57% of the public supported the new legislation.

[524] The Japanese Government. "The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law." October 2001. <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html>.

[525] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law." November 16, 2001.

ship *Towada*, minesweeper *Uraga*, and destroyer *Sawagiri*, the Maritime SDF ships were ordered to logistically support the U.S-led military operations in Afghanistan and offer aid to Afghan refugees. Defense Agency Chief, General Nakatani in a speech delivered at Yokosuka base said that "We should aim to be a nation that is respected by the rest of the world and a nation that can act on behalf of people around the world through active and responsible contributions."[526] The second flotilla joined the first dispatch and conducted logistic support operations in close coordination with the U.S.[527]

U.S. Call for Military Assistance in Iraq and the War Contingency Bill

After the initial combat phase of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan ended, President Bush visited Japan on 18 February 2002 as part of his diplomatic trip to Asia. It was a few weeks later after his 2002 State of the Union address, in which President Bush identified North Korea as "Axis of Evil" along with Iran and Iraq. During summit and ministerial meetings, key issues were the U.S.-Japan security relations and bilateral economic relations. First, recognizing continued collaboration on the war of terrorism, the U.S. and Japan agreed to strengthen bilateral dialogue on security arrangement. Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi stressed the importance of continued consultation on the relocation and return of Futenma Air Force base. Regarding the missile defense, Secretary of State Colin Powel stated that the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had opened new avenues for advancing mutual missile defense.[528] Second, Koizumi stated that revitalizing the economy was the number one priority of his Cabinet.[529] He assured President Bush that

---

[526] "Second MSDF flotilla sails to war." *The Japan Times*. 26 November 2001.

[527] Allegedly, the U.S. was frustrated with Japan's failure to dispatch an Aegis destroyer. Since only the U.S. and Japanese navies have the high-tech vessel, it was reported that the U.S. was pushing Tokyo to dispatch an Aegis-equipped ship to support the coalition. "U.S. envoy Baker disappointed by Japan's failure to send Aegis." *Kyodo News*. December. 3, 2001.

[528] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Outline of the Japan-US Foreign Ministers Meeting." February 18, 2002. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pv0202/fmmeet.html>.

[529] As for policies regarding North Korea, Koizumi stated that it was most important to support President Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy and to maintain close among Japan, the U.S. and South Korea.

economic reform was in progress and that the Japanese government would take comprehensive measures to deal with deflation. President Bush, on his part, somewhat bluntly stressed that the Japanese economy must restructure and deal with non-performing loans.[530] Meanwhile, while not mentioned in official conference, it was reported that President Bush apparently stated that the U.S. had plans to invade Iraq. For its part, Koizumi replied that Japan would stand with the U.S. in the war against terrorism. By saying this, even before the U.S. began to establish a coalition of the willing, Japan confirmed its commitment to the U.S. War in Iraq.

Notably, the Japanese government submitted three bills related to emergency legislation to the Diet in April 2002. While the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law dealt with countermeasures against terrorism, the purpose of the bills called "emergency legislation" was to enact legislative measures to respond effectively to possible armed attacks against Japan.[531] In part the Koizumi' urgent call for emergency legislation was due to immediate security concerns. Japan viewed both China and North Korea as significant and growing threats. In particular, at that time, Japan recognized renewed threat from North Korea: North Korean vessels trespassed into Japanese waters; new revelations about North Korea abductions of Japanese citizens created anxiety in Japan; and North Korea declared that it was operating secret uranium enrichment facilities. This renewed threat perception gave Japan strong incentives to ready the SDFs for

---

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Outline of the Japan-US Summit Meeting." February 18, 2002. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pv0202/outline.html.>.

[530] Bumiller, Elisabeth. "Bush, on Tokyo Visit, Calls Koizumi 'a Great Reformer.' " *New York Times*. February 18, 2002.

[531] First was "the Bill to Respond to Armed Attack Situation" which prescribes the basic principles for response to an armed attack, the respective responsibilities of the national and local governments, the areas in which the people will be called upon to cooperate, and other fundamental items necessary in ensuring the preparedness of our country. The second was a bill to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law, which corrects long-standing pending legislative issues regarding the activities of the JSDF, such as land use and transportation by the JSDF in an armed attack situation. Finally, the third bill amends the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, which strengthens the functions of the Security Council of Japan in the event of a national emergency. For details of each bill, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda on Japan's Preparedness to Respond to National Emergencies." April 16, 2002.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/4/0416.html>

contingency operations.[532] Indeed, the idea of enacting emergency legislation to allow the SDFs to use force in response to an armed attack on Japan had been debated beginning in the early 2002.

Submitting the bills, Koizumi stressed that the terrorist attacks in the U.S. forced the Japanese government to improve its preparedness in both the legislative and operational aspects of defense posture against diverse contingencies. Koizumi stated,

> The Government of Japan is in the process of conducting a comprehensive review of its preparedness to respond to emergency situations and is taking steps so that as a state, we can ensure our security and respond to any situations or events that may arise. Towards that end, under the Constitution of Japan, while defining the basic principle for responding to incidents involving armed attacks, the Government will further strengthen the functions of the Security Council of Japan as well as formulate the necessary measures in both the legislative and operational aspects in order to further enhance the Government's comprehensive response preparedness and thereby ensure the security of its people.[533]

In sum, with a set of bills for emergency, Koizumi suggested the Japanese government to specify measures to be taken in the case of emergency, to undertake the enhancement of the systems of security decision-making, and to enact necessary legislations to render the SDFs' operations constitutional.

The Koizumi cabinet's proposal of the "War Contingency Bill" marked a significant milestone for Japan's security role conception. At a glance the three bills were to provide *modus operandi* of Japan's response to an armed attack on Japan. However, together with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the emergency legislation was to enhance effectiveness in Japan's national security by allowing the Japanese SDFs to respond actively and legislatively in times of contingency situations. In other words, the two legislations constituted the core of Japan's post-Cold War national security policy.

---

[532] Shinoda (2007), pp.99-112.

[533] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Preparedness to Respond to National Emergencies." April 16, 2002. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/state0204.html>.

In addition, Koizumi's early moves for security legislation proved that Japan even before the start of War in Iraq was already predisposed to provide military support to the U.S.

When the U.S. shifted its strategic focus from Afghanistan to Iraq and was contemplating on a war against Saddam Hussein in March 2003, Koizumi announced that the Japanese government supported President Bush's decision to go to war. On 7 March 2003, the Japanese government announced that Iraq's possession of WMDs was unacceptable and that Japan would unconditionally stand with the U.S. and support in the event of war. More tellingly, Japan pledged to support the U.S. with or without UN Resolution and thereby distinguished itself from other major Western powers—France, Germany, and Russia—who opposed the invasion of Iraq. Japan cited UN Resolutions 1441, 678, and 687 as good enough reasons to support the U.S.[534] Japan was one of the first major democracies in the world to condemn Iraq's hostilities and make a statement of war support for the U.S. By doing so, Koizumi sent a strong message of a solid security partnership with the U.S.

While Koizumi was struggling to pass a necessary legislation against domestic opposition to the idea of dispatching the SDFs to dangerous combat areas, the end of initial combat operations in Iraq strengthened the prospect of new legislation. After pledging unconditional support for the war in Iraq, Koizumi began pressing for the deployment of the SDFs to Iraq to provide various support such as minesweeping security support, and dismantling WMDs. However, Koizumi's initiatives faced opposition. The general public was wary of sending the Japanese troops to dangerous combat areas.[535] Even some elements in the Koizumi's own LDP party opposed the Koizumi's plan because of Koizumi's unilateral decision-making.[536] On 1 May 2003, Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq. The UNSC passed Resolution 1483, which called for member countries' contribution to reconstruction of Iraq.

---

[534] "Japan Offers Unconditional Support of U.S.A. on Iraq Attack Issue, U.N. Resolution or not." *Yomiuri News*. 7 March 2003.

[535] According to a public opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun, only 39% of the public approved Koizumi's support for U.S. military actions in Iraq, while 50% disapproved. Shinoda (2007), pp.109-110.

[536] Shinoda (2007), p. 119. .

Those events helped empower Koizumi's supportive stance vis-à-vis the U.S. Koizumi, in a visit the Washington on May 23, noted that Japan welcomed the adoption of Resolution 1483 and would actively support nation-building effort in Iraq. During a summit meeting, Koizumi mentioned the possibility of dispatching C-130 aircraft carriers for transportation support in Iraq, and expressed his willingness to legislate a new law that would enable the dispatch of the SDF to assist in the Iraq reconstruction. Koizumi stressed that "the dispatch of the SDF and others to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq was something for Japan itself to decide, and that Japan wished to make a contribution commensurate with its national power and standing."[537] Bush, on his part, welcomed Japan's strong commitment to playing a leading role in Iraq's reconstruction.[538]

On 7 June 2003, the Japanese Diet passed the three War Contingency Bills, which had been submitted to the Diet in April 2002. After clearing the Lower House on May 15, the bills were finally approved by an overwhelming majority in the Upper House. The three bills were endorsed not only by the ruling coalition—the LDP, the New Conservative Party, and New Komeito—but also by the opposition parties—the Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberal Party.[539] The War Contingency Law marked an unprecedented step for Japan's security policy. The law allowed the SDFs to play a more powerful and active role in the event of security contingency. When there is an attack, the government would draft a military plan and deploy the SDFs upon the Diet's approval. For example, under the new contingency law, when a military attack on Japan is deemed imminent, the SDFs, upon the Diet's approval, could launch a preemptive strike as an active defense measure. Koizumi, hailing the enactment, stated, "These laws

[537] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Overview of Japan-US Summit Meeting." May 26, 2003. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv0305/overview.html>.

[538] U.S. Department of State. "President Bush Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi." May 23, 2003. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/20953.htm>.

[539] Reportedly, only members of the Japanese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party opposed the passage of the bills. Those who opposed the legislation saw the bills conflicting with the pacifist constitution.

have established a basic system to cope with emergency situations—the most important task of the national government."[540]

U.S. Call for the Japanese Boots on the Grounds and Iraq Special Measures Legislation

The Bush administration conveyed clear the message that the U.S. called on Japan for military support. In preparing for a war in Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz advocated the need for "boots on the ground," which referred to military personnel in Iraq. After pledging unconditional support for the U.S., Koizumi came under pressure to make good on the promise. As the phase of Iraq reconstruction began, the U.S. called for Japan to put boots on the ground in order to help rebuild Iraq. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, visiting Tokyo on 9 June 2003, hailed Japan's decision to dispatch the SDFs to Iraq. On a press conference after meeting with Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda, Armitage welcomed the recent legislation and expressed the U.S. expectation of Japan's role in the Iraq reconstruction, by drawing an analogy to a baseball game.

> On the question of what we expect from Japan, I'll tell you I'm absolutely delighted with what I've read in the newspapers about the willingness to move forward, among the coalition members of the government, with an Iraqi-related piece of legislation. So, first of all, whatever assistance the government of Japan renders, I think, is most appropriate. But let me be clear what is important to me as a person. I've desired and worked for years to try to bring about a situation in which the United States and Japan take part in the great endeavors of our time, and I used an analogy which some people accuse me of being silly about, but the analogy was, *it's about time for Japan to quit paying to see the baseball game and get down on the baseball diamond and play the game*. It's not necessary to be a pitcher or a catcher, where you have to be involved in every play. You can play first base or right field or shortstop or whatever is comfortable to you. But one thing's for sure, unless you're on the baseball diamond, you can't play, you just pay to watch. In that regard, Japan, if successful in the Diet deliberations coming forward with any assistance and/or "boots on the ground," would be a most

[540] Shimoyachi, Nao and Reiji Yoshida. "Diet enacts legislation for war contingencies." *The Japan Times*. June 7, 2003.

> welcome development, and it would leave me with a great feeling of confidence that Japan is willing to take her place with the major nations of the world and play a positive role for security.[541]

In addition, by referring to the Japan's support during the Gulf War in 1991, Armitage stated, "While Japan was kind enough to pay a huge amount of money [$13 billion], it's a bit as if Japan were paying to watch a baseball game, and sat in the stands. I've long suggested that it's most appropriate for Japan to take her place on the playing field."[542]

After expanding the autonomy of the SDFs through the War Contingency Law, Koizumi moved on to the next step. Koizumi began discussion of a new legislation that would enable the SDFs to be deployed to Iraq to participate in Iraq reconstruction effort. On 7 June, one day after the War Contingency Law was enacted, Prime Minister Koizumi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda announced that the Japanese government would submit the Iraq legislation. When enacted, the new law would allow the Japanese government to dispatch the SDFs to Iraq, 1) to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, 2) to assist the U.S. and other international forces in ensuring security in Iraq, 3) and to assist in the dismantling of WMDs. Even though the representatives of major political parties approved the general outline of the legislation, public support for Japan's contribution to Iraq was not as high as in the case of the Anti-Terrorism legislation. Japanese domestic politics, even within the LDP, was divided between pro- and anti-Koizumi lines as the presidential election came to close. Despite domestic opposition, Koizumi seemed determined to push for the legislation to tighten security ties with the U.S. On June 13, the Koizumi cabinet submitted the "Iraq Special Measures Legislation" to the Diet. After going through politics turbulences, on 26 July 2003 the Diet enacted the legislation to dispatch the SDF military personnel and civilians to Iraq.[543] Koizumi

---

[541] U.S. Department of State. "Press Roundtable." Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State. Tokyo, Japan. June 9, 2003. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/21360.htm>.

[542] U.S. Department of State. "Remarks to Press after Meeting with Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda." Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State. Tokyo, Japan. June 10, 2003. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/21418.htm>.

[543] For detailed analysis of negations and compromises between the Koizumi cabinet and the opposition parties regarding the legislation, see Shinoda, Tomohito. "Japan's top-down policy process to dispatch

stressed that the law would provide a structure in which the Japanese SDFs could assist in the reconstruction of Iraq.[544]

(3) Japan's Assistance to Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations in Iraq

Even though the U.S. declared an end to major combat operations in May, the situation in Iraq was not easily stabilized. After the Hussein regime was toppled by the allied forces, militant insurgency surged at a scale unexpected by the U.S. military strategies, incurring casualties. Between May and August 2003, some 60 U.S. soldiers were killed in attacks by Iraqi forces opposed to the American occupation. It proved that invasion into Iraq was one thing, and nation-building was another. On 20 August, terrorists even shelled the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing some 20 people. In response, the U.S. undertook to establish a multinational force under the auspice of the UN in order to deal with increasing unstable situation in Iraq. On 22 August, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested that the UNSC could establish a multinational force in Iraq that would be led by the U.S. as the largest troop contributor. For that purpose, he stated that a new UNSCR is required to invest the multinational forces with a clear role and to make sure that political control would be returned to the Iraq people once security is in place.[545]

U.N. Sponsorship and Japan's Support

As the U.S. agreed on establishing a multinational force under UN leadership, the Japanese government actively supported the U.S. initiative by lending diplomatic and political assistance. On August 28, the Bush administration signaled that it would

---

the SDF to Iraq." *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 7-01 (2006): 71-91.

[544] The Government of Japan. "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Concerning the Establishment of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq." July 26, 2003. <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2003/07/26danwa_e.html>.

[545] Barringer, Felicity. "U.N. Chief Says New Force in Iraq Can Be Led by U.S." *New York Times*. August 23, 2003.

allow a multinational force in Iraq to operate under the sponsorship of the UN as long as it is commanded by an American commander.[546] Days earlier, Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed the possibility of UN sponsorship with Secretary General Annan, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage described the arrangement as establishing a multinational UN force in which the American would be the UN commander. The U.S. position marked a significant shift in military policy, which until then insisted that all the military, political, economic matters should be under the U.S. control.[547] For the U.S., the UN sponsorship was essential in gaining support from the UN members for continued U.S.-led occupation of Iraq.

Such U.S. proposal also fit in with the interest of the Japanese government. First, the UN leadership would give the U.S. legitimacy of its military occupation, and that would in turn provide legitimacy to Japan and other countries backing up the U.S. counter-insurgency efforts in Iraq. Second, supporting the U.S. as part of a multinational force gave the Japanese government more freedom of action. By providing military support under the UN, the Japanese government could appease domestic opposition based on war-renouncing constitution.

Against this backdrop, the Japanese government actively supported the U.S. proposal. In addition to making a pledge to offer $1.5 billion commitment to rebuilding Iraq, the Japanese government assisted the U.S. by lobbying member states of the UNSC. In particular, Japan's lobby to win Syrian support was critical. At that time, the U.S. lacked effective diplomatic leverage toward Syria, which was then one of the non-permanent members of UNSC. Identifying Syria as a supporter of terrorist groups, the U.S. had placed trade embargo on Syria. Meanwhile, Japan established a good diplomatic relations with Syria after offering continued ODA support since 1999.[548]

---

[546] Jehl, Dougals. "After the War: Diplomacy; U.S. now signals it might consider U.N. forces in Iraq." *New York Times*. August 28, 2003.

[547] "A change of heart: And a big victory for Colin Powell and the generals over Donald Rumsfeld." *The Economist*. September 4, 2003.

[548] For Japan's ODA support during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan's ODA Data by Country." <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/data/04ap_me02.html>.

Japan in the end persuaded Syria to vote for a resolution drafted by the U.S. On 16 October 2003, the UNSC unanimously adopted the Resolution 1511, which authorized continued military presence in Iraq and urged UN member states to contribute to a multinational force in Iraq.[549] In a U.S.-Japan summit meeting held on next day, President Bush expressed his appreciation for Japan's role in realizing the adoption of Resolution 1511 as well as Japan's financial contribution to rebuilding Iraq.[550] The concept of the "U.S.-Japan Alliance in the global context" prevailed the meeting.

While the U.S. welcomed Japan's proactive support, the U.S. policymakers, in fact, pressed Japan to act voluntarily, trying to avoid the impression that the U.S. was applying hard pressure on Japan. In a meeting with Japanese government officials, Richard Armitage Deputy Secretary of State reportedly comment, "Don't walk away," referring Japan's support to U.S. efforts in Iraq. The Armitage's remark seemed to reflect U.S. concern that after pledging billions of dollars of aid in reconstruction, Japan might have second thoughts about deploying troops.[551]

While Koizumi won the LDP presidential election on September 22, the Japanese government could not expedite the process of dispatching the SDFs to Iraq as it promised to the U.S. First, political opposition to the SDF dispatch increased. Through the national election in November 2003, the DPJ, pledged to oppose the SDF dispatch during the campaign, gained 40 more seats in the lower house, emerged as an effective

---

[549] As the UN Secretary General insisted, the Resolution called for called for power to be returned to the Iraqi people as soon as possible. United Nations, "Security Council resolution 1511 (2003) on authorizing a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." UN Security Council. October 16, 2003.

[550] While President Bush appreciated Japan's support in adopting the Security Council Resolution, he did not conceal his distrust of the UN When Koizumi urged Bush to work more closely within the framework of the UN, Bush described the UN as an aging and sluggish institution. President Bush also expressed his concern over dollar appreciation and trade imbalance. Bush insinuated that Japan and China should stop intervening in the currency market and manipulating their currencies as a means to promote exports. See Sanger, E. David. "Bush and Japan's Premier Fail to Agree on Issue of the Dollar." *New York Times*. October 17, 2003.

[551] Nabeshima, Keizo. "Decision to dispatch SDF Troops to Iraq a watershed for Defense, security policy." *Japan Times*. January 1, 2004.

opposition party, and thus changed political landscape. More voices in the Diet expressed concern over the safety of the SDFs in Iraq.

Second, the situation in Iraq became more unstable despite the adoption of the Resolution 1511. Casualties of the multinational forces continued to rise. On 19 November 2003, the Italian contingent was attacked by the Iraqi armed forces in Nasiriyah, not far from Samawah, the SDF's planned location. Even though, Koizumi was reappointed as Prime Minister, changed political climate and the situation in Iraq forced the Japanese government to postpone the approval of the Action Guideline to dispatch the SDF in Iraq. To make things worse, the death of the two Japanese diplomats—Katsuhiko Oku and Masamori Inoue—swept through Japan, generating concern over the safety of the SDF in case of deployment.[552]

Koizumi's Action Guideline and Troop Deployment to Iraq

Despite mounting opposition, Koizumi did not waver in his commitment to support for U.S.-led campaign against terrorism and pushed for the action guideline to dispatch the SDFs to Iraq. As the opposition parties, referring the death of the two diplomats, criticized the Koizumi cabinet for poor assessment of the Iraq situation, Koizumi responded by saying, "Japan has a responsibility to provide humanitarian and reconstruction aid in Iraq . . . There is no change to our policy of not giving into terrorism."[553] The Koizumi Cabinet proceeded to draft an action guideline, and on December 9, Koizumi disclosed the outline. The guideline (The Basic Plan regarding the measures based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq) stipulated the following: 1) the SDFs would provide humanitarian and reconstruction support in Samawah, Southern Iraq, 2) the number of ground SDFs would not exceed 600, 3) the period of dispatch would be on year, beginning 15 December 2003. Criticism based on Article 9 of the Constitution was

---

552 "Two Japanese diplomats killed in Iraq." *USA Today.* November 29, 2003.

553 Filkins, Dexter. "The struggle for Iraq: insurgency; 7 Spanish agents and 2 Japanese are slain in Iraq." *New York Times*. November 30, 2003.

circumvented by restricting the role of the SDFs to non-combatant and reconstruction purposes only. Interestingly, for those who opposed to the dispatch of the Japanese troops based on the war-renouncing Constitution, Koizumi protested by saying that "I believe that the international community is calling upon Japan, and the people of Japan to act in accordance with the ideals of our Constitution. I call upon the members of the SDF to undertake activities that conform to the spirit and ideals of the Constitution."[554]

After Koizumi approved the basic guideline of dispatch on December 18, Defense Agency Chief Ishiba Shigeru ordered the three services of the SDF to prepare for dispatch. On 26 December 2003, an advance Air contingent consist of 3 C-130 cargo planes and 48 personnel was deployed to provide transportation support for the U.S. and British forces in Iraq. After careful consideration of the Iraq situation, an advance ground SDF unit was deployed to Samawah, Iraq on 16 January 2004. The Koizumi's plan to deploy main ground forces faced strong resistance from the opposition parties, who repeatedly claimed the troop deployments would infringe on the Peace Constitution. On 9 February 2004, however, the Diet approved the dispatch of the main Ground SDFs, finally clearing the legal process for the dispatch. The main Ground SDFs of some 600 troops joined the advance contingence in Samawah. The Ground forces were transported by the Japanese transport ship escorted by a Maritime SDF destroyer. Japan's decision to deploy Ground forces to Iraq, where major conflict was going on, marked a major turning point for Japan's security policy.

(4) Analysis and Summary

Japan's Proactive Role Behavior

[554] In a press conference, Koizumi cited the preface of the Constitution and read out a portion of the preface word by word. The Government of Japan. "Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi." December 9, 2003. <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2003/12/09press_e.html>.

As have been discussed so far, in 2003 the Japanese government responded to the U.S. call for support in proactive manner. Japan's contributed to the U.S.-led coalition made in three distinctive ways—political, military, and economic. Each of the support proved beneficial for the U.S. in garnering international support for the war in Iraq while each support posed challenges or risks to the Japanese political leaders at varying degrees. In the face of international crisis, Japan despite constitutional constraints chose to support its ally, the U.S. in war against terrorism.

First, Koizumi provided Bush with proper political support, which was reassuring for the U.S. not only in timing but also in content and intensity. Immediately after the 9/11, Japan, condemning the terrorist attack, promised support in the war against terrorism. More importantly, Koizumi pledged support for a possible military operations in the Middle East as early as February 2002, long before the Bush administration announced a plan to build an international coalition to wage a war against the Hussein regime. Once having set his mind to support the U.S., Koizumi did not waver in his decision to make necessary contribution which would be commensurate with Japan's national strength. Despite mounting domestic criticism over troop deployment, Koizumi pushed for the Japanese military support for the war in Iraq.

What is more noteworthy was Japan's diplomatic support for the U.S. in the UN. When the U.S., after the end of combat phase in Iraq, needed a UNSCR that would authorize to establish a multinational force in Iraq and to give the U.S. operational control, Japan's diplomatic support was critical for the UN's unanimous support for the resolution. While the U.S. lacked diplomatic bargaining leverage against Syria, Japan as major donor for economic aid to Syria persuaded the Syrian government to vote for the resolution.

Second, Japan provided substantial military contribution to the U.S.-led coalition, which marked stark contrast to Kaifu's response in the Persian Gulf War 1991. As we have noted, Japan's military support started as early as in 2001. When the U.S. military prepared for a possible military operation in the Middle East, the Maritime Japanese forces with Aegis-level destroyers escorted the deployment of the U.S. forces

stationed in Japan. After establishing legal ground for military support by enacting the "Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law," the Japanese government more actively supported the U.S. operations in Afghanistan by providing rear area logistics and transportation support. Japan's military support continued after the U.S. made a case for war in Iraq. Even though the troop dispatch was delayed due to security situations in Iraq and ensuing political opposition, Japan's military support, though limited to non-combat operations, proved useful for the U.S. efforts in establishing peace and stability in Iraq. The Japanese government, under the top-down leadership of Koizumi and his cabinet, passed "Iraq Special Measures Legislation" and deployed the SDFs to Iraq. The Koizumi's plan to dispatch the SDFs to a combat zone bore political risks. In the face of opposition, not only from the public and the opposition parties but also from his own party LDP, Koizumi took on political risks and pushed for troop deployment. After all, more than 1,000 SDF troops participated in the Iraq reconstruction efforts. Japan's deployment of the Maritime and Ground forces in such a scale to a countries in a *de facto* state of war, was the first time in the post-war history and thus marked a major turning point for Japan's security policy.

Lastly, along with the political and diplomatic support and the troop dispatch, Japan also made significant financial support for the U.S. and its reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Immediate after the 9/11 attacks, the Japanese government pledged to offer $10 million to help fund the rescue and cleanup mission in the U.S. In the early phases of war, the Japanese government also provide emergency economic aid to the neighboring countries—Pakistan and India—to make up for the loss incurred by the war and solicit their cooperation. In addition, Japan provided $5 billion aid package for Iraq along with $1.5 billion of grants. These financial contributions represented Japan's willingness to play more active role in sustaining peace and stability of the international system.

Japan's Security Role Conceptions

The 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 marked a turning point for Japan's post-World War security and defense policy. After promising unconditional support for the U.S., the

Japanese government went to great length to assist the U.S., enacting necessary laws and appropriating resources. By deploying the SDFs to the Persian Gulf, the Japanese government from the early stage of war provided rear-area logistic support to the U.S. In the face of terrorist attacks in the U.S., the Japanese government also proposed the modalities of Japan's response to possible armed attack on Japan. More importantly, for the first time in the post-war history, the large scale of Ground SDFs were deployed to a *de facto* combat zone. In the following, implications that each policy measure has on the Japanese security policy will be discussed.

First, with the enactment of the war contingency legislation, the Japanese government established legal ground for the "Japanization of defense." The 9/11 attacks and the North Korean nuclear crisis served to heighten the sense of insecurity, leading the Japanese government to review and modify its national defense policy and laws to be better suited for security crises. Hence, the new Koizumi cabinet discussed publicly the necessity of the legislation to deal with emergency situations. The emergency legislation consist of three legislative measures in the case of armed attacks against Japan. The first bill was the Bill to Respond to Armed Attack Situation, which prescribed basic principles for government responses in case of an armed attack. The bill specified the respective responsibilities of each national and local government agencies and stipulated necessary measures to ensure prompt and accurate responses to emergency situations. The second bill was to modify the Self-Defense Forces Law to allow prompt and effective responses to security incidents by armed agents. Newly added provisions allowed the armed SDF units to gather information and use weapons, if needed to protect the lives of Japanese. The amendment also stipulated that the use of weapons in the public security operations would be a lawful act when circumstances require the use of force. The third bill was the amendment of the Law on the Establishment of the Japanese Security Council, which was to strengthen the functions of the Security Council in the event of a national security crisis. Put together, the legal measures served to enhance Japanese government's responses to armed attacks.

In fact, the passage of the contingency bills in 2002 was the fruits of long years of studies and debates. It was 1977 when the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) first began studies on emergency legislation. The studies focused on the requirements of a legislative framework to guarantee the SDFs' effective response in times of emergency. The JDA announced the outcomes of review and suggested the outline of the main issues in 1981 and 1984.[555] These efforts did not result in actual legislation largely because the studies were not intended for immediate legislation. Given the entrenched pacifist sentiment in Japan, no politician was willing to take political risk of publicizing the issue and pushing for legislation. In the meantime, the Persian Gulf War in 1991 changed the awareness of the Japanese people, and people began to recognize that Japan's national security system, which proved ineffective in dealing with security challenges, had to be reviewed. The approval of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Area Surrounding Japan in 1999, based on the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, was a turning point. The Japanese people recognized that it was necessary to promote emergency legislation in order to defend Japan. After all, the emergency legislation in 2002 was an extension of the past efforts to promote effectiveness in dealing with emergency situations. The three bills not only reflected the outcomes of the previous efforts, but also proposed the specific measures to improve decision-making system in the event of an armed attack against Japan.

The enactment of the emergency legislation, after the legislation of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001, was epochal in that it marked a step away from Japan's exclusively defense-oriented security policy established after the World War II. Traditional policy of "exclusive self-defense" allowed the use of force as a defensive measure only when the Japanese Archipelago was under a direct attack. By enacting the emergency legislation in 2002, the Japanese government allowed the use of the SDFs in gathering information and preventing the loss of Japanese lives. The anti-

[555] Nukaga, Fukushiro. "Japan's Emergency Legislation and the War on Terrorism." *The Heritage Foundation*. June 10, 2002. <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/japans-emergency-legislation-and-the-war-on-terrorism>.

terrorism law also enabled the SDFs to be deployed for overseas missions of providing logistical support to international forces. As we have discussed, the Post-Cold War security environment required Japan to assume more proactive defense policy. Under the recognition that moderate changes to the defense posture would not serve Japan's security interest, the Koizumi cabinet pushed for active defense policy in order to adapt to the changing security environment. Despite enactments of legislative measures, Japan's defense policy was still defensive in nature. The idea that laws governing the use of the SDFs and international military support must be consistent with the peace constitution prevailed among the Japanese public and government officials. However, it was clear that the legislations marked a shift from the passive and exclusive defense to that of active and effective defense.[556]

Second, the deployment of the SDFs to Iraq marked a watershed for Japan's security policy, illustrating the possibility of exercising collective defense.[557] With the Iraq Special Measures legislation, the Japanese government had more than 1,000 SDF personnel participated in the Iraq reconstruction mission. Even though the Koizumi cabinet stressed that the SDFs would join only in non-combat operation, overseas deployment of forces on such a large scale was the first-time in the post-war history. And Koizumi's claim that fighting terrorism did not constitute combat mission and contradict the war-renouncing constitution created controversy among the Japanese politicians.

What is notable about Japan's decision to dispatch troops to Iraq was the role of the UN. The Koizumi cabinet's effort to make troop deployment to Iraq with the special measures legislation was in part empowered by the UNSCR to authorize the establishment of the multinational forces and encouraged UN member states' support. By sending the SDF forces with the UN flag, the Japanese government could alleviate domestic opposition. Had it not been for the UN resolution, Koizumi's effort to support the U.S. missions in Iraq would have faced much more fierce opposition not only from the opposition parties but also from the LDP. Indeed, for those who supported Japan's

---

[556] Park (2004).

[557] Nabeshima, Keizo. "SDF dispatch opens new era for Japan." *The Japan Times*, February 11, 2004.

increased role in the regional and international peace building effort, the SDF's participation in the Iraq reconstruction under the auspices of the UN was desirable. While it is widely understood that Japan's defense policy should accommodate changes in security environment, Japan's military contribution to the international peace and security would increase if Japan's participation would be authorized by the international community through the UN.

Lastly, Japan's response to the war on terrorism, after all, resulted in a gradual progress toward remilitarization of Japan. While the post-9/11 response measures by the Japanese government might seem epochal and dramatic, Japan's adoption of proactive foreign policy was incremental. Moves for change in security policy started in the early 1990s. Faced with the international and domestic criticism of the Japanese government for not playing its role, the Japanese government in 1992 passed the PKO law and made its contribution to the UN's PKO missions. Changes in the Japanese attitude towards exclusive self-defense policy and collective defense were already underway. The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan released in 1994 confirmed Japan's increased security commitment to the international peace and stability through the UN. The Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation signed in 1997 loosened the restrictions on the exercise of collective self-defense policy by specifying the issues of U.S.-Japan security cooperation in case of armed attack against Japan and emergency situations surrounding Japan.

In that sense, Japan's policy response made during the Gulf War was rather an incremental change than a major leap in policy. Japan's security policy shifted from passive and defense-oriented policy to responsive and proactive policy, driven by changes in security environment, threat perception as well as changes in domestic political landscape. Changes in security and defense policy inevitably accompanied domestic debate on the interpretation of the constitution. If the Japanese government would continue this course towards remilitarization, the pace and scope of policy change would depend on how effectively the Japanese government could justify its security activism in the context of the peace constitution.

Sources of Japan's Proactive Role Performance

Japan's response in 2003 War in Iraq marked a sharp break from pacifism entrenched in the Japanese society and politics. There are several factors, interconnected with each other, that contributed to Japan's proactive and swift response. First of all, Japan's unprecedented assistance to the U.S. in war against terrorism was largely driven by lessons learned from discreditable experiences of the first Persian Gulf War. It was this political learning effect that made the difference between 1991 and 2003.[558] In that sense one could argue that experiences in 1991 led to path-dependent actions and responses by Japanese policymakers. In other words, Japan's course was already set. The Kaifu administration's response was reactive and slow. Although Japan offered as much as $13 billion out of the Japanese tax payers' burden, Japan's contribution was derided as "check book diplomacy." U.S. policymakers thought that Japan's military support came as "too little, too late."[559] The limited participation of Japan left humiliation for many Japanese especially when Kuwait excluded Japan in a list of allied support. The U.S., the sole security guarantor for Japan, did not hide its frustration over Japan's passive stance, and this created a sense of urgency in Japan. The U.S. as well as the international community as a whole required Japan to play a leading role and make more commitment to the international peace and security in a way that reflects Japan's national power. The Koizumi cabinet clearly understood that defraying the cost of war alone would not fulfill Japan's role prescribed in the bilateral security agreement with the U.S.

Second, changes in Japanese political institutions helped rapidly materialize the Koizumi's support. After going through the humiliating experience during the Persian Gulf War, it came out in the open that Japan lacked political leadership to cope with post-Cold War security challenges. Therefore, the Japanese government undertook political

---

[558] For a review of the role of historical lessons by policymakers in making states' foreign policy decisions, see Reiter, Dan. *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1996.

[559] When the Japanese Diet approved the dispatch of minesweepers to the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S.-led coalition, the war was already over. Midford, P. "Japan's response to terror: dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea." *Asian Survey*, 43-2 (2003), p.330.

reforms, starting in the mid-1990s. For specific changes that contributed to Koizumi's decisive leadership in mobilizing support and resources for carrying out pledged support for the U.S., Shinoda points to three institutional changes: the 1994 electoral system, the 1999 Diet and government reform, and the 2001 administrative reform.[560] These institutional changes combined contributed to the increased centralization of prime minister's power.

Taking advantages of these institutional changes, Koizumi could react rapidly and decisively to post-9/11 security challenges. Once Koizumi was determined to provide an unconditional support, the cabinet secretariat, reinforced by the reforms, took control and responded quickly. The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Legislation was a case in point. After swiftly identifying the 9/11 attacks as a security crisis, Koizumi ordered his cabinet to revise a plan to support U.S. for possible military operations. The cabinet officials came up with specific measures to support the U.S. only in eight days and then drafted an outline of a bill that would authorize the SDF action in the Indian Ocean. The Anti-Terrorism bills were enacted on October 29, only 13 days after the bill was introduced. Koizumi's top-down leadership, supported by the empowered cabinet, enabled the swift passage of a major legislation.[561]

Third, Koizumi's proactive assistance was backed up by public support for Japan's increased role and strong leadership. One the one hand, the sense of urgency incurred by the "too little and too late" support for the war against Iraq in 1991 called for proactive foreign policy. The passage of the P.K.O. bill in 1992 could not have been possible without public support for the increased role of Japan. On the other hand, the lack of strong and effective bureaucracy had been a focal issue during the 1990s. A series of crises—the Hansin earthquake in 1995, the 1995 sarin gas incident in Tokyo, and the oil spill in the Japan Sea in 1997—increased public demand for administrative reforms to make the Japanese government more responsive to security crises. Under this changed

[560] Shinoda, Tomohito. "Koizumi's top-down leadership in the anti-terrorism legislation: the impact of political institutional changes." *SAIS Review*, 23-1 (2003): 19-34.

[561] For detailed analysis of the role of *Kantei*—the Japanese cabinet—in implementing Koizumi's anti-terrorism support, see Shinoda (2007).

political climate, Koizumi's prompt response to 2001 crisis received considerable support from the public. The announcement of the unconditional support by Koizumi in September 2001 brought about criticism from the opposition parties; however, the public support for the Koizumi cabinet remained high.

Forth, before everything else, Japan's foreign policy shift was caused by the rise of regional security challenges—North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and China's increasingly assertive behavior. Japan's renewed threat perception contributed to Japan's unprecedented support for the war on terrorism. Japan's regional security environment underwent significant changes since the dissolution of the Soviet threat. China's rapid military build-up based on continued economic development was a cause for concern. In particular, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis was intimidating event for Japan. As a counterblast to Taiwan's abandonment of the "One-China policy," China between 1995 and 1996 conducted missile tests in the waters surrounding Taiwan. Surrounded by increasingly hostile neighbors, Japan without any viable alternative became more dependent on the U.S. for its security. The cost of neglecting the U.S.-Japan security alliance surged.

North Korea was one of the key factors that contributed Koizumi's decision to support the U.S. The 1993 North Korean nuclear crisis posed a serious security challenge for Japan. Furthermore, in September 1998, North Korea fired a long-range ballistic missile over Japan, setting off an alarm in the Japanese society. Since 2001, North Korean threat reemerged rapidly as North Korea violated territorial waters, revealed abductions of Japanese citizens, and declared the existence of secret nuclear programs. These concerns gave impetus to demands for changes in defense policy in ways to allow the SDFs to respond effectively in the event of an armed attack on Japan.[562] Furthermore, in the fall of 2002, when the U.S. was contemplating invasion into Iraq, North Korea

[562] Most notably, the ruling coalition parties formed a "Government Parties Council for Iraq and North Korea. Shinoda writes, "After North Korea returned several Japanese abductees in October 2002, many Japanese recognized that threat the secretive nation posed. The Japanese government needed to strengthen is alliance with the United States in order to gain American support on this issue." Shinoda (2007), pp. 116-117.

admitted to have operated a uranium-enrichment program, withdrew from the N.P.T., and declared itself a *de facto* nuclear power. North Korea's nuclear programs became Japan's overriding security concern.

The enactment of the War Contingency Law in June 2003, which was to allow the SDFs to use force in response to armed attack on Japan, was undoubtedly consistent with Japan's concern about North Korea. Later, in implementing legislations required for troop deployment to Iraq, the Koizumi cabinet linked Japanese support for the U.S. in Iraq reconstruction to U.S. support for Japan against North Korea.[563] In a poll by Asahi Sumbun, among those who approved Koizumi's support for U.S. military actions in Iraq, 67% of them responded that North Korean issue was a major consideration.[564] Koizumi repeatedly explained that it was important for Japan to demonstrate that Japan is a trustworthy ally of the U.S. since if Japan were to come under attack by North Korea, it would be the U.S. that would come to help Japan. In short, renewed threat perception of North Korea increased Japan's dependence on the U.S. security commitment. As a result, Japan needed to bolster the alliance by expanding the role of the SDFs and responding actively to the U.S. requests for assistance.

Lastly, a personal factor cannot be ruled out. Koizumi's pro-American inclination and decisiveness played an important role in implementing Japan's proactive support. During the Gulf War, the Japanese government was led by Prime Minister Kaifu, who was hesitant and indecisive in handling a crisis. The result was delayed and limited support, much to America's dismay. In contrast, Koizumi did not hesitate to give

---

[563] Koizumi stated, "The United States has clearly stated that an attack on Japan would be an attack on the United States. The United States is the only country which clearly states that an attack on Japan would be considered as an attack on the United States. The people of Japan should not forget that the fact that the United States deems the attack to Japan as an attack to itself is serving as a great deterrence against any country attempting to attack on Japan. . . North Korea represents a threat, and I imagine many people in Japan certainly perceive threat of North Korea in the issues of abductions and unidentified vessels. Looking at the recent spate of provocative acts concerning nuclear issues, the perception of threat by many Japanese people is understandable, but it is my belief that the Japan-US Alliance is functioning effectively in regard to such issues as this. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. "Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq." March 20, 2003. <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2003/03/20kaiken_e.html>.

[564] Shinoda (2007), pp. 109-110.

categorical assurance to the U.S. Once determined, Koizumi did not waver on his commitment to support, even risking political support.

Convergence of Role Expectations and Role Performance

Figure 31. Role-based Approach to the U.S.-Japan Relations during the Gulf War



In terms of bilateral role model, the U.S. and Japan achieved security role convergence, though not in full. As presented in <Figure 31>, there was a convergence between the Japan's security role prescribed by the U.S. and the Japan's role performance. There are several elements that need to be underlined in order to understand the role convergence in a more analytical way. First, the U.S., as delineated in the Armitage

Report in 2002, encouraged Japan to redefine its security role, and Japan went to great length to accommodate it. Having in mind the special relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain as a model for the alliance, the U.S. envisioned a post-Cold War global security alliance network with the two main axes: the reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance as a backbone of a regional alliance network in the trans-Pacific region and the U.S.-British alliance in Europe and Atlantic region. The U.S. encouraged Japan to play a larger regional and international role, and the U.S. wanted the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation signed in 1996 to function "as the floor for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance."[565]

As have been discussed in this chapter, the Japanese government attempted to redefine Japan's role in the world, by enacting necessary legislations and making an epochal decision to dispatch large scale of the SDFs to Iraq. On 2 February 2004, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, during a Q&A session at the Japan National Press Club, applauded for Japan's embracement of its expanded security role. Armitage remarked:

> I believe that Prime Minister Koizumi has set a new benchmark, not just in the dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces to Iraq, but also in redefining Japan's role in the world, as well as finding a way forward for this country. The Prime Minister has a remarkable vision, and I believe the right vision at the right time. . . A little over three years ago, I joined together with Dr. Joe Nye to chair a bipartisan panel on U.S./Japan relations. I don't think that we anticipated that so much would happen so quickly. The events of the past three years have been dramatic. Indeed, my nation's entire frame of reference has shifted and brought the worldwide battle with terrorism to the fore. . . . So we can say today that much of the vision laid out in the Nye/Armitage report has become a reality. Of course, given how important this is to my country, as well as to me personally, I wish I could take more credit for these developments. But the fact is, it was our counterparts in Japan who were thinking along the same lines. It was Prime Minister Koizumi and the people of Japan who actually made this happen. In this time of change at home, in the region and around the world, Japan had not been caught standing still. Indeed, today Japan is putting its skillful hands on the tiller of the

[565] Armitage Report (2002), p. 3.

> international community, no longer content simply being a passenger, which I believe will chart a course to a direct and a rightful role in shaping a better future.[566]

It is particularly interesting to note that, Armitage, in his remarks, conceptualized the different yet complementary security responsibilities of the U.S. and Japan in terms of role conception. Armitage went on to say the following:

> Now, that may sound to some of you like an overstatement. But there can be no exaggerating the importance of this new era of self-confidence for Japan. Certainly for Japan itself the benefits mean everything from a stronger economy to a safer region. But there are also important benefits for the United States, which is recognizing an equal partner in a mature relationship, and for the international community, in its entirety, because Japan has a unique contribution to make to world affairs. History has handed the United States extraordinary wealth and power. As President Bush has said, "with great power comes great responsibility." We accept that responsibility. We will play our role. Japan too has great wealth and great power, as the second largest economy in the world, as the second largest donor of foreign aid, with a political and a cultural character that influences millions of people around the world every day. But as a country of such great significance, Japan has a different role to play. Certainly our roles are complementary, for the simple reason that we share core regional and global strategic interests, as well as common political and common economic values.[567]

For its part, since the mid-1990s, Japan became determined to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan alliance and redefine its role, contributing to the convergence of the role perception and performance. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the course of U.S.-Japan security wandered. The trade disputes between Washington and Tokyo continued, weakening the alliance cohesion. At the onset of the post-Cold War, the alliance relation between the U.S. and Japan lost focus and coherence. After such brief drift in the alliance, however, Japan turned to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Given Japan's economic prowess and international standing, the U.S. wanted Japan to be a more equal

---

[566] U.S. Department of State. "Remarks and Q & A at the Japan National Press Club." Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State. Tokyo, Japan. February 2, 2004. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/28699.htm>.

[567] Ibid.

alliance partner and play leadership not only in the region but for the most important challenges.

In order to assume increased security role, the Japanese political leaders had to overcome the war-renouncing provision in the constitution as well as the entrenched pacifism in the Japanese society. In crafting a vision for the post-Cold War U.S.-Japan security alliance, the U.S. clearly recognized that the pacifist tendency in Japan foreign policy would the major obstacle in advancing the bilateral relation toward a mature partnership. The Armitage Report pointed out as follows:

> Japan's prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. *Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation*. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner.[568]

Indeed, even though the Japanese political leaders were determined to enlarge Japan's security roles, tackling the constitutional prohibition was not without cost. Japan learned through humiliating experience in the 1991 Persian Gulf that simply writing the checks was not enough. Japan's growing leadership role demanded the Japanese government take necessary risks. At the outbreak of the 9/11 terrorist attack, Prime Minister Koizumi took risks by announcing unconditional support for the U.S. The security-related bills, that would enable the SDFs to be deployed to the Middle East in support of the U.S.-led coalition, were submitted to the Diet, and Koizumi had to face fierce opposition not only from opposition parties but also from this own party and the governing coalition. In order to get the legislations passed, Koizumi had to walk a fine line between politicians and voters who opposed Japan's involvement in the war and the U.S. who expected Japan to deliver its promise. Largely thanks to his top-down leadership and political skills as well as competent cabinet members, Koizumi managed

[568] Armitage Report (2000), p. 3.

to balance his desire for Japan to assume increased security responsibility with political cost of pursuing proactive foreign policy. After all, Japan's assistance to the U.S. war on terrorism marked a turning point in Japan's post-war defense policy.

Lingering Impact of Pacifism

Changing assessment of the values of the U.S. security guarantee and the peace constitution affected Japan's foreign policy shift. The post-Cold War security challenges required Japan, the second largest economy in the world, to make visible contributions to the international peace and stability. The U.S.-Japan security alliance, freed from the Cold War stand-off, had to be redefined and adapted to different security environment. The U.S. security strategy in the Pacific mandated to have the U.S.-Japan alliance as the centerpiece of the U.S. strategy in Asia and reinvigorate the alliance by expanding the depth and width of security cooperation. The result was increased demand for Japan's shift away from post-war pacifism. The 2002 U.S. war on terrorism was the test ground for Japan's proactive role.

In order to redefine Japan security role within the U.S-Japan alliance, major challenge that the Japanese political leaders had to tackle was the peace constitution. The war-renouncing provision of the constitution barred Japan from deploying the SDFs to defend its interests by use of force. Under general interpretation of the constitution, exercise of the right to collective self-defense was not permitted. Japan's dilemma was that when the U.S. was requesting Japan to play a leading role, the failure to respond to the demand, the Japanese political leaders assumed, would undoubtedly undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance. Changes in Japan's security environment helped Koizumi overcome the dilemma, provided assistance to the U.S, and reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan alliance. To put it in an equation, regional security threats rendered the security benefit that Japan was expected to get from the strengthened alliance partnership greater than the cost of deploying the SDFs in support of the U.S. and reinterpreting the constitution to allow for the right of collective self-dense. On the same equation, the U.S. pressure, as another external factor, also made the cost of abandoning Japan's security role greater than the

benefit of remaining as a reluctant pacifist. If Japan were to continue to redefine and expand its security roles, the pace and scope of change would rely on how well the Japanese policymakers could manage to overcome deeply entrenched pacifism.

CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

1. Conclusion

(1) Overview

Alliance Politics of Role-Playing

An alliance relationship comprises interrelated policy understandings and agreements. When fully developed, they include a common strategic objective that defines shared obligations of alliance partners; a coordinated defense strategy in which roles and responsibilities of each members are specified; an agreement on force structure to implement the defense strategy; and specialized agreements regarding base arrangement and cost-sharing.[569] An alliance is a dynamic rather than static entity. While particular strategic interests of an alliance may be enduring, the terms of alliance arrangements, in particular roles and responsibilities of alliance partners continue to change as environmental factors shaping the terms of an alliance relationship change. This research attempted to analyze the evolving roles and responsibilities in order to understand alliance discord, a subject under-studied in alliance literature despite its significance.

The research on the changing role of alliance partners and conflicts resulting from divergent role conceptions is particularly important and relevant when it comes to bilateral asymmetrical alliances. In contrast to capability aggregation model of alliance, an asymmetrical alliance is marked by specified roles and responsibilities in defense policy arrangements. Compared to multilateral alliances, two parties involved in bilateral

[569] Pollack, J. D., Cha, Y. K., Kim, C., Levin, N. D., & Chung, C. I. *A New Alliance for the Next Century. The Future of US-Korean Security Cooperation*. Rand Corp., Santa Monica CA, 1995. pp. xiii-xiv.

security groupings consult with each other about respective security roles in a more definite manner, make arrangements on the security roles, and expect the other to perform its proper security roles. Another distinctive feature of an asymmetrical alliance is that a stronger party assumes lop-sided security responsibility. The first corollary to this feature is security-autonomy trade-off.[570] The weaker party benefits security at the expense of autonomy. The second corollary is that the weaker party, dependent upon the strong party for its security, has strong incentives to be amenable to the stronger party's needs, largely out of fear of being abandoned in times of desperate security crisis. If changes in environmental factors alter alliance arrangements, the weaker party has to accommodate to the changes.

In East Asia, the U.S. developed unique bilateral alliance systems after the World War II.[571] The two key formal bilateral security arrangements in East Asia—the ROK-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance—were asymmetric in nature. The U.S. had assumed lop-sided security responsibility, and the weaker parties—South Korea and Japan—received security guarantee by allowing the U.S. forces to be stationed in their territories and enjoy strategic autonomy. The lasting regional security threat even after the end of the Cold War made South Korea and Japan to be remain dependent on the U.S. for their security. The fear and cost of abandonment by the U.S. remained insurmountable. Meanwhile, changes in the post-Cold War environmental factors and increased capabilities of its East Asia alliance partners encouraged the U.S. to realign its bilateral security arrangements. South Korea and Japan had faced increasing pressure from the U.S. to assume redefined and increased security roles and responsibilities. The U.S. call for alliance support for the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the War in Iraq in 2003 served as a test ground for alliance partners' commitment to redefined security roles.

---

[570] Morrow (1991).

[571] Cha (2010); Hemmer, C. and Katzenstein, P. J. "Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism." *International Organization*, 56-03 (2002): 575-607.

This research applied a role model to analyze allies' military, political, and economic assistance to the U.S. and its responses to alliance partners. The role model assumed that alliance relation in an asymmetrical bilateral alliance is a function of role prescription and role conception. The stronger party prescribes a certain security role for the weaker party that deem proper in security surrounding and is commensurate with the partner's capability. The strong party expects the weaker partner to fulfill its role and, if necessary, realign its security relations through consultation with its partner, by redefining security obligations and respective security roles and readjusting force structure and other specialized agreements. For its part, the weaker party develops its role conception. It refers to a role that the weaker party as an alliance partner to assume in achieving common security objectives. The role conception can be shaped by specific security requirements as well as external and domestic conditions. The role performed by the weaker party as a response to common security crisis and requests for support from the strong party reflects the role conception. However, the role performance can also be affected by specific security concerns and domestic conditions that the weaker party faced in a specific security crisis. The role prescription and role conception undergo change as an alliance evolves.

Why Intra-Alliance Conflict Matters?

According to the role model, it is the divergence between role prescription and role performance that causes conflict in intra-alliance relations. The U.S., the stronger party in the East Asian bilateral alliances, prescribes a specific, though not in concrete, security role for its alliance partner. For their part, South Korea and Japan, the weaker parties, respectively establish a role conception, a set of basic principles that would lead their foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis the U.S. A role conception, in other words, is a road map that guides policy makers in making foreign policy decisions regarding the security ties with the U.S. When there is a convergence of role prescription and performance between alliance partners, the alliance relationship will be consolidated. Parties involved in the alliance fulfill security responsibility expected by the other, even

at times even risking costs. On the contrary, divergence of security roles lead to discord in alliance. When the weaker party forsakes its security roles or failed to deliver security arrangements in case of emergency, the alliance relationship will drift apart. The stronger party with relatively bigger bargaining power would seek measures to induce or, if necessary, coerce its partner to shoulder responsibility. If the latter is the case, the future of the alliance would depend on how successfully the alliance partners could manage to close the gaps in roles and responsibilities. The U.S. requests for support in wars—the first and second Gulf War—offered unique opportunity to test its security partners' commitment to mutual security roles. The research reviewed South Korea and Japan's response to the U.S. call for support in light of security conception and performance.

In analyzing bilateral security relations between the ROK-U.S. and between U.S.-Japan, this research focused on intra-alliance relations on dyadic level. The focus on dyadic level does not invalidate the necessity of analyzing the impact of systemic and domestic level variables. However, the dyadic level analysis draws close attention to intra-alliance phenomena which has been downplayed in the alliance literature. Adding a dyadic lens into alliance studies and focusing on intra-alliance relations can shed light on relations between security areas and other foreign policy arenas within a bilateral alliance. This research analyzed how role prescriptions and role conceptions in the post-Cold War U.S. bilateral security relationships in East Asia developed over times, by tracing intra-alliance relations.

The Post-Cold War U.S. Security Role Conceptions and Bilateral Alliances in East Asia

The post-Cold War security environment forced the U.S. to review its grand strategy and realign its security agreements in order to address new, diverse security challenges. As for the East Asian bilateral security alliances, as the backbone of the U.S. security policy in Asia Pacific, the U.S. sought to redefine its security roles vis-à-vis its security partners, while readjusting defense posture in the region. The essence of alliance restructuring in East Asia was to reinvigorate the alliances by encouraging its security

partners to be integrated into and play more active role in the post-Cold War U.S. regional strategy. By doing that, for one thing, the U.S. could rebalance its regional force posture in a way to respond to new security challenges more effectively. While the U.S. was freed from the Cold War duty of providing lop-sided security to its security partners, the U.S. found itself faced new security challenges such as rogue states, the WMDs, and so on, which required the U.S. to overhaul its security policy and alliance relationship. Another factor that facilitated alliance rearrangements was strong demand for cuts in defense spending. Domestic economic difficulties and changes in threat perception made the Cold War-style defense buildup virtually unsustainable. As a result, the U.S. post-Cold War security strategy for the Asia-Pacific gave the priority to the delivery of peace dividend. With these two factors combined, it was imperative for the U.S. to realign its security arrangement vis-à-vis South Korean and Japan and to call for them to assume increased security roles, which would be commensurate with their increased capability.

Meanwhile, even after the end of the Cold War rivalry, South Korea and Japan still left dependent upon the U.S. security guarantee for their security. One might argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union combined with the increased security capability of the ROK and Japan would have substantially lowered security dependency on the U.S. However, that was not the case for East Asia. That was because, above anything else, the Cold War security threat persisted in East Asia even after the dissolution of the Soviet threat. The Korean peninsula remained the Cold War's last divide, and North Korea continued to pose serious security threat to both South Korea and Japan with its formidable military forces, relentless nuclear ambition, and missile capability. China's rapid military modernization also emerged as major security concern. Without any viable alternative alliance partners or regional security architecture to turn to, the prospect and fear of the U.S. disengagement became salient in East Asia.[572]

[572] Framing this issue in the context of alliance politics theory, Victor Cha argued that the fear of abandonment tends to dominate South Korea's and Japan's strategic choice because of power imbalances of the two states vis-à-vis the U.S., constant external threats represented by North Korea, and no alternative alliance partners. Consequently, he contended that the alliance theory based on the fear of abandonment/entrapment is still relevant in explaining alliance systems in contemporary East Asia. See

Second, South Korea and Japan could not afford to shoulder all the security burdens in case the U.S. disengages from the region. Without the U.S. presence, for instance, South Korea, faced with provocative North Korea, would have to solely responsible for its security, which would require massive military buildup. Increase in defense spending would lead to mounting pressure on economic growth. Japan's concerns over U.S. disengagement are no less than South Korea's. Without the U.S. security presence, Japan would have to shoulder the burden—both financial and political—of securing peace and stability in the region. As a result, the end of the Cold War had effectively made South Korea's and Japan's security dependence on the U.S. structurally inherent.

(2) 1991 Persian Gulf War

The ROK-U.S. Alliance

During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. did not set the bar high for South Korea's assistance to the U.S.-led coalition. The U.S. expectations for South Korea's military and economic support were not high. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. role prescription of South Korea was mainly confined to security roles in the Korean peninsula. As specified in the 1989 Nunn-Warner amendment and 1990 East Asia Strategic Initiative, the U.S. had strong initiative to gradually draw down its military foothold and to encourage South Korea to assume greater share of the responsibility for the country's defense. In that regard, the long-term strategic goal of the U.S. was the enhancement of South Korea deterrence capability, only with essential U.S. military presence, and the role of the U.S. was to be transformed from leading role to supporting role. At the time of the Persian crisis, the Korean government succeeded in maintaining proper balance amid changing respective security roles and responsibilities.

Cha, Victor D. "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea." *International Studies Quarterly*, 44-2 (2002): 261-291.

Clearly, improvements in security environment gave South Korea some latitude: the Cold War threat suddenly evaporated; Russia's and China's relative power declined; and North Korea was in a quagmire of economic difficulties. Notwithstanding the role of environmental changes, South Korea's own foreign policy initiative, *Nordpolitik*, deserves credit. South Korea's bold moves to build diplomatic relations with former Soviet countries, including Russia and China, and to resolve North Korean security threat contributed not only to improved security environment on the peninsula but to South Korea's increased autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance

Meanwhile, the U.S. set a high bar for Japan's support in the Persian Gulf War. At the end of the Cold War, Japan, along with Germany, emerged as the potential great power. The U.S. goal was to integrate Japan fully into its regional economic and political strategy. The U.S.-Japan alliance served as the linchpin of the U.S. strategy in Asia. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War rivalry diminished the tendency in Washington to play down economic interests in favor of strategic concerns. So-called "Japan bashing" intensified. U.S. Congress heavily criticized Japan for free-riding, claiming that unequal security relation is hurting U.S. economy. U.S. Congress contended that increasing trade deficit is attributable to lopsided security guarantee for Japan.

During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. expectation of Japan's role performance was not met. The U.S. requested Japan's military and economic support, but Japan failed to make visible and timely contributions largely due to entrenched pacifism and constitutional constraints. It proved that the Japanese government was still ill-suited to assume increased security responsibility that corresponds to its national power and status. After all, even though Japan, under U.S. pressure, offered $13 billion in support of the U.S. war efforts, Japan was derided by the international community. Financial contribution alone could not meet the U.S. role prescription of post-Cold War Japan.

(3) 2003 Iraq War

The ROK-U.S. Alliance

During the Gulf War of 2003, the ROK-U.S. alliance relationship drifted away. The divergent views of alliance objectives and obligations resulted in imbalances between South Korea's security role prescribed by the U.S. and South Korea's role conception. While the U.S. wanted South Korea to assume primary responsibility for defense and to contribute to the regional and international stability, South Korea attempted to envision and pursue its own security role. The intensified North Korean threat at the increasing fear of WMDs should have drawn the two alliance partners closer; however, the alliance relationship grew apart over North Korea policy. Main reason behind that was change in domestic politics—the rise of progressive political forces. South Korea's political leadership attempted to shift away from the Cold War security role and to gain autonomy in intra-alliance relation. The flash point was policy toward North Korea. While the U.S. took tougher stance against North Korea over its nuclear program, South Korea pursed appeasement policy. At the U.S. call for support in the global war on terrorism, the Roh administration was reluctant to take political risk of force deployment to Iraq and later attempted to use its military and economic assistance as political instrument to gain U.S. support for its engagement policy toward North Korea, which the U.S. was strongly opposed. As a result, South Korea's significant yet delayed military support was not fully appreciated by the U.S.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance

Japan's behavior in 2003 Iraq War marked a turning post for Japan foreign policy. Japan attempted to restore strained relations, actively embraced U.S. demand for increased security roles, and provided timely and substantial assistance to the U.S. war on terrorism. Japan's transition from reactive to proactive foreign policy was, first of all, derived from the shameful experience of the Persian Gulf War. Second, strong political

leadership buttressed by not only domestic support but political reforms took the initiative in expanding Japan's security scope and pushed for a series of security-related legislations. Third, North Korean nuclear and missile threat, as a key external factor, forced Japan to reinvigorate the military alliance. The Japanese political leaders walked a fine line between the constitution constraints and the U.S. demand for increased security roles and gradually shifted away from post-war pacifism.

After all, the 2003 Iraq War marked a significant turn for the U.S.-Japan alliance. First, the U.S. and Japan achieved horizontal expansion of their security relations. The U.S. war on terrorism served as a momentum for the U.S. and Japan to realign their security arrangements and to extend Japan's security role. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Japanese government formulated seven point support measures. In less than a month, the Japanese government enacted the Anti-Terrorism Law, which paved the way for Japan's overseas military support for the U.S. Following consultations with the U.S. on the support plan, the SDFs were deployed to the Indian Ocean for rear-area logistical support, such as fuel supply and transportation. The Maritime SDFs dispatched combat support ships and destroyers, which engaged in refueling mission for the U.S. and U.K. naval vessels. The Air SDFs supported the U.S. with C-130 transport air-cargos, transporting goods and supplies between Japan and the U.S. forward bases.

The Iraq Special Measures Legislation, mandating support for reconstruction of Iraq, further expanded the scope of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. For the first time in Japan's post-war history, the Japanese government mobilized ground forces for military operations in a foreign country in a state of war. By dispatching more than 1,000 ground forces, the Japanese government though in non-combat operation supported the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts in Iraq. During the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan security alliance aimed at maintaining security of Japan and stability of the Eastern Pacific. However, the end of the Cold War and particularly the U.S. global war on terrorism created an opportunity for the U.S. and Japan to redefine their bilateral security relations. The SDF deployment to Iraq was a testament of Japan's willingness to assume an increased security role. As a result, the scope of the alliance was effectively expanded to

include areas such as the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. In sum, the U.S.-Japan security partnership became regionalized and globalized, expanding Japan's role in maintaining international peace and stability.

Second, besides horizontal expansion, the U.S. and Japan also deepened vertical expansion of the bilateral alliance. The bilateral defense cooperation became much more deepened through collaborative efforts in the war on terrorism. On 21 September 2001, when the USS aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk departed from its base in Yokosuka for the Middle East in preparation of war, the U.S. naval forces were escorted by the Japanese naval destroyers. Even before the Diet passed the anti-terrorism law, the Japanese government committed three naval destroyers and other naval vessels from Japan's Marine SDF to provide support for the U.S. Forces in the Indian Ocean. Even though the move was symbolic, it was emblematic of Japan's willingness to honor the security rearrangement made in the 1990s. In addition, the legislation of the contingency law in April 2002 was, on the one hand, designed to prescribe Japan's military response and legalize the use of force, if needed to protect Japanese lives. On the other hand, the legislation was to ensure the smooth, unhindered operation of the U.S. forces in situations of armed attacks around Japan.[573] After all, the legislation was to promote joint U.S.-Japan operations in regional emergency situations.

Lastly, Japan's decision made in 2003 to introduce a ballistic missile defense system contributed to further upgrading bilateral security ties. Devised as a counter measure against the North Korea's increasingly formidable nuclear and missile program, the decision had Japan's missile defense program to be incorporated into the global missile defense system of the U.S., constituting the joint missile defense program as on the major pillar of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements.

Managed Conflict and Alliance Transformation

[573] Nukaga, Fukushiro. "Japan's Emergency Legislation and the War on Terrorism." *Heritage Foundation*. June 10, 2002. <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/japans-emergency-legislation-and-the-war-on-terrorism>.

Even though conflicting interests regarding coalition contributions caused tense relations and conflicts during the two Gulf Wars, intra-alliance conflicts in the U.S. bilateral security alliances did not resulted in the dissolution of alliances. Intra-alliance conflicts were managed over time. Oftentimes state officials exchanged vitriolic criticism against each other, and some commentators from both sides in bilateral relations intermittently voiced that their governments should abrogate alliance treaty. However, diplomatic flash points for tensions did not lead to lasting division or direct confrontations, not even near to the end of alliance. Instead, tense relations was sooner or later settled with the weaker parties, South Korea and Japan, ended up making supplementary contributions or realigning their foreign policy or policies for security burden sharing in ways in which would satisfy the U.S. role prescriptions. How do we make sense of this coerced convergence in security role conceptions between the U.S. and its allies?

This question is closely related to the question of the persistence of alliance—why some alliances endure even after their original rationale for alliance formation evaporated? Walt unlined the role of hegemonic power as an obvious source of durability.[574] In order to maintain alliance, a strong alliance leader exercises its power by bearing cost, offering inducements, or at times threatening to punish disloyal partners. Institutionalization, Walt argues, could extend the life of alliances.[575] The greater the level of institutionalization, the more likely alliance is to endure.

While drawing on this analytical backgrounds, this research finds the persistence of regional security threats as the major source of not only durability of the East Asia bilateral alliances but compliance by South Korea and Japan as well. Undeniably, high level of institutionalization, for both cases, helped prevent the alliances from dissolving over intra-alliance conflict. Each alliance has developed formal

---

[574] Walt (1997), pp. 164-65.

[575] To illustrate, Walt argues a large formal bureaucracy "creates a cadre of individuals whose professional perspectives are closely tied to maintaining the relationship." Ibid, p. 166. Walt contends that other factors such as preserving credibility, domestic politics and elite manipulation, and ideological solidarity can also contribute to the durability of alliances.

organizations and procedures for regular meeting to discuss various bilateral security issues such as joint military exercises, military exchanges programs, and weapons procurement, which would contribute to the maintenance of the security relations.[576]

Indeed, the ROK-U.S. alliance and Japan-U.S. alliance, like any other alliances, are rooted in institutions, perceptions, and identity beyond power and threat. Yet, the convergence of security role conceptions, in particular compliance by South Korea and Japan, after intra-alliance conflict can be best explained by security dependence on the U.S. as a vital means to address regional security threat. Without any viable alternatives, South Korea and Japan have to rely on the U.S. in order to maintain security in the face of mounting regional security threats. The anxieties over the U.S. disengagement continues to dominate strategic choice of South Korea and Japan despite their increased defense capability. Without the U.S. military presence and security guarantee, South Korea, faced with provocative North Korea, would have to be solely responsible for its security, which would require massive military buildup. Increase in defense spending would lead to mounting pressure on economic growth, drying up resources available for other investments, mostly notably social welfare.

Japan's concerns over U.S. disengagement are no less than South Korea's. Japan is immediately exposed to the threats coming from North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles. Japan also needs U.S. security commitment as a hedge against increasingly assertive China. Without the U.S. security presence, Japan would have to shoulder the burden—both financial and political—of securing peace and stability in the region.

The fear of U.S. abandonment, as Victor Cha argued, has become structurally inherent. In that sense, East Asian allies' currying favor with the U.S., as Stephen Walt argued, can be understood as a means to balance against regional threats—North Korea and China—and use American power to deal with them.[577] In terms of security-autonomy trade-offs, South Korea and Japan can attain security from the U.S. at the expense of autonomy in foreign policy decisions. After all, the alliances maintained

[576] Suh, Jae-Jung. *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*. Macmillan, 2007.
[577] Walt (2005), pp. 187–91.

because policymakers of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan understood that their national interests would be better served to be in alliance despite costs.

As a result of intense intra-alliance conflict, this research finds that, the alliances were transformed rather than dissolved. Intra-alliance conflicts were managed, but that does not mean that the alliance relations returned to their original conditions. Terms of mutual security arrangement changed. Security dependence of the U.S. is the major driving force for behind alliance transformation. As we have seen, the U.S. bilateral alliances, after the end of the Cold War, have been transformed, and intra-alliance conflicts have served as an opportunity for the U.S. to exercise its bargaining power and redefine the parameters of respective security roles and responsibilities in ways that is favorable to the U.S. security interest. South Korea has gradually transformed itself from a supporting to leading role in deterrence against North Korea, giving the U.S. forces in Korea strategic flexibility in responding to regional security challenges. Japan has gradually but surely continued to expand its security roles in the region, centering on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Figure 32. Transformation of the U.S. Alliance System



In that sense, the gravest challenges for ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan security relations would come ironically when regional security threat, say North Korea, would become significantly reduced or cease to exist for any possible reasons, whether be it regime change in North Korea or success of diplomatic efforts by South Korea or other regional actors. The worst possible scenario is as follows: China becomes more assertive

in securing its economic and security interest in the region. As a result, the Sino-U.S. power competition continues to be intensified. Then, the U.S. strategic interest of military presence based on security ties in the region will increase. However, the absence of eminent regional security threat will serve to curtail the U.S. bargaining leverage against its traditional allies, and South Korea and Japan might have a second thoughts on their commitments to the U.S. out of fear of risking their economic interest with China.

2. Implications for Research and Policy

(1) Research Implications

Role-based Approach to Alliance

First of all, this research contributes to alliance literature in IR by introducing a role model in analyzing bilateral alliance relations. Previous studies in alliance in IR have dealt with two major domains: alliance formation and alliance management. This research contributed to the latter. So far, theories and studies on alliance approached the subject of alliance management with focus on material variables, such as military and economic capability, interests, threats, and bargaining power. By incorporating role variable, this research highlighted the role of respective role conception perceived, defined, and performed by alliance partners in alliance management. Convergence and/or divergence of role conceptions constitute an important indicator that shows whether an alliance is in full harmony and ready to achieve common security goals.

The virtue of incorporating role conception into the analysis of alliance management is that it helps capture the diversity of the intra-alliance relations. The focus on asymmetry in power within an alliance relations helped understand the asymmetrical alliance and its unique nature that separate it from power aggregation model of alliance. Yet, power capability alone cannot explain diverse alliance relations that were designed

to serve specific strategic goals and interests. The alliance relations, as this research demonstrates, can be further divided according to different roles and responsibilities that an alliance member have vis-à-vis its partner(s). The role model of alliance provides an analytical framework to analyze the sub-division of labor within an alliance system. The case in point is the "hub and spoke" alliance system in East Asia, which served as the political and geographical foundation for the U.S. security strategy of the region. The role model approach, as this research attempted, would help understand different and specific roles and missions the U.S. prescribed to each bilateral relations in order to achieve regional security goals. In short, the role model approach could provide a systemic view of the U.S. alliance network in the region, in which each alliances as organs perform specific functions to sustain the massive alliance network as an organic whole.

The second advantage is that the role-based approach helps identify factors that affect the changes in security arrangements. As the cases of the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliance demonstrate, the division of labor within an alliance is influenced by not only changes in external security environment but domestic political, economic, and social conditions. More importantly, the research shows that changes in respective security roles do not merely reflect changes in external and domestic environment. Rather, even in asymmetrical alliance setting, the changes are also the result of intensive and continuous negotiations, formal/informal agreements, and compromises reached by mutual concessions between alliance partners, which often even involve enticement and coercion.

For the third advantage, the role model approach assumes that alliance is not static but ever-changing security binding, the terms of which continue to change. The majority works of alliance formation and management focus on systemic and sub-systemic conditions that determine who align with whom and on what terms, in a specific time or very limited time frame. The common security interests, the terms of agreement, and major security arrangements are assumed to remain unchanged once an alliance is fully developed. Even if they acknowledge the changing nature of alliance system, they

lack a tool to explain it. For instance, relative capability matters, but capability alone cannot grasp the scope and direction of changes in intra-alliance relations. The role-based approach allows us to trace the evolution of an alliance in a diachronic way since the most important challenge in alliance transformation is how to recalibrate and redefine roles and responsibilities and how to ensure mutual commitment. As this research demonstrated, the role model provides a proper explanatory tool to explain the undergoing alliance transformations between South Korea and the U.S. in long term perspective.

Dyadic Level Analysis and the Portents of Conflict

This research called for the use of a dyadic level approach when analyzing a bilateral alliance relationship. Regardless of whether an alliance is bilateral or multilateral, traditional studies on alliance treated alliance as a subject matter in an aggregate manner. Under the assumption that underlying principles that govern bilateral security grouping are different from those of multilateral groupings, a dyadic level approach requires emphasis to be given to the bilateral intra-alliance relations. Emphasis on intra-alliance relations underlined the reciprocity in a bilateral security grouping, the linkage between security and non-security issues, which was underestimated or even forgotten in alliance studies.

Dyadic level approach deserves particular attention in the analysis of the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia since, as the research has found, the linkage between security and economy is evident there. For example, the ROK-U.S. alliance started as a typical asymmetrical alliance in which the U.S. provided lop-sided security support in return for basing right from Seoul. In addition, the U.S. offered financial and military aid and, more importantly, offered South Korea access to its markets, supporting South Korea's export-oriented developmental strategy.[578] From the U.S. perspective, South

[578] For South Korea's post-war developmental strategy, see Amsden, Alice Hoffenberg. *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. Oxford University Press, 1992; Wade, Robert. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton

Korea's post-war economic success, known as "the miracle of Han-river," was in part attributable to the longtime U.S. support made in the framework of the bilateral alliance. The ROK-U.S. security alliance is an institution with history of more than half century. Seen from long-term historical perspective, it is important to note that a sense of reciprocity has lingering impact on the intra-alliance relations between the U.S. and South Korea. The same is true for U.S.-Japan relations as well. Japan's post-war economic success, U.S. policymakers assume, is largely attributable to the lop-sided U.S. security support to Japan.

Dyadic level approach presents us a new angle on intra-alliance management and conflict in bilateral security groupings. According to dyadic approach, any negotiations to change the parameters of alliance are dyadic, and the conflict behavior of the two member states are generated by actions taken by one state against the other. In that way, dyadic approach reveals the relations between conflicts in security areas and conflicts in other foreign policy areas—in particular, economic—within a bilateral alliance.

In the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia, conflicts in areas other than wartime contributions proved to be the portents of division or conflict to come, leaving a profound effect on bilateral relations. For example, deepening trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan and the ensuing trade dispute in the 1980s were a prelude to intra-alliance conflict to come. In 2003, the uneasy inter-government relations marked by an uneasy personal rapport between President Roh and President Bush in that sense portended friction in alliance relations, which was later exacerbated by South Korea's growing assertiveness in foreign policy, the rise of anti-American sentiment, and differences in their approach to solving North Korea nuclear crisis. All of these factors augured ill for bridging the differences that divided South Korea and the U.S. over coalition contributions.

University Press, 1990; Haggard, Stephan. *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*. Cornell University Press, 1990.

Bilateral Alliance vs. Multilateral Alliance

By adopting dyadic level analysis, the research draws attention to the need to develop analytical tools to reflect distinctive features of bilateral alliances, which separate them from multilateral security groupings. Despite its usefulness, aggregate approach to the alliance system fails to address the fact that from the formation to the management, the two types of alliances grouping—bilateral and multilateral—might be governed by somewhat different rules, logics, determinants, or mechanisms. Instead, the majority of alliance studies had focused on NATO, a multilateral groupings, and the findings from the studies were applied to the analysis of bilateral alliance system without necessary critical review of different conditions that separate one from the other. The international politics of today requires special attention to the bilateral security groupings. The U.S. under the rubric of the "pivot to Asia" or "rebalancing" has strong initiative to strengthen existing bilateral security alliance and expand new bilateral ties with partners in Asia. More elaborate analytical framework is required to make sense of the expanding security network in Asia and around the world.

(2) Policy Implications

After changes in security environment marked by the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has continued to realign security arrangements with its allies and partners in accordance to the shift in national security strategy. The strategic shift from deterrence to preemptive attacks required the U.S. to readjust its global defense posture and defense policy. As the backbone of new defense strategy, the U.S. initiated a global realignment of its military forces under the name of the Global Posture Review (GPR).[579] The ultimate goal the

[579] U.S. Congress. "The Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed Overseas." Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, September 23, 2004. Vol. 108; Feith, Douglas J. "Transforming the US Global Defense Posture." Center for Strategic and International Studies (2003); _____. "Strengthening US Global Defense Posture: Report to Congress." Department of Defense. September 17, 2004; Krepinevich, Andrew, and Robert O. Work. "A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era."

GPR was to increase strategic flexibility and agility in responding to global security challenges. The U.S. global rebalancing of force structure accompanied the rearrangement of alliance structure.[580] Security vacuum created by troop reduction should be filled with close coordination with allies, and the increased security burden should be shared by relevant security stakeholders. In that regard, the U.S. realignment of its alliance structure in East Asia was not an option but a necessity. In the following, policy implications of this research will be discussed.

ROK-U.S. Relations

First, the undergoing ROK-U.S. security realignment requires the Korean government to maintain proper balance between the U.S. role prescription and South Korea's role conception. Seen from the role perspective, the transition of the U.S. forces from a leading role to a supporting role in defense of South Korea is still underway. Between South Korea and the U.S., institutional arrangements that would settle down the transition when completed are in progress. Key issue areas include: transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and a new combined defense system, strengthening combined defense posture, and defense cost sharing. After 9/11 attacks, South Korea and U.S. initiated the transfer of wartime OPCON with the goal of improving the combined command structure. The discussion took off in full scale after the 37th ROK-U.S. SCM in 2005, and after a delay, President Lee Myung-Bak and President Obama in 2010 agreed to complete the transfer on 1 December 2015.[581] Yet

---

Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2007).

[580] O'Hanlon, Michael. *Unfinished Business: US Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century*. Center for A New American Security, 2009.

[581] During the ROK-US Summit talk in 2006, President Roh and President Bush agreed on needs and basic principles for the transition, and in February 2007, the Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense confirmed the transfer date of 17 April 2012. In order to provide a concrete basis for implementing the transition, the ROK and U.S. approved 'Strategic Transition Plan (STP),' which contains detailed tasks and timeline. However, it was a series of North Korean provocations—testing nuclear weapons and missile in 2009, the Cheonan sinking, the shelling of Yongpyeong islands in 2010—that fueled public concern over the transition and finally delayed the transfer. At the 42nd SCM in October 2010, the ROK Minister of Defense and U.S. Secretary Defense signed the 'Strategic Alliance 2015' to

the problems of the "deadline-based approach" brought up after President Park Geun-Hye took office. In 2014, the leaders of two countries called for the transfer to be "condition-based" and agreed to postpone the transfer indefinitely.[582]

Along with wartime OPCON transfer, the ROK and the U.S. also have recognized the importance of establishing a command structure that can maintain the efficiency of the current Combined Forces Command (CFC) after the OPCON transfer. The OPCON transfer and a new combined defense system would mark a fundamental change in standing operating procedure of defense posture, which involves changes of command and control. The new alliance command structure would be vital in maximizing the efficiency of ROK-U.S. combined operations.[583] At the same time, the two countries are consolidating, closing, and relocating the U.S military bases scattered nationwide in order to ensure secure basing.[584] The proper level of Seoul's cost for supporting U.S. troops is also being discussed since it is crucial in fostering a sustainable stationing of the USFK.[585] These issues have significant meanings in the ROK-U.S.

---

replace the STP and set a basic framework for the OPCON transfer. Ministry of National Defense. *Defense White Paper 2012*. Republic of Korea, 2012.

[582] Reportedly, South Korea and the U.S. agreed that the transfer would take place by mid-2020 when South Korean forces would possess necessary defensive capabilities to address North Korean threat. Harper, Jon. "OPCON transfer, US troop redeployment in Korea postponed indefinitely." *Stars and Stripes*. October 23, 2014.

[583] During the MCM held in April 2013, the defense heads of two countries agreed to replace the existing CFC with a new "Combined Theater Command (CTC)" in which U.S. military will be under the command of Korea's military with a four star Korean general serving as CTC commander and a U.S. general as a deputy commander. Yet, the final plan is yet to be finalized since the OPCON transfer has been further delayed indefinitely.

[584] The base relocation plan consists of two major parts. First, the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) is to relocation of the key headquarters—UNC, CFC, and USFK Commands—all located in Yongsan, Seoul to Pyeongtaek. Second, the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is a plan to consolidate USFK military facilities and close, thereby return, unnecessary facilities and land. The Agreement for the LPP was signed and ratified in 2002 and later amended to include the relocation of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division. As a follow-up, Facility Master Plan was established to manage successful relocation of the major USFK bases and the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek. In 2011, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to complete the construction of Pyeongtaek base by 2105. See Ministry of National Defense (2012).

[585] The size of ROK's share was to be determined by taking into account various factors, including the ROK's financial capacity, guaranteeing stable stationing conditions for the USFK, and the USFK's contribution to the defense of ROK. During the 8th SMA in 2009, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to reflect the consumer price of two years ago when increasing the annual defense cost sharing with the ceiling of

alliance. First of all, it would provide an opportunity of the alliance to evolve into a comprehensive strategic alliance. With a new defense structure that reflects South Korea's increased capability, Seoul could play a leading role in fostering a new cooperative security order in the region. Second, wartime OPCON transfer and a new combined command system would serve to enhance the Korean forces' capability. Under a new command structure, the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) would exercise command and control over both peacetime and wartime operations. In that way, the South Korea's military could take a leading role in developing operational plan and have more operational freedom, executing ground, naval, and air operation with the U.S. forces.

What this research implies to the on-going alliance transformation is that South Korean policy makers should be well aware of the U.S. role prescription of South Korea. That does not necessary mean that South Korea should blindly follow the role prescribed by the U.S. Even in asymmetrical alliance, security rearrangements usually go through negotiations and bargaining. Rather that means South Korea when negotiating terms of security agreements should carefully measure the scope of negotiations available within the expectations of the U.S. In addition, when there seems to be a divergence in roles conceptions and responsibilities, South Korea should carefully weigh benefits against risks and costs. What would the U.S. response be if South Korea would rely on the U.S. security guarantee without making visible effort in the "Koreanization of the Korean defense"? Japan's experience in 1991 Persian Gulf War might be a helpful reference. Japan's downright reluctance to assume proper security role brought about international criticism and anger from the U.S. As a result, Japan lost a chance to take initiative in redefining its post-Cold War security roles vis-à-vis the U.S., the cost of which were discord in the U.S.-Japan alliance and domestic political and social unrest.

This research also suggests that policy makers should pay close attention to factors that would affect the U.S. role prescription. Significant changes in regional

4 percent increase. In the latest SMA negotiation, the two sides agreed to another increase in ROK's burden sharing to 920 billion won in 2014, a short of Washington's original demand for 1 trillion Won. See Song, Sang-ho. "South Korea agrees to pay 5.8% more to host U.S. troops," *The Korea Herald*. January 12, 2014.

security environment as well as the U.S. domestic conditions—the Congressional pressure and the U.S. defense budget cuts—could lead to redefinition of respective security roles and terms of agreements. It should also be noted that South Korea's domestic politics might work either to promote or to hinder South Korea's role conception and performance. To add, the ROK-U.S. security alliance should be understood in the context of the intra-alliance relationship on a dyadic level. South Korea's policy makers should learn to use the inescapable nexus between security and non-security issues to their interest.

Another implications of this research is that the North Korean issue should be of major consideration in order to take initiative in establishing proper role within the ROK-U.S. alliance. Implementing more autonomous foreign policy hinges on, among other things, whether South Korea can independently find ways to relieve security tensions in the Korean peninsula and to improve inter-Korean relations. The Roh administration strived to gain independence from the U.S. and pursued an engagement policy towards North Korea. However, after the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, the Roh administration failed to make visible progress in resolving the nuclear standoff. After all, South Korea's diplomacy became hostage to North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship and ended up becoming more dependent on the U.S. in resolving nuclear crisis. The decision to deploy troops to Iraq despite domestic opposition and political risk was made largely to gain the U.S. consent on the engagement policy, but North Korean threat persisted. Meanwhile, *Nordpolitik* might be a good reference point. South Korea's proactive foreign policy, driving a wedge between the communist countries and North Korea, contributed to significant improvement of the inter-Korean relations, which, in turn, helped South Korea to gain latitude in the ROK-U.S. relations. Successful management of inter-Korean tensions is an essential precondition for playing a leading role with greater autonomy in intra-alliance relations.

As South Korea and U.S. attempts to upgrade now the 60-year-old alliance into a "comprehensive alliance" that stretches beyond security to encompass economic,

social, and cultural exchanges,[586] it becomes increasingly important for South Korea to take its position in which national interest can be maximized. The on-going transformation of the ROK-U.S. alliance brings challenges, but at the same time it creates possibilities for South Korea. Most notably, the rise of China serves to increase South Korea's geopolitical importance. Mindful of this, South Korea should take advantage of the on-going security rearrangements—wartime OPCON transfer, a new combined defense system, and strengthening combined defense—to consolidate South Korea's strategic value to the U.S. regional security strategy. For example, newly fortified and integrated U.S. military bases in Pyeongtaek might function as a Main Operating Base (MOB).[587] Further increased strategic value will give South Korea more say in key security decisions.

In the medium term perspective, the biggest challenge would be South Korea's strategic positioning between the U.S. and China. The power transition between the U.S. and China is becoming increasing visible, and the U.S. is committed to the pivot of its

---

[586] The White House. "Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America." May 07, 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/07/joint-declaration-commemoration-60th-anniversary-alliance-between-republ>. The joint declaration confirmed two nation's commitment to the 2009 Joint Vision for the alliance, which laid out for the first time a blueprint for the future development of the strategic alliance.

[587] According to the U.S. Department of Defense, MOBs will be permanent bases with resident forces and robust infrastructure. They are intended to support training, security cooperation, and the deployment and employment of military forces for operations. Examples include: Ramstein Air Base in Germany, Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, and Camp Humphreys in Korea. The more austere facilities—Forward Operating Sites (FOSs) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs)—are focal points for combined training and will expand and contract as needed to support military operations. FOSs will be scalable, "warm" facilities intended for rotational use by operational forces. They often house prepositioned equipment and a modest, permanent support presence. FOSs will support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. Examples include: Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. CSLs will be facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence. Instead they will be maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host-nation support. CSLs will provide contingency access and be a focal point for security cooperation activities. A current example of a CSL is in Dakar, Senegal, where the Air Force has negotiated contingency landing, logistics, and fuel contracting arrangements. See U.S. Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy of the United States America 2005.* Washington D.C. (March 2005), p. 19.

policy towards Asia.[588] Changing regional security environments marked by the rise of China and instability of North Korea will continue to redefine South Korea's security role within the ROK-U.S. alliance. In that regard, South Korea should be remain alert to even subtle changes in the U.S. alliance policy toward the East Asia.[589] While Asian countries support an active U.S. role in the region and the U.S. is strongly committed in Asia, the U.S. will begin to ask how much its Asian allies are willing to help, pressuring them to do their shares. Stephen Walt points out that:

> The Asian states who are supposedly worried about China's rise don't seem willing to do very much to balance against it. Instead, they seem to be mostly interested in getting Washington do the heavy lifting, while they continue to enjoy profitable economic ties with Beijing and keep their own defense burdens low.[590]

Those who are optimistic say that the two relations are not mutually exclusive: improving one relations will not hurt the other. However, given the South Korea's growing economic dependence on the Chinese market, walking the diplomatic tight rope might not be easy. The case in point is the Missile Defense. The U.S. wanted to integrate South Korea into its global missile defense system. Admittedly, the U.S. currently has strong initiative to deploy its missile defense battery into the Korean peninsula and urges South Korea to purchase a missile defense. However, the Korean government continued to refuse to accept the U.S. proposal in order not to instigate China. Keeping the balance between the U.S. and China would be a difficult task because, as the role based approach implies, what matters in the ROK-U.S. alliance is what the U.S. wants.

---

[588] Obama, B. and L. E. Panetta. "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." U.S. Department of Defense. January 2012. For military aspect of the pivot, see U.S. Department of States. "Shangri-La Security Dialogue, Delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta." Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, June 02, 2012. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681>.

[589] Sheen points out that the Obama administration's South Korea policy has been focused on increasing South Korea's security burden, by redefining the parameters of mutual security commitment. Sheen, Seong-Ho. "The Obama administration's East Asian policy and alliance policy on the Korean peninsula." *EAI National Security Panel Report*, 39 (2009).

[590] Walt, S. M. "What Has Asia Done for Uncle Sam Lately?," *Foreign Policy* (2014). <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/15/what_has_asia_done_for_uncle_sam_lately_pivot_obama_china>.

While working on the present and mid-term challenges, South Korea at the same time should be prepare for the long-term challenges in the ROK-U.S. alliance. The pressing concern would be of the proper role of the U.S. after the unification. Presumably, uncertainties and potential instabilities would continue to characterize the regional security order in the coming decade. However, major change in the Korean peninsula could occur, and accordingly the regional security environment would undergo a major transformation. In particular, the reduction or elimination of North Korean threat would incur dramatic change in the alliance politics. Under such circumstances, the need for alliance would diminish appreciably. The scale, size, and role of the U.S. military forces might be curtailed. Then, the following questions would address South Korea's key security challenges. If the alliance's singular goal, deterring North Korean threat, would cease to exist, the interests of the U.S. and the ROK would grow more divergent? If regional stability is realized in the longer term, how the ROK-U.S. security alliance should be rearranged? What would be the U.S role prescription of South Korea, and what kind of security role South Korea should assume in relation to the U.S.?

U.S.-Japan Relations

Second, after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and Japan have continued to consolidate their security cooperation, gradually materializing regionalization and globalization of their security relations. Through the regular joint security consultative committee meetings (2+2 Meeting), the two countries agreed to promote Japan's active engagement to improve the regional and international security environment, emphasizing the need for Japan's increased military capability to respond effectively to diverse security threats.[591] The U.S. and Japan also continued to realign defense force posture in Japan

[591] For example, at the 2+2 meeting held in 2005, Japan and U.S. reached an agreement to finalize the direction of reshaping the bilateral alliance. Two primary areas of bilateral concerns were "1) defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies, and 2) efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities." See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." Security Consultative Committee

in order to ensure secure presence of the U.S. military forces in Japan.[592] When completed, Japan's defense posture would be optimized to serve as a U.S. forward base in Asia. After joint research, the U.S. deployed Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles on U.S. bases in Japan, integrating Japan into its global missile defense system. While reaffirming the U.S. security commitment to the defense of Japan, the U.S. continued to encourage Japan to assume increased regional and global security roles and to pursue proactive foreign policy. Most recently, in a joint statement, the U.S. reiterated that the U.S. security commitments extend to all the territories of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, and welcomed Japan's consideration of exercising the right of collective self-defense.[593]

However, it should be noted that the security role convergence between the U.S. and Japan bears serious repercussions. Amicable relationship between the two alliance partners might be desirable for the bilateral security alliance itself. However, Japan's embrace of the U.S. call for increased security roles might lead to undermine the regional peace and stability, the very goal that U.S.-Japan security alliance is designed to uphold. First, the U.S. push for Japan's increased regional role might lead to Japan's political disorder. The Japanese government's moves to remilitarize and exercise the collective self-defense might trigger strong domestic backlash in Japan. Usually, a political escape from mounting domestic criticism of the subservient government to a stronger power—the U.S.—is nationalism. Japan's recent historical revisionism can be understood in that perspective. Second, Japan's gradually remilitarization would contribute to regional instability. In close coordination with the U.S., the Japanese government continues the horizontal and vertical expansion of the SDF's military capacity. Due to historical reasons, however, developments in the military and security field would pose significant

---

Document. October 29, 2005. <ttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>.

[592] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." May 1, 2006. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html>.

[593] The White House. "U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond." April 25, 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac>.

security threat to neighboring countries, escalating tensions and eventually causing security dilemma. In order to avoid unnecessary conflicts, Japan has to maintain a proper balance between its desire to play bigger role in the U.S.-Japan security and growing concern of its neighbors.

For that reason, the challenge of strategic U.S.-ROK-Japan triangle cooperation has become more difficult for the U.S.[594] The increasing regional threat should have drawn the U.S. and its two Northeast Asian partners closer. The U.S. has a strong initiative in strengthening the triangular alliance in order to coordinate response to regional security challenges, posed by North Korean's nuclear ambition and China's rapid military modernization and increasingly assertive foreign policy. However, the U.S. efforts to promote the trilateral cooperation has been stranded because of the political standoff between South Korea and Japan.[595] Unless historical problems would be resolved, South Korea's security needs and role conception within the quasi-alliance could not be separated from South Kora's political relations with Japan and the status of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Careful coordination of the security roles and responsibilities between the three countries would be essential in promoting the three-way relationships.

Whiter the San Francisco System?

In conclusion, the last question will be about the future of the bilateral alliance in East Asia. Despite the region's economic dynamism and increasing economic integration, a comprehensive regional political and security institution is lacking.[596] Developments in the region's major powers continue to underline the sense of uncertainty in the region. Yet, besides bilateral security ties between ROK and the U.S.

---

[594] Calder, Kent. "The Strategic US-Japan-Korea Triangle: Emerging Perils and Prospects for Cooperation." *Nippon*. December 24, 2013. <http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a02702/#auth_profile_0>.

[595] Victor Cha argued that when fears of U.S. disengagement are salient, South Korea and Japan have strong incentives to cooperate. Cha, Victor D. *Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

[596] Pempel, T. John, ed. *Remapping East Asia: the Construction of a Region*. Cornell University Press, 2005.

and between the U.S. and Japan, there is no institutionalized security architecture in East Asia to restrain potential geopolitical rivalries.[597]

The future of the ROK-U.S. alliance will depend on the future of the East Asian security order. If security tensions continue to rise as the power competition between the U.S. and China intensifies, what would be the U.S. position in East Asia? And more importantly, in what ways the U.S. would attempt to lead the alliance? What kind of security roles will the U.S. want its alliance partners to assume? How might South Korea and Japan fulfill the U.S. aspirations? On the other hand, once the common regional security threats cease to exist in the long term, say peaceful unification of the two Koreas and China's full integration into the Western economic order followed by democratic transition, how might South Korea and the U.S. judge the possibilities for continued security collaboration? How would South Korea's long-term security goals and interests converge with or diverge from the U.S. security strategy? Slavoj Zizek, a philosopher and psychoanalyst, argued that in relations between the subject and the other, the subject's question of "*Che Vuoi* (What do you want)?" to the other eventually returns to the subject himself. Whatever course the future takes, the question of "what the U.S. wants?" would remain as an important reference point for the direction of South Korea's security strategy.[598]

3. Limitations of the Research and Future Research

(1) Research Limitations

[597] It is often argued that regional multilateral security framework would complement, but not replace, the existing U.S.-based bilateral alliance system. Cha, Victor D. "Complex patchworks: US alliances as part of Asia's regional architecture." A*sia Policy*, 11-1 (2011): 27-50.

[598] Zizek, Slavoj. (1989). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. Verso, 1989, pp.81-130.

This section addresses potential challenges and limitations of this research as a preliminary step in laying out directions for future research in alliance study. First, there have been limitations in the research caused by the scarcity of firsthand materials. Presenting security role conceptions by policymakers of each state requires comprehensive analysis of primary sources—conversations between leaders of alliance members, records of conversations within and between policymakers and top security officials of each state, and records of speeches, interview, press releases and even personal memoirs of policymakers. Yet, the sensitive nature of subject matter—how much to request and how much to comply—constrains the availability of sources. And policymakers of states involved would be reluctant to release their true intention for the sake of negotiations and diplomacy. That is particularly true in the analysis of 2003 Iraq War cases. Much of the relevant sources are yet to be widely available both in the U.S. and South Korea/Japan. For that reason, analyses of all the four cases remain to be reconfirmed and reevaluated if more primary sources become available over time.

Second, the research focused primarily, though not exclusively, on the U.S. side. The outcomes of analysis revealed that the weaker parties in the alliance—South Korea and Japan—ended up complying with the security role prescribed by the U.S. In a way, that reflects the *Sollen* and *Sein* dichotomy. The analytical outcomes, the power imbalance and coerced compliance by the weak parties, are not much about the way things have to be that way—*sollen*—but the way things are—*sein.* Yet, it should be noted that this research presented a U.S.-centered perspective on intra-alliance conflict in which the U.S. finally gets what it wants, which is not necessarily true for all intra-alliance bargaining even in asymmetric alliances.[599] Indeed, the U.S. bilateral alliance relations in East Asia are ripe with historical instances in which small states exercised big influence with alliance decision making. In that regard, whether the analytical

[599] Keohane, Robert O. "The big influence of small allies." *Foreign Policy* 2 (1971): 161-182; Handel, Michael I. *Weak states in the International System*. Psychology Press, 1990. For an example of an application to the ROK-U.S. relations, see Alln, Mlm Suk. "The Big Influence of a Small State!." *The Korean Journal of International Relations*, 46-5 (2006): 37-72.

framework based on role conceptions can explain that aspect of asymmetric alliance remains to be tested.

Lastly, this research could not adequately incorporate the effect of historical lessons into analytical framework. Arguably, Japan's unprecedented assistance to the U.S. in 2003 was largely driven by lessons learned from discreditable experiences in 1991.[600] Experiences in 1991 might have led to path-dependent actions and responses by Japanese policymakers. Yet, this research could not fully address the political learning effect in analytical method.

(2) Future Research

This section will lay out some of these more immediately accessible avenues for future research. The following future research suggestions arise out of the research limitations identified above. First, the utility of the analytical framework based on role conceptions can be examined in different contexts and settings. The focus of this research is placed on a specific context—U.S. bilateral security groupings in East Asia during the two Gulf Wars; therefore, this research cannot be generalized to explain intra-alliance conflicts. Yet, it can still be applied to other bilateral security groupings. As of 2014, the U.S. have designated 18 countries, including South Korea and Japan, as close allies who have strategic working relations with varying degree of formality and mutual security commitment. Based on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 the U.S. can provide military and financial benefits to those states. The analytical framework used in this research may be applied to intra-alliance management to those major non-NATO allies of the U.S.

[600] It can also be argued that lessons of World War II— military aggression and devastating defeat—also have lingering impact on Japan's security decisions. In that sense, there are many different strands of historical lessons at work for Japan's policymakers. For a discussion on the effect of historical learning on Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis, see Takashi, Inoguchi. "Japan's response to the Gulf crisis: an analytic overview." *Journal of Japanese Studies* (1991), pp. 263-66.

The role-based approach can also be applied to other asymmetric alliances or bilateral security alignments, whether formal or informal, temporary, *ad hoc,* or permanent. For instance, the evolution of Sino-North Korea relations might be explained in the framework. In doing so, necessary modifications in analytical framework might lend some insight into the understanding of specific cases.

Second, the role-based approach to intra-alliance conflicts can be further developed. It can be achieved by following different strategies. The alliance role conception argument can be expanded by adding new independent or inter-mediate variables into the conceptual framework and reexamining variables that were not focused. In asymmetric alliance, for example, consideration of small power's role expectations of a great power, alliance leader, might lead to a more comprehensive understating of dynamics of intra-alliance management. Different role types within bilateral security alliance can also be specified with distinct descriptions of roles based on mission, mutual security arrangement or commitment, state's military and economic capability, or the capacity of political leadership. In addition, role-based approach to alliance can be developed with focus on material or non-material variables that were not addressed in this research, if justified by alliance literature.

Lastly, building on the findings of this research, the study on intra-alliance management can be further developed. Major findings, such as the importance of the security role conceptions by policymakers, inextricable linkage between low and high politics, portents of intra-alliance conflicts to come, coerced-compliance, and etc. may lead to new avenues of approach to intra-alliance management or alliance bargaining in general.

REFERENCES

Advisory Group on Defense Issues. *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*. Tokyo: Advisory Group on Defense Issues, 1994.

Allen, Richard V. "Seoul's Choice: The U.S. or the North." *New York Times*. January 16, 2003.

Ahn, Mun-Suk. "The Big Influence of a Small State!." *The Korean Journal of International Relations*, 46-5 (2006): 37-72.

Amsden, Alice Hoffenberg. *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. Oxford University Press, 1992.

Apple Jr., R. W. "Bush is reported ready to retreat on military money." *New York Times*, March 18, 1990.

Armacost, Michael H. *Friends Or Rivals?: The Insider's Account of US-Japan Relations*. Columbia University Press, 1996.

Armitage, Richard L. "A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea." *Global Security* (March 1999).

Armitage, Richard and Joseph Nye. "The United States and Japan: advancing toward a mature partnership." *INSS Special Report*, 11 (2000).

Art, Robert J. "A defensible defense: America's grand strategy after the Cold War." *International Security*, 5-53 (1991).

Aspin, Les and Colin L. Powell. *Bottom-Up Review*. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 1993.

Bak, Sang-Mee. "South Korean Self-Identity and Evolving Views of the United States." In *Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the US-ROK Alliance* (2004).

Baker, James A. *The Politics of Diplomacy*. New York, 1995.

Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. *Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing and the War in Iraq*. Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2008.

Bandow, Doug. "Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment." *Parameters*, 33-2 (2003).

Barringer, Felicity. "U.N. Chief Says New Force in Iraq Can Be Led by U.S." *New York Times*. August 23, 2003.

Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War." *International Organization*, 48-01 (1994): 39-75.

Berger, Thomas U. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Vol. 272. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Berry Jr, W. E. *North Korea's Nuclear Program: the Clinton Administration's Response*. Institute for National Security Studies. U.S. Air Force Academy, 1995.

Betts, Richard K. "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War." *International Security*, 18-3 (1993): 34-77.

_____. "Southeast Asia and US Global Strategy," *Orbis*, 29-2 (Summer 1985).

Bickers, Amy. "S. Korea to Send 3,000 Troops to Iraq." *Voice of America*. 2003.

Blanchard, Christopher M., and Catherine Marie Dale. "Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction." *Congressional Research Service* (2007).

Boemeke, M. F., Feldman, G. D., Chickering, R. and Glaser, E. (Eds.). *The Treaty of Versailles: a Reassessment after 75 Years*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Bong, Youngshik and Katharine HS Moon. "Rethinking Young Anti-Americanism in South Korea." In *The Anti-American Century* (2007): 77-108.

Bowman, Tom. "U.S. to Shift 3,600 Troops from S. Korea to Iraq: Army Struggling to Quell the Growing Insurgency." *Sun National*. May 18, 2004.

Boyd, J. Patrick and Richard J. Samuels. "Nine lives?: the politics of constitutional reform in Japan." East-West Center Washington, Washington, DC: Policy studies, 19 (2005).

Breuning, Marijke. “Role research: genesis and blind spot.” In Harnisch, Sebastian, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (Eds.) *Role Theory in International Relations*. Taylor & Francis (2011).

Brinkley, Douglas. “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine.” *Foreign Policy* (1997): 111-127.

Brooke, James. “Threats and Responses: Seoul: Musing on an Exodus of G.I.’s, South Korea Hails U.S. Presence.” *New York Times*. March 8, 2003.

_____. “Threats and Responses: Weapons; South Opposes Pressuring North Korea, Which Hints It Will Scrap Nuclear Pact.” *New York Times*. January 1, 2003.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “Selective global commitment.” *Foreign Affairs* (1991): 1-20.

Buckley, Roger. *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Book 21). Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Bush, on Tokyo Visit, Calls Koizumi ‘a Great Reformer.’ ” *New York Times*. February 18, 2002.

Bush Presidential Library and Museum of George Bush. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit.” September 11, 1990. <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9>.

_____. “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with President Roh Tae Woo.” The White House, Washington DC. June 6, 1990.

_____. “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with President Roh Tae Woo.” The White House, Washington DC. October 17, 1989.

_____. “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong Koo.” The White House, Washington DC. September 11, 1990.

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan on August 29, 1990.” The White House, Washington DC. August 29, 1990.

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan, September 13, 1990.” The White House, Washington DC. September 13, 1990.

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan.” The White House, Washington DC. August 13, 1990.

_____. “Remarks Following Discussions with President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea.” The White House, Washington DC. October 17, 1989.

Bush, G. W. “State of the Union Address: Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.” White House, Washington DC. January 29, 2001.

_____. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Executive Office of the President. Washington DC, 2002.

_____. “The President’s News Conference with President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea in Seoul, South Korea,” The American Presidency Project. February 20, 2002. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73261>.

Bush, George H. W. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1990*. Brassey’s, 1990.

_____. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1991*. Brassey’s, 1991.

Calder, Kent E. “Japanese foreign economic policy formation: explaining the reactive state.” *World Politics*, 40-04 (1988): 517-541.

_____. “The Strategic US-Japan-Korea Triangle: Emerging Perils and Prospects for Cooperation.” *Nippon*. December 24, 2013.

Campbell, Kurt M. “The end of alliances? Not so fast.” *Washington Quarterly*, 27-2 (2004): 151-163.

Carter, Ashton B. and Perry, W. J. “Back to the Brink.” *Washington Post*. October 20, 2002.

Carter, Ashton B., William J. Perry, and John M. Shalikashvili. “A Scary Thought: Loose Nukes in North Korea.” *Wall Street Journal*. February 6, 2003.

Cha, Victor D. “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 44-2 (2002): 261-291.

_____. *Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

_____. “Anchored or Adrift?.” *Strategic Asia*, 4 (2003): 109-130.

_____. “Complex patchworks: US alliances as part of Asia’s regional architecture.” *Asia Policy*, 11-1 (2011): 27-50.

_____. “Korea’s Place in the Axis.” *Foreign Affairs*, 81 (2002).

_____. “Politics and Democracy under the Kim Young Sam Government: Something Old, Something New.” *Asian Survey* (1991): 849-863.

_____. “Powerplay: Origins of the US alliance system in Asia.” *International Security*, 34-3 (2010): 158-196.

Cha, V. D. and Kang, David C. “The Korea Crisis.” *Foreign Policy* (2003).

Chang, Noh-soon. “Trade-Off in the “Autonomy-Security Trade-Off Model”: The Case of Asymmetric U.S.-South Korea Alliance.” *Korean Journal of International Studies*, 36-1 (1996).

Cheney, Dick. *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993.

Cho, Dong-jun. “Oegyojeongchaekgyeoljeongja simlibunseokui yoyongseong gyeomto [Examining the utility of psychological factors of foreign policy decision makers].” *Korean Journal of Political and Diplomatic History*, 26-1 (2004).

Choe, Sang-Hun. “North Korea Launches Anti-Ship Missile.” *Bangor Daily News*. February 25, 2003.

_____. “South Korea’s ‘balancer’ policy attacked.” *New York Times*, April 9, 2005.

Choi, Tae Y. and Su G. Lee. *Effect Analysis of US Military Aid to the Republic of Korea*. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, 1989.

Christensen, T. J. “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia.” *International Security*, 23-4 (1999): 49-80.

Chun, Chae-Sung. “Rohtaewoo haengjeongbuui bukbangjeongchaek gyeoljeongyoingwa ihuui bukbangjeongchaek byeonhwagwajeong bunseok [Determinants of the Roh administration’s Nordpolitik and process of change of the policy].” In Ha, Yong-chool (Ed.). *Bukbang Jeongchaek: Kyiown, Jeongae, Yeonghyang [Nordpolitik: Origin, Development, Effect]*. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2003.

_____. “The Northern Policy: Analysis of Determinants in Roh Tae Woo Administration`s Nordpolitik.” *Journal of World Politics*, 24-1 (2002): 259-279

_____. “Theoretical Approaches to Alliance: Implications on the ROK-US Alliance.” *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Vol.7-2 (2000): 71-88.

Clinton, Bill. *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. White House, Washington D.C., 1994.

Clinton, Hillary. “America’s Pacific century.” *Foreign Policy*, 189-1 (2011): 56-63.

Cohen, William S., ed. *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. DIANE Publishing, 1997.

Cossa, Ralph A. “US-Korea: Summit Aftermath.” PacNet, Pacific Forum. Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001). <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0111.pdf>.

_____. “Silence Loose Cannons in S. Korea-U.S. Relations.” *Sentinel*. November 8, 2004.

Cotton, James. “North-South Korean relations: another false start?.” *The World Today* (1989): 104-108.

Cronin, Patrick M. and Michael J. Green. *Redefining the US-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program*. No. 31. DIANE Publishing, 1994.

Cronin, Richard P. “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program: US Policy Options.” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1994.

David, Mason T. “Introduction: The Strategic Context of U.S.-Japan Trade Friction.” In Mason, T. D. & A. M. Turay (Eds.). *US-Japan Trade Friction: Its Impact on Security Cooperation in the Pacific Basin*. Macmillan, 1991.

DePalma, Anthony. “Threats and Responses: An Overview: March 17, 2003; Diplomatic Impasse, a U.S. Ultimatum to Iraq, and Civilian Fears.” *New York Times*. March 18, 2003.

Dibb, P. “The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?.” *Washington Quarterly*, 25-2 (2002): 129-144.

Doyle, Michael W. “Liberalism and world politics.” *American Political Science Review*, 80-4 (1986): 1151-1169.

Dudley, R. W. *It Takes Two to Tango: An Endogenous Theory of Bilateral Military Alliances*. University of California, Davis, 2010.

Dunham, Will. “U.S. Considers Withdrawing Troops from South Korea.” *Free Republic*. March 6, 2003.

Elman, C. “Horses for Courses: Why nor Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” *Security Studies*, 6-1 (1996): 7-53.

Fallows, James. “Containing Japan: Japan’s One-Sided Trading Will Make the U.S-Japanese Trading Partnership Impossible to Sustain—Unless We Impose Limits on Its Economy.” *Atlantic Monthly*, 263, no. 5 (May 1989): 40-62.

Feith, Dougals J. “Strengthening US Global Defense Posture: Report to Congress.” Department of Defense. September 17, 2004.

_____. “Transforming the US Global Defense Posture.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2003).

Filkins, Dexter. “The struggle for Iraq: insurgency; 7 Spanish agents and 2 Japanese are slain in Iraq.” *New York Times*. November 30, 2003.

Foster-Cater, Aidan. “North Korea-South Korea Relations: Peace economics?” *CSIS*. Comparative Connections (2006).

French, Howard W. “A Nation at War: The Asian Arena; South Korea Agrees to Send Troops to Iraq.” *New York Times*, April 3, 2003.

_____. “Reversals in U.S.-South Korea Links, and Some Jagged Fault Lines,” *New York Times*. February 11, 2003.

_____. “Seoul Looks to New Alliances.” *New York Times*, January 26, 2003.

Friedberg, A. L. “11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations.” *Survival*, 44-1 (2002): 33-50.

_____. “Ripe for rivalry: prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia.” *International Security*, 18-3 (1993): 5-33.

_____. “The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?.” *International Security*, 30-2 (2005): 7-45.

Funabashi, Yoichi. “Japan and America: global partners.” *Foreign Policy* (1992).

_____. *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*. Brookings Institution Press, 2007.

Gaddis, John Lewis. “International relations theory and the end of the Cold War.” *International Security* (1992): 5-58.

_____. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. Vol. 690. Oxford University Press, 1982.

Gargan, John J. “To defend a nation: An overview of downsizing and the US military.” *Management*, 2-3 (1999).

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press, 2005.

Giarra, Paul S. and Akihisa Nagashima. “Managing the new US-Japan security alliance: Enhancing structures and mechanisms to address post-Cold War requirements.” In Michael Green and Patrick Cronin. (Eds.). *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (1999).

Gibler, Douglas and Toby Rider. “Prior commitments: Compatible interests versus capabilities in alliance behavior.” *International Interactions*, 30-4 (2004): 309-329.

Gills, Barry K. “Economic liberalisation and reform in South Korea in the 1990s: A ‘coming of age’ or a case of ‘graduation blues’?” *Third World Quarterly*, 17-4 (1996): 667-688.

Gitting, John. “North Korea fires missile over Japan.” *Guardian*. September 1, 1998.

Gittings, John and Suzanne Goldenberg. “Rumsfeld gets tough on North Korea.” *Guardian*. December 24, 2002.

Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. “Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework.” In *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (1993): 3-30.

Gordon, Michael R. “Pentagon Drafts Strategy for Post-Cold War World.” *New York Times*. August 2, 1990.

Government Information Agency. “President Rho Moo-Hyun’s Speech at the National Assembly, April 2, 2003.” Archive of the Participatory Government, 2008.

_____. *Je16dae Daetongryeongjik Insuwiwonhoe Baekseo: Daehwa [White Paper by the Commission on the 16th Presidential Transition: Dialogue]*. The Commission on Presidential Transition, 2003.

Green, Michael. *Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*. Macmillan, 2003.

Gross, Donald G. “US–Korea relations: strains in alliance, and the US offers a nuclear deal.” *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, 6-2 (2004).

Ha, Yong-chool. *Bukbang Jeongchaek: Kyiown, Jeongae, Yeonghyang [Nordpolitik: Origin, Development, Effect]*. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2003.

Haass, Richard N. “Paradigm lost.” *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (1995).

Haggard, Stephan. *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*. Cornell University Press, 1990.

Halloran, Richard. “Washington Talk; U.S. Considers the Once Unthinkable on Korea.” *New York Times*. July 13, 1989.

Ham, Walter T. “Strike Brigades Vets to Mark Deployment Anniversary.” *U.S. Army*. May 13, 2014.

Handel, Michael I. *Weak states in the International System*. Psychology Press, 1990.

Harnisch, Sebastian, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (Eds.). *Role Theory in International Relations*. Taylor & Francis, 2011.

Harper, Jon. “OPCON transfer, US troop redeployment in Korea postponed indefinitely.” *Stars and Stripes*. October 23, 2014.

Head, William P. and Earl H. Tilford (Eds.). *The Eagle in the Desert: Looking back on US Involvement in the Persian Gulf War*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.

Hemmer, C. and Katzenstein, P. J. “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism.” *International Organization*, 56-03 (2002): 575-607.

Higgins, Alexander. “Baker: Premature to Talk of a U.S. Withdrawal from Korea.” *Associated Press*. March 14, 1989.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*. Yale University Press, 1928.

Holbrooke, Richard. “Japan and the United States: ending the unequal partnership.” *Foreign Affairs* (1991).

Holsti, Kalevi J. “National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* (1970): 233-309.

Hong, Kyudok. “The impact of NGOs on South Korea’s decision to dispatch troops to Iraq.” *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 12-2 (2005).

Hopf, Ted. *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Cornell University Press, 2002.

Hughes, Christopher W. “The North Korean nuclear crisis and Japanese security.” *Survival*, 38-2 (1996): 79-103.

_____. “Japanese military modernization: in search of a “normal” security role.” *Population*, 127 (2005),

_____. *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*. No. 368-369. Routledge, 2013.

Hunt, K. “Japan’s security policy.” *Survival*, 31-3, (1989): 201-207.

Huntington, S. P. “The lonely superpower.” *Foreign Affairs*, 35-49 (1999).

Hwang, J. “Realism and US foreign policy toward North Korea: The Clinton and Bush administrations in comparative perspective.” *World Affairs* (2004): 15-29.

IAEA. “Agreed Framework Between The United States of America And The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” IAEA INFCIRC/457. November 2, 1994. <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf>.

Ikenberry, G. J. (Ed.). *America Unrivaled: the Future of the Balance of Power*. Cornell University Press, 2002.

Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno (Eds.). *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia University Press, 2003.

Jaffe, Lorna S. *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C. Joint History Office, 1993.

Jameson, Sam and Teresa Watanabe. “Seoul Sees ‘Grave Threat’ in North’s Move.” *Los Angeles Times*. March 13, 1993.

Jehl, Dougals. “After the War: Diplomacy; U.S. now signals it might consider U.N. forces in Iraq.” *New York Times*. August 28, 2003.

Jervis, Robert. “War and misperception.” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988): 675-700.

_____. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Vol. 49. Princeton University Press, 1976.

Jin, Chang-soo and Cheolsoo Kim (Eds.). *Mi-ildongmaeng: Anbowa Milyakui Yeoksa [U.S.-Japan Alliance: History of Security and Secret Agreement]*. Seoul: Hanwool Academy, 2006.

Johnson, Chalmers. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975*. Stanford University Press, 1982.

Jonsson, Gabriel. “The Peace-keeping Role of the American Troops in South Korea.” *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, 20-1 (2011): 155-182.

K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 14-3 (September 1970).

Kaifu, Toshiki. “Japan’s Vision.” Foreign Policy (1990): 28-39.

Kamiya, Matake. “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia.” In Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, (Eds.). *Japanese Foreign Policy Today*. New York: Palgrave, 2000.

Kane, Tim. “Global US Troop Deployment, 1950–2003.” Heritage Foundation (2004).

Kang, I. D. “Toward peace and prosperity: The new government’s North Korea policy.” *East Asian Review*, 15 (2003): 3-18.

Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Kaplan, Morton A. *System and Process in International Politics*. ECPR Press, 2005.

Karsh, Efraim and Inari Rautsi. “Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait.” *Survival*, 33-1 (1991): 18-30.

Katzenstein, Peter. J. *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*. Routledge, 2008.

_____. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in postwar Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press, 1996.

Kelley, Matt. “U.S. Repositioning Bombers near N. Korea.” *Beaumontenterprise*. March 5, 2003.

Kelly Wallace, John King, and Andrea Koppel. 2002. “Rumsfeld: N. Korea may have nuclear weapons already.” *CNN*. October 17, 2002.

Keohane, R. O. and Martin, L. L. “The promise of institutionalist theory.” *International Security*, 20-1 (1995): 39-51.

Keohane, Robert O. “The big influence of small allies.” *Foreign Policy*, 2 (1971): 161-182.

Kihl, Young W. *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture*. ME Sharpe, 2005.

Kim, Byong-guk and Anthony Jones (Eds.). *Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

Kim, Gye-dong. “Reappraisal of the ROK-US Alliance: With the Analytical Framework of the Alliance Theory.” *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, 41-2 (2001).

Kim, Jinwung. “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Causes.” *Asian Survey*, 29-8 (1989).

Kim, Jong-Dae. *Rohmoohyun, Sidaeui Moontukeul Neomda [Roh Moo-Hyun, Crossing the Threshold of the Age]*. Seoul: Tree and Wood, 2010.

Kim, Kihwan. “The Political Economy of US-Korea Trade Friction in the 1980s: A Korean Perspective.” In Myers, Ramon (Ed.). *US-Korea Economic Relations*. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1991.

Kim, Pyong-guk and Anthony Jones (Eds.). *Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

Kim, S. H. “Anti-Americanism in Korea.” *Washington Quarterly*, 26-1 (2002): 109-122.

Kim, Samuel S. (Ed.). *Korea's Globalization*. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Kim, Seung-Hwan. “Anti-Americanism in Korea.” *Washington Quarterly*, 26-1 (2002).

_____. “Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United States, 2001-2004.” In *Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the US-ROK Alliance* (2004): 24-35.

Kim, Y. and Kim, M. “North Korea’s Risk-taking vis-à-vis the US Coercion in the Nuclear Quagmire.” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 19-4 (2007).

Kim, Yeoncheol. “Rhotaewoo jeongbuui bukbangjeongchaekgwa nambukgibonhabuiseo [Roh administration’s Nordpolitik and Inter-Korean Basic Agreement].” *Critical Review of History*, 97 (2011): 80-110.

Kimball, A. L. “Alliance formation and conflict initiation: The missing link.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 43-4 (2006): 371-389.

Kirk, Don. “‘Trip wire should remain’ against North: Seoul makes case for U.S. presence.” *New York Times*. March 7, 2003.

Kirk, Jeremy. "USFK, South Korea officials discuss alliance." *Stars and Stripes*. March 7, 2003.

Krauthammer, C. "The unipolar moment." *Foreign Affairs*, 23-33 (1990).

_____. "What's Wrong with the 'Pentagon Paper'?." *Washington Post*, 13 (1992), A25.

Krepinevich, Andrew and Robert O. Work. "A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2007).

Krepinevich, Andrew. *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous." *New York Times*. January 11, 1993.

_____. "Seoul Leader Asks End to Sanctions on North Koreans." *New York Times*, June 2, 1998.

Kupchan, C. A. "After Pax Americana: benign power, regional integration, and the sources of a stable multipolarity." *International Security*, 23-2 (1998): 40-79.

Kwak, Kwang Sub. *US-ROK Alliance, 1953-2004*. Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 2006.

LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: US-Japanese Relations Throughout History*. WW Norton & Company, 1998.

Layne, C. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy." *International Security*, 22-1 (1997): 86-124.

_____. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise." *International Security*, 17-4 (1993): 5-51.

Lee, C. M. "Reassessing the ROK-US alliance: transformation challenges and the consequences of South Korea's choices." *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 57-2 (2003): 281-307.

Lee, Chae-Jin. "The Limits of South Korea's Strategic Choices." *Asia Policy*, 3-1 (2007): 71-74.

_____. *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*. JHU Press, 2006.

Lee, G. Geunwook. “South Korea's Faustian attitude: the republic of Korea's decision to send troops to Iraq revisited.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19-3 (2006): 481-493.

Lee, Jong-Heon. “S. Korea may send fewer troops to Iraq.” *United Press International*. November 4, 2003.

Lee, Ming. “Seoul’s searching for Nordpolitik: Evolution and Perspective.” *Asian Perspective*, 13-2 (1989): 2141-2178.

Lee, S. J. “Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean Attitudes.” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 17-1 (2005): 81-104.

Leeds, B. A. “Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties.” *International Organization*, 57-4 (2003): 801-828.

_____. *Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook*. Houston: Rice University, Department of Political Science, 2005.

Leeds, B. A. and B. Savun. “Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements?.” *Journal of Politics*, 69-4 (2007): 1118-1132.

Leeds, B. A. and S. Anac. “Alliance institutionalization and alliance performance.” *International Interactions*, 31-3 (2005): 183-202.

Leeds, B. A., M. Mattes, and J. S. Vogel. “Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments.” *American Journal of Political Science*, 53-2 (2009): 461-476.

Leeds, Brett et al. “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.” *International Interactions*, 28-3 (2002): 237-260.

Legro, J. W. “Military culture and inadvertent escalation in World War II.” *International Security* (1994): 108-142.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. “Balancing on land and at sea: do states ally against the leading global power?.” *International Security*, 35-1 (2010): 7-43.

Linton, Ralph. *The Study of Man: an Introduction*, 1936.

Liska, George. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*. Vol. 42. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

Lobell, S. E., N. M. Ripsman and J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Lundestad, Geir. " 'Imperial Overstretch', Mikhail Gorbachev, and the End of the Cold War." *Cold War History*, 1-1 (2000): 1-20.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Yale University Press, 1997.

Mandelbaum, Michael. "Coup de grace: The end of the Soviet Union." *Foreign Affairs* (1991): 164-183.

Manyin, M. E., E. Chanlett-Avery, and H. Marchart. "North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004." Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, Washington D.C. (2005, January).

Marquand, Robert. "Rethinking US troops in S. Korea: Rumsfeld comments spark debate over moving soldiers back from northern border." *Christian Science Monitor*. March 10, 2003.

Mastanduno, M. "Preserving the unipolar moment: realist theories and US grand strategy after the cold war." *International Security*, 21-4 (1997): 49-88.

Maull, Hanns W. "Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers." *Foreign Affairs* (1990): 91-106.

McNulty, Timothy J. "Bush Seeks Help With Gulf Bills: Allies Asked To Bear Their 'Fair Share.'" *Chicago Tribune*. August 31, 1990.

Mearsheimer, J. J. "China's Unpeaceful Rise." *Current History-New York Then Philadelphia*, 105-690 (2006).

_____. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3-4 (2010): 381-396.

_____. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. WW Norton & Company, 2010.

_____. "The future of the American pacifier." *Foreign Affairs* (2001): 46-61.

_____. "Why we will soon miss the Cold War." *The Atlantic Monthly*, 266-2 (1990): 35-50.

Menon, Rajan. "The End of Alliances." *World Policy Journal*, 20-2 (2003): 1-20.

Midford, P. “Japan’s response to terror: dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea.” *Asian Survey*, 43-2 (2003).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.” November 16, 2001.

_____. “Japan’s ODA Data by Country.”

_____. “Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century.” April 17, 1996.

_____. “Japan-US Summit Meeting (Summary).” October 3, 2003.

_____. “Outline of the Japan-United States of America Summit Meeting,” October 20, 2001.

_____. “Outline of the Japan-US Foreign Ministers Meeting.” February 18, 2002.

_____. “Overview of Japan-US Summit Meeting.” May 26, 2003.

_____. “Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the United States of America.” September 26, 2001.

_____. “Section 2. Japan’s Response to the Gulf Crisis.” In *Diplomatic Blue Book*, 1991.

_____. “Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka at the Ceremony in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.” September 8, 2001.

_____. “Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda on Japan's Preparedness to Respond to National Emergencies.” April 16, 2002.

_____. “Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Preparedness to Respond to National Emergencies.” April 16, 2002.

_____. “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” September 1997.

_____. “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” Security Consultative Committee Document. October 29, 2005.

_____. “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” May 1, 2006.

_____. *National Defense Program Outline in December 1995*. National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996, 1995.

Ministry of National Defense. *Defense White Paper 1991*. Seoul: Defense Ministry, 1991.

_____. *Kukgoon Gulfjeonjaeng Pabyeongsa [History of Troop deployment to the Persian Gulf War by the Korean Military]*. Seoul: Institute of Military History, 2013.

_____. *Defense White Paper 2012*. Republic of Korea, 2012.

_____. *Participatory Government: Defense Policy*. Seoul, 2003.

Mochizuki, Mike M. "Japan's search for strategy." *International Security* (1983): 152-179.

Modelski, George. "The study of alliances." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7-4 (1963): 769-776.

Monteiro, N. P. "Unrest assured: Why unipolarity is not peaceful." *International Security* (2011).

Moon, Ihlwan, Mark L. Clifford, and Stan Crock "The Politics of Peril." *Businessweek*. February 23, 2003.

Moon, Chang-Geuk. *Hanmigaldeungui Haebu [Analysis of ROK-U.S. Conflict]*. Seoul: Nanam, 1994.

Moon, Chung-in. "Changing South Korean perception of the United States since September 11." *Asian Studies*, 50 (2004): 45-57.

_____. "Rohmoomhyun 'sin yoigyo' yeoddeohkwy bolgeokinga: donbukah gyunhyeongja yeokhalron [How to make sense of New Diplomacy of President Roh: Northeast Asia Balancer argument]." *Chosun-ilbo*, April 11, 2005.

Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics." *International Organization*, 51-04 (1997): 513-553.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Vol. 189). University of Chicago Press, 1967.

_____. *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Peace and Power*. New York: Knoph, 1973

Morita, Akio and Shintaro Ishihara. "The Japan That Can Say No." *The New US-Japan Relations Card* (1989): 4-62.

Morrow, James D. "Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability aggregation model of alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* (1991): 904-933.

_____. "Alliances: Why write them down?." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3-1 (2000): 63-83.

Murdoch, J. C. and T. Sandler. "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26-2 (1982): 237-263.

Murdock, Clark A., Kelley Sayler, and Ryan A. Crotty. "The Defense budget's double whammy: drawing down while hollowing out from within." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 1 (2012).

Nabeshima, Keizo. "Decision to dispatch SDF Troops to Iraq a watershed for Defense, security policy." *Japan Times*. January 1, 2004.

Nabeshima, Keizo. "SDF dispatch opens new era for Japan." *Japan Times*, February 11, 2004.

Nara, Hiroshi (Ed.). *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

National Security Council. *Yukseongeuro Deudneun Rohmoohyun Daetongyreongui Yoigyoanbo Gusang [Real Voice of President Roh Moo-hyun on Foreign and Security Policy]*. Office of Unification, Foreign, and Security Policy, Blue House, 2006.

Neack, Laura. "Linking state type with foreign policy behavior." In Neack, L,, Hey, J.A.K., and Haney, P. J. (Eds.). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall (1995).

Nelms, Larry W. *Japanese Host Nation Support: Future Outlook*. National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1993.

Niebuhr, R. *Christianity and Power Politics*. Archon Books, 1969.

Niksch, L. A., L. Q. Nowels, V. N. Pregelj, R. S. Shinn, and R. G. Sutter. "Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (November, 1994).

Nukaga, Fukushiro. "Japan's Emergency Legislation and the War on Terrorism." *Heritage Foundation*. June 10, 2002.

Nye, J. S. "Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18-4 (1988): 581-590.

Nye, Joseph S. "Soft power." *Foreign policy* (1990): 153-171.

_____. "The changing nature of world power." *Political Science Quarterly* (1990): 177-192.

_____. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs, 2004.

O'Hanlon, Michael E., Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, and Ian S. Livingston. *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*. Brookings Institution, 2007.

O'Hanlon, Michael. *Unfinished Business: US Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century*. Center for A New American Security, 2009.

Obama, B. and L. E. Panetta. "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." U.S. Department of Defense. January 2012.

Oberdorfer, Don. *The Two Koreas: a Contemporary History*. Addison-Wesley, 1997.

Office of Management and Budget. "Historical tables: Budget of the United States Government 2013." White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/hist.pdf>.

Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea." News Release. March 7, 2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html>.

_____. "Coalition Members." March 27, 2003.

_____. “Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi.” The White House, June 30, 2001.

_____. “President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.” March 22, 2003.

Olsen, Edward. “Target Japan as America’s Economic Foe.” *Orbis*, 36-4 (1992): 491-503.

Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard Economic Studies, V. 124. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Olson, Mancur and Richard Zeckhauser. “An economic theory of alliances.” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* (1966): 266-279.

Onish, Norimitsu. “U.S. and South Korea Try to Redefine Their Alliance.” *New York Times*. December 26, 2003.

Ozawa, Ichiro. *Blueprint for a New Japan: the Rethinking of a Nation*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994.

Pape, Robert A. “Soft balancing against the United States.” *International Security*, 30-1 (2005): 7-45.

Park, Cheol Hee. “From Exclusive Defense to Active Defense: Changes in US-Japan Alliance, threat Perception and the Politics of Japanese Defense Policy Change.” *Korean Journal of International Relations*, 44-1 (2004): 169-190.

Park, Geonyeong and Uk-sik Jeong. “Kimdaejung-Bush jeongby sigyi hanmigwangye [ROK-U.S. Relations during Kim Dae-Jung-Bush Administration].” *Critical Review of History* (2009): 140-168.

Park, H. J. “Divergent Threat Perceptions on North Korea. Forging New US-ROK Political Relationships.” The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation (2005).

Park, Hwee-Rhak,. "An Analysis on Cost Sharing Status and Lessons for South Korea: Focused on Theories and Practices.” *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies*, 103 (2014), p. 174.

Park, Hyeong Jung. “Divergent Threat Perceptions on North Korea.” In *Forging New US-ROK Political Relationships* (2005).

Park, Kun-Young et al. *Hanbando Pyeonghwabogoseo: Hanbando Uigyigeukbokgwa Pyeonghwajeongchakui Banggeobron [A Comprehensive Solution to the Korean Peninsula Problems]*. Seoul: Hanwool, 2002.

Park, Yeong-june. "Donbukah gyunhyeongjarongwa 21segyi hankook yoigyo [Northeast Asian balancer discourse and South Korea's diplomacy in the 21st century]." *Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History*, 28-1 (2006).

Patrick E. Tyler. "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

Paul, Thazha V. "Soft balancing in the age of US primacy." *International Security*, 30-1 (2005): 46-71.

Pempel, T. John (Ed). *Remapping East Asia: the Construction of a Region*. Cornell University Press, 2005.

Perlez, Jane and Martin Fackler. "China Patrols Air Zone over Disputed Islands." *New York Times*, November 28, 2013.

Perry, J. William. *United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995.

_____. *United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1998.

Pollack, J. D., Y. K. Cha, C. Kim, N. D. Levin, and C. I. Chung. *A New Alliance for the Next Century. The Future of US-Korean Security Cooperation*. Rand Corp., Santa Monica CA, 1995.

Pollack, Jonathan D. "The strategic futures and military capabilities of the two Koreas." *Population* (m) 48 (2005): 22-27.

Popper, K. R. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Hutchinson, 1959.

Powell, Colin L. "US forces: Challenges ahead." *Foreign Affairs* (1992): 32-45.

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. "Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq." March 20, 2003.

Prime Minister's Official Residence. "The Ninety Fifth Meeting of the Security Council." September 12, 2001.

Purrington, Courtney. “Tokyo’s policy responses during the Gulf War and the impact of the “Iraqi Shock” on Japan.” *Pacific Affairs* (1992).

Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” *International Organization*, 42-03 (1988): 427-460.

Pyle, Kenneth B. “Restructuring Foreign Policy and Defense Policy: Japan,” In Brook, Christopher and Anthony McGrew (Eds.). *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*. Routledge (1998).

_____. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. Public Affairs, 2007.

Reagan, Ronald. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers Incorporated, 1988.

_____. *National Security Strategy of the United States. 1987*. White House, 1987.

Reiter, Dan. *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1996.

Reuveny, Rafael and Aseem Prakash. “The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.” *Review of International Studies*, 25-4 (1999): 693-708.

Rho, Taewooo. *Hyiogorok ha-kwon: Jeonhawangiui Daejeonryak [Memoir: Grand strategy during a Turning Point]*. Seoul: Chosun Newspress, 2011.

Rice, Condoleezza. “Promoting the national interest.” *Foreign Affairs*, 79 (March/April 2000).

_____. *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*. Random House LLC, 2011.

Rise, James. “Brady Seeks $25 Billion in Allied Aid.” *Los Angeles Times*. September 05, 1990.

Ritter, Gerhard. *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*. Coral Cables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1969.

Roh, Moo Hyun. “Address at the Commencement Ceremony of the Korea Third Military Academy.” Office of the President, March 22, 2005.

_____. “Address on the 86th March 1st Independence Movement Day.” Office of the President, March 1, 2005.

Roh, Tae Woo. *Korea, a Nation Transformed: Selected Speeches of President Roh Tae Woo*. Presidential Secretariat the Republic of Korea, 1990.

Rosati, Jerel A. “The power of human cognition in the study of world politics.” *International Studies Review*, 2-3 (2000): 45-75.

Rose, G. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” *World Politics*, 51 (1998): 144-172.

Ross, R. S. “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century.” *International Security*, 23-4 (1999): 81-118.

Roy, D. “Hegemon on the Horizon?: China’s Threat to East Asian Security.” *International Security*, 19-1 (1994): 149-168.

Ruggie, John Gerard. “What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge.” *International Organization*, 52-04 (1998): 855-885.

Russett, Bruce. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton University Press, 1994.

Safire, William. “Three-Ring Circus.” *New York Times*. January 2, 2003.

Samuels, Richard J. ““New Fighting Power!” Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security.” *International Security*, 32-3 (2008): 84-112.

_____. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Cornell University Press, 2011.

Samuelson, Robert. “The Japan problem.” *Washington Post*, April 10, 1991.

Sandler, Todd and Keith Hartley. “Economics of alliances: The lessons for collective action.” *Journal of Economic Literature* (2001): 869-896.

Sanger, David E. “The Nation: Car Wars; The Corrosion at the Core of Pax Pacifica.” *New York Times*. May 14, 1995.

_____. “Intelligence Puzzle: North Korean Bombs.” *New York Times*. October 14, 2003.

_____. “North Korea Reluctantly Seeks U.N. Seat.” *New York Times*. May 29, 1991.

_____. “Bush and Japan’s Premier Fail to Agree on Issue of the Dollar.” *New York Times*. October 17, 2003.

Scalapino, Robert A. “Asia and the United States: The Challenges Ahead.” *Foreign Affair*s (1989): 89-115.

Schmitt, Eric. “After the War: Peacekeeping; Up to 30,000 Troops from a Dozen Nations to Replace Some G.I.’s in Iraq.” *New York Times*. June 19, 2003.

_____. “North Korea Mig’s Intercept U.S. Jet on Spying Mission.” *New York Times*. March 4, 2003.

Schrader, Esther and Barbara Demick. “Troops in S. Korea to Go to Iraq: Shift of a Unit Reflects the War’s Strain on the Military and a Change in Pentagon Policies.” *Los Angeles Times*. May 18, 2004.

Schweller, R. L. “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism.” In *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (2003): 311-47.

_____. “Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist state back in.” *International Security* (1994): 72-107.

Scofield, David. “Clearing the Nuclear Fog over North Korea” *World Press Review*. January 22, 2004.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. Press Conference, Koryo Hotel, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 24, 2000. As released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. <http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/001024b.html>.

Shalikashvili, John M. “National Military Strategy of the United States American: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement.” Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1995).

Sheen, Seongho. “Grudging Partner: South Korea.” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 30-2 (2003): 96-103.

_____. “The Obama administration’s East Asian policy and alliance policy on the Korean peninsula.” *EAI National Security Panel Report*, 39 (2009).

Shichor, Yitzhak. "China's Voting Behavior in the UN Security Council." *China Brief*, 6-18 (2006): 4-6.

Shimoyachi, Nao and Reiji Yoshida. "Diet enacts legislation for war contingencies." *The Japan Times*. June 7, 2003.

Shin, G. W. "South Korean anti-Americanism: A comparative perspective." *Asian Survey* (1996): 787-803.

Shin, Wookhee, "Conflicts in Asymmetric Alliances: Political-Psychological Aspects." *Journal of National Defense Studies*, (2007): 3-31.

Shinn, Rinn-Sup. "South Korea: "Sunshine Policy" and Its Political Context." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1999.

Shinoda, Tomohito. "Japan's top-down policy process to dispatch the SDF to Iraq." *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 7-01 (2006): 71-91.

_____. "Koizumi's top-down leadership in the anti-terrorism legislation: the impact of political institutional changes." *SAIS Review*, 23-1 (2003): 19-34.

_____. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. University of Washington Press, 2007.

Shorrock, Tim. "The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americanism," *Third World Quarterly*, 8-4 (1986): 1195-1218.

Sigal, Leon V. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton University Press, 1999.

Singer, J. David and Melvin Small. "Formal alliances, 1815—1939: A Quantitative Description." *Journal of Peace Research*, 3-1 (1966): 1-31.

Singer, J. David. "International Conflict Three Levels of Analysis." *World Politics*, 12-03 (1960): 453-461.

_____. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations." *World Politics*, 14-01 (1961): 77-92.

Smith, Sheila A. "The evolution of military cooperation in the US-Japan alliance." In Michael Green and Patrick Cronin (Eds.) *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations (1999): 69-93.

Snyder, Glenn H. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

_____. "The security dilemma in alliance politics." *World Politics*, 36-04 (1984): 461-495.

Snyder, J. L. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Cornell University Press, 1991.

Snyder, Scott. "South Korea's Squeeze Play." *The Washington Quarterly*, 28-4 (2005).

Song, Sang-ho. "South Korea agrees to pay 5.8% more to host U.S. troops," *The Korea Herald*. January 12, 2014.

Spencer, Richard. "South Korea's leader impeached over gaffe." *Telegraph*. March 13, 2004.

Stangarone, Troy. "Taking a Larger Role in International Affairs: Korea's Growing Efforts in Peacekeeping Missions and Development Aid." *Korea Economic Institute*. August 2007.

Sterngold, James. "Confrontation in the Gulf: Japan Putting Limits on Aid To Nations Hurt by Embargo." *New York Times*. August 29, 1990.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Struck, Doug. "Powell Makes Few Gains on Asia Tour; Secretary Unable to Win Pledges of Support on North Korea, Iraq." *The Washington Post*, February 25, 2003.

Stuart, Douglas T. and William T. Tow. *A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-power System in Asia*. Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995.

Suh, Jae-Jung. *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*. Macmillan, 2007.

Takashi, Inoguchi. "Japan's response to the Gulf crisis: an analytic overview." *Journal of Japanese Studies* (1991).

Tamamoto, Masaru. "Trial of an Ideal: Japan's Debate over the Gulf Crisis." *World Policy Journal* (1990).

Taylor, William J., Jennifer A. Smith, and Michael J. Mazarr. "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970–1990." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* (1990): 256-286.

Terasawa, Katsuaki L. and William R. Gates. “Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons learned and implications for the future.” *Defense Analysis*, 9-2 (1993).

Tertrais, Bruno. “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances.” *Washington Quarterly*, 27-2 (2004): 133-150.

The Government of Japan. “Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.” December 9, 2003.

_____. “Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Concerning the Establishment of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.” July 26, 2003.

_____. “The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.” October 2001.

The Institute for Peace Affairs. “Kimdaejung dangseonjaui tongil, oeigyo, kukbangbubun daeseon gongyak [President-elect Kim Dae-Jung’s campaign promise on unifications, foreign and defense policy].” *Unification Korea*, Vol. 169(January 1998): 108-111.

The Library of Congress. “Iraq overview.” Library of Congress Web Archives.

The Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement by the President.” Washington DC. June 13, 2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html>.

The U.S. National Security Strategy Archive. <http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=48>.

The White House. “Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.” May 07, 2013.

_____. “U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond.” April 25, 2014.

Thies, W. J. “Alliances and Collective Goods A Reappraisal.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31-2 (1987).

Thucydides, N. D. *The Peloponnesian War*. Baltimore: Penguin Book, 1954.

Tow, William. W. *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001.

Tsuneo, Akaha. “US-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Ambiguous Adjustment to a Changing Strategic Environment.” In Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (Eds.). *Japanese Foreign Policy Today: a Reader*, 2000.

Turner, Ralph H. “Role-taking, role standpoint, and reference-group behavior.” *American Journal of Sociology* (1956): 316-328.

U.N. Security Council. “Acting Unanimously, Calls for Power to be Returned to Iraqi People ‘As soon as Practicable.’” October 18, 2003.

U.S. Congress. “Review of Persian Gulf Burden Sharing” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress. Washington D.C., May 14, 1991.

_____. “The Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed Overseas.” Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, September 23, 2004. Vol. 108.

_____. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Asian Response to the Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. One Hundred First Congress, second session, September 19, 1990.

U.S. Department of Defense. “The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline.” <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45404>.

_____. *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century (EASI I)*. Washington DC: Report to Congress, April 1990.

_____. *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century (EASI II)*. Washington DC: Report to Congress, 1992.

_____. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 1992.

_____. *National Defense Strategy of the United States America 2005*. Washington D.C. (March 2005).

_____. *Nuclear Posture Review Report*. Washington D.C., 2002. <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

_____. United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. Washington, D.C., 1995.

U.S. Department of State. "North Korean Nuclear Program." Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman. Washington, DC. October 16, 2002. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14432.htm>.

_____. "Address by President Bill Clinton to the UN General Assembly." Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. September 27, 1993. <http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm>.

_____. "President Bush Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi." May 23, 2003.

_____. "Press Roundtable." Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State. Tokyo, Japan. June 9, 2003.

_____. "Remarks and Q & A at the Japan National Press Club." Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State. Tokyo, Japan. February 2, 2004.

_____. "Remarks to Press after Meeting with Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda." Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State. Tokyo, Japan. June 10, 2003.

_____. "Section 2207: Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction." Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (July 2008).

_____. "Shangri-La Security Dialogue, Delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta." Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, June 02, 2012.

_____. "Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction." Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (July 2008).

U.S. Government Printing Office. "Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea." White House, Washington DC. October 20, 2003.

U.S. National Security Council. "U.S. Policy in Korea." Presidential Directive/NSC 12. May 5, 1977.

_____. *The Defense Planning Guidance: FY 1994-1999*. April 16, 1992. <http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/pdf/2008-003-docs1-12.pdf>.

United Nations. "Statement by His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush, President of the United States of America Address to the United Nations General Assembly." September 23, 2003.

_____. "Security Council resolution 1511 (2003) on authorizing a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." UN Security Council. October 16, 2003.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments." Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington D.C. (May 9, 2007).

Vagts, Alfred. *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military*, 1959.

Van Evera, Stephen. "Offense, defense, and the causes of war." *International Security*, 22-4 (1998): 5-43.

_____. "The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War." *International Security* (1984): 58-107.

Wade, Robert. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton University Press, 1990.

Walker, Stephen G. (Ed). *Role theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987.

Walt, Stephen M. "What Has Asia Done for Uncle Sam Lately?." *Foreign Policy* (2014).

_____. "Alliances in a unipolar world." *World Politics*, 61-01 (2009): 89-91.

_____. "Why alliances endure or collapse." *Survival*, 39-1 (1997): 156-179.

_____. *The Origins of Alliance*. Cornell University Press, 1987.

Waltz, Kenneth. N. "Reductionist and Systemic Theories." In Keohane, R. O. (Ed.). *Neorealism and its Critics*. Columbia University Press (1986): 47-69.

_____. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” *International Security*, 18-2 (1993): 44-79.

_____. *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland Press, 2010.

_____. “America as a model for the world? A foreign policy perspective.” *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 24-04 (1991): 667-670.

_____. “Evaluating theories.” *American Political Science Review* (1997): 913-917.

_____. “Structural realism after the Cold War.” *International Security*, 25-1 (2000): 5-41.

_____. “The stability of a bipolar world.” *Daedalus* (1964): 881-909.

_____. “International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis.” *World Politics* (1960).

_____. “International Politics is not Foreign Policy.” *Security Studies*, 6-1 (1996): 54-57.

Weisman, Steven R. “Confrontation in the Gulf; Japan Defends Aid in Mid-East Effort.” *New York Times*. 14 September 1990.

Weitsman, Patricia A. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford University Press, 2004.

Wendt, Alexander. E. “The agent-structure problem in international relations theory.” *International Organization*, 41-03 (1987): 335-370.

_____. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

White House Archives. “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice on the President’s Bilateral Meetings.” JW Marriott. Bangkok, Thailand. October 20, 2003.

Wish, Naomi B. “National attributes as sources of national role conceptions: A capability-motivation model.” In Walker, S. G. (Ed.) *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press (1987).

_____. “Foreign policy makers and their national role conceptions.” *International Studies Quarterly* (1980): 532-554.

Wohlforth, William. C. “Realism and the End of the Cold War.” *International Security*, 19-3 (1994): 91-129.

_____. “The stability of a unipolar world.” *International Security*, 24-1 (1999): 5-41.

WuDunn, Sheryl. “North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory.” *New York Times*. September 1, 1998.

Yoda, Tatsuro. “Japan’s host nation support program for the US-Japan Security Alliance: past and prospects.” *Asian Survey*, 46-6 (2006).

Yoshida, Reiju. “Koizumi-Bush friendship one for the ages.” *The Japan Times*. 29 June 2006.

Yu, Wong-won. “Which Unit Will Be Dispatched to Iraq? Possibility of Dispatching Special Commando Brigade.” *Choson Ilbo*, September 29, 2003.

Zakaria, Fareed. “America’s New Balancing Act.” *Newsweek*, August 6, 2001.

_____. “Realism and Domestic Politics: a Review Essay.” *International Security*, 17-1 (1992): 177-198.

Zizek, Slavoj. (1989). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. Verso, 1989.

“A change of heart: And a big victory for Colin Powell and the generals over Donald Rumsfeld.” *The Economist*. September 4, 2003.

“Armitage wants bills on SDF role passed soon.” *The Japan Times*. October 7, 2001.

“Asia, Europe agree on multilateral approach to Iraq.” *Kodo News International*. September 23, 2002.

“Baker hopes Japan will send SDF to Iraq, Koizumi to contemplate.” *Kyodo News*. September 26, 2001.

“Bush rejects Taliban offer to hand Bin Laden over.” *The Guardian*. October 14, 2001.

“China sends warplanes into disputed airspace over East China Sea.” *The Guardian*. November 28, 2013.

“Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival’,” *New York Times*. March 8, 1992.

“Japan Offers Unconditional Support of U.S.A. on Iraq Attack Issue, U.N. Resolution or not.” *Yomiuri News.* March 7, 2003.

“Japan’s New Frustration.” *Washington Post.* March 17, 1991.

"Joint Communique Following Discussions with Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan." May 8, 1981 <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/50881b.htm>.

"Koizumi starts preparations so SDF could support U.S." *Japan Times*. September 20, 2001.

"Korea yet to Decide Level of Support for U.S.-Led War with Iraq." *Yonhap News Agency*. March 13, 2003.

"Leadership and Alliances: American Strategy in East Asia" *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Volume 6 Issue 01, September 1995.

"North Korean fighter jet crosses border." *USA Today*. February 20, 2003.

"Participation of non-combat units in the War in Iraq." *Hankook-Ilbo*. March 21, 2003.

"President Bush's Acceptance Speech to the Republican National Convention." *The Washington Post*. September 2, 2004.

"Roh Moo Hyun's inauguration speech." *BBC News*. February 25, 2003.

"Roh's words reveal gulf with Washington." *Reuters*. March 06, 2003.

"ROK-US, second day of negotiation over military participation." *Yonhap News*. November 7, 2003.

"Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan" *CNN*. May 1, 2003.

"Rupture in troop negotiation, early return of the Korean delegation." *Yonhap News*. November 8, 2003.

"Second MSDF flotilla sails to war." *The Japan Times*. 26 November 2001.

"South Korea Pledges More Troops for Iraq," *Washington Post*. 18 October 2003.

"The Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from South Korea." *The Nuclear Information Project*. September 28, 2005.

"Two Japanese diplomats killed in Iraq." *USA Today*. November 29, 2003.

"U.S. 'may withdraw from S. Korea' " *CNN*. March 7, 2003.

"U.S. calls for South Korea's support in Iraq, the government considering deployment of non-combat units." *Hangyeong Press*. March 10, 2003.

"U.S. Carrier Leaves Base in Japan." *Associated Press*. September 21, 2001.

"U.S. envoy Baker disappointed by Japan's failure to send Aegis." *Kyodo News*. December. 3, 2001.

"U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Perry Review." Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 106th Congress. Washington DC, October 13, 1999. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg62724/html/CHRG-106hhrg62724.htm>.

"U.S., N.K., Diplomats Held Substantive Talks in Beijing," *The Korean Herald*. January 27, 1989.

"US Seeks Asian Support on Iraq." *BBC NEWS*. December 9, 2002.

ABSTRACT IN KOREAN

역할수행의 동맹정치:
제 1, 2 차 걸프전 당시 한-미, 미-일동맹 내부의
갈등에 대한 연구

양 희 용
국제대학원 국제학과
서울대학교 대학원

본 연구는 탈냉전기 미국의 동북아 양자동맹 내부의 갈등을 보다 체계적이고 이론적인 관점에서 이해하기 위한 시도이다. 냉전이후 미국에 의해 주도된 두 차례의 걸프전 당시 한국과 일본이 외교적, 경제적, 군사적 측면에서 상당한 수준의 기여를 했음에도 불구하고 동맹결속력이 강화되기 보다는 미국 측의 불만으로 인해 오히려 동맹관계가 악화되는 모습을 보였다. 그와 같은 양상은 신고전현실주의 혹은 경제적 관점에 기반을 둔 기존의 연구에 의해 만족스럽게 설명되지 않는다. 이에 본 연구는 한-미, 미-일 동맹행위에 영향을 미치는 조건들을 새로운 분석틀을 바탕으로 검토함으로써 비대칭 양자동맹에서의 동맹정치를 이해하는데 기여하고자 한다.

본 연구는 홀스티(K. J. Holsti)의 역할론을 분석적 기반으로 삼는다. 정책입안자들의 국가역할구상(national role conception)과 대외정책간의 상관관계를 주장했던 홀스티의 역할론을 동맹정치학에 적용하여 양자동맹의 동맹행위를 분석한다. 동맹역할론에 의하면, 비대칭 양자동맹의 역학은

강국이 약소국인 파트너에 부여하는 역할규정(role prescription)과 동맹파트너의 역할구상(role conception) 및 그에 따른 역할수행(role performance)에 의해 결정된다. 만약, 강대국의 역할기대와 동맹 파트너의 역할수행이 수렴(convergence)할 경우 동맹관계는 원활하게 유지된다. 반대로 역할기대와 역할수행간에 분기(divergence)가 있을 경우 그 정도에 따라 동맹관계는 갈등 또는 심한 경우 동맹파기에 이르게 된다.

이러한 동맹역할론을 바탕으로 1, 2차 걸프전에서 한-미, 미-일간 동맹 기여를 둘러싼 협상 과정을 분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. 1991년 걸프전의 경우, 한-미간에는 역할구상이 수렴하는 모습을 보였다. 하지만 일본 정책입안자들은 요시다 독트린과 평화헌법에 기댄 채 소극적이고 수동적인 태도로 일관하였으며, 결국 경제대국으로 부상한 동맹 파트너에 대한 미국의 역할기대에 미치지 못한 채 미국으로부터 "무임 승차자"라는 비난을 받게 된다. 반대로 2003년 이라크 전의 경우, 탈냉전기 한국의 민주화와 동맹 내 자주성 요구가 증대한 결과 한-미간 역할구상에 있어 분기가 발생한다. 미국의 전투병 파병요구에 대해 한국정부는 소극적인 태도를 보이며 파병결정을 지연하였으며, 결국 대북정책에 있어서의 주도권을 확보하기 위한 수단으로 파병을 결정하게 된다. 반면, 일본의 경우 1991년 걸프전의 쓰라린 경험으로 동맹관계 회복을 위해 적극적인 모습을 펼쳤다. 걸프전 이후 미국과의 안보협력증진을 위해 힘써온 일본 정책입안자들은 미국의 대테러 전쟁에 대한 "무조건적인 지원"을 약속하였다. 고이즈미 총리의 주도하에 자위대의 파병을 위한 법적장치들을 신속히 마련하였으며 이를 바탕으로 미국에 대한 군사적, 경제적 지원을 감행하였다. 이라크 재건을 위한 육상 자위대의 이라크 파병은 일본 외교전략 및 미일동맹에 있어 상징적인 전환을 의미한다.

이와 같은 동맹역할론에 기반한 동북아 양자동맹 행위에 대한 분석은 다음과 같은 함의를 가진다. 정책입안자들의 역할구상이 국제체제나

위협인식과 같은 외부요인은 물론 국내정치청중(domestic audience)이나 정치주도 세력의 변화와 같은 내부요인, 그리고 둘 간의 상호작용에 의해 결정된다. 이로써 동맹역할론은 동맹변환(alliance transformation)을 보다 체계적으로 이해할 수 있는 단초를 제공한다. 정책적인 측면에서도, 동맹역할론은 미중간의 세력경쟁이 가속화되는 가운데 미국의 동북아 동맹파트너에 대한 역할기대의 변화와 그것의 전략지정학적 함의를 유추해 볼 수 있는 틀을 제공한다.

……

주제어: 역할이론, 한미동맹, 미일동맹, 걸프전, 이라크전, 안보비용분담

학번: 2011-30832